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BNS Section 23 · Deep dive

BNS Section 23: Involuntary Intoxication (Why the Proviso, Not the Drunkenness, Decides the Case)

BNS Section 23 is the involuntary intoxication defence, and it is the narrowest of the capacity exceptions. Its incapacity formula is borrowed word for word from Section 22 - incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law - so everything decided about that formula in the insanity context carries across. What Section 23 adds, and what decides virtually every case, is the proviso: the intoxicant must have been 'administered to him without his knowledge or against his will'. Degree of intoxication is irrelevant to that proviso, which is the error most often made: however incapacitated a person became, if he chose to start drinking the section is closed to him, as the Karnataka High Court held in Imtiaz Ahamed, where the plea failed because 'the intoxication was self-inflicted, but not against his will nor was it administered without his knowledge'. The article also notes a mismatch between the marginal note, which speaks of a person 'incapable of judgment', and the operative text, which requires incapacity of knowing - a reader working from the title will substantially overestimate the section's reach. Section 23 is read here against three provisions that show how differently the Sanhita treats intoxication depending on whose it is: Section 123 makes administering a stupefying or intoxicating drug an offence punishable with up to ten years, Section 28(b) provides that an intoxicated person unable to understand cannot give valid consent, and Section 355 makes public drunkenness itself punishable. Section 23 reproduces IPC Section 85 word for word, with a programmatic diff returning zero differences; the only measurable change in the surrounding cluster is that the fine for public drunkenness rose from ten rupees to one thousand, with community service added.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 23 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 23 — Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 85 — Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will · substantively unchanged
Section 84 — Act of a person of unsound mind · substantively unchanged
Section 86 — Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated · substantively unchanged
Section 328 — Causing hurt by means of poison, etc., with intent to commit and offence · substantively unchanged
Section 510 — Misconduct in public by a drunken person · modified
Section 105 (Indian Evidence Act, 1872) — Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions · renumbered
Side-by-side converterIPC 85 → BNS 23

What the section says

Section 23 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2

23. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

The official marginal-note title is "Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1

This is the involuntary intoxication defence. It is the narrowest of the capacity exceptions, because almost all intoxication is self-induced, and self-induced intoxication is expressly excluded.

The section borrows s. 22's test and adds a gate

Set the two provisions side by side and the architecture becomes obvious. S1

s. 22 (unsound mind)s. 23 (intoxication)
Timing"at the time of doing it""at the time of doing it"
Cause"by reason of unsoundness of mind""by reason of intoxication"
Incapacity"incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law""incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law"
Extra conditionNoneProviso: the intoxicant must have been "administered to him without his knowledge or against his will"

The incapacity formula is word-for-word the same as s. 22's, save for one added comma. S1 Everything decided about that formula under s. 22 therefore carries across: it is a cognitive test; knowledge that the act was wrong defeats the defence even without knowledge that it was unlawful, and knowledge that it was unlawful defeats it even without knowledge that it was wrong; and the standard for "wrong" is the objective one of ordinary reasonable people. Those propositions, established in Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P. in the context of s. 84 IPC, are set out in the article on s. 22 and are not repeated here. S7

What s. 23 adds is the proviso, and the proviso, not the incapacity, is where almost every case is decided.

A title that promises more than the text delivers

The marginal note speaks of a person "incapable of judgment". The operative words require incapacity of knowing the nature of the act, or its wrongfulness or illegality. S1S2

Those are not the same idea. Impaired judgment is a matter of degree and is the ordinary consequence of drinking; incapacity to know what one is doing is a far higher threshold. The operative text controls, and a reader who works from the marginal note will substantially overestimate the section's reach. The same mismatch existed in IPC s. 85, whose marginal note was identical. S4

The proviso is the whole battleground

Two alternatives satisfy the proviso. The intoxicant must have been administered: S1

  • without his knowledge. He did not know he was consuming an intoxicant at all; or
  • against his will: he knew, but it was forced on him.

Three features of this wording deserve attention.

"Administered" points to an outside hand. The word is not "consumed" or "taken". It suggests the intoxicant came from someone or something other than the accused's own deliberate choice. A person who drinks what he knows to be liquor, in whatever quantity, has not had it administered to him.

Quantity is irrelevant to the proviso. Extreme drunkenness does not convert voluntary intoxication into involuntary intoxication. This is the error most often made. However incapacitated a person became, if he chose to start, the proviso fails and s. 23 is unavailable, though s. 24 may still affect what mens rea can be attributed to him, which is a different question.

The two limbs cover different situations. A spiked drink is administration "without his knowledge". Being held down and made to swallow something is administration "against his will". Both are within the proviso; neither requires the other.

(Two situations at the edges are worth flagging as genuinely open. A person who takes prescribed medication and suffers an unexpected intoxicating reaction has arguably had the intoxicating substance administered "without his knowledge" of its intoxicating character, even though he knowingly took the tablet. A person who consumes something he believes to be non-alcoholic, a sweet or a drink prepared by another, is on stronger ground, because he did not know he was taking an intoxicant at all. No authority was located deciding either situation under s. 85 IPC or s. 23 BNS, and both are offered as analysis, not law.)

What the cases show: the plea almost always fails on the proviso

Imtiaz Ahamed alias Imtiaz Pasha v. State, Karnataka High Court, 9 July 2001, is a clear illustration. The accused, after a quarrel with his father-in-law the previous evening, consumed alcohol that morning, walked over a furlong to the deceased's house armed with a knife, stabbed his father-in-law fatally and injured his wife and mother-in-law. S8 His drunkenness was not in dispute: "it is not necessary to prove further about the drunken condition of the accused". S8 The s. 85 plea nonetheless failed, and the reason was the proviso: S8

"Therefore, we find absolutely no evidence in support of this defence that the act was done under intoxication, as the intoxication was self-inflicted, but not against his will nor was it administered without his knowledge."

The Court then turned to s. 86 and held the requisite intention could be gathered from the proved facts: the prior quarrel, the distance walked, the knife carried, the absence of any opportunity to escape afforded to the victim. The appeal was dismissed. S8

(Characterisation: a decision of a single High Court on a concurrent appeal. It is a straightforward application of settled principle rather than a development of it, and it binds no other High Court.)

The Supreme Court has not, so far as located, decided a case in which s. 85 IPC succeeded. What it has done is place intoxication within the older taxonomy of incapacity: in Hari Singh Gond the four kinds of persons non compos mentis are listed as "(1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos by illness; (3) a lunatic or a mad man and (4) one who is drunk". S7 That taxonomy is drawn from English textbooks and is of its period; under the Sanhita the fourth category is dealt with separately by ss. 23 and 24, not by s. 22.

Who proves what

Section 23 is a General Exception, so s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies: the burden of proving the circumstances is on the accused, and "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5

The practical weight of that is heavier here than anywhere else in Chapter III, because the accused must prove two things, and the second is usually the harder:

  1. that at the time of the act he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it was wrong, or that it was contrary to law; and
  2. that the intoxicant was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

Proof of the second ordinarily requires evidence about someone else's conduct, who gave him what, and in what circumstances. A bare assertion will not do; as the Supreme Court said of the cognate exception, "mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough". S7

The mirror image: intoxication as a weapon and as an offence

Section 23 is easier to understand once it is read alongside three other provisions, because the Sanhita treats intoxication very differently depending on whose it is and how it came about.

The person who administered it commits an offence

If the proviso to s. 23 is satisfied, then by definition someone administered an intoxicant to the accused. That conduct is itself an offence. Section 123 provides: S1

"Whoever administers to or causes to be taken by any person any poison or any stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug, or other thing with intent to cause hurt to such person, or with intent to commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

So the same facts that excuse the intoxicated actor expose the person who spiked him, including where the intent was "to commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence". The maximum is ten years and the fine is mandatory ("shall also be liable to fine"). Section 123 reproduces IPC s. 328 without change of substance or punishment. S1S4

An intoxicated person cannot give valid consent

Where intoxication is the victim's, it works in the opposite direction. Section 28(b) provides that consent is not consent within the meaning of the Sanhita where it is given by a person who, "from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent". S1 Section 36 likewise preserves the right of private defence against an act that is not an offence by reason of "the intoxication of the person doing that act". S1

The asymmetry is deliberate and worth stating plainly: intoxication readily destroys a victim's consent, but only rarely excuses an accused. The reason is the proviso. The consent provisions ask only whether understanding was absent; s. 23 asks additionally how the intoxication came about.

Voluntary intoxication can itself be punishable

Finally, being drunk is not merely a failed excuse; in a public setting it is an offence in its own right. Section 355 provides: S1

"Whoever, in a state of intoxication, appears in any public place, or in any place which it is a trespass in him to enter, and there conducts himself in such a manner as to cause annoyance to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty-four hours, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both or with community service."

This is one of the few places where the recodification made a measurable change in this area. IPC s. 510 was identically worded but the fine "may extend to ten rupees", and community service was not available. S4 So the imprisonment maximum (twenty-four hours, simple) is unchanged, the fine ceiling has risen a hundredfold, and community service has been added as an alternative. S1S4

Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 23 corresponds to s. 85 IPC.

FeatureIPC s. 85BNS s. 23
Operative text"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will."Identical
Marginal title"Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will"Same, with a terminal full stop
ProvisoPresent, identicalPresent, identical
Section number8523

A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace and punctuation, returns zero differences. S1S4 Section 23 is a pure renumbering.

No reform, no rationale located, and the related provisions tell the same story

No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 23 has been located in the official legislative material examined. None would be expected for a verbatim re-enactment.

The honest summary of what the BNS did in this area is narrow but precise:

  • s. 23 (from IPC s. 85): unchanged;
  • s. 24 (from IPC s. 86): unchanged (verified by the same diff method, zero differences);
  • s. 123 (from IPC s. 328): unchanged in substance and punishment;
  • s. 355 (from IPC s. 510): fine ceiling raised from ten rupees to one thousand rupees, and community service added. S1S4

Neither "intoxication" nor "intoxicated" is defined anywhere in the Sanhita, as a search of all thirty-eight defined terms in s. 2 confirms. S1 The words appear in nine sections: ss. 23, 24, 28, 36, 63, 107, 123, 335 and 355: and in each the content of the term is left to the facts. S1 That too is carried over from the IPC rather than resolved by the recodification.

Describing s. 23 as a modernised or strengthened intoxication defence would be inaccurate. The one measurable change in the surrounding provisions went in the opposite direction, increasing the consequences of public drunkenness.

The practical benefit of the continuity is that Basdev, Hari Singh Gond and the High Court authorities on ss. 85 and 86 apply to ss. 23 and 24 directly, with no argument needed about whether the principle survives a change in wording.

Worked examples

Hypotheticals, not decided cases.

Within s. 23. A guest's soft drink is spiked at a party without his knowledge. Disoriented, he drives a parked car into a wall, causing damage. If the court finds he was incapable of knowing the nature of what he was doing, and that the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge, s. 23 applies. The person who spiked the drink faces s. 123 if the intent or knowledge there is made out. S1

Within s. 23: second limb. A man is held down by others and alcohol is forced into him. The administration was "against his will". If the resulting incapacity is established, s. 23 applies. S1

Outside s. 23: self-induced, however extreme. A man drinks heavily of his own accord and becomes, on the evidence, "almost in an unconscious condition", then shoots someone. Those were substantially the facts in Basdev v. The State of Pepsu, where the accused was described by the Sessions Judge as "excessively drunk". S6 Section 85 was not available to him at all; his argument had to be run under s. 86 on whether the requisite intention could be attributed. It failed, and the murder conviction stood. S6

Outside s. 23: drunk but knowing. A man drinks, then goes to a relative's house with a knife after an earlier quarrel and stabs him. Even ignoring the proviso, the conduct shows he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. On Imtiaz Ahamed's reasoning, the plea fails twice over. S8

Outside s. 23, but s. 24 may matter. A voluntarily intoxicated man is charged with an offence requiring a particular intention. Section 23 is closed to him. Section 24 then governs: knowledge is attributed to him as if sober, while intention must still be gathered from the circumstances with due regard to the degree of intoxication. S1S6

The victim's side. An intoxicated person purports to consent to something harmful. If he was unable to understand the nature and consequence of what he was consenting to, that is not consent at all under s. 28(b): regardless of whether his intoxication was voluntary. S1

Common misconceptions

"If he was drunk enough, he is excused." No. Degree of intoxication is irrelevant to the proviso. Unless the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will, s. 23 is unavailable no matter how drunk he was. S1S6S8

"Involuntary intoxication is a defence because the title says 'incapable of judgment'." The operative text requires incapacity of knowing the nature of the act, or its wrongfulness or illegality: a much higher threshold than impaired judgment. S1

"He didn't know it was illegal, so s. 23 applies." Not by itself. The incapacity formula is the same as s. 22's, and knowledge that the act was wrong defeats the defence even without knowledge of illegality, and vice versa. S7

"Drunkenness is covered by the insanity provision." It is not. Hari Singh Gond's historical taxonomy lists "one who is drunk" among persons non compos mentis, but the Sanhita deals with intoxication separately in ss. 23 and 24, and s. 22 requires unsoundness of mind. S1S7

"The prosecution must disprove involuntary intoxication." No. The burden is on the accused under s. 108 BSA, and the court presumes the absence of the circumstances. S5

"Nobody is liable where the accused was involuntarily intoxicated." The accused may be excused, but the person who administered the intoxicant is exposed under s. 123, with a maximum of ten years and a mandatory fine. S1

"The BNS strengthened the intoxication defence." It reproduced IPC s. 85 word for word. The only measurable change in this cluster of provisions is that public drunkenness under s. 355 now carries a fine of up to one thousand rupees rather than ten, with community service added. S1S4

  • s. 24: offences requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated; the companion rule for voluntary intoxication, sharing s. 23's proviso.
  • s. 22: unsoundness of mind; the source of the incapacity formula s. 23 reuses.
  • ss. 20–21: incapacity by age.
  • s. 28(b): consent given by a person unable to understand by reason of intoxication is not consent.
  • s. 36: private defence against an act that is not an offence by reason of intoxication; s. 37: restrictions on that right.
  • s. 63: rape, where consent is vitiated by, among other things, intoxication or the administration of a stupefying substance.
  • s. 107: abetment of suicide of, among others, a person in a state of intoxication.
  • s. 123: administering poison or a stupefying or intoxicating drug with intent to cause hurt or to facilitate an offence.
  • s. 355: misconduct in public by a drunken person.
  • s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.

Sources, verification and limitations

Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against the India Code entry for s. 23 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which brought the Sanhita into force on 1 July 2024 except s. 106(2), so s. 23 has been in force since that date S3; IPC s. 85 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 23 by programmatic word-level diff, returning zero differences, with the same check run for IPC s. 86 against BNS s. 24, IPC s. 328 against BNS s. 123 and IPC s. 510 against BNS s. 355 S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5; two Supreme Court judgments and one High Court judgment read in full text S6S7S8. The s. 2 definitions were enumerated to confirm that "intoxication" is undefined, and every section of the Sanhita using the word was identified. Law checked as of the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.

Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 23 was located. No case was located in which the s. 85 IPC defence succeeded, in the Supreme Court or otherwise, on the searches conducted; the article therefore does not assert how such a case would be decided, and the worked examples within the section are expressly hypothetical. Imtiaz Ahamed is a single High Court decision, persuasive but not binding elsewhere. The two edge situations discussed (prescribed medication with an unexpected intoxicating effect, and consumption of something believed to be non-alcoholic) are labelled as analysis, no authority on either having been located. The propositions about the incapacity formula are carried across from the s. 22 analysis rather than re-established here, and the authority for them is Hari Singh Gond, a decision on s. 84 IPC. The common-law taxonomy quoted from Hari Singh Gond is reproduced as that judgment's reasoning, drawn there from English textbooks, which were not consulted. The English authorities discussed in Basdev (Rex v. Meakin, Rex v. Meade, Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard and R. v. Doherty) were not separately examined and are not relied on; they are mentioned in the companion article on s. 24 only as Basdev reports them. BNS ss. 63, 107, 123, 335 and 355 are referred to for context; their offences, ingredients and punishments were not analysed beyond the words quoted. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted. Judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, which did not resolve at the time of checking.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether s. 23 protects a particular accused depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+When does BNS Section 23 actually apply?
Only where two things are established. First, that at the time of the act the accused was, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he was doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. Second - and this is the gate that closes most cases - that the thing which intoxicated him 'was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will'. S1 A spiked drink satisfies the first limb of the proviso; being forced to swallow something satisfies the second.
+If someone was extremely drunk, does Section 23 apply?
No. Degree of intoxication is irrelevant to the proviso. However incapacitated a person became, if he chose to start drinking, the intoxication was self-induced and Section 23 is unavailable. S1 In Basdev v. The State of Pepsu the accused was described by the Sessions Judge as 'excessively drunk' and, on one witness's evidence, 'almost in an unconscious condition' - yet Section 85 was simply not available to him, and his argument had to be run under Section 86 instead. S6 That said, failing Section 23 does not end the matter: Section 24 then governs what mental element may be attributed to him.
+Why does the section's title mention 'judgment' when the text does not?
This is a genuine mismatch, carried over unchanged from IPC Section 85. The marginal note is 'Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will', but the operative words require incapacity of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law. S1S2S4 Impaired judgment is a matter of degree and is the ordinary consequence of drinking; incapacity to know what one is doing is a far higher threshold. The operative text controls, and a reader who works from the title will substantially overestimate the section's reach.
+Is the test under Section 23 the same as the insanity test under Section 22?
The incapacity formula is the same - word for word, apart from one additional comma. S1 So the judicial construction of that formula applies to both: the test is cognitive, not volitional; and knowledge that the act was wrong defeats the defence even without knowledge that it was unlawful, and knowledge that it was unlawful defeats it even without knowledge that it was wrong, as the Supreme Court explained in Hari Singh Gond. S7 The differences between the two sections are the cause of the incapacity and Section 23's additional proviso.
+What did the court decide in Imtiaz Ahamed?
The accused, after a quarrel with his father-in-law the previous evening, drank that morning, walked over a furlong to the deceased's house carrying a knife, stabbed his father-in-law fatally and injured his wife and mother-in-law. His drunkenness was not in dispute. The Karnataka High Court nonetheless rejected the Section 85 plea, holding: 'we find absolutely no evidence in support of this defence that the act was done under intoxication, as the intoxication was self-inflicted, but not against his will nor was it administered without his knowledge.' S8 It then held under Section 86 that the requisite intention could be gathered from the prior quarrel, the distance walked, the knife carried and the absence of any chance to escape. The appeal was dismissed. It is a decision of a single High Court, persuasive but not binding elsewhere.
+Who has to prove involuntary intoxication?
The accused, and the burden is heavier here than for any other exception in Chapter III. Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 places the burden of proving a General Exception on the accused and directs that the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. S5 Under Section 23 the accused must prove both the incapacity and the involuntary administration, and proof of the second ordinarily requires evidence about someone else's conduct - who gave him what, and in what circumstances. A bare assertion will not do.
+If a person's drink was spiked, is anyone liable for what happened?
Yes - the person who spiked it. Section 123 punishes whoever 'administers to or causes to be taken by any person any poison or any stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug, or other thing with intent to cause hurt to such person, or with intent to commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause hurt' with imprisonment of either description up to ten years and a mandatory fine. S1 So the same facts that excuse the intoxicated actor under Section 23 expose the person who administered the intoxicant. Section 123 reproduces IPC Section 328 without change, a programmatic diff returning zero differences. S1S4
+Does intoxication affect consent?
Yes, and in the opposite direction from the defence. Section 28(b) provides that consent is not consent within the meaning of the Sanhita where given by a person who, 'from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent'. S1 The asymmetry is worth stating plainly: intoxication readily destroys a victim's consent but only rarely excuses an accused. The reason is the proviso - the consent provision asks only whether understanding was absent, while Section 23 asks additionally how the intoxication came about.
+Can being drunk itself be an offence?
In a public setting, yes. Section 355 punishes whoever, in a state of intoxication, 'appears in any public place, or in any place which it is a trespass in him to enter, and there conducts himself in such a manner as to cause annoyance to any person' with simple imprisonment up to twenty-four hours, or a fine up to one thousand rupees, or both, or with community service. S1 This is also the one measurable change the BNS made in this cluster: a programmatic diff against IPC Section 510 shows the fine ceiling rising from ten rupees to one thousand rupees and community service being added, with the conduct element and the twenty-four-hour maximum unchanged. S1S4
+Is 'intoxication' defined in the BNS?
No. An enumeration of all thirty-eight defined terms in Section 2 confirms that neither 'intoxication' nor 'intoxicated' is among them. S1 The words appear in nine sections - 23, 24, 28, 36, 63, 107, 123, 335 and 355 - and in each the content of the term is left to be worked out on the facts. S1 That position is carried over from the IPC rather than resolved by the recodification.
+Did the BNS change the law on intoxication?
Not the defences. Programmatic word-level diffs return zero differences for IPC Section 85 against BNS Section 23, for IPC Section 86 against BNS Section 24, and for IPC Section 328 against BNS Section 123. S1S4 No section-specific legislative rationale was located, which is what one would expect for verbatim re-enactments. The only measurable change is in Section 355, and it runs against the intoxicated person: the fine for public drunkenness rose from ten rupees to one thousand, with community service added as an alternative. S1S4 Describing Section 23 as a modernised or strengthened intoxication defence would be inaccurate.
+Has any court interpreted BNS Section 23, and has the defence ever succeeded?
No judgment construing Section 23 was located; the section has been in force since 1 July 2024 under MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which commenced the whole Sanhita except Section 106(2). S3 More significantly, no case was located on the searches conducted in which the Section 85 IPC defence actually succeeded, in the Supreme Court or otherwise. This article therefore does not assert how such a case would be decided, and the examples given of conduct falling within the section are expressly hypothetical.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 23 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S6Basdev v. The State of Pepsu — Supreme Court of India, 17 April 1956 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S7Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P. — Supreme Court of India, 29 August 2008 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S8Imtiaz Ahamed alias Imtiaz Pasha v. State by Laxmipuram Police, Mysore — Karnataka High Court, 9 July 2001 (accessed 3 October 2026)

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