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BNS Section 25 · Deep dive

BNS Section 25: Consent to Harm (the Ceiling Is Set by the Doer's Mind, Not by the Injury)

BNS Section 25 makes consent a defence to harm, but only up to a ceiling: the act must be one the doer neither intended to cause death or grievous hurt by, nor knew to be likely to cause either. The most important precision point, and the one most often got backwards, is that the ceiling is set by the doer's state of mind rather than by the injury that eventuates - so grievous hurt that was neither intended nor foreseen does not take the case outside the section, while an act done in the expectation of broken bones is outside it even if nobody is hurt. That matters because 'grievous hurt' is a closed list in Section 116 whose clause (g) covers any fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth, with no requirement of permanence or danger to life. The section has two limbs - consent to suffer the harm, and consent to take the risk of it - and requires the person harmed to be above eighteen, a higher threshold than the twelve years used in Sections 27 and 28(c). Consent may be express or implied, but the illustration confines implied consent to harm caused 'without foul play'. Two provisions control the section from outside: Section 28 decides whether there was valid consent at all, and Section 29 removes the exception where the act is an offence independently of the harm - affray under Section 194 being a clear example. Section 25 reproduces IPC Section 87 without substantive change. No judgment construing Section 25 was located, and no significant body of authority on IPC Section 87 was located either; the article says so rather than filling the gap with tangential citations.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 22 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 25 — Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 87 — Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent · substantively unchanged
Section 90 — Consent known to be given under fear or misconception · modified
Section 91 — Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm cause · renumbered
Section 320 — Grievous hurt · renumbered
Section 105 (Indian Evidence Act, 1872) — Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions · renumbered
Side-by-side converterIPC 87 → BNS 25

What the section says

Section 25 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2

25. Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.

Illustration.

A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.

The official marginal-note title is "Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1

(A note on the printed text: the Gazette text of s. 25 ends the main provision with a doubled full stop, "…to take the risk of that harm..", before the illustration. This appears to be a typographical artefact and has no effect on meaning. S1)

The structure: a ceiling and two limbs

Section 25 is built as a ceiling followed by two alternative routes through it. S1

The ceiling. The act must be one "which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt". Both conditions must hold; the conjunction is "and", so the doer must neither intend nor foresee death or grievous hurt.

The two limbs.

What the victim consented toWhat the doer's state of mind is
Limb 1"to suffer that harm"The harm was caused, or was intended by the doer
Limb 2"to take the risk of that harm"The harm was known by the doer to be likely

The distinction matters in practice. Limb 1 covers consent to a specific harm. A person who agrees to a procedure that will hurt. Limb 2 covers consent to exposure. A person who agrees to run a risk that may or may not eventuate. A consent form that records agreement to a procedure may establish limb 1 without establishing limb 2, or the reverse, and the two should be pleaded distinctly.

The ceiling is about the doer's mind, not about what actually happened

This is the single most important precision point in s. 25, and it is easy to get backwards.

The section does not say "nothing which does not cause death or grievous hurt". It says nothing which is not intended to cause, and not known to be likely to cause, death or grievous hurt. S1

So the test is applied to the doer's state of mind at the time, not to the injury that eventuated:

  • Grievous hurt results, but was neither intended nor foreseen as likely → the ceiling is not breached, and s. 25 remains available.
  • Grievous hurt was intended or foreseen as likely, but only minor harm results → the ceiling is breached, and s. 25 is unavailable however light the actual injury.

A fencing bout in which an opponent's tooth is unexpectedly broken is within the section if the doer neither intended nor foresaw that; a bare-knuckle fight arranged in the expectation of broken bones is outside it even if nobody is actually hurt.

Why "grievous hurt" is a hard ceiling in practice

"Grievous hurt" is not a general impression of seriousness. Section 116 provides that "the following kinds of hurt only are designated as 'grievous'", and lists eight: S1

(a) Emasculation; (b) Permanent privation of the sight of either eye; (c) Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear; (d) Privation of any member or joint; (e) Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (f) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (g) Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; (h) Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.

The word "only" makes the list closed. S1 The practical consequence for s. 25 is clause (g): a fracture or a dislocation (of any bone, or even of a tooth) is grievous hurt. It does not have to be permanent, disfiguring or life-threatening.

That sets the ceiling far lower than most readers assume. Contact activity in which fractures are a known likelihood sits at or beyond the edge of s. 25, because the doer's knowledge that a fracture is likely breaches the ceiling. By contrast "hurt": "bodily pain, disease or infirmity" under s. 114: is comfortably within the section when consented to. S1

Eighteen, and why that number is unusual here

Section 25 protects harm consented to by "any person, above eighteen years of age". S1

That threshold is worth noticing, because the consent provisions in Chapter III do not use a single age:

ProvisionAge used
s. 25: consent to suffer harm or take a riskabove eighteen
s. 27: good faith for the benefit of a child, by or with guardian's consentunder twelve
s. 28(c): consent generally invalid by reason of ageunder twelve, "unless the contrary appears from the context"

So a sixteen-year-old's consent is not protected by s. 25 at all, even though s. 28(c) would not by itself invalidate it. Section 25 sets its own, higher bar, and the general invalidity rule in s. 28(c) is the floor rather than the standard. Note also that s. 28(c) is expressly qualified, "unless the contrary appears from the context", so the twelve-year figure is not a fixed rule across the Sanhita, and offences dealing with sexual conduct contain their own consent provisions.

Express or implied, and the limits of implication

Consent may be "express or implied". S1 The illustration is an exercise in implication: an agreement to fence "implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play". S1

Two things follow from that single phrase.

Implied consent is scoped by the activity. What is impliedly consented to is the harm ordinarily incidental to the thing agreed upon, not any harm that happens to occur during it.

"Without foul play" is the boundary. The illustration is careful to add that A was "playing fairly". Consent to a contest is not consent to a breach of its rules. A deliberate foul, or an act outside the ordinary incidents of the activity, is not covered, because it was never consented to.

Two provisions that control s. 25 from outside

Section 25 cannot be read alone. Two other sections in the same chapter govern it.

Section 28 decides whether there was consent at all

Section 28 provides that a consent is not consent "as is intended by any section of this Sanhita" if it was given under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact (where the doer knows or has reason to believe that), or by a person unable to understand by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication, or (unless the context indicates otherwise) by a person under twelve. S1 Section 25 presupposes a valid consent; s. 28 is where its validity is tested.

Section 29 removes the section where the act is an offence anyway

Section 29 provides that "the exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent". S1

This is the limitation most often overlooked, and it has teeth. Consider two people who agree to fight in a public place and exchange blows causing only minor hurt. Section 25 may answer a charge founded on the hurt. It does not answer s. 194, which provides that "when two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace, they are said to commit an affray", punishable with up to one month's imprisonment or a fine up to one thousand rupees or both. S1 An affray is an offence against public peace; it does not depend on harm to the consenting participants at all, so their consent is irrelevant to it.

Who proves what

Section 25 is a General Exception, so s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies: the burden of proving the circumstances is on the accused, and "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5

In a s. 25 case the accused must therefore establish, on the civil standard applicable to an accused discharging such a burden, each of the following:

  1. that he did not intend death or grievous hurt;
  2. that he did not know death or grievous hurt to be likely;
  3. that the person harmed was above eighteen; and
  4. that that person consented, expressly or impliedly, either to suffer the harm (limb 1) or to take the risk of it (limb 2).

Items 1 and 2 are negatives about his own state of mind, ordinarily proved from the nature of the activity, the instruments used and the surrounding conduct.

Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 25 corresponds to s. 87 IPC.

FeatureIPC s. 87BNS s. 25
Operative text"Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm."Identical
Marginal title"Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent"Same, with a terminal full stop
Age thresholdAbove eighteenUnchanged
IllustrationThe fencing illustrationIdentical
Section number8725

A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace and punctuation, returns no substantive difference: the only token the diff reports is a stray page number carried in the IPC source text. S1S4 Section 25 is a pure renumbering.

Two renumberings matter when reading older commentary on s. 87: the consent-validity provision moved from s. 90 IPC to s. 28 BNS, and the limitation on the consent exceptions moved from s. 91 IPC to s. 29 BNS, with its internal cross-references updated from "sections 87, 88 and 89" to "sections 25, 26 and 27". S1S4

No reform, and no rationale located

No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 25 has been located in the official legislative material examined, which is what one would expect for a verbatim re-enactment.

The age of eighteen, the death-or-grievous-hurt ceiling, the express/implied distinction, the two limbs and the fencing illustration all date from 1860 and survive untouched. Describing s. 25 as a modernised or clarified consent provision would be inaccurate.

Judicial interpretation: a thin field, honestly stated

No judgment construing BNS s. 25 was located, and the section has been in force only since 1 July 2024, the date appointed by MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which commenced the whole Sanhita except s. 106(2). S3

More unusually, no significant body of authority on IPC s. 87 was located either. A search for decisions applying s. 87 to consensual harm returned a single result, which could not be retrieved. This is worth stating plainly rather than papering over with tangential citations: s. 25 is a provision whose content, on the material located, rests on its own text, on the closed definition of grievous hurt in s. 116, and on the controlling provisions in ss. 28 and 29.

The authorities that do exist in this area are overwhelmingly on s. 90 IPC: now s. 28: concerning when an apparent consent is vitiated. They are discussed in the article on s. 28, because that is the provision they construe. A submission under s. 25 will in practice be met by an argument under s. 28, and the case law lives there.

Worked examples

Hypotheticals, not decided cases.

Within s. 25: the illustration in modern form. Two adults spar in a martial arts class under supervision. One is bruised. Neither intended nor foresaw death or grievous hurt; the harm is within the ordinary incidents of the activity consented to. Section 25 applies. S1

Within s. 25: unexpected fracture. In the same bout, an awkward fall fractures a wrist. A fracture is grievous hurt under s. 116(g), but the ceiling is set by the doer's intention and knowledge, not by the outcome. If neither intention nor knowledge of likelihood is established, s. 25 still applies. S1

Outside s. 25: foreseen fracture. Two adults agree to a bare-knuckle fight in which, on the evidence, both expected bones to be broken. Knowledge that grievous hurt was likely breaches the ceiling. Section 25 is unavailable even if the injuries turn out to be minor. S1

Outside s. 25: foul play. During the sparring one participant deliberately strikes the other after the bout has been stopped. The illustration's limit applies: implied consent extends only to harm caused "without foul play". S1

Outside s. 25: age. The same sparring injury is caused to a seventeen-year-old. Section 25 requires the person harmed to be above eighteen, so the section does not apply, whatever that person agreed to. S1

Outside s. 25: independent offence. Two adults fight by agreement in a public street, causing each other minor hurt. Section 25 may answer a charge based on the hurt, but not a charge of affray under s. 194, which is an offence against public peace and does not depend on harm to the participants. Section 29 makes that explicit. S1

Not s. 25: the wrong section. A surgeon operates with consent, intending the patient's benefit. Section 25 is not the provision: s. 26 covers acts not intended to cause death done by consent in good faith for the person's benefit, and it has a different and higher ceiling. S1

Consent vitiated. An adult "agrees" to a painful procedure after being threatened. If the consent was given under fear of injury and the doer knew or had reason to believe that, s. 28(a) means there was no consent, and s. 25 has nothing to operate on. S1

Common misconceptions

"Consent is a complete defence to physical harm." It is not. Section 25 stops at death and grievous hurt, and "grievous hurt" includes any fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth under s. 116(g). S1

"If the injury turns out to be grievous, s. 25 is lost." Not necessarily. The ceiling is defined by what the doer intended or knew to be likely, not by the injury that resulted. S1

"If the injury turns out to be minor, s. 25 is safe." Not necessarily, for the same reason in reverse: an act done intending or foreseeing grievous hurt is outside the section regardless of outcome. S1

"Any consent will do." Consent must be valid. Section 28 invalidates consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact (where the doer knows or has reason to believe it), or by a person unable to understand by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication, or by a person under twelve unless the context indicates otherwise. S1

"Consent to a game covers everything that happens in it." The illustration confines implied consent to harm caused "without foul play". S1

"A sixteen-year-old can consent under s. 25." No. The section requires a person above eighteen. S1

"If both parties consented, no offence of any kind is committed." Section 29 provides that ss. 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts that are offences independently of the harm: affray under s. 194 being a clear example. S1

"The BNS widened the scope of consent." It reproduced IPC s. 87 without substantive change. S1S4

  • s. 26: act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for the person's benefit; the medical-treatment counterpart, with a higher ceiling.
  • s. 27: good faith for the benefit of a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind, by or with the consent of a guardian; and its four provisos.
  • s. 28, when an apparent consent is not consent; the provision on which s. 25 cases are usually fought.
  • s. 29: the exceptions in ss. 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts that are offences independently of harm.
  • s. 30: good faith for a person's benefit without consent, where consent is impossible to obtain.
  • s. 33: act causing slight harm that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of; a shorter route than s. 25 where the harm is trifling.
  • s. 114, "hurt"; s. 115, voluntarily causing hurt; s. 116: the closed list of grievous hurt.
  • s. 194: affray; an offence that consent cannot answer.
  • s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.

Sources, verification and limitations

Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against the India Code entry for s. 25 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E) S3; IPC s. 87 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 25 by programmatic word-level diff, returning no substantive difference S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5. BNS ss. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 114, 115, 116 and 194 were read directly in the Gazette text for the comparisons and cross-references made above. Law checked as of the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.

Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 25 was located. No significant body of authority on IPC s. 87 was located either; a targeted search returned one result which could not be retrieved, and the article therefore relies on the statutory text and the controlling provisions rather than on case law, and says so. The authorities on vitiated consent construe s. 90 IPC (now s. 28) and are dealt with in the article on that section. The observation that contact activity involving likely fractures sits at or beyond the edge of s. 25 follows from reading s. 25 with s. 116(g) and is the author's analysis; no authority applying s. 87 to sport was located, and nothing here should be taken as a statement of how any sporting injury would be treated. The affray example is drawn from the text of ss. 29 and 194 read together; no judgment applying them in combination was located. The ingredients and punishments of ss. 114, 115, 116 and 194 were not analysed beyond the words quoted. The doubled full stop in the Gazette text of s. 25 is reported as a typographical artefact on the face of the document; no corrigendum was searched for. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether s. 25 protects a particular act depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+Does consent make it lawful to hurt someone?
Up to a point. Section 25 provides that nothing which is not intended to cause death or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of harm caused to a consenting person above eighteen. S1 So consent can answer a charge based on ordinary hurt, but the section stops at death and grievous hurt, and it operates only where the consent is valid under Section 28 and where the act is not an offence independently of the harm under Section 29. S1
+If the injury turns out to be grievous, is Section 25 lost?
Not necessarily, and this is the point most often got backwards. The section does not say 'nothing which does not cause death or grievous hurt'. It says nothing which is not intended to cause, and not known to be likely to cause, death or grievous hurt. S1 The ceiling is therefore applied to the doer's state of mind at the time, not to the outcome. Grievous hurt that was neither intended nor foreseen as likely does not breach the ceiling; conversely, an act done intending or foreseeing grievous hurt is outside the section even if only minor harm results.
+What counts as 'grievous hurt' for this purpose?
A closed statutory list. Section 116 says 'the following kinds of hurt only are designated as grievous' and sets out eight clauses: emasculation; permanent privation of the sight of either eye; permanent privation of the hearing of either ear; privation of any member or joint; destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; permanent disfiguration of the head or face; fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; and any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be for fifteen days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. S1 Clause (g) is the one that matters most here: any fracture or dislocation - of any bone, or even a tooth - is grievous hurt, with no requirement of permanence, disfigurement or danger to life.
+What are the two limbs of Section 25?
The first covers a person who has consented 'to suffer that harm', and applies where the harm was caused or was intended by the doer. The second covers a person who 'has consented to take the risk of that harm', and applies where the harm was known by the doer to be likely. S1 The distinction is practical: consent to a specific harm is not the same as consent to run a risk, and a document recording one may not establish the other. The two should be pleaded distinctly.
+Does Section 25 apply to a seventeen-year-old's consent?
No. The section protects harm consented to by 'any person, above eighteen years of age'. S1 That is a higher threshold than the twelve years used in Section 27 and in Section 28(c), so Section 25 sets its own bar rather than relying on the general invalidity rule. Note also that Section 28(c) is itself qualified by the words 'unless the contrary appears from the context', so twelve is not a fixed figure across the Sanhita, and offences dealing with sexual conduct contain their own consent provisions.
+Does consenting to a game mean consenting to everything that happens in it?
No. The illustration to Section 25 is precise: an agreement to fence 'implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play', and the example turns on A 'playing fairly'. S1 Implied consent is scoped by the activity agreed upon and extends to harm ordinarily incidental to it. A deliberate foul, or an act outside the ordinary incidents of the activity, was never consented to.
+Can two adults agree to fight and escape all liability?
No, and Section 29 is the reason. It provides that the exceptions in Sections 25, 26 and 27 'do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm' which they may cause to the person giving the consent. S1 Section 25 may answer a charge founded on the hurt, but it cannot answer a charge of affray under Section 194, which provides that 'when two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace, they are said to commit an affray', punishable with up to one month's imprisonment or a fine up to one thousand rupees or both. S1 An affray is an offence against public peace and does not depend on harm to the participants at all.
+Who has to prove consent under Section 25?
The accused. Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 places the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within a General Exception on the accused and directs that the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. S5 Under Section 25 that means establishing four things: that he did not intend death or grievous hurt; that he did not know either to be likely; that the person harmed was above eighteen; and that that person consented, expressly or impliedly, either to suffer the harm or to take the risk of it. The first two are negatives about his own state of mind, ordinarily proved from the nature of the activity, the instruments used and the surrounding conduct.
+Is Section 25 the right provision for medical treatment?
Usually not. Section 25 is about harm consented to without any intention or foresight of death or grievous hurt. Medical treatment is dealt with by Section 26, which covers acts not intended to cause death done by consent in good faith for the person's benefit, and which therefore has a higher ceiling; and by Section 27 where the patient is a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind and a guardian consents, subject to four provisos; and by Section 30 where consent cannot be obtained at all. S1
+Has any court interpreted Section 25, or IPC Section 87?
No judgment construing BNS Section 25 was located; the section has been in force only since 1 July 2024 under MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which commenced the whole Sanhita except Section 106(2). S3 More unusually, no significant body of authority on IPC Section 87 was located either - a targeted search returned a single result which could not be retrieved. That is stated here rather than disguised with tangential citations. The substantial case law in this area is on Section 90 IPC, now Section 28, concerning when an apparent consent is vitiated, and it is discussed in the article on that section.
+Did the BNS change the law on consent to harm?
No. A programmatic word-level diff of IPC Section 87 against BNS Section 25 reports no substantive difference, the only token returned being a stray page number in the IPC source text. S1S4 The age of eighteen, the death-or-grievous-hurt ceiling, the express/implied distinction, the two limbs and the fencing illustration all date from 1860 and survive untouched. No section-specific legislative rationale was located, which is what one would expect for a verbatim re-enactment.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 25 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)

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