The short answer
Section 117 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 has four sub-sections, and that is the first thing to notice: the Indian Penal Code did this work in two. Sections 322 and 325 of the IPC defined and punished voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Section 117 absorbs both, and then adds two entirely new offences on top S1; S3.
| What it does | IPC position | |
|---|---|---|
| s. 117(1) | Defines "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt", with an Explanation and an illustration | IPC s. 322: two differences only |
| s. 117(2) | The offence: up to 7 years and mandatory fine, except in the case provided for by s. 122(2) | IPC s. 325: one difference only |
| s. 117(3) | Hurt causing permanent disability or a persistent vegetative state: rigorous imprisonment of not less than 10 years, up to life meaning the remainder of natural life | No IPC counterpart |
| s. 117(4) | Grievous hurt by a group of five or more acting in concert on discriminatory grounds: up to 7 years and fine | No IPC counterpart |
Three findings stand out.
First, the transplanted parts were copied with extraordinary fidelity. Section 117(1) differs from IPC s. 322 in exactly two places: a full stop added after the word "Illustration", and "twenty days" changed to "fifteen days" inside the illustration. The Explanation is word for word identical, and so is a long-standing grammatical slip in the IPC illustration, "A, intending of knowing himself to be likely permanently to disfigure Z's face", which appears once in each text S1; S2; S3. Section 117(2) differs from IPC s. 325 in exactly one place: the cross-reference moved from s. 335 to s. 122(2).
Second, there was no fine increase here, and that is worth saying because there was one next door. Section 115(2) multiplied IPC s. 323's fine ceiling tenfold. Section 117(2) could not do the same, because IPC s. 325 never named a figure: it said "and shall also be liable to fine", and so does s. 117(2) S1; S3. The fine remains mandatory and unquantified.
Third, sub-sections (3) and (4) are the real story. Both are new. Sub-section (3) takes a severity previously reserved for acid attacks and for rape and applies it to grievous hurt generally S1; S3. Sub-section (4) creates a group-liability offence on discriminatory grounds which, although it carries the same seven-year maximum as s. 117(2), is non-bailable and triable only by a Court of Session, where s. 117(2) is bailable and triable by any Magistrate S4.
Nothing here is legal advice. Whether grievous hurt was voluntarily caused, and which sub-section applies, are questions of fact and law for the court on the evidence before it.
Sub-section (1): the definition, and what "voluntarily" adds
Section 117(1) reads:
"Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt, is said 'voluntarily to cause grievous hurt'." S1
The structure requires two things to be grievous: the hurt intended or foreseen, and the hurt actually caused. The Explanation says so expressly, and then softens it in a way that is easy to miss:
"Explanation.—A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. But he is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind, he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind." S1
So the kinds need not match. A person who means to inflict one kind of grievous hurt and inflicts a different kind is still within the sub-section. What he cannot be convicted of is causing grievous hurt where he intended or foresaw only ordinary hurt: that case belongs to s. 115.
The illustration makes the point concretely: A, intending or knowing himself likely permanently to disfigure Z's face, gives Z a blow which does not permanently disfigure the face "but which causes Z to suffer severe bodily pain for the space of fifteen days. A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt" S1. The intended kind was clause (f) of s. 116; the kind caused was clause (h). Both are grievous, and that is enough.
The illustration also carries the fifteen-day amendment. The corresponding illustration to IPC s. 322 used twenty days S3. That the drafter changed the illustration as well as s. 116(h) itself is the clearest textual evidence that the reduction of the period was deliberate: a point developed in the article on s. 116.
Sub-section (2): the offence, and the one thing that changed
"(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section (2) of section 122, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." S1
Against IPC s. 325 there is exactly one difference: "section 335" became "sub-section (2) of section 122" S1; S3. IPC s. 335 punished grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation; the Sanhita moved that provision to s. 122(2). The carve-out is the same carve-out.
Three details repay attention.
The fine is mandatory and unquantified. "And shall also be liable to fine". The conjunction is "and", not "or". Unlike s. 115(2), there is no fine-only option and no ceiling stated S1. A court must impose a fine in addition to whatever imprisonment it awards, and the amount is not capped by the section.
"Imprisonment of either description" means the court may award simple or rigorous imprisonment. Contrast s. 117(3), which requires rigorous imprisonment S1.
The comma survived. Section 117(2) reads "by sub-section (2) of section 122**,** voluntarily causes grievous hurt". The comma closing the parenthesis is present. Its counterpart in s. 115(2) is missing, so that omission is an isolated drafting slip rather than a systematic restyling S1; S2. This was verified in the Gazette.
The section 122(2) carve-out, and a second lesson about fines
Section 122(2) covers voluntarily causing grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation, where the accused "neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt to any person other than the person who gave the provocation": imprisonment up to five years, or fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both S1.
Compare IPC s. 335: imprisonment up to four years, or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both S3.
So in the carve-out, both limbs moved: imprisonment from four years to five, and the fine from two thousand rupees to ten thousand: a fivefold increase. And the neighbouring sub-section, s. 122(1), raised IPC s. 334's fine from five hundred rupees to five thousand: a tenfold increase S1; S3.
That is worth pausing on. Within a single section of the Sanhita, one sub-section multiplies the old fine by ten and the other by five, while s. 117(2) carries no figure at all. There is no single uniform multiplier, and any statement that the Sanhita "increased fines tenfold" is unsafe as a general proposition. Each provision has to be checked against its own predecessor.
One further change in the carve-out: IPC s. 335 carried an Explanation reading "The last two sections are subject to the same provisos as Exception 1, section 300": covering ss. 334 and 335 together. Because the Sanhita merges both into one section, s. 122's Explanation now reads "This section is subject to the same proviso as Exception 1 of section 101", s. 101 being the Sanhita's murder provision S1; S3.
Sub-section (3): a new offence, built from borrowed language
"(3) Whoever commits an offence under sub-section (1) and in the course of such commission causes any hurt to a person which causes that person to be in permanent disability or in persistent vegetative state, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life." S1
There is no IPC counterpart to this as a general aggravator of grievous hurt. But its components were not invented, and tracing them shows exactly what the Sanhita did.
| Element | Where it stood in the IPC |
|---|---|
| "persistent vegetative state" | Only in IPC s. 376A: "Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of victim", applying where a person commits rape under s. 376(1) or (2) and "in the course of such commission inflicts an injury which causes the death of the woman or causes the woman to be in a persistent vegetative state". Punishment: rigorous imprisonment not less than twenty years, up to life meaning the remainder of natural life, or death S3. |
| "permanent disability" | Only in Explanation 1 to IPC s. 326B, and there merely as part of the definition of "acid": a substance capable of causing injury "leading to scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanent disability" S3. |
| The "not less than ten years … extending to imprisonment for life" formula | IPC s. 326A: voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, which carried not less than ten years extending to imprisonment for life, and fine S3. |
| "in the course of such commission" | The same phrase as IPC s. 376A S3. |
So s. 117(3) generalises. The drafting pattern of s. 376A is applied to grievous hurt at large; the ten-year minimum previously attached to acid attacks under s. 326A is extended to any grievous hurt producing permanent disability or a persistent vegetative state; and "permanent disability", which the IPC used only incidentally when defining acid, becomes an operative trigger.
Two cautions on that analysis:
- It is a textual genealogy, not a documented legislative history. No legislative material was retrieved, and no purpose is attributed to Parliament. The claim is about where the words previously appeared, which is checkable, not about why they were chosen.
- IPC s. 376A remains the closer analogue in drafting, but it is a sexual-offence provision with a twenty-year minimum and the death penalty available. Section 117(3) is neither, and nothing about s. 376A's severity should be read across.
Sub-section (3) in practice: the medical opinion problem
One located decision shows precisely where this sub-section will be fought.
In Anand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (Jodhpur Bench, Baljinder Singh Sandhu J, 16 January 2026) the complainant's lip had been bitten and severed. He contended that both s. 117(2), "which pertains to disfiguration", and s. 117(3), "which pertains to permanent disability", were attracted. His complaint was procedural and pointed: when the opinion of the medical jurist was sought, "only the opinion regarding disfiguration was sought, and no appropriate opinion with respect to disability" was obtained. His application under BNSS s. 193 for a medical report and further investigation had been dismissed and cognizance taken. The High Court declined to interfere with the trial court's order of 20 February 2025 and upheld it, but disposed of the petition "with liberty to the petitioner to approach the investigation agency by way of filing an appropriate application under Section 193(9) BNSS, which shall consider by the agency in accordance with law" S5.
The lesson is not about the outcome. It is that sub-section (3) turns on a medical question that has to be asked. "Permanent disability" is not a conclusion a court can reach from an injury description alone, and if no opinion on disability is sought during investigation, the sub-section cannot be made out: whatever the injury looks like. The petitioner in that case was the injured person, trying to get the graver sub-section added.
No decision interpreting the words "permanent disability" or "persistent vegetative state" in s. 117(3) was located, and a targeted search pairing "persistent vegetative state" with the Sanhita returned only the text of the statute itself S5.
Sub-section (4): same maximum, very different consequences
"(4) When a group of five or more persons acting in concert, causes grievous hurt to a person on the ground of his race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground, each member of such group shall be guilty of the offence of causing grievous hurt, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." S1
There is no IPC counterpart. The IPC contained no provision making group grievous hurt on discriminatory grounds a distinct offence.
It is, however, not freestanding within the Sanhita. Section 103(2) is its exact structural twin for murder: "When a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground each member of such group shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine" S6. The two provisions share their trigger (five or more persons acting in concert, the same enumerated grounds, and the same open-ended "any other similar ground") and differ only in the harm and the penalty. The Sanhita therefore built a two-tier scheme for group violence on discriminatory grounds: murder under s. 103(2), grievous hurt under s. 117(4).
The procedural asymmetry
Here is the finding that matters most about sub-section (4), and it is invisible in the section itself:
| Provision | Punishment | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Trial court |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| s. 117(2) | 7 years and fine | Cognizable | Bailable | Any Magistrate |
| s. 117(3) | Rigorous imprisonment, not less than 10 years, to life meaning remainder of natural life | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Court of Session |
| s. 117(4) | 7 years and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Court of Session |
Sections 117(2) and 117(4) carry the identical maximum sentence: seven years and fine. Yet under the BNSS First Schedule the first is bailable and triable by any Magistrate, while the second is non-bailable and triable only by a Court of Session. The discriminatory-group element, not the sentence, is doing the work.
Two notes on the Schedule itself, recorded because this article relies on it:
- The Schedule describes s. 117(4) compactly as "Grievous hurt caused by a group of 5 or more persons", omitting the discriminatory-grounds element that the section requires. The section governs; the Schedule's column 2 is a label, not a definition S1; S4.
- The s. 117(3) row opens "If hurt to results in", which is a typographical error in the Schedule S4.
No decision on s. 117(4) was located. A targeted search on the phrase "group of five or more persons acting in concert" together with grievous hurt returned nothing usable S5.
How section 117 is being used
Three decisions were read in full, and a pattern emerges that is more interesting than any single one of them.
Two of the three are complaints that the police under-charged. In both, the injured person went to the High Court because the investigating officer had filed a charge sheet for plain hurt and left s. 117 out.
In Ramlakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior Bench, Rajesh Kumar Gupta J, 10 March 2026) the petitioner sought a direction to the police to file an additional challan incorporating "offence under Section 117 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (equivalent to Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code)", the challan having been filed only under ss. 115, 296, 351(2) and 351(3). He contended that the medical documents "clearly indicate that the petitioner sustained fracture injury which falls within the category of grievous hurt", and that the officer "deliberately did not add the offence". The Court declined to direct the police. It held that once a charge sheet is filed the trial court is empowered to alter or add charges at any stage before judgment, and that on Kantilal Chandulal Mehta v. State of Maharashtra "the court is not bound by the opinion of the investigating agency regarding the sections to be applied"; it also cited State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra. The petition was disposed of, without any opinion on the merits, with a direction to the petitioner to apply to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Joura with the MLC, injury report, X-ray report and discharge ticket: the Magistrate to consider it and pass a reasoned order, taking into account the MLC indicating injury to the petitioner's index finger S7.
That order also supplies judicial corroboration of the mapping: it records s. 117 BNS as equivalent to IPC s. 325 S7.
One procedural observation, recorded factually. The Ramlakhan order as reported invokes "Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure" and "Section 216 Cr.P.C." in a 2026 judgment about a BNS charge. The corresponding Sanhita provisions are BNSS ss. 528 and 239. This article does not treat that as affecting the reasoning, the powers are materially the same, but it is consistent with the citation drift seen elsewhere in this group of sections.
The third is an anticipatory bail refusal. In Gaurav Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (Rakesh Kainthla J, 28 July 2026) three petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in an FIR registered under BNS ss. 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 351(2), 109(1) and 117(2), arising from an incident while a field was being ploughed. The petitions were dismissed, the Court referring to "the gravity of the offence and the severity of the punishment", and expressly confining its observations to the disposal of those petitions S8.
What this establishes, and what it does not. It establishes that s. 117(2) is in active use as a companion charge; that the plain-hurt / grievous-hurt boundary is being litigated from the complainant's side as well as the accused's; and that the practical route for a victim who says the police under-charged is an application to the trial court rather than a mandamus to the police. It establishes nothing about sub-sections (3) or (4), beyond Anand Sharma's illustration of the medical-opinion problem. No Supreme Court decision on s. 117 was located, and these searches were not exhaustive.
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Section 117 is the same as IPC section 325." Sub-section (2) is, bar the cross-reference. But s. 117 as a whole is not: it also contains the definition formerly in IPC s. 322 and two new offences in sub-sections (3) and (4) S1; S3.
"The fine for grievous hurt went up tenfold like the fine for hurt." No. IPC s. 325 never stated a figure and neither does s. 117(2). The fine is mandatory and unquantified in both. The tenfold increase happened at s. 115(2), where the IPC had stated a figure S1; S3.
"The Sanhita multiplied all fines by ten." Demonstrably not. In the carve-out section alone, s. 122(1) multiplies IPC s. 334's fine by ten and s. 122(2) multiplies IPC s. 335's by five, while s. 117(2) carries no figure at all S1; S3.
"If the injury caused is not the injury intended, there is no offence under section 117." The Explanation says the opposite, provided both are grievous: intending grievous hurt of one kind and causing grievous hurt of another is within the sub-section S1.
"Intending ordinary hurt and causing grievous hurt is section 117." No. The Explanation requires that the accused both cause grievous hurt and intend or foresee grievous hurt. Intending only ordinary hurt points to s. 115 S1.
"Sub-section (4) is just sub-section (2) with more accused." It carries the same seven-year maximum but it is non-bailable and triable only by a Court of Session, where s. 117(2) is bailable and triable by any Magistrate. And it requires the discriminatory-grounds element, which the Schedule's short label omits S1; S4.
"Permanent disability is obvious from the injury." In Anand Sharma the whole difficulty was that no medical opinion on disability had been sought, even though one on disfiguration had S5. Sub-section (3) depends on an opinion somebody must ask for.
"Provocation is a defence to grievous hurt." Section 122(2) is not an acquittal provision. It substitutes a lower bracket (five years, or a fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both) and requires grave and sudden provocation plus the absence of intention or knowledge as to injuring anyone other than the provoker S1.
"The police must add section 117 if the doctor says the injury is grievous." Ramlakhan holds the remedy lies with the trial court, which may alter or add charges and is not bound by the investigating agency's view of the sections S7.
Worked examples
These are editorial hypotheticals, written to show how the sub-sections interact. They are not judgments and not predictions. Each states the facts that decide it.
Example 1: the Explanation at work. A intends to fracture B's arm and strikes him. No bone breaks, but B is in severe bodily pain and unable to work for sixteen days. The kind intended was s. 116(g); the kind caused was s. 116(h). Both are grievous, so on the Explanation A voluntarily caused grievous hurt S1. Change one fact (A intended only to cause pain, and the sixteen days of disability was an unforeseen consequence) and the Explanation's requirement that he intend or foresee grievous hurt is unmet; the case points to s. 115.
Example 2: why sub-section (3) needs an opinion. C attacks D and severs part of D's finger. D says he has lost the use of the hand permanently. If no medical opinion addresses permanent disability, s. 117(3)'s trigger is unevidenced however grave the injury appears, the Anand Sharma problem S5. Change one fact, a specific opinion establishes permanent loss of function, and the sub-section's ten-year minimum and life maximum come into play S1.
Example 3: the sub-section (4) asymmetry. Six people together beat E and cause a fracture, expressly because of E's caste. The maximum sentence is seven years, exactly as under s. 117(2), but the offence is non-bailable and triable only by a Court of Session S1; S4. Change one fact, the six attack E over a money dispute, with no discriminatory ground, and sub-section (4)'s element is absent; on the Schedule the case is bailable and triable by any Magistrate.
Example 4: the carve-out. F, gravely and suddenly provoked by G, strikes G and fractures his nose, neither intending nor foreseeing injury to anyone else. The case falls within s. 122(2) (up to five years, or a fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both) and outside s. 117(2) S1. Change one fact, F also injures a bystander whose presence he was aware of, and the condition in s. 122(2) fails.
Example 5: rigorous versus either description. H is convicted under s. 117(2). The court may award simple or rigorous imprisonment, but must also impose a fine. Change one fact, the conviction is under s. 117(3), and the imprisonment must be rigorous, must be at least ten years, and may extend to imprisonment for the remainder of H's natural life S1.
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 117
- BNS s. 116: the closed list of eight kinds of grievous hurt. Section 117 cannot be approached without it, and its clause (h) carries the fifteen-day amendment S9.
- BNS s. 115: the plain-hurt offence, and where a case goes if the hurt intended or caused is not grievous S1; S4.
- BNS s. 122(2): the only carve-out written into s. 117(2) S1.
- BNS s. 103(2): the structural twin of s. 117(4), applying the same group-and-discriminatory-grounds trigger to murder S6.
- BNS s. 118: grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means, which on the First Schedule carries imprisonment for life or not less than one year up to ten years and fine S4.
- BNSS s. 193: the investigation and report provisions under which the complainant in Anand Sharma sought a further medical opinion S5.
Sources and honest limits
The statutory comparison was done by token-level diff against the operative text of the IPC, not against its table of contents: a trap that cost a false result earlier in this group and was avoided here by anchoring on distinctive operative wording. Section 117(1) was found to differ from IPC s. 322 in two places and s. 117(2) from IPC s. 325 in one. The genealogy of sub-section (3)'s language was established by whole-document searches of the IPC for "persistent vegetative state" and "permanent disability" and by reading ss. 326A, 326B and 376A. The First Schedule rows for all of ss. 117(2), (3) and (4) were read from the BNSS. All three judgments were read in full, including their operative directions.
The material limits are recorded in this article's limitations field. In outline: no decision interpreting "permanent disability" or "persistent vegetative state" in s. 117(3) was located, and none at all on s. 117(4); no Supreme Court decision on s. 117 was located; the IPC-era body of learning on grievous hurt under ss. 322 and 325 was not surveyed, which is the largest gap given how nearly identical the texts are; no legislative material was retrieved, so the genealogy of sub-section (3) is offered as a textual account and not as legislative intent; the searches were targeted rather than exhaustive, and two of them returned thousands of numeral matches that were left unread; later treatment of the three decisions was not traced; and ss. 118 and 122 were read only so far as this article needed and are not mapped to the IPC.
This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text and early application of a statutory provision. It is not legal advice and not a prediction of any outcome. Whether the hurt intended and the hurt caused were both grievous, whether permanent disability or a persistent vegetative state is established, whether the group and discriminatory-grounds elements of sub-section (4) are made out, and what sentence may follow, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.