What the section says
Section 20 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is thirteen words long: S1S2
20. Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.
The official marginal-note title is "Act of a child under seven years of age." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1
There is no proviso, no exception, no explanation and no illustration. That bareness is the whole point of the section, and it is what distinguishes it from every other capacity provision in the Sanhita.
An absolute rule, not a presumption to be rebutted
Section 20 states a conclusion of law. Once the child's age is established as under seven, the enquiry ends. The prosecution cannot reopen it by proving that this particular child was unusually intelligent, understood perfectly what he was doing, planned it, concealed it afterwards, or admitted it. None of that is relevant, because s. 20 does not ask about understanding at all.
Compare the section that follows. Section 21 protects a child above seven and under twelve only "who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion". S1 That is a question of fact, decided child by child and occasion by occasion. Section 20 contains no such qualification.
The Supreme Court drew exactly this contrast in Kakoo v. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided 27 February 1976: S6
"Under the Penal Code, an infant under seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing crime. At this age he is not endowed with any discretion to distinguish right from wrong (Section 82). Even a child between seven and twelve who may not have attained sufficient maturity of understanding to entertain a criminal intent (doli incapax), is presumed to be incapable of committing an offence (Section 83)."
The words "conclusively presumed" matter. A conclusive presumption is not a starting point that evidence can displace; it is a rule of law expressed in the language of presumption.
(Characterisation of the authority: Kakoo was an appeal confined to the question of sentence. A 13-year-old had been convicted of rape and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment; the Court reduced the sentence to one year's rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 2,000, directed that he be detained separately from adult prisoners and preferably in a reformatory school, and ordered the fine to be paid as compensation to the victim's mother. S6 The passage on ss. 82 and 83 was part of the Court's reasoning on why child offenders are treated differently, not a holding on the construction of s. 82, which was not in issue. The appellant was 13. It is therefore an authoritative Supreme Court characterisation of the provision, but strictly an observation.)
Why "nothing is an offence" does more work than "shall not be punished"
The drafting choice is deliberate and has consequences well beyond the child.
Section 20 does not say the child shall be excused, acquitted, or not punished. It says nothing is an offence. No offence comes into existence at all. The act remains an act, and it may be a tort, a tragedy, or a ground for protective intervention, but it is not a crime.
Three consequences follow, and each is traceable to express provisions of the Sanhita or of the Juvenile Justice framework.
1. The Sanhita uses this very section to explain how all general exceptions work
Section 3(1) provides that throughout the Sanhita every definition of an offence and every penal provision "shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled General Exceptions, though those exceptions are not repeated". Of all the examples available, the illustration the drafter chose is this one: S1
"(a) The sections in this Sanhita, which contain definitions of offences, do not express that a child under seven years of age cannot commit such offences; but the definitions are to be understood subject to the general exception which provides that nothing shall be an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age."
So s. 20 is not merely one exception among many. It is the Sanhita's own worked example of the mechanism by which Chapter III is read into every offence definition, which is why no offence section needs to carry an age qualification of its own.
2. The adult behind the child is fully liable, and the Sanhita says so expressly
A person who uses a child under seven as an instrument gains nothing from s. 20. Section 46, Explanation 3 provides that "it is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence", and Illustration (b) to that Explanation is written around a child of exactly this age: S1
"(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act in the absence of A and thereby causes Z's death. Here, though B was not capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable to be punished in the same manner as if B had been capable by law of committing an offence, and had committed murder, and he is therefore subject to the punishment of death."
That is the sharpest possible answer to the suggestion that s. 20 creates a loophole. The child's immunity is complete; the instigator's exposure is capital.
Separately, the BNS creates a distinct offence for this conduct. Section 95 provides: S1
"Whoever hires, employs or engages any child to commit an offence shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to ten years, and with fine; and if the offence be committed shall also be punished with the punishment provided for that offence as if the offence has been committed by such person himself."
Explanation. — Hiring, employing, engaging or using a child for sexual exploitation or pornography is covered within the meaning of this section.
Three features of s. 95 are worth noting precisely. The minimum sentence is three years and is mandatory. The fine is mandatory ("and with fine"), not an alternative. And where the offence is actually committed, the punishment for that offence is imposed in addition, as if the hirer had committed it himself. "Child" here carries the s. 2(3) meaning, any person below eighteen, so s. 95 is far wider than s. 20's seven-year threshold. S1
No corresponding IPC provision was located. A search of the IPC's section titles for child-related offences returns ss. 82, 83, 89, 305, 315, 316, 317 and 369, none of which penalises hiring or employing a child to commit an offence; the nearest IPC provision on hiring, s. 150, concerns hiring persons to join an unlawful assembly. S4 Section 95 therefore appears to be a genuinely new offence rather than a renumbered one. (This is a negative search result on section titles, not proof that no IPC provision could ever have covered such conduct through abetment; abetment liability under IPC s. 109 read with s. 108 Explanation 3 existed throughout.)
3. Private defence against the child's act is unaffected
Because no offence is committed, a person attacked by a child under seven might appear to have no right of private defence, which under s. 35 is a right against an offence. S1 Section 36 closes that gap expressly: where an act would otherwise be an offence but is not, "by reason of the youth" of the person doing it, "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence". S1 The immunity protects the child from prosecution; it does not disarm the victim.
Proving the age
Section 20 turns entirely on a fact, and the fact must be established.
The burden lies on the accused. Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 places the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within any General Exception on the accused, and directs that "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5 In practice, in a case involving a very young child the age will usually be obvious or uncontested, but as a matter of law it is not presumed in the child's favour.
Where a juvenile justice authority is involved, a statutory procedure applies. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 governs presumption and determination of age: S9
- Where it is obvious from appearance that the person is a child, the Committee or Board "shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be" and proceed without waiting for further confirmation (s. 94(1));
- Where there is reasonable doubt, age is determined by seeking, in a prescribed order of preference: (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate; failing which (ii) the birth certificate from a corporation, municipal authority or panchayat; and only in the absence of both, (iii) an ossification test or other latest medical age determination test, to be completed within fifteen days of the order (s. 94(2));
- The age so recorded "shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person" (s. 94(3)).
The hierarchy is mandatory in form: medical testing is a last resort, not a first option. Note also that s. 94(3) deems the age true "for the purpose of this Act", that is, for the purposes of the JJ Act, which is a point of some practical importance when the same age question arises in a BNS prosecution of an adult co-accused.
What actually happens to the child
This is the question readers most often have, and the answer turns on definitions rather than on s. 20 itself.
The JJ Act defines a "child in conflict with law" as "a child who is alleged or found to have committed an offence and who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date of commission of such offence" (s. 2(13)). S8 Because s. 20 means that nothing done by a child under seven is an offence, a child under seven does not, on the face of that definition, answer the description of a child in conflict with law.
What the JJ Act does provide is the separate category of a "child in need of care and protection" (s. 2(14)), which is defined by the child's circumstances, including a child residing with a person who has injured, exploited, abused or neglected the child, a child whose parent or guardian is found unfit or incapacitated to care for and protect the child's safety and well-being, and a child found vulnerable to being inducted into drug abuse or trafficking. S8 A child under seven whose act has caused serious harm may well fall within one or more of those limbs, and the Child Welfare Committee route is then the applicable one.
Section 1(4) of the JJ Act reinforces that this framework, rather than ordinary criminal process, occupies the field: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all matters concerning children in need of care and protection and children in conflict with law, including — (i) apprehension, detention, prosecution, penalty or imprisonment, rehabilitation and social re-integration of children in conflict with law…" S10
(The inference that a child under seven cannot be a "child in conflict with law" follows from reading BNS s. 20 with JJ Act s. 2(13), and is identified here as analysis. No judgment on the point was located. The practical handling of such children is governed by the JJ Act and the rules and procedures made under it, which have not been examined for this article.)
A drafting point worth knowing: the JJ Act still refers to the IPC
The JJ Act's definitions of "heinous offences" (s. 2(33)) and "petty offences" (s. 2(45)) are both pegged to punishments "under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force". S8 The IPC was repealed by BNS s. 358(1) with effect from 1 July 2024. S1S3
The gap is closed by s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897: S11
"Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted."
So the JJ Act's IPC references are to be read as references to the corresponding BNS provisions. BNS s. 358(4) separately preserves the general application of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act to the effect of the repeal. S1 The point is mechanical rather than dramatic, but it matters: a reader who notices that the JJ Act still names a repealed statute should not conclude that its categories have ceased to operate.
Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 20 corresponds to s. 82 IPC.
| Feature | IPC s. 82 | BNS s. 20 |
|---|---|---|
| Operative text | "Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age." | Identical |
| Marginal title | "Act of a child under seven years of age" | Same, with a terminal full stop |
| Age threshold | Seven | Seven: unchanged |
| Nature of the rule | Absolute | Absolute |
| Section number | 82 | 20 |
A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace and punctuation, returns zero differences. S1S4 Section 20 is a pure renumbering.
The age of seven was not raised, and no section-specific rationale was located
This deserves to be stated plainly, because a recodification is the natural occasion to revisit such a threshold and the BNS did not do so.
No section-specific legislative rationale for retaining seven has been located in the official legislative material examined for this article. What can be said accurately is:
- the threshold is unchanged from 1860;
- the Sanhita contains no transitional or qualifying language around it; and
- the surrounding architecture did change in one respect relevant to children: s. 95 creates a new offence of hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence, which is directed at adults who exploit the very incapacity s. 20 confers. S1
In Salil Bali v. Union of India, decided 17 July 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed writ petitions challenging the juvenile justice framework's treatment of persons under eighteen. S7 Two cautions are necessary before that decision is pressed into service here. First, the case concerned the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which has since been replaced by the 2015 Act. Second, the references in the judgment to ss. 82 and 83 IPC, and to comparative material such as the Canadian age of twelve and Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, appear in the Court's recital of counsel's submissions, not in its own reasoning. S7 The Court's own conclusion was narrower:
"we do not think that any interference is necessary with the provisions of the Statute till such time as sufficient data is available to warrant any change in the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules. On the other hand, the implementation of the various enactments relating to children, would possibly yield better results." S7
The Court's stated rationale for eighteen as the juvenile justice threshold was that the scheme is "restorative and not retributive", and that the age was fixed "on account of the understanding of experts in child psychology and behavioural patterns that till such an age the children in conflict with law could still be redeemed and restored to mainstream society". S7
Salil Bali is therefore authority that the juvenile justice age threshold has withstood constitutional challenge. It is not authority on the age of criminal responsibility in s. 82 IPC or s. 20 BNS, and should not be cited as if it were.
Two thresholds, doing two different jobs
Much confusion about children and criminal law comes from conflating two independent questions.
| Capacity (BNS ss. 20–21) | Juvenile justice (JJ Act, 2015) | |
|---|---|---|
| Question asked | Is this an offence at all? | How is a child who commits an offence dealt with? |
| Threshold | Under 7: never an offence. 7–12: no offence if immature understanding. | Under 18 at the date of commission |
| Effect | No offence comes into existence | An offence exists, but the child is dealt with under a separate framework |
| Where found | Substantive penal law | Special law, with an overriding clause in s. 1(4) |
A 15-year-old who commits theft commits an offence, ss. 20 and 21 do not reach him, but he is dealt with as a child in conflict with law. A 6-year-old who does the same act commits no offence at all. The JJ Act never has to ask about capacity, and the BNS never has to ask about rehabilitation.
Worked examples
These are hypotheticals, not decided cases.
Clear case. A six-year-old takes a neighbour's phone and sells it. No offence. The child's evident understanding, and any admission, are irrelevant: s. 20 does not make understanding a question. S1
The adult behind it. The same child is sent by an uncle to take the phone. The uncle is liable as an abettor, punishable as if the child had been capable of committing the offence (s. 46, Explanation 3), and separately exposed to s. 95 with its three-year minimum and mandatory fine. S1
Age in dispute. A child said to be "about seven" causes a fire. The age is not presumed in his favour; the burden of establishing it lies on the defence under s. 108 BSA. S5 If a juvenile justice authority is seized of the matter, s. 94 of the JJ Act governs, and a medical test may be ordered only if neither a school/matriculation certificate nor a municipal or panchayat birth certificate is available. S9
Just over the line. A child aged seven years and two months does the same act. Section 20 is unavailable. Section 21 may apply, but only if the defence establishes that he had not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion: a fact-specific enquiry. S1
Defending oneself. A six-year-old attacks a person with a heavy object. The attacker commits no offence, but s. 36 gives the person attacked the same right of private defence as if it were an offence: subject to the ordinary restrictions in s. 37. S1
Common misconceptions
"A child under seven gets a lighter sentence." There is no sentence, because there is no offence. Section 20 is not a mitigating factor; it is a complete bar. S1
"It can be rebutted if the child clearly knew what he was doing." It cannot. That enquiry belongs to s. 21, which applies to the 7–12 group. The Supreme Court in Kakoo described the under-seven rule as a conclusive presumption. S6
"The child will be sent to a juvenile home as a child in conflict with law." That description depends on an offence having been committed, which s. 20 excludes. The applicable JJ Act category is "child in need of care and protection" where the circumstances in s. 2(14) are satisfied. S8
"The BNS raised the age of criminal responsibility." It did not. The text is word-for-word identical to IPC s. 82. S1S4
"Nobody can be prosecuted for what the child did." The child cannot. An adult who instigated, hired, employed or engaged the child can be, and under s. 46, Explanation 3, Illustration (b), to the same extent as if the child had been capable of committing murder. S1
"Section 20 means the act has no legal consequences." It means the act is not an offence. Civil liability, protective proceedings under the JJ Act, and the victim's right of private defence under s. 36 are all unaffected. S1S8
Related provisions
- s. 21: child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding; the fact-sensitive counterpart to s. 20.
- s. 22: act of a person of unsound mind; the other incapacity exception, which asks about knowledge of the nature or wrongfulness of the act.
- s. 3(1) and Illustration (a): how the General Exceptions are read into every offence definition, illustrated by this very section.
- s. 2(3): "child" means any person below eighteen; the general definition, which s. 20 narrows to seven for its own purpose.
- s. 36: private defence against the act of a child or other person lacking capacity; s. 37: the restrictions on that right.
- s. 46, Explanation 3 and Illustration (b): abetment of a person not capable by law of committing an offence.
- s. 95: hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence.
- s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.
- JJ Act, 2015: ss. 1(4), 2(12), 2(13), 2(14) and 94.
- s. 358 BNS (repeal of the IPC and savings; s. 8, General Clauses Act, 1897) construction of references to the repealed Code.
Sources, verification and limitations
Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against
the India Code entry for s. 20 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E),
which brought the Sanhita into force on 1 July 2024 except s. 106(2), so s. 20 has been in force since
that date S3; IPC s. 82 verified against the India Code text of the IPC and compared with s. 20 by
programmatic word-level diff, returning zero differences S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5; the JJ
Act provisions read from the India Code section-level entries for the Central Act (Act 2 of 2016)
S8S9S10; s. 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 read verbatim S11; both Supreme Court judgments
read in full text S6S7. Law checked as of the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.
Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 20 was located; the authorities used are IPC and JJ Act decisions, and the operative text of s. 20 being identical to s. 82, they apply on their own terms. The Kakoo passage is an authoritative Supreme Court characterisation but strictly an observation in a sentencing appeal. In Salil Bali the ss. 82–83 and comparative material appear in counsel's submissions, not the Court's reasoning, and the case concerned the superseded JJ Act of 2000; it is not relied on for any proposition about the age of criminal responsibility. No section-specific legislative rationale for retaining the age of seven was located, and none is asserted. The conclusion that a child under seven falls outside the JJ Act definition of "child in conflict with law" is drawn from reading the two statutes together and is labelled as analysis; the rules and procedures made under the JJ Act, and the practical handling of such children, have not been examined. The statement that s. 95 has no IPC counterpart rests on a search of IPC section titles and on the absence of any hiring provision other than s. 150; abetment liability under the IPC existed independently. Judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, which did not resolve at the time of checking.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.