The short answer
Section 124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the acid-attack provision. It has two sub-sections and both carry minimum sentences. S1
Sub-section (1) punishes causing permanent or partial damage or deformity, or burning, maiming, disfiguring or disabling any part of the body, or causing grievous hurt, or causing a person to be in a permanent vegetative state - by throwing acid, administering acid, or using any other means, with intent or knowledge of likelihood. The sentence is not less than ten years and up to imprisonment for life, and with fine, and that fine is subject to two provisos: it must be "just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses of the treatment of the victim", and it must be paid to the victim. S1
Sub-section (2) punishes throwing or attempting to throw acid, attempting to administer it, or attempting to use any other means, with the intention of causing any of those injuries. The sentence is not less than five years and up to seven years, and fine. S1
Three points govern everything else.
Almost nothing changed from the Penal Code. The minima, the life maximum, the seven-year cap, the victim-compensation provisos and the definition of "acid" were all already in IPC sections 326A and 326B. The Sanhita's only substantive addition is the permanent vegetative state limb, with a matching addition to Explanation 2. S1; S2
The injury need not be grievous, despite the title. The Supreme Court decided exactly that in Maqbool v. The State of Uttar Pradesh: "it is not the percentage or gravity of injury, which makes the difference. Be it simple or grievous, if the injury falls under the specified [types] under Section 326A on account of use of acid, the offence under Section 326A is attracted." S4
The line between the two sub-sections is actual injury. Again from Maqbool: "The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B of IPC is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A." S4
What the two sub-sections require
Sub-section (1): injury caused
The conduct may take three forms - throwing acid, administering acid, or "using any other means" - so the section is not confined to acid at all, provided the specified injury results. S1
The specified outcomes are a list, not a single concept:
- permanent or partial damage or deformity to any part or parts of the body;
- burns, maiming, disfigurement or disablement of any part or parts of the body;
- grievous hurt; or
- a permanent vegetative state. S1
The mental element is intention to cause, or knowledge of likelihood of causing, "such injury or hurt". S1
"Acid" is defined, in Explanation 1: "any substance which has acidic or corrosive character or burning nature, that is capable of causing bodily injury leading to scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanent disability." Note that the definition is satisfied by capacity to cause temporary disability - it does not require permanence. S1
Explanation 2 removes a further obstacle: "permanent or partial damage or deformity or permanent vegetative state shall not be required to be irreversible." So "permanent" in this section is not read as meaning incurable. S1
Sub-section (2): injury not required
Sub-section (2) is the inchoate offence, and it is drafted to cover four situations: throwing acid, attempting to throw acid, attempting to administer acid, and attempting to use any other means - each with the intention of causing one of the listed injuries. S1
Because it requires only the act and the intention, a completed throwing that happens to cause no injury falls here. That is the gap the provision exists to close, and the reason is documented. S1; S6
Why the injury need not be grievous
The title of sub-section (1) speaks of "grievous hurt", and that produced genuine divergence in the High Courts until the Supreme Court settled it.
In Maqbool v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Supreme Court, Kurian Joseph and Sanjay Kishan Kaul JJ, 7 September 2018, reported AIR 2018 SC 5101 and (2019) 11 SCC 395), the appellant sought discharge from a charge under IPC section 326A on the ground that the medical report described the injury as simple. The trial court refused, the High Court upheld the refusal, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. S4
The Court held that the nature of the injury "being simple or grievous, is irrelevant for distinguishing between Section 323 and Section 326A of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of IPC. If the injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among the specified ... injuries, whether ... simple or grievous, the special provisions are attracted." S4
It expressly disapproved two High Court decisions to the contrary - one of the Rajasthan High Court and one of the Madras High Court - which had held that a simple injury took the case out of section 326A and into section 326B. Of the Madras decision the Court said that although the legal position had been analysed correctly, the court "unfortunately committed a patent error in taking note of the nature of injury as simple and altering the conviction to Section 326B". S4
In reaching that conclusion the Court invoked a purposive approach, quoting Learned Hand's dictum that "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them", as reiterated in two of its own earlier decisions. S4
That holding transfers directly to section 124, because section 124(1) reproduces IPC section 326A's operative words and section 124(2) reproduces IPC section 326B's exactly. It also confirms, on Supreme Court authority, a structural point this collection reached by reasoning at section 123: a marginal note does not control the operative words of the section it heads. S1; S2; S4; S12
Against IPC sections 326A and 326B
Sub-section (1) against IPC section 326A
A token comparison returns one substantive change and one consequential one.
The substantive change: "or causes a person to be in a permanent vegetative state" is new. IPC section 326A's conduct clause ended at "such injury or hurt"; section 124(1) adds that limb. S1; S2
The consequential change: the second proviso read "any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim" and now reads "under this sub-section" - a necessary adjustment on merging two sections into one. S1; S2
Everything else is identical. The ten-year minimum, the maximum of imprisonment for life, "imprisonment of either description", the mandatory fine, and both provisos - the medical-expenses measure and the payment to the victim - were already in IPC section 326A. S1; S2
This matters for a running finding in this collection. Minimum sentences were added by the Sanhita at sections 118(2) and 121(2). Here they were not: both minima are inherited. A reader tracking minimum sentences across this chapter must check each provision against its own predecessor rather than assuming the Sanhita introduced them. S1; S2; S9; S10
Sub-section (2) against IPC section 326B
No substantive change at all. The conduct, the four situations, the intention clause, the five-year minimum, the seven-year maximum and the fine are identical. The only alteration is the relocation of the two Explanations, which IPC section 326B carried at its own foot. S1; S2
The Explanations
IPC Explanation 1 and Explanation 2 both opened "For the purposes of section 326A and this section". In the Sanhita both read "For the purposes of this section" - again consequential on the merger, and they now govern both sub-sections from the foot of the single section. S1; S2
The definition of "acid" in Explanation 1 is reproduced word for word. Explanation 2 gained three words: IPC section 326B's version read "permanent or partial damage or deformity shall not be required to be irreversible", and section 124's adds "or permanent vegetative state". That addition tracks the new limb in sub-section (1) and is the only place in the Explanations where anything changed. S1; S2
The fine, and why section 8(1) is not the operative rule here
Section 124 is unusual in this chapter. Most of its neighbours either state a figure or state none, leaving section 8(1) to make an unquantified fine "unlimited, but shall not be excessive". Section 124(1) states no figure but supplies its own measure: the fine must be just and reasonable to meet the victim's medical expenses, and must be paid to the victim. S1; S13
The Supreme Court explained the effect in Maqbool: "The fine is mandatory and the quantum should be just and reasonable in the sense that it should be, in any case, sufficient to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim." S4
So the fine under sub-section (1) is not a penalty calibrated to culpability but a compensatory floor calibrated to the victim's treatment. Sub-section (2) carries an ordinary unquantified fine, with no proviso and no direction to pay the victim, so section 8(1) governs there. S1; S4; S13
The documented rationale
This is the first section in this collection for which a documented rationale could be retrieved, and it comes from two sources that must be kept distinct.
The immediate trigger was the J.S. Verma Committee. The Supreme Court records in Maqbool that "Section 326A was introduced by The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 pursuant to the recommendations contained in the Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, popularly known as J.S. Verma Committee". That Committee's report was not retrieved for this article; the fact is taken from the Supreme Court's statement of it. The India Code text records the insertion as taking effect on 3 February 2013. S2; S4
An earlier and fuller proposal came from the Law Commission of India. Its 226th Report (July 2009) was submitted to the Supreme Court in a writ petition filed by an acid-attack survivor, the Commission having taken the matter up of its own motion "in view of the gravity of the offence of acid attacks". S6
The Commission set out five deficiencies in the then-existing IPC section 326, and the enacted provisions answer each of them in turn: S6
| The Commission's stated deficiency | What the enacted provision does |
|---|---|
| "the definition of grievous hurt is not broad enough to cover the various kinds of injuries which are inflicted during acid attacks" | sub-section (1) lists damage, deformity, burns, maiming, disfigurement and disablement alongside grievous hurt |
| "the section does not cover the act of administering acid" | sub-section (1) covers "administering acid to that person" |
| "the section gives a wide discretion to the courts as far as punishment is concerned. The cases on acid attacks in India show that normally inadequate punishment is awarded" | a mandatory minimum of ten years |
| "the section in the I.P.C does not punish the intentional act of throwing of acid if no injuries occur" | sub-section (2), which requires no injury |
| "the section also does not specify who the fine should be awarded to" | the proviso requiring the fine to be paid to the victim |
That is an unusually clean correspondence between a stated problem and an enacted solution, and it explains the architecture of section 124 better than the text alone can.
Two things the Commission proposed were not enacted in this form. It proposed fine ceilings - ten lakh rupees for the injury offence and five lakh for the throwing offence - where the enacted provision states no figure and instead ties the fine to the victim's medical expenses. And it proposed a maximum of ten years for the throwing offence, where the enacted maximum is seven. S1; S6
One recommendation does not appear in section 124 at all. The Commission proposed that "if a person has thrown or administered the acid on another person a presumption should be raised against the person ... that he has done so deliberately". No such presumption appears in section 124. The Commission's further recommendations - restricting over-the-counter sale of acid, recording purchasers' particulars, and establishing Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards with a separate compensation statute - are regulatory and procedural matters outside the Sanhita, and this article does not trace whether they were implemented elsewhere. S1; S6
The relationship with Section 117(3)
Both sections cover a vegetative state, and they do not treat it the same way. This needs setting out because the overlap is easy to miss.
Section 117(3) punishes a person who commits an offence under section 117(1) and in the course of it causes hurt leading to "permanent disability or ... persistent vegetative state", with rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years up to imprisonment for life, "which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life". S9
Section 124(1) covers causing a person to be in a "permanent vegetative state" by acid or other means, with imprisonment of either description of not less than ten years up to imprisonment for life - plain, without the whole-life gloss. S1
Three differences follow, all verifiable from the two texts:
- The adjective differs. Section 117(3) says "persistent"; section 124(1) says "permanent". The Sanhita uses two different words for what appears to be the same clinical condition, in sections seven provisions apart. No definition of either expression appears in the Sanhita, and no authority construing the difference was located.
- Section 117(3) requires rigorous imprisonment; section 124(1) permits either description.
- Section 117(3)'s life sentence means the remainder of natural life; section 124(1)'s does not say so.
So for a vegetative-state outcome, section 117(3) is the harsher provision on two counts, even though both share a ten-year floor. Which applies depends on the route to the injury: section 117(3) requires the predicate offence under section 117(1), while section 124(1) requires acid or "any other means" with the specified intent or knowledge. Whether and how they overlap on a single set of facts is not addressed by any decision located, and this comparison is drawn from the texts. S1; S9
Classification
The First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 classifies both sub-sections: S14
| Section | Punishment | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Court |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 124(1) | Imprisonment for not less than 10 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Court of Session |
| 124(2) | Imprisonment for 5 years but which may extend to 7 years and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Court of Session |
Both are cognizable, non-bailable and triable by a Court of Session, which can impose both sentences. There is no forum mismatch here, unlike at sections 119(1), 120(1), 121(1) and 122(2). S14; S15
Neither sub-section is compoundable. Section 124 appears in neither the Table following section 359(1) nor the Table following section 359(2), so it cannot be compounded with or without the court's permission. That matches what the Law Commission had recommended for the offence it proposed. S6; S14
One defect in the Schedule is worth flagging, and it is internal to this section. The column 3 entry for sub-section (1) preserves the minimum - "not less than 10 years" - while the entry for sub-section (2) drops it, reading "Imprisonment for 5 years but which may extend to 7 years". The section itself says "shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years". A reader working from the row would not know that five years is a floor. The two rows of the same section treat minima inconsistently. S1; S14
How the courts apply it
Alamin Miah v. State of Tripura (Tripura High Court, Division Bench of S. Talapatra and S.G. Chattopadhyay JJ, 20 July 2020) shows the provision in operation and, more usefully, shows how the minimum constrains sentencing. S5
The appellant threw acid on his wife, causing burn injuries to her face, ear, shoulder, chest and hand amounting to about twenty per cent of body surface area; the medical officer certified the injury as grievous and caused by chemical. He was convicted by the Sessions Judge under IPC sections 326A and 498A and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of one lakh rupees payable to the victim on the former count. S5
The High Court set aside the section 498A conviction, holding that cruelty was not established, but upheld the conviction under section 326A, rejecting arguments that the victim had falsely implicated her husband and that the medical evidence was inconclusive. On the section 326A charge the Court relied on Maqbool. S4; S5
On sentence the Court reduced imprisonment for life to rigorous imprisonment for ten years, "which is the mandatory minimum sentence within the statutory limit of Section 326A", taking into account as a mitigating circumstance the breakdown of the marriage. It also reduced the fine, noting that the appellant had been a day labourer, that default would add a year to his custody, and that twenty per cent of a convict's prison wages is already deducted for the State Victim Compensation Fund. S5
Two points for a reader of section 124. The minimum is a real constraint and a real floor: an appellate court moderating a life sentence came down to exactly ten years and could go no lower. And the fine, because it must be paid to the victim, interacts with the convict's means in a way an ordinary fine does not - a point the Court addressed expressly. S1; S5
A transcription note
Alamin Miah at one point refers to "the sentence to imprisonment for life awarded to the convict under Section 326, IPC" where it plainly means section 326A, and Maqbool at one point says the fine should be "paid to the litigant" where the statute says victim. Neither slip affects either holding. They are the fifth and sixth instances in this chapter of statutory words being reproduced imprecisely in judgments, and the discipline stands: verify statutory text against the Gazette or India Code, not against a quotation. S1; S4; S5
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
The injury need not be grievous. Maqbool decides it. A simple injury falling within the specified types still attracts sub-section (1). S4
The difference between the sub-sections is actual injury, not the gravity of it. Maqbool again: "the presence of actual injury under Section 326A". Where injury results, sub-section (1); where the act is done with the requisite intention but no injury results, sub-section (2). S4
The section is not confined to acid. "By using any other means" appears in sub-section (1), and "attempts to use any other means" in sub-section (2). The injuries define the offence; acid is the paradigm. S1
"Acid" is defined by effect, not chemistry, and capacity to cause temporary disability suffices. S1
"Permanent" does not mean irreversible. Explanation 2 says so expressly, for damage, deformity and permanent vegetative state alike. S1
Both minima are inherited, not new. They came in with the 2013 amendment, not with the Sanhita. S1; S2; S4
The fine under sub-section (1) is compensatory and must go to the victim. It is measured by the cost of treatment, not by the offender's culpability, and it is mandatory. Sub-section (2) has no such proviso. S1; S4
There is no provocation carve-out. Section 124 makes no reference to section 122, so provocation cannot move a case out of it - as with sections 119, 120, 121 and 123. S1; S11
Neither sub-section is compoundable, whatever the parties may wish. S14
Section 123 is a different provision. Administering a stupefying or unwholesome substance with intent to commit an offence is section 123, which carries ten years with no minimum; causing the listed injuries by acid or other means is section 124, with a ten-year floor. S1; S12
Worked examples
Example 1. A throws acid on B, disfiguring B's face. Section 124(1) - not less than ten years, up to life, with a fine measured by B's medical expenses and payable to B. Court of Session; non-bailable; not compoundable. S1; S14
Example 2. The same act, but the medical report records the injury as simple. Still section 124(1), on Maqbool: gravity is irrelevant if the injury falls within the specified types. S4
Example 3. A throws acid at B intending disfigurement; B steps aside and is untouched. Section 124(2) - not less than five years, up to seven. No injury is required. S1
Example 4. A causes the listed injuries by a corrosive substance that is not, chemically, an acid but has burning character capable of causing scarring. Section 124(1) - the Explanation 1 definition is satisfied, and in any event "any other means" is within sub-section (1). S1
Example 5. A's attack leaves B in a vegetative state from which some recovery is medically conceivable. Still within section 124(1), because Explanation 2 provides that a permanent vegetative state need not be irreversible. S1
Example 6. A is convicted under section 124(1) and the court considers life imprisonment disproportionate on the facts. On Alamin Miah, the court may reduce the sentence but not below ten years. S1; S5
Example 7. B gravely provokes A, who immediately throws acid on B. Section 124(1) applies and provocation does not reduce it, because section 124 contains no carve-out to section 122. S1; S11
Commencement and which law applies
Section 124 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S16
For conduct before that date, IPC sections 326A and 326B apply. Because the punishments are identical in both sub-sections, the transition is immaterial to exposure in the ordinary case - with one exception. The permanent-vegetative-state limb is new, so conduct before 1 July 2024 that caused a vegetative state but none of the other listed outcomes could not be charged under IPC section 326A on that basis, and the new limb cannot be applied retrospectively to it. Whether such conduct was in practice reached by IPC section 326A's other limbs, or by section 326 or the homicide provisions, is not addressed here. S1; S2; S16
Conduct before 3 February 2013, when the India Code records sections 326A and 326B as taking effect, was not covered by either, and the general grievous-hurt provisions applied - which is precisely the gap the Law Commission and the J.S. Verma Committee had identified. S2; S4; S6
The procedural law is separate: for proceedings instituted on or after 1 July 2024 the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita governs, so the First Schedule classification and the non-compoundability apply whichever substantive Act supplies the offence. S14
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 124
- Section 114 - definition of hurt. S7
- Section 116 - the closed list of grievous hurt, which section 124 deliberately goes beyond. S8
- Section 117 - voluntarily causing grievous hurt, and in particular section 117(3) on permanent disability and persistent vegetative state. S9
- Section 118 - hurt by dangerous weapons or means, which covers corrosive substances at the three-year level. S10
- Section 122 - hurt on provocation; relevant by its absence. S11
- Section 123 - administering poison or a stupefying substance with intent to commit an offence. S12
- Section 8 - the amount of fine where no sum is expressed, which governs sub-section (2) but is displaced for sub-section (1) by its own provisos. S13
- Section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - sentencing powers, the reason the Court of Session assignment matters. S15
Sources and honest limits
The comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 124 against the India Code text of IPC sections 326A and 326B, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The First Schedule rows and the absence of section 124 from both compounding Tables were read from the Gazette text of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. India Code handles were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S14
What this article does not establish:
- The J.S. Verma Committee report was not retrieved. That the 2013 amendment followed its recommendations is taken from the Supreme Court's statement in Maqbool, not from the report itself.
- The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 was not retrieved. The commencement date of 3 February 2013 is taken from the India Code footnote to the IPC text.
- The Law Commission's 226th Report is a proposal, not the enacted law. Its five stated deficiencies are quoted as the Commission's own reasoning. The correspondence drawn in the table between those deficiencies and the enacted provisions is this article's analysis; the Commission did not draft what was enacted, and two of its proposals - the fine ceilings and a ten-year maximum for the throwing offence - were not adopted.
- Whether the Commission's other recommendations were implemented is not traced. The proposed presumption does not appear in section 124; the recommendations on regulating acid sales and on compensation boards concern instruments outside the Sanhita and were not researched.
- The section 117(3) comparison is drawn from the two texts. No authority construes the difference between "persistent" and "permanent" vegetative state, neither expression is defined in the Sanhita, and no decision addressing an overlap between sections 117(3) and 124(1) was located.
- The effect of the new vegetative-state limb on earlier conduct is stated narrowly. This article does not say how such conduct was in fact charged before 1 July 2024.
- Maqbool construed IPC sections 326A and 326B. Its application to section 124 rests on the verified identity of the operative words, which is a sound basis, but it is a transfer rather than a decision on the new section.
- Alamin Miah is a Division Bench decision of one High Court and does not bind elsewhere. Its subsequent treatment was not checked. The sentencing outcome in it is an illustration, not a tariff.
- No decision construing section 124 under its new numbering was located, and the searches on IPC sections 326A and 326B returned 25 and 63 hits which were not read exhaustively. One Madhya Pradesh decision was opened and set aside because its references to section 326A appear in a comparative sentencing table rather than in any holding.
- The First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not retrieved, so no claim is made about how IPC sections 326A and 326B were previously classified.
- Victim compensation beyond the fine is outside scope. The statutory victim-compensation schemes referred to in Alamin Miah were not researched, and nothing here states what a victim may claim apart from the fine.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita or the Schedules, are not reflected.
Section 124 is the 2013 acid-attack regime carried into the Sanhita almost intact: the same two offences, the same ten-year and five-year floors, the same life and seven-year ceilings, the same definition of acid, and the same requirement that the fine meet the victim's treatment costs and be paid to the victim. The Sanhita's contribution is the permanent-vegetative-state limb and a matching three words in Explanation 2. What a reader most needs to know is settled by the Supreme Court rather than by the text: the injury need not be grievous, and what separates the two sub-sections is whether injury was caused at all. Verify the current text and classification, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.