What the section says
Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2
22. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
The official marginal-note title is "Act of a person of unsound mind." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1
This is India's insanity defence. It is also the most frequently misunderstood provision in Chapter III, because the clinical question ("was he mentally ill?") and the legal question ("was he incapable of knowing X?") are different questions, and only the second one is in the section.
The structure: one gateway, two alternative incapacities
Section 22 has a gateway condition and then two alternative routes through it. S1
The gateway: the incapacity must exist at the time of doing the act, and must arise by reason of unsoundness of mind. Both limbs are essential. An incapacity arising from some other cause is not within s. 22, and unsoundness of mind at some other time is irrelevant.
The two routes. The accused must be incapable of knowing either:
- (a) the nature of the act; or
- (b) that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
The Supreme Court parsed this structure with unusual precision in Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P., decided 29 August 2008: S8
"The accused is protected not only when, on account of insanity, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, but also when he did not know either that the act was wrong or that it was contrary to law, although he might know the nature of the act itself. He is, however, not protected if he knew that what he was doing was wrong, even if he did not know that it was contrary to law, and also if he knew that what he was doing was contrary to law even though he did not know that it was wrong."
That second sentence is the one practitioners most often get backwards. Read carefully, limb (b) is structured so that knowledge of either wrongfulness or illegality defeats the defence. The accused must have been incapable of knowing both that it was wrong and that it was contrary to law. The "or" in "wrong or contrary to law" is not a choice offered to the accused; it is a pair of exits for the prosecution.
| What the accused knew | Section 22 available? |
|---|---|
| Nothing about the nature of the act | Yes, limb (a) |
| The nature of the act, but neither that it was wrong nor that it was unlawful | Yes, limb (b) |
| The nature of the act, and that it was wrong, but not that it was unlawful | No |
| The nature of the act, and that it was unlawful, but not that it was wrong | No |
"Unsoundness of mind" is not defined, and legal insanity is not medical insanity
The Sanhita nowhere defines "unsoundness of mind". This was true of the IPC as well, and the courts have addressed it directly.
In Hari Singh Gond the Court said: S8
"Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. There is no definition of 'unsoundness of mind' in the IPC. Courts have, however, mainly treated this expression as equivalent to insanity. But the term 'insanity' itself has no precise definition. It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. So, every person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto exempted from criminal responsibility. A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical insanity. A Court is concerned with legal insanity, and not with medical insanity."
Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, decided 6 January 2011, put the same point as a direct instruction: "an accused who seeks exoneration from liability of an act under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity". S9
The practical consequence is the single most important thing to understand about s. 22: a diagnosis is not a defence. A psychiatric report establishing schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or any other condition proves medical insanity. It becomes legal insanity only if it supports the conclusion that, at the moment of the act, the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of what he did, or that it was wrong, or that it was unlawful.
What is not enough
Surendra Mishra lists the matters that do not attract the section. The accused being "conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is not quite all right", physical and mental ailments having "rendered his intellect weak and affected his emotions", indulging "in certain unusual acts", having "fits of insanity at short intervals", being "subject to epileptic fits", "abnormal behaviour" or behaviour that "is queer". None of these is sufficient. S9 Hari Singh Gond contains a materially identical list. S8
Hari Singh Gond adds the doctrinal reason: S8
"It is only unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground of exemption from criminal responsibility."
Hence: S8
"Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under Section 84 as the law contained in that section is still squarely based on the outdated M'Naghten rules of 19th Century England."
Two things are worth noting about that sentence. First, it excludes the volitional and emotional: a person who knew exactly what he was doing and that it was wrong, but could not stop himself, is outside s. 22. There is no "irresistible impulse" defence in Indian law. Second, the Supreme Court itself describes the test as "outdated": a judicial criticism of the provision, not a defence of it. The Court recorded that s. 84 is "in substance the same as that laid down in the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by the House of Lords, in M'Naghten's case (1843) 4 St. Tr. (NS) 847". S8 The BNS re-enacted it unchanged anyway.
(Note on the consulted text: the judgment copy relied on renders the case name variously as "Naughton" and "M Naughton"; it is the decision universally known as M'Naghten's Case. The same copy refers to the "Indian Evidence Act, 1972", plainly a slip for 1872.) S8
The four historical categories
Hari Singh Gond reproduces the common-law taxonomy of persons non compos mentis (not of sound mind): "(1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos by illness; (3) a lunatic or a mad man; and (4) one who is drunk", drawing on Archbold, Russell on Crimes and Hale's Pleas of the Crown. S8 The Court also defines a lucid interval: S8
"A lucid interval of an insane person is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the person soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not necessarily mean complete or perfect restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition."
This vocabulary is of its period and the fourth category, drunkenness, is now dealt with separately by ss. 23 and 24. The taxonomy is set out here because it is part of the leading judgment's reasoning, not because the language should be reproduced in modern pleadings.
The crucial time is the moment of the act
Section 22 fixes the enquiry at "the time of doing it". S1 Hari Singh Gond: "The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit of this section should be given or not, is the material time when the offence takes place." S8 Surendra Mishra records the same rule from State of M.P. v. Ahmadull, AIR 1961 SC 998: the burden is to prove that "the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by the section". S9
Because the state of mind at a single past moment is almost never directly provable, the courts allow it to be inferred from surrounding conduct: S8
"Behaviour, antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, may be relevant in finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the event, but not that remote in time. … some indication thereof is often furnished by the conduct of the offender while committing it or immediately after the commission of the offence."
The conduct indicators
Where previous insanity is proved or admitted, Hari Singh Gond adopts Mayne's summary of the considerations that bear on the question: S8
"Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the act; whether it was done in a manner which showed a desire to concealment; whether after the crime, the offender showed consciousness of guilt and made efforts to avoid detection; whether, after his arrest, he offered false excuses and made false statements."
and the test Bramwell put to a jury: S8
"Would the prisoner have committed the act if there had been a policeman at his elbow?"
The Court was careful about the limits of these tests: they "are good for cases in which previous insanity is more or less established", and "are not always reliable where there is, what Mayne calls, 'inferential insanity'". S8 The distinction matters — the Court separates cases "in which insanity is more or less proved and the question is only as to the degree of irresponsibility" from cases "in which insanity is sought to be proved in respect of a person, who for all intents and purposes, appears sane". S8
Absence of motive proves nothing
Hari Singh Gond is explicit: "Mere absence of motive for a crime, howsoever atrocious it may be, cannot in the absence of plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this section." S8 The Court relied on Sheralli Wali Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra (1972 Cr.LJ 1523 (SC)), where the fact that no motive was proved for the accused murdering his wife and child, and that he made no attempt to run away when the door was broken open, "would not indicate that he was insane or that he did not have necessary mens rea for the offence". S8
The Court also warned against the opposite error: "it would be dangerous to admit the defence of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime". S8 The grotesqueness of an act is not evidence of insanity.
Who proves what, and the escape route most readers miss
Section 22 is a General Exception, so s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies: the burden of proving circumstances bringing the case within it "is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5 Illustration (a) to s. 108 is itself an insanity example: "A, accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act. The burden of proof is on A." S5
But the burden is a civil-standard burden, and there is a further route to acquittal that survives even total failure to discharge it. The governing statement is in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, (1964) 7 SCR 361, set out verbatim in Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, decided 2 July 2018: S10
"(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea, and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.
(3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged."
Proposition (3) is the one that is most often overlooked, and it changes how the defence should be run. A s. 22 plea that falls short of proving legal insanity is not therefore a wasted plea: the same material may still create a reasonable doubt about mens rea, and acquittal then follows on the prosecution's own burden, not on the exception at all.
Devidas Loka Rathod is a worked example of exactly that. The appellant had been convicted under ss. 302 and 324 IPC after picking up a sickle and assaulting several people, killing one who tried to intervene. S10 The Supreme Court allowed the appeal: S10
"the appellant has been able to create sufficient doubt in our mind that he is entitled to the benefit of the exception under section 84 I.P.C. because of the preponderance of his medical condition at the time of occurrence, as revealed from the materials and evidence on record. The prosecution cannot be said to have established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant is therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal."
Note the reasoning route: not "legal insanity conclusively proved", but "sufficient doubt" arising from the "preponderance of his medical condition". That is proposition (3) in action.
Surendra Mishra supplies the necessary counterweight: "Mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough for availing of the benefit of the exceptions under Chapter IV." S9 The accused's own assertion, unsupported, achieves nothing. In that case the conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed; S9 in Hari Singh Gond the trial court and High Court were held to have "rightly held that Section 84 IPC has no application", and the appeal was dismissed. S8 Two of the three leading cases discussed here are failures of the plea. That is the realistic picture.
The investigating officer's duty: an under-used point
Hari Singh Gond states a proposition that cuts in the accused's favour and is frequently not pressed: S8
"The onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the accused. But where during the investigation previous history of insanity is revealed, it is the duty of an honest investigator to subject the accused to a medical examination and place that evidence before the Court and if this is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused."
So a documented history of mental illness known to the investigation imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution. Failure to discharge it is "a serious infirmity in the prosecution case" attracting the benefit of doubt. Read with Dahyabhai proposition (3), this gives the defence a route that does not depend on proving legal insanity at all.
The Court also set out what the accused must ordinarily do: discharge the onus "by producing evidence as to the conduct of the accused shortly prior to the offence and his conduct at the time or immediately afterwards, also by evidence of his mental condition and other relevant factors". S8 And it noted two presumptions the prosecution need not prove: "Every person is presumed to know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly every person is also presumed to know the law." S8
The standard applied
Hari Singh Gond: "The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong." S8 The yardstick for "wrong" in limb (b) is therefore external and objective, ordinary community morality, not the accused's own moral code.
What happens after a successful plea: not simply release
This is the most consequential practical point about s. 22, and it is governed by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 rather than by the BNS.
An acquittal under s. 22 is a special acquittal with mandatory consequences.
BNSS s. 373 requires the finding to be split: S6
"Whenever any person is acquitted upon the ground that, at the time at which he is alleged to have committed an offence, he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act alleged as constituting the offence, or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not."
BNSS s. 374 then makes an order compulsory where the finding is that he did commit the act: S6
"(1) Whenever the finding states that the accused person committed the act alleged, the Magistrate or Court before whom or which the trial has been held, shall, if such act would, but for the incapacity found, have constituted an offence,—
(a) order such person to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit; or
(b) order such person to be delivered to any relative or friend of such person."
Two safeguards are built in. Detention in a public mental health establishment may be ordered only "in accordance with such rules as the State Government may have made under the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017" (s. 374(2)). S6 And delivery to a relative or friend may be ordered only on that person's application and on security that the person delivered will "be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person" and produced for inspection as directed (s. 374(3)). S6 The court must report its action to the State Government (s. 374(4)). S6 Section 378 provides a later route for a relative or friend to apply to the State Government for the person's delivery into their care. S6
Devidas Loka Rathod shows the Supreme Court using these powers and explaining why: having acquitted the appellant, the Court considered it "necessary to give further directions under Section 335 or 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as the case may be, so that the appellant is not exposed to vagaries and receives proper care and support befitting his right to life under Article 21". S10 Sections 335 and 339 CrPC are the provisions now re-enacted as BNSS ss. 374 and 378. S6S7
So the honest answer to "does an insanity acquittal mean the accused walks free?" is: no. It means he is not criminally liable, and the court must then make an order for safe custody or supervised care.
Fitness to stand trial is a different question
Section 22 asks about the accused's mind at the time of the act. Whether he can presently participate in a trial is separate, and is governed by BNSS Chapter XXVII ("Provisions as to accused persons of unsound mind"). S6 Section 367(1) requires a Magistrate who has reason to believe the person is "of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence" to inquire into the fact, cause him to be examined by the civil surgeon of the district or another medical officer directed by the State Government, and examine that officer as a witness, reducing the examination to writing; if the civil surgeon finds unsoundness of mind, the accused is referred to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist of a Government hospital or medical college "for care, treatment and prognosis of the condition". S6 Section 368 applies the equivalent procedure in a trial before a Magistrate or Court of Session, and s. 369 provides for release. S6
A person may therefore be fit to stand trial but entitled to s. 22, or unfit to stand trial but with no s. 22 defence at all. Conflating the two is a common error.
Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 22 corresponds to s. 84 IPC.
| Feature | IPC s. 84 | BNS s. 22 |
|---|---|---|
| Operative text | "Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law." | Identical |
| Marginal title | "Act of a person of unsound mind" | Same, with a terminal full stop |
| Test | M'Naghten-based cognitive test | Unchanged |
| Section number | 84 | 22 |
A programmatic word-level comparison, after normalising whitespace and punctuation, returns zero differences. S1S4 Section 22 is a pure renumbering.
Where the BNS did change something: the vocabulary
The substantive test was untouched, but the statutory vocabulary around it was cleaned up, and this is a real and verifiable change rather than a claimed one.
Counting across the full texts of all four codes: S1S4S6S7
| Word | IPC, 1860 | BNS, 2023 | CrPC, 1973 | BNSS, 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| "lunatic" | 1 | 0 | 17 | 0 |
| "insane" / "insanity" | 7 | 0 | — | — |
| "idiot" | 1 | 0 | — | — |
| "delirious" | 1 | 1 | — | — |
The IPC's single use of "lunatic" was in s. 108, Explanation 3, Illustration (a): "abets a child or a lunatic"; the corresponding illustration to BNS s. 46 reads "abets a child or a person of unsound mind". S1S4 The seven uses of "insane" were confined to three provisions, and each has been recast:
| IPC | BNS |
|---|---|
| s. 89: "…benefit of child or insane person, by or by consent of guardian" | s. 27: "…benefit of child or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent of guardian" |
| s. 90: side-heading "Consent of insane person" | s. 28: side-headings removed; recast as clauses (a)–(c), with clause (b) covering a person who "from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence" of the consent |
| s. 305: "Abetment of suicide of child or insane person" | s. 107: "Abetment of suicide of child or person of unsound mind" |
The clearest single comparison is s. 305 IPC against s. 107 BNS, where four descriptive terms were revised in one sentence: S1S4
| IPC s. 305 | BNS s. 107 |
|---|---|
| "any person under eighteen years of age" | "any child" (defined in s. 2(3) as a person below eighteen) |
| "any insane person" | "any person of unsound mind" |
| "any delirious person" | "any delirious person": retained |
| "any idiot" | omitted entirely |
The same modernisation runs through the procedural code. The CrPC used "lunatic" in the titles of ss. 328, 337, 338 and 339; the BNSS counterparts: ss. 367, 376, 377 and 378: all read "person of unsound mind", and the word "lunatic" appears nowhere in the BNSS. S6S7 The BNSS also updates the machinery: where the CrPC relied on certification by the Inspector-General of Prisons or "visitors", BNSS s. 376 provides for certification by the Inspector-General of Prisons or, for a person detained in a public mental health establishment, by "the Mental Health Review Board constituted under the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017". S6
This is a genuine modernisation of language and of some procedural machinery. It is not a change in the legal test, and it should not be described as one. A person who would have failed s. 84 fails s. 22 on identical words.
No reform of the test, and no rationale located
No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 22 has been located in the official legislative material examined, which is unsurprising for a provision re-enacted verbatim.
This is a point where honest reporting matters. The Supreme Court has itself called the underlying test "outdated" and noted that it excludes irresistible impulse and the compulsive behaviour of a psychopath. S8 The recodification did not revisit that. Describing s. 22 as a modern or reformed insanity defence would be inaccurate; what was modernised was the surrounding vocabulary.
The practical benefit of the continuity is that Dahyabhai, Hari Singh Gond, Surendra Mishra and Devidas Loka Rathod apply to s. 22 directly, with no argument needed about whether the principle survives a change in wording.
Worked examples
Hypotheticals, not decided cases.
Limb (a): nature of the act. A man in an acute psychotic episode believes he is cutting a rope and cuts a sleeping person's throat. He is incapable of knowing the nature of the act. Section 22 applies if the court so finds on the evidence. S1 Hari Singh Gond cites Stephen's example of a man who cuts off a sleeping man's head "because it would be great fun to see him looking for it when he woke up" as a case of incapacity to know the physical effects of the act. S8
Limb (b): wrongfulness and illegality. A woman suffering from a delusional disorder believes a divine command obliges her to kill. If the court finds she was incapable of knowing both that it was wrong and that it was contrary to law, s. 22 applies. If she concealed the body or fled, that conduct is evidence she knew it was wrong or unlawful, and the defence fails on Hari Singh Gond's reasoning. S1S8
Fails: knowledge of wrongfulness. A man with diagnosed schizophrenia, in remission and medicated, kills a neighbour after a boundary dispute, hides the weapon and gives a false account to the police. The diagnosis establishes medical insanity; the concealment and false account defeat limb (b). Hari Singh Gond and Mayne's indicators both point the same way. S8S9
Fails: irresistible impulse. A man says he knew the act was wrong and unlawful but could not stop himself. Section 22 is cognitive; this is outside it. S8
Fails. No motive. No motive for a killing is proved and the accused made no attempt to escape. On Sheralli Wali Mohammed as applied in Hari Singh Gond, that does not establish insanity. S8
Succeeds without proving legal insanity. A man with a documented psychiatric history known to the investigation is never medically examined by the police. Hospital records and family evidence are led. The court may find the s. 22 exception not conclusively established, yet acquit because the prosecution has failed to prove mens rea beyond reasonable doubt: Dahyabhai proposition (3), applied in Devidas Loka Rathod, reinforced by the investigator's duty in Hari Singh Gond. S8S10
After acquittal. In any of the successful cases, the court must record specifically whether the accused committed the act (BNSS s. 373) and then order safe custody or delivery to a relative or friend on security (BNSS s. 374). He is not simply released. S6
Common misconceptions
"A psychiatric diagnosis is a defence." It is not. The courts are concerned with legal insanity, not medical insanity. S8S9
"If he couldn't control himself, s. 22 applies." No. Irresistible impulse and the compulsive behaviour of a psychopath afford no protection; the test is cognitive. S8
"He didn't know it was illegal, so he's protected." Not by itself. Knowledge that the act was wrong defeats the defence even without knowledge that it was unlawful, and vice versa. S8
"Insanity means acquittal and release." No. BNSS s. 373 requires a specific finding on whether he committed the act, and s. 374 then requires an order for safe custody or delivery to a relative or friend on security. S6
"Being mentally ill at the time of trial is enough." That is fitness to stand trial under BNSS Chapter XXVII, a different question from s. 22, which looks at the time of the act. S1S6
"If the plea fails, the accused is convicted." Not necessarily. Dahyabhai proposition (3) permits acquittal on reasonable doubt as to mens rea even where the exception is not conclusively established. S10
"The accused's own statement that he was insane is enough." "Mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough." S9
"The BNS modernised the insanity defence." It reproduced IPC s. 84 word for word. What changed was vocabulary elsewhere in the statute book, "lunatic" and "insane" were removed, not the test. S1S4
Related provisions
- s. 23: involuntary intoxication, which uses the same incapacity formula as s. 22 but requires the intoxicant to have been administered without the accused's knowledge or against his will.
- s. 24: intoxication and offences requiring particular intent or knowledge; the counterpart rule for voluntary intoxication.
- ss. 20–21: incapacity by age.
- s. 27: acts done in good faith for the benefit of a child or person of unsound mind by or with the consent of a guardian.
- s. 28(b): consent given by a person who, "from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence" of what he consents to is not consent.
- s. 36: private defence against an act that is not an offence by reason of unsoundness of mind; s. 37: restrictions on that right.
- s. 46, Explanation 3 and Illustration (c): abetment of a person of unsound mind; the abettor is guilty though the person abetted commits no offence.
- s. 107: abetment of suicide of a child or person of unsound mind.
- s. 108 BSA and Illustration (a): burden of proving a General Exception, illustrated by insanity.
- BNSS ss. 367, 368, 369, 373, 374, 378: fitness to stand trial, the form of the acquittal, and post-acquittal custody or care; Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, referred to in BNSS s. 374(2).
Sources, verification and limitations
Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against
the India Code entry for s. 22 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E),
which brought the Sanhita into force on 1 July 2024 except s. 106(2), so s. 22 has been in force since
that date S3; IPC s. 84 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 22 by programmatic
word-level diff, returning zero differences S4; BSA s. 108 and its Illustration (a) read verbatim
S5; BNSS ss. 367, 368, 369, 373, 374 and 378 read verbatim from the Gazette text S6; the
corresponding CrPC provisions and chapter titles read for the terminology comparison S7; three
Supreme Court judgments read in full text S8S9S10. Word counts for "lunatic", "insane" and
"insanity" were computed across the full texts of all four codes. Law checked as of the date recorded in
lawCheckedAsOf.
Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 22 was located; the authorities are IPC-era and apply because the operative words are identical, but they should be cited as IPC decisions. Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat was not read in its original text: the three propositions are quoted as they are set out verbatim in Devidas Loka Rathod, and the citation given ((1964) 7 SCR 361) is the one recorded there; Hari Singh Gond cites the same case as AIR 1964 SC 1563. State of M.P. v. Ahmadull AIR 1961 SC 998 and Sheralli Wali Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra 1972 Cr.LJ 1523 (SC) were likewise not separately examined and are reported only as Surendra Mishra and Hari Singh Gond respectively report them. The Rama v. State of Rajasthan reference in Devidas Loka Rathod concerns the appellate court's duty to reappraise evidence and was not pursued. The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 was not examined; it is mentioned only because BNSS s. 374(2) refers to rules made under it. State rules under that Act were not examined. No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 22 was located, and none is asserted. The common-law taxonomy and lucid-interval material is reproduced as the leading judgment's reasoning, drawn there from English textbooks. Judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, which did not resolve at the time of checking; the consulted copy of Hari Singh Gond contains evident transcription slips (the case name rendered "Naughton", and "Indian Evidence Act, 1972" for 1872), noted in the text.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether s. 22 protects a particular accused depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome (acquittal, conviction, custody or release) is predicted here. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.