The short answer
Section 116 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is a closed list. It designates eight kinds of hurt as "grievous" and nothing else can be added to them:
"The following kinds of hurt only are designated as 'grievous', namely:— (a) Emasculation; (b) Permanent privation of the sight of either eye; (c) Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear; (d) Privation of any member or joint; (e) Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (f) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (g) Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; (h) Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." S1
Three things make this one of the most important provisions in the Sanhita to get right.
First, it is the switch that decides everything else. Section 116 creates no offence and prescribes no punishment: like s. 114 it has no entry in the BNSS First Schedule S4. But whether a case falls inside or outside this list determines whether the offence is s. 115(2) (one year, fine up to ten thousand rupees, non-cognizable) or s. 117(2): seven years and fine, cognizable S4. It therefore decides whether the police may register and investigate as of right at all.
Second, one limb was quietly broadened. The Indian Penal Code's corresponding provision, s. 320, designated as grievous any hurt which caused the sufferer "to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits". The Sanhita reduced that period to fifteen days S1; S2; S3. Hurt that keeps a person in severe bodily pain, or off his ordinary pursuits, for fifteen to nineteen days was not grievous under the IPC and is grievous now.
Third, nothing else of substance changed. The eight kinds are the same eight kinds, in the same order. The IPC's ordinals, "First.— Secondly.— … Eighthly.—", were restyled as lettered clauses, and "namely:—" was added, but no kind of grievous hurt was added to the list or removed from it S1; S3.
Nothing here is legal advice. Whether an injury falls within any clause of s. 116 is a question of fact, usually turning on medical evidence, for the court on the material before it.
The twenty-day rule became a fifteen-day rule
This is the substantive change, and it is easy to miss because it is a single word inside the longest clause of the section.
| Clause (h) / Eighthly | |
|---|---|
| IPC s. 320 | "Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." |
| BNS s. 116(h) | "Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." |
The change was verified three ways.
- The section text and the Gazette of India copy of the enacted Act both read "fifteen days" S1; S2.
- The phrase "space of twenty days" appears nowhere in the Gazette text of the Sanhita, zero occurrences, while "space of fifteen days" appears twice S2.
- The second occurrence shows the change was carried through deliberately. The illustration to s. 117(1) describes a blow that "causes Z to suffer severe bodily pain for the space of fifteen days", and concludes that A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt. The corresponding illustration to IPC s. 322 used twenty days S2; S3. A drafter who had merely mistyped the threshold in s. 116 would not have altered the illustration in the next section to match.
Why a five-day reduction matters more than it looks
Clause (h) is the clause that most assault cases actually turn on. The first seven clauses describe specific, largely irreversible injuries: emasculation, loss of sight or hearing, loss or destruction of a member or joint, permanent disfiguration of the head or face, fracture or dislocation. Clause (h) is the general one, and its second limb is the only clause in the section that works by duration rather than by kind of injury.
Shortening that period moves a band of cases across the line. On the face of the provisions, an injury that disables a person for, say, seventeen days now sits in the s. 117(2) bracket rather than the s. 115(2) bracket. The practical consequences of crossing that line are set out in the next section, and they are not marginal.
Two cautions, because the point is easily overstated:
- Clause (h) has two independent limbs. "Any hurt which endangers life" is the first, and it has nothing to do with any number of days. The fifteen-day limb is the second. An injury satisfying either is grievous.
- No decision interpreting the fifteen-day period was located, and none applying it to a case that would have failed the twenty-day test. The consequence described above follows from the words of the two provisions compared; it is not drawn from any ruling.
Section 116 decides the bracket, and cognizability
Section 116 convicts nobody. Its entire effect is to route a case into one of two very different regimes.
| Plain hurt | Grievous hurt | |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | s. 114 | s. 116 |
| Offence | s. 115(2) | s. 117(2) |
| Punishment | Imprisonment up to 1 year, or fine up to 10,000 rupees, or both | Imprisonment up to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine |
| Fine | A ceiling; a fine alone is available | Mandatory: "and shall also be liable to fine"; no fine-only option |
| Cognizable? | No | Yes |
| Bailable? | Yes | Yes |
| Trial court | Any Magistrate | Any Magistrate |
Three consequences follow, and they are the practical heart of this section.
1. Cognizability. Plain hurt is non-cognizable, so BNSS s. 174 applies: the informant is referred to the Magistrate and no police officer may investigate without a Magistrate's order S6. Grievous hurt is cognizable, so the police may act. Whether a complainant gets a police investigation or has to file a complaint case before a Magistrate therefore depends on which side of s. 116 the injury falls.
2. Consent ceases to protect. The general exception in s. 25: harm consented to by a person above eighteen: applies only where the act "is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and … is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt" S7. Once the case crosses into grievous hurt, that exception is unavailable by its own terms. The fifteen-day amendment therefore also narrows, by the same movement, the range of consensual harm that s. 25 can cover.
3. The seven-year bracket is not the ceiling. Section 117 has two further sub-sections, both of which go well beyond seven years:
- s. 117(3), where, in committing the offence, the accused causes hurt putting the person in permanent disability or in a persistent vegetative state: rigorous imprisonment for not less than ten years, extending to imprisonment for life, "which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life" S5.
- s. 117(4), where a group of five or more persons acting in concert causes grievous hurt on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground: each member is guilty, punishable with up to seven years and fine S5.
Both of those sub-sections are analysed in the article on s. 117, not here. They are mentioned because they are reached only if the injury is grievous within s. 116, which is what makes this definition the gateway to the whole group.
The eight clauses, and the word "only"
The opening words do real work. The list is of kinds of hurt that "only" are designated as grievous, which makes it exhaustive: an injury that is serious, painful, expensive or frightening but falls outside all eight clauses is not grievous hurt, however much a court might sympathise.
High Courts applying s. 116 have treated it exactly that way, reproducing the section in full and testing the injury against the clauses.
| Clause | What it covers | Note |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Emasculation | — |
| (b) | Permanent privation of the sight of either eye | Permanent, and either eye suffices |
| (c) | Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear | Permanent, and either ear suffices |
| (d) | Privation of any member or joint | Loss of the member or joint |
| (e) | Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint | Function rather than loss; "permanent" qualifies impairing |
| (f) | Permanent disfiguration of the head or face | Confined to head or face, and permanent |
| (g) | Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth | No permanence requirement in this clause |
| (h) | Hurt which endangers life, or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits | Two independent limbs |
Note how often the word "permanent" appears: in clauses (b), (c), (e) and (f). Clause (g), by contrast, carries no such qualifier: a fracture or dislocation is grievous whether or not it leaves any lasting effect. And clause (d) speaks of privation of a member or joint without the word, while clause (e) requires permanence for impairment of its powers. These are distinctions in the text, and they were carried over from the IPC untouched S1; S3.
How courts are applying section 116
Three High Court decisions under the Sanhita were read in full. Together they show the closed list being policed in both directions.
The list excluded the injury: swelling without fracture. In Shri Ravi alias Ravindra Wader v. State of Karnataka (Dharwad Bench, V. Srishananda J, 9 January 2026) the wound certificate recorded "swelling and tenderness on the right shoulder, which resulted in restriction of the movement of lift of the right arm. There is no fracture." The Court held that "prima facie the injury cannot be termed as grievous as defined under Section 116 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita", adding that "it is a matter for trial" and that the injured was "now hale and healthy". The appeal was allowed and the appellant released on bail on conditions S8. The absence of a fracture is doing the work: clause (g) was the obvious candidate and it was not met, and restricted movement of an arm was not treated as destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of a member under clause (e).
The list excluded the injury: a bunch of keys. In Tarun Kumar Tiwari v. State of West Bengal (Kausik Chanda J, 15 July 2026) the petitioners sought quashing of a case registered under BNS ss. 126(2), 115(2) and 118(1). The allegation was that the victim had been struck with a bunch of keys on his head, back and waist. The Court reproduced s. 116 and held that "the injury alleged in the FIR and reflected in the injury report contained in the charge sheet cannot be classified as 'grievous hurt' within the meaning of Section 116". It then rejected the Public Prosecutor's submission that s. 118(1) "is attracted in cases involving voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt", holding that a bunch of keys could not in the circumstances be regarded as a dangerous weapon or dangerous means within s. 118(1), "particularly when the injury report does not suggest that the victim suffered any major injury". The charge sheet was quashed only in so far as it related to s. 118(1), the remaining offences proceeding to trial S9.
That is a precise and useful order: it shows a court declining to let the aggravated provisions be read as covering any hurt case, and it leaves the ordinary s. 115(2) charge intact.
The list caught the injury: clause (h), first limb. In Mantun Kuwar alias Mantun Kumar v. State of Bihar (Patna High Court, Rajiv Roy J, 23 July 2025) the petitioners sought anticipatory bail. Counsel reproduced s. 116 and argued that "none of the kinds of hurt designated under the heading 'grievous' can be attributed to the present assault", and that the primary health centre had reserved its opinion while a later private hospital report recorded the injury as grievous. The Court recorded that "the injuries have been found to be grievous in nature", that s. 116(h) covers "any hurt which endangers the life", and that "the Medical report talks about the injuries on the head, abdomen and on the hand which comes under clause (h)". Anticipatory bail was rejected S10.
Read that one carefully. The Court applied the first limb of clause (h), hurt which endangers life, and not the fifteen-day limb. The reasoning as recorded is brief: the conclusion that injuries to the head, abdomen and hand come within clause (h) is stated rather than worked through, and the competing medical reports are noted but not resolved. This article reports what the order records and does not endorse the inference. It is an order refusing anticipatory bail, not a finding at trial.
What this material does and does not establish. It establishes that s. 116 is being litigated at the threshold stage within months of commencement, that courts are reproducing the closed list and testing injuries against it clause by clause, and that both outcomes occur. It establishes nothing about the fifteen-day limb: no decision interpreting or applying the fifteen-day period was located. These searches were not exhaustive.
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Section 116 is an offence." It is not. It designates kinds of hurt. The offence is s. 117, and s. 116 has no First Schedule entry at all: the same pattern as s. 114 S1; S4; S5.
"Serious injuries are grievous hurt." Only if they fall within one of the eight clauses. The word "only" makes the list exhaustive, and in both Ravi Wader and Tarun Kumar Tiwari real injuries were held to fall outside it S1; S8; S9.
"A fracture has to be serious, or has to leave lasting damage." Clause (g) says "Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth" and contains no permanence or severity qualifier: unlike clauses (b), (c), (e) and (f), which all require permanence S1.
"Twenty days of pain is the test." Not any longer. The threshold is fifteen days, and the twenty-day formula was removed from the Sanhita entirely S1; S2; S3.
"The fifteen-day clause is the whole of clause (h)." No. Clause (h) begins with hurt which endangers life, which is independent of any period. That was the limb applied in Mantun Kuwar S1; S10.
"Grievous hurt and plain hurt are tried the same way." They are both triable by any Magistrate and both bailable, but plain hurt is non-cognizable and grievous hurt is cognizable, which changes who investigates S4; S6.
"If the victim consented, it does not matter how bad the injury is." It matters a great deal. Section 25 is unavailable where death or grievous hurt is intended or known to be likely S7.
"A medical certificate calling an injury 'grievous' settles it." It is evidence, not a conclusion of law. The question is whether the injury falls within a clause of s. 116, and in Mantun Kuwar the existence of two differing medical opinions was part of the argument rather than the answer S1; S10.
Worked examples
These are editorial hypotheticals, written to show how the clauses operate. They are not judgments and not predictions. Each states the facts that decide it.
Example 1: the amendment's effect. A strikes B, who suffers no fracture and no permanent injury, but is in severe bodily pain and unable to work for seventeen days, as established by medical evidence. Under IPC s. 320 the twenty-day threshold was not met, so this was plain hurt. Under s. 116(h) the fifteen-day threshold is met, so on the words of the provision it is grievous hurt (moving the case from s. 115(2) to s. 117(2), and from non-cognizable to cognizable S1; S3; S4. Change one fact) the disability lasts twelve days, and clause (h)'s second limb is not met, and the case stays in the s. 115(2) bracket unless some other clause applies.
Example 2: the clause that needs no permanence. C punches D and chips D's tooth. The chip is cosmetic and causes no lasting problem. Clause (g) covers "fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth" with no permanence requirement, so the question is simply whether there was a fracture or dislocation S1. Change one fact, D suffers only bruising to the jaw with no fracture, and clause (g) falls away; on Ravi Wader's approach, swelling and restricted movement without a fracture are not obviously within any clause S8.
Example 3: the two limbs of clause (h). E stabs F in the abdomen. F is hospitalised and recovers fully within eight days. The fifteen-day limb is not met. The first limb may well be: a hurt which endangers life is grievous regardless of how long recovery takes S1. Change one fact, a shallow surface wound that never threatened F's life and healed in days, and neither limb of clause (h) is met.
Example 4: why the label changes the procedure. G alleges that H broke his finger. If the fracture is established, clause (g) is met, the offence is s. 117(2), and it is cognizable, so the police may investigate S1; S4. Change one fact (the finger is sprained, not fractured, and G is off work for six days) and the offence is s. 115(2), which is non-cognizable: the station officer refers G to the Magistrate and no officer investigates without a Magistrate's order S4; S6.
Example 5: consent and the gateway. J and K agree to a bare-knuckle contest. J, fighting by the agreed rules, causes K pain but no injury within s. 116. Section 25 is capable of applying, since neither death nor grievous hurt was intended or known to be likely, and K is an adult S7. Change one fact, J intends to break K's nose and does so, and the act is intended to cause grievous hurt, so s. 25 is excluded by its own words, whatever K agreed to.
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 116
- BNS s. 114: the definition of hurt. Section 116 designates which kinds of hurt are grievous, so s. 114 must be satisfied first S11.
- BNS s. 115: the plain-hurt offence, and the bracket a case falls into if s. 116 is not satisfied S1; S4.
- BNS s. 117: the grievous-hurt offence, including the Explanation and illustration to sub-section (1), the seven-year bracket in (2), the ten-year minimum in (3) for permanent disability or persistent vegetative state, and the group-liability provision in (4) S5.
- BNS s. 118: voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means, which Tarun Kumar Tiwari holds is not attracted merely because hurt was caused S9.
- BNS s. 122(2): grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation, the carve-out written into s. 117(2) S5.
- BNS s. 25: the consent exception that grievous hurt takes outside its scope S7.
- BNSS s. 174: the police route for a non-cognizable offence, which is where a case lands if s. 116 is not met S6.
Sources and honest limits
The statutory texts were read from the Gazette of India copy of the Sanhita and from the Indian Penal Code and compared clause by clause rather than by a single whole-section diff, because the question here was whether any kind of grievous hurt had been added or dropped. The answer is that none was: the change is confined to the period in clause (h), and that change was confirmed three ways, including by the absence of the twenty-day formula anywhere in the Sanhita and by the matching amendment of the illustration to s. 117(1). The First Schedule entries were read from the BNSS. All three judgments were read in full from the court's own order, including their operative paragraphs.
The material limits are recorded in this article's limitations field. In outline: no decision interpreting or applying the fifteen-day period was located; no Supreme Court decision on s. 116 was located; the case-law searches were targeted rather than exhaustive and result sets were capped; later treatment of the three decisions was not traced; the IPC-era body of learning on individual clauses of s. 320: what counts as a fracture, when a hurt "endangers life": was not surveyed; no legislative material explaining the reduction from twenty days to fifteen was retrieved, so no rationale is attributed to Parliament; and the contents of ss. 117 and 118, including the new sub-sections (3) and (4) of s. 117, are left to their own articles.
This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text and early application of a statutory definition. It is not legal advice and not a prediction of any outcome. Whether an injury falls within any clause of s. 116, what the medical evidence establishes, and which offence and bracket follow, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.