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BNS Section 24 · Deep dive

BNS Section 24: Not a Defence (Knowledge Is Imputed to a Drunk Accused, Intention Is Not)

BNS Section 24 is not a defence, and reading it as one is the commonest error made about it. It is the only provision in Chapter III that attributes a mental element to an accused rather than taking one away, and the phrase 'shall be liable to be dealt with' occurs nowhere else in the Sanhita. The section contains a drafting asymmetry that the Supreme Court had to resolve: its opening words refer to offences requiring 'a particular knowledge or intent', but its deeming limb attributes only 'the same knowledge' the accused would have had if sober. In Basdev v. The State of Pepsu the Court acknowledged that the omission created 'a certain element of doubt in interpretation' and settled a two-track rule - knowledge is attributed as if the man were quite sober, while intention 'we must gather from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication'. The threshold for negating intention is high: 'was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being?' In Basdev itself the accused was described as 'excessively drunk' and, on one witness's evidence, 'almost in an unconscious condition', yet the argument failed because he walked unaided, chose his own seat, spoke coherently at times, tried to flee and asked forgiveness afterwards - and the murder conviction stood. Section 24's proviso is identical to Section 23's, so the same factual question decides both sections in opposite directions. Section 24 reproduces IPC Section 86 word for word, a programmatic diff returning zero differences, leaving the 1956 drafting gap exactly as the Supreme Court found it.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 25 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 24 — Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 86 — Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated · substantively unchanged
Section 85 — Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will · substantively unchanged
No earlier equivalent · substantively unchanged
Section 299, 300 and 304 — Culpable homicide; murder; punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder · renumbered
Section 105 (Indian Evidence Act, 1872) — Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions · renumbered
Side-by-side converterIPC 86 → BNS 24

What the section says

Section 24 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2

24. In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

The official marginal-note title is "Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1

The odd section in the exceptions chapter

Every other provision in the first part of Chapter III takes something away from the prosecution. Sections 14 to 23 and 25 to 27, 30 and 33 all begin with some form of "Nothing is an offence…". S1

Section 24 does the opposite. It attributes a mental element to the accused that he may not actually have had. The phrase "shall be liable to be dealt with" appears nowhere else in the entire Sanhita. S1

Two other sections in the chapter also operate against an accused: s. 28 withdraws validity from certain consents, and s. 29 excludes the consent-based exceptions from acts that are offences independently of harm. S1 But neither of those imputes a state of mind. Section 24 is the only provision in Chapter III that works by deeming the accused to have had a mental element. It is a liability rule housed in an exceptions chapter, and reading it as though it were a defence is the commonest error made about it.

The drafting puzzle the Supreme Court had to solve

The section opens by referring to offences requiring "a particular knowledge or intent". It then deems the intoxicated person to have had "the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated". S1

Intent is mentioned in the first half and silently dropped from the second. Is intention to be imputed too?

The Supreme Court confronted this in Basdev v. The State of Pepsu, decided 17 April 1956, where special leave had been granted limited to the question whether the offence fell under s. 302 or s. 304 IPC having regard to s. 86. S6 The Court acknowledged the difficulty in terms: S6

"It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness knowledge is to be presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness, what about those cases where mens rea is required. Are we at liberty to place intent on the same footing, and if so, why has the section omitted intent in its latter part?"

Its answer created the two-track rule that governs the section: S6

"So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication."

KnowledgeIntention
How treatedDeemed: attributed as if soberProved: gathered from the circumstances
Does intoxication matter?NoYes: "due regard to the degree of intoxication"
SourceSection 24's express wordsSection 24's silence, as construed in Basdev

So the omission was deliberate and consequential. An intoxicated accused cannot say "I was too drunk to realise what would happen" — knowledge is imputed. He can say "I was too drunk to form the intention alleged", but he must make that good on the facts.

How intention is actually determined

Basdev supplies the test: S6

"Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts."

The threshold is therefore high: not "impaired", not "very drunk", but "beside his mind altogether". Short of that, the ordinary presumption about natural consequences operates and the intoxication adds nothing.

Motive, intention and knowledge are three different things

Because the section turns on the knowledge/intention distinction, Basdev takes care to separate the concepts: S6

"Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things."

The Court added that "even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion". S6 That caution is worth carrying into any s. 24 submission: an argument that slides between "he didn't realise", "he didn't mean to" and "he had no reason to" will not survive the section's structure.

Basdev applied: why the plea failed on the facts

The facts. The appellant, a retired military Jamadar, went with others to a wedding. At the midday meal he asked a boy of about 15 or 16, Maghar Singh, to move aside so he could take a convenient seat. The boy did not move. The appellant "whipped out a pistol and shot the boy in the abdomen". The injury proved fatal. There had been much drinking; the Sessions Judge recorded that he was "excessively drunk" and that on one witness's evidence "he was almost in an unconscious condition", and for that reason, together with "the total absence of any motive or premeditation to kill", awarded the lesser penalty of transportation for life. S6

Why the degree of drunkenness did not save him. The High Court's findings, which the Supreme Court adopted, drew the distinction Basdev requires: S6

"All that the evidence shows at the most is that at times he staggered and was incoherent in his talk, but the same evidence shows that he was also capable of moving himself independently and talking coherently as well. At the same time it is proved that he came to the darwaza of Natha Singh by himself, that he made a choice for his own seat and that is why he asked the deceased to move away from his place, that after shooting at the deceased he did attempt to get away and was secured at some short distance from the darwaza, and that when secured he realised what he had done and thus requested the witnesses to be forgiven saying that it had happened from him."

On those findings the accused "had… failed to prove such incapacity as would have been available to him as a defence, and so the law presumes that he intended the natural and probable consequences of his act". S6 The offence was not reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and "the conviction and sentence are right and the appeal is dismissed". S6

What to take from it. The evidence of capacity was ordinary and behavioural: he walked unaided, chose a seat, spoke coherently at times, tried to escape, and showed awareness afterwards by asking forgiveness. None of it was expert evidence. Those are the facts that defeat a s. 24 argument on intention, and they are the facts any practitioner should expect to be gathered.

(Characterisation: Basdev is a Supreme Court decision in which special leave was expressly limited to the s. 302 / s. 304 question in the light of s. 86, so the two-track rule is the ratio of the case on the very point, not an aside. It remains the leading authority. It construes IPC s. 86, not BNS s. 24, though the two provisions are textually identical.)

The proviso: the same gate as s. 23

Section 24's deeming rule does not apply "unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will". S1 That is word-for-word the proviso to s. 23. S1

The consequence is a clean division of labour between the two sections:

Intoxication involuntaryIntoxication voluntary
Complete exception available?Yes: s. 23, if the incapacity is also provedNo
Is knowledge imputed?No: s. 24's proviso excludes itYes: s. 24 applies
IntentionNot reached if s. 23 succeedsGathered from circumstances, with regard to degree of intoxication

So the same factual question: how did he come to be intoxicated?: governs both sections, and answers them in opposite directions.

What this means where death results

Section 24 does not create or grade any offence; it governs what mental element may be attributed. Its practical bite is therefore felt in offences whose grading depends on the distinction between intention and knowledge, and homicide is the clearest example.

Under the Sanhita, culpable homicide under s. 100 may be committed with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing bodily injury likely to cause death, or "with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death". S1 Section 105 then punishes culpable homicide not amounting to murder more severely where the act was done with intention, and less severely, up to ten years and fine, where it was done "with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death". S1 Section 101 sets out when culpable homicide is murder, including, in clause (d), where the person "knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death… and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk". S1

Two things follow, and it is important to state them carefully:

  1. Imputed knowledge does not disappear. Because s. 24 attributes knowledge as if sober, an intoxicated accused cannot escape the knowledge-based routes to liability by pleading intoxication.
  2. Negating intention does not necessarily mean acquittal. Where intention is successfully negated under the Basdev approach, the knowledge-based limbs remain available to the prosecution. That is why the argument in Basdev was about s. 302 versus s. 304: a question of grading: rather than about guilt or innocence. S6

(The mapping of Basdev's s. 302 / s. 304 analysis onto the BNS provisions is the author's, offered as analysis. The Sanhita's homicide provisions were read for this purpose, but no judgment applying s. 24 to them has been located, and nothing here should be taken as a prediction of how any homicide charge would be graded.)

A High Court application

Imtiaz Ahamed alias Imtiaz Pasha v. State, Karnataka High Court, 9 July 2001, applied both sections in sequence. Having rejected the s. 85 plea because the intoxication was self-inflicted, the Court turned to s. 86 and noted that it "is provided to meet those cases where certain guilty knowledge or intention forms part of the definition of many offences", and that "there may be cases in which a particular knowledge is an ingredient, and there may be other cases in which a particular intent is an ingredient, the two not being necessarily always identical". S8

On the facts: a quarrel the previous evening, alcohol consumed that morning, a walk of more than a furlong to the deceased's house, a knife carried, no opportunity to escape afforded, and no evidence of extreme intoxication. The Court held that "the requisite intention can be gathered from the proved facts" and that the accused was not entitled to the benefit of s. 86. The appeal was dismissed. S8

(Characterisation: a single High Court decision on a concurrent appeal, applying Basdev rather than developing it; persuasive but not binding elsewhere.)

Burden of proof: a question s. 24 complicates

Section 24 is placed among the General Exceptions, so s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies on its face: the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within a General Exception is on the accused, and "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5

In practice the burden under s. 24 splits:

  • The proviso is a circumstance the accused must establish. He must prove the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will.
  • Intention, by contrast, is an ingredient of the offence that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, and s. 24 does not relieve it of that. Basdev's language is the language of presumption and rebuttal: the accused "had… failed to prove such incapacity as would have been available to him as a defence, and so the law presumes that he intended the natural and probable consequences of his act". S6

(How precisely the burden on the intention question is allocated, whether the accused bears a burden of proving incapacity to form intention, or merely needs to raise a reasonable doubt on an ingredient the prosecution must prove: is not resolved on the face of either statute, and no judgment addressing the tension directly was located. It is flagged here as an open question rather than answered.)

Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 24 corresponds to s. 86 IPC.

FeatureIPC s. 86BNS s. 24
Operative text"In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will."Identical
Marginal title"Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated"Same, with a terminal full stop
The omission of "intent" from the deeming limbPresentPresent, not corrected
Section number8624

A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace and punctuation, returns zero differences. S1S4

The drafting gap was left in place

This deserves to be said plainly, because it is the most striking fact about s. 24.

The Supreme Court identified, in 1956, a "certain element of doubt in interpretation" arising from the omission of intent in the latter part of the section, and asked expressly: "why has the section omitted intent in its latter part?" S6 The recodification of 2023 reproduced the provision word for word, leaving the omission exactly as it stood. S1S4

No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 24 has been located in the official legislative material examined, and none would be expected for a verbatim re-enactment. The practical consequence is that the gap continues to be filled by Basdev's judicial construction rather than by the statute, so the two-track rule, though settled, is case law resting on a statutory silence that Parliament has now twice declined to fill.

Describing s. 24 as modernised, clarified or reformed would be inaccurate. The one measurable change anywhere in this cluster of provisions is in s. 355 (misconduct in public by a drunken person), where the fine ceiling rose from ten rupees to one thousand and community service was added as an alternative: a change that runs against the intoxicated person, not in his favour. S1S4

Worked examples

Hypotheticals, not decided cases.

Knowledge imputed. A voluntarily intoxicated man fires a gun into a group of people and says he was too drunk to realise anyone might be hit. Section 24 attributes to him the knowledge he would have had sober. The plea fails on knowledge. S1

Intention contested, successfully. A voluntarily intoxicated man, on evidence that he was unable to stand, speak coherently, recognise anyone or act purposively, strikes a blow that causes death. If the court finds he was "beside his mind altogether for the time being", the requisite intention cannot be fixed on him. S6 Knowledge-based liability is not thereby excluded.

Intention contested, unsuccessfully. A voluntarily intoxicated man who walked unaided, chose where to sit, spoke coherently at times, tried to flee and asked forgiveness afterwards. These were substantially the facts in Basdev, and the intention argument failed. S6

Section 24 does not apply at all. A man's drink is spiked. The proviso is satisfied, so no knowledge is imputed, and he may in addition have the complete exception under s. 23 if the required incapacity is established. S1

Mistaking the section for a defence. Counsel pleads "s. 24" as an exception for an intoxicated client. Section 24 confers no exception; it is the provision the prosecution relies on. The exception, if any, is s. 23. S1

Common misconceptions

"Section 24 is a defence for drunk offenders." It is the opposite. It attributes knowledge to the accused as if he were sober, and the phrase "shall be liable to be dealt with" appears nowhere else in the Sanhita. S1

"Intoxication negates mens rea generally." It does not touch knowledge at all, and affects intention only where the accused was "beside his mind altogether for the time being". S1S6

"Both intention and knowledge are imputed." Only knowledge. The omission of intent from the deeming limb was identified by the Supreme Court as deliberate and consequential. S6

"Neither is imputed, because the section is in the exceptions chapter." Knowledge is expressly imputed by the section's own words. Its placement does not change its effect. S1

"Being very drunk is enough to negate intention." The threshold is "beside his mind altogether", not "very drunk". In Basdev the accused was described as "excessively drunk" and "almost in an unconscious condition" by one witness, and still failed. S6

"If intention is negated, the accused is acquitted." Not necessarily. The knowledge-based routes to liability survive, which is why Basdev was argued as a grading question between s. 302 and s. 304. S6

"The BNS fixed the drafting gap." It did not. The omission of "intent" from the deeming limb was reproduced word for word. S1S4S6

  • s. 23: the complete exception for involuntary intoxication, sharing s. 24's proviso verbatim.
  • s. 22: unsoundness of mind, the source of s. 23's incapacity formula.
  • s. 28(b): consent given by a person unable to understand by reason of intoxication is not consent.
  • s. 36, private defence against an act not an offence by reason of intoxication; s. 37, restrictions on that right.
  • ss. 100, 101, 105: culpable homicide, murder and punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder: the provisions whose grading turns on the intention/knowledge distinction that s. 24 governs.
  • s. 123: administering a stupefying or intoxicating drug with intent to cause hurt or facilitate an offence: the offence committed by a person who brings s. 24's proviso into play.
  • s. 355: misconduct in public by a drunken person.
  • s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.

Sources, verification and limitations

Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against the India Code entry for s. 24 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which brought the Sanhita into force on 1 July 2024 except s. 106(2), so s. 24 has been in force since that date S3; IPC s. 86 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 24 by programmatic word-level diff, returning zero differences S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5; one Supreme Court judgment and one High Court judgment read in full text S6S8. The opening words of every section in Chapter III (ss. 14 to 44) were tabulated to establish that s. 24 is the only provision in the chapter that attributes a mental element, and the phrase "shall be liable to be dealt with" was searched across all 358 sections and found only in s. 24. S1 BNS ss. 100, 101 and 105 were read for the homicide discussion. Law checked as of the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.

Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 24 was located; Basdev and Imtiaz Ahamed construe IPC s. 86 and apply to s. 24 because the provisions are textually identical, but they should be cited as IPC decisions. The mapping of Basdev's s. 302 / s. 304 reasoning onto BNS ss. 100, 101 and 105 is the author's analysis; no judgment applying s. 24 to the Sanhita's homicide provisions has been located, and no prediction is made about how any charge would be graded. The allocation of the burden on the intention question is left open: whether the accused bears a burden of proving incapacity to form intention, or need only raise a reasonable doubt on an ingredient the prosecution must prove, is not resolved on the face of either statute and no judgment addressing the tension directly was located. The English authorities surveyed in Basdev: Rex v. Meakin [1836] 173 ER 131, Rex v. Meade [1909] 1 KB 895, Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard and R. v. Doherty [1887] 16 Cox CC 306: were not separately examined, are reported only as Basdev reports them, and are not relied on for any proposition in this article. Imtiaz Ahamed is a single High Court decision, persuasive but not binding elsewhere. BNS ss. 123 and 355 are referred to for context; their ingredients were not analysed beyond the words used. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted. Judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, which did not resolve at the time of checking; the consulted copy of Basdev contains evident transcription slips (for example "doe&" and "bad" for "had"), which have been silently corrected in the quotations without altering their sense.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether intoxication affects the mental element in a particular case depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+Is BNS Section 24 a defence for someone who commits an offence while drunk?
No - it works against the accused. Section 24 provides that a person who does the act in a state of intoxication 'shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated'. S1 It attributes a mental element rather than removing one. It is the only provision in Chapter III that does so: the opening words of every section in the chapter were tabulated, and ss. 14-23, 25-27, 30 and 33 all exempt, while the phrase 'shall be liable to be dealt with' appears nowhere else in the Sanhita. S1 The exception for intoxication, if any, is Section 23.
+Does intoxication wipe out mens rea?
No. It does not touch knowledge at all, because Section 24 imputes the knowledge the accused would have had if sober. S1 It can affect intention, but only where the accused was, in the Supreme Court's words in Basdev, 'beside his mind altogether for the time being'; short of that, 'we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts'. S6
+Why does the section mention 'intent' at the start but only 'knowledge' later?
That asymmetry is the central puzzle of the section, and the Supreme Court addressed it directly in Basdev: 'while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omission… Are we at liberty to place intent on the same footing, and if so, why has the section omitted intent in its latter part?' S6 The Court's answer was that only knowledge is deemed, while intention must be gathered from the circumstances. The BNS reproduced the provision word for word, so the omission - and the need for judicial construction to fill it - remains. S1S4
+What is the two-track rule from Basdev?
The Supreme Court stated it thus: 'So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication.' S6 So knowledge is deemed and intoxication is irrelevant to it; intention must be proved on the facts, and there the degree of intoxication does matter.
+How drunk must someone be before intention cannot be attributed?
Very drunk is not enough. Basdev poses the test as a question: 'Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts.' S6 In Basdev itself the Sessions Judge had recorded that the accused was 'excessively drunk' and that on one witness's evidence he was 'almost in an unconscious condition', and the argument still failed. S6
+What facts defeated the plea in Basdev?
Ordinary behavioural evidence, not expert evidence. The findings adopted by the Supreme Court were that although at times he staggered and was incoherent, he was 'also capable of moving himself independently and talking coherently'; he came to the house by himself; he 'made a choice for his own seat', which is why he asked the deceased to move; after the shooting he 'did attempt to get away' and was secured a short distance away; and when secured 'he realised what he had done' and asked the witnesses to forgive him, saying that it had happened from him. S6 On those findings he had failed to prove incapacity, 'and so the law presumes that he intended the natural and probable consequences of his act'. The offence was not reduced from murder to culpable homicide and the appeal was dismissed. S6
+What is the difference between motive, intention and knowledge here?
Basdev separates them because the section turns on the distinction: 'Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things.' S6 The Court added that in some English decisions the three ideas are used interchangeably, 'and this has led to a certain amount of confusion'. S6
+When does Section 24 not apply at all?
Where 'the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will'. S1 That proviso is word-for-word the proviso to Section 23, so the same factual question - how did he come to be intoxicated - governs both provisions and answers them in opposite directions. If the intoxication was involuntary, no knowledge is imputed under Section 24 and the complete exception in Section 23 may also be available if the required incapacity is established. S1
+If intention is negated, is the accused acquitted?
Not necessarily, and this is why Basdev was argued as a grading question between IPC Sections 302 and 304 rather than as a question of guilt. S6 Under the Sanhita, Section 100 makes it culpable homicide to cause death 'with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death', and Section 105 punishes that knowledge-based form with up to ten years and fine; Section 101(d) can make it murder where the person knows the act to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death and commits it without any excuse for incurring the risk. S1 Since Section 24 imputes knowledge in any event, negating intention affects grading rather than guilt. The mapping of Basdev's analysis onto these BNS provisions is offered as analysis; no judgment applying Section 24 to them was located.
+Who bears the burden under Section 24?
It splits, and part of it is genuinely unresolved. The proviso is a circumstance the accused must establish, and Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 places the burden of proving a General Exception on him while directing the court to presume the absence of such circumstances. S5 Intention, however, is an ingredient of the offence that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, and Section 24 does not relieve it of that. Basdev's language is nonetheless that of presumption and rebuttal. S6 Whether the accused bears a burden of proving incapacity to form intention, or need only raise a reasonable doubt, is not resolved on the face of either statute, and no judgment addressing the tension directly was located.
+Did the BNS fix the drafting gap in this section?
No. A programmatic word-level diff of IPC Section 86 against BNS Section 24 returns zero differences, so the omission of 'intent' from the deeming limb was reproduced exactly. S1S4 The Supreme Court had flagged the difficulty in 1956 and asked why intent had been omitted; the 2023 recodification left the answer to judicial construction. S6 No section-specific legislative rationale was located, which is what one would expect for a verbatim re-enactment. Describing Section 24 as modernised or clarified would be inaccurate.
+Has any court interpreted BNS Section 24 itself?
No judgment construing Section 24 was located in the searches conducted for this article. The section has been in force since 1 July 2024, the date appointed by MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which commenced the whole Sanhita except Section 106(2). S3 Basdev and Imtiaz Ahamed construe IPC Section 86 and apply to Section 24 because the provisions are textually identical, but they should be cited as IPC decisions rather than as decisions interpreting the BNS.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 24 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S6Basdev v. The State of Pepsu — Supreme Court of India, 17 April 1956 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S8Imtiaz Ahamed alias Imtiaz Pasha v. State by Laxmipuram Police, Mysore — Karnataka High Court, 9 July 2001 (accessed 3 October 2026)

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