The short answer
Section 118 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes causing hurt by a particular class of means, weapons and substances capable of killing, regardless of how serious the injury turns out to be. It merges two Indian Penal Code sections into two sub-sections S1; S3:
| Conduct | Punishment | IPC source | |
|---|---|---|---|
| s. 118(1) | Voluntarily causing hurt by the listed means, except in the case provided for by s. 122(1) | Up to 3 years, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both | IPC s. 324 |
| s. 118(2) | Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by any means referred to in sub-section (1), except in the case provided for by s. 122(2) | Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for not less than one year up to ten years, and mandatory fine | IPC s. 326 |
Three findings, and two of them run in opposite directions.
A one-year minimum was added. IPC s. 326 carried "imprisonment for life, or … a term which may extend to ten years" with no minimum at all. Section 118(2) reads "not less than one year but which may extend to ten years" S1; S3. A court can no longer impose a token sentence for causing grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon.
But the maximum fine under sub-section (1) was cut. IPC s. 324 said simply "or with fine", naming no figure, and under IPC s. 63, where no sum is expressed, "the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive". Section 118(1) caps the fine at twenty thousand rupees, and BNS s. 8(1) carries the identical unlimited-fine default, so the contrast is real and not an artefact of a changed general rule S1; S3; S6. For this offence the ceiling on fines came down.
The provision punishes by mode, not by gravity. That was the original design. In Anwarul Haq v. State of Uttar Pradesh the Supreme Court quoted the Authors of the Penal Code: "an offender who has used a knife or a hot iron for the purpose of wreaking his hatred is a [far] worse and more dangerous member of a society than he [who] has only used his fist… many hurts which would not, according to our classification, be designated as grievous ought yet, on account of the mode in which [they] are inflicted, to be punished more severely than many grievous hurts" S5.
Nothing here is legal advice. Whether an instrument falls within s. 118 and whether the hurt caused was grievous are questions of fact for the court on the evidence before it.
The listed means
Sub-section (1) sets out the class, and sub-section (2) simply refers back to it:
"…by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal" S1
This list is reproduced from IPC s. 324 word for word. Two points of structure:
- It is a closed class of means, not of injuries. The gravity of the injury is what separates sub-section (1) from sub-section (2); the means are identical for both.
- The second item is the open one. "Any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death" is the catch-all, and it is the item that litigation turns on.
What the Supreme Court has said about that catch-all
Anwarul Haq (Supreme Court, 26 April 2005) is the controlling authority on the identical IPC wording, and because s. 118(1) reproduces it exactly, the construction carries across S1; S3; S5.
The test is the nature of the instrument, not how it was used. "The expression 'an instrument, which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death' should be construed with reference to the nature of the instrument and not the manner of its use" S5. So the question is whether the thing is of a kind likely to cause death if used as a weapon, not whether the accused in fact wielded it dangerously.
What the prosecution must prove. "What has to be established by the prosecution is that the accused voluntarily caused hurt and that such hurt was caused by means of an instrument referred to in this Section" S5. Two elements, and no more: voluntarily causing hurt, and causation by a listed means.
The marginal note is part of the construction. The Court held that the catch-all, "when read in the light of marginal note to Section 324, means dangerous weapon which if used by the offender is likely to cause death" S5. That reasoning survives the recodification: the Sanhita's marginal note to s. 118 is "Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means" S2.
Non-recovery of the weapon is not fatal. In Anwarul Haq the knife was never recovered. The Court held that "merely because the knife has not been recovered during investigation same cannot be a factor to discard the evidence of PWs. 1 & 2", that the wounds noticed by the doctor "throw considerable light", and that the doctor's opinion about the weapon, "though theoretical, cannot be totally wiped out". The conviction under s. 324 was upheld and the appeals dismissed S5.
And the point has to be taken at trial. The Court noted that "the plea that the weapon used was not a dangerous weapon had never been urged before the trial court or the High Court", and declined to permit it for the first time on appeal S5.
What courts have held is not enough
Under the Sanhita, the Calcutta High Court has already policed the boundary. In Tarun Kumar Tiwari v. State of West Bengal the victim had been struck with a bunch of keys on the head, back and waist. The Court rejected the Public Prosecutor's submission that s. 118(1) "is attracted in cases involving voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt", and held that a bunch of keys could not, "in the facts and circumstances of the present case, be regarded as a dangerous weapon or dangerous means within the meaning of Section 118(1) of the BNS, 2023, particularly when the injury report does not suggest that the victim suffered any major injury". The charge sheet was quashed only in so far as it related to s. 118(1), the remaining offences proceeding to trial S7.
Two cautions about that order. It is expressly tied to "the facts and circumstances of the present case", so it is not a ruling that keys can never qualify. And its reliance on the absence of major injury sits a little awkwardly with Anwarul Haq's instruction to look at the nature of the instrument rather than the manner of its use: a tension this article records without attempting to resolve, since no decision reconciling the two was located.
Sub-section (1) against IPC s. 324: the fine ceiling came down
| IPC s. 324 | BNS s. 118(1) | Character |
|---|---|---|
| "except in the case provided for by section 334" | "except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122" | Consequential renumbering: the same carve-out |
| "or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance" | "…explosive substance**,** or by means of any substance" | A comma added |
| "or with fine" | "or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees" | SUBSTANTIVE: a new ceiling |
| "three years" | "three years" | Unchanged |
The third row is the one that matters, and it is counter-intuitive, so it is worth setting out the chain:
- IPC s. 324 stated no fine figure.
- IPC s. 63: "Where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive" S3.
- So a court sentencing under s. 324 could impose any fine that was not excessive.
- BNS s. 8(1) reproduces that default rule in identical terms S6, so the general law did not change.
- But s. 118(1) now expresses a sum: twenty thousand rupees. The default no longer applies, and the ceiling binds.
The practical effect is that the maximum fine for this offence fell from "unlimited but not excessive" to ₹20,000. Whether that was intended is not something this article can say, no legislative material was retrieved, but the textual position is clear, and it is the opposite of what happened at s. 115(2), where a stated figure of one thousand rupees was multiplied tenfold.
This is now the fourth distinct pattern found in this family, and together they dispose of any general claim about the Sanhita and fines:
| Provision | IPC predecessor | What happened to the fine |
|---|---|---|
| s. 115(2) | s. 323: ₹1,000 | ×10 to ₹10,000 |
| s. 122(1) | s. 334: ₹500 | ×10 to ₹5,000 |
| s. 122(2) | s. 335: ₹2,000 | ×5 to ₹10,000 |
| s. 117(2) | s. 325: unquantified | no change: still unquantified |
| s. 118(1) | s. 324: unquantified | a ceiling introduced, reducing the maximum |
Sub-section (2) against IPC s. 326: a minimum where there was none
| IPC s. 326 | BNS s. 118(2) | Character |
|---|---|---|
| "except in the case provided for by section 335" | "except in the case provided for by sub-section (2) of section 122" | Consequential renumbering |
| The full list of means repeated | "by any means referred to in sub-section (1)" | Drafting economy; no change of substance |
| "imprisonment for life, or … a term which may extend to ten years" | "imprisonment for life, or … a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years" | SUBSTANTIVE: a one-year minimum added |
| "and shall also be liable to fine" | "and shall also be liable to fine" | Unchanged, mandatory, unquantified |
The one-year minimum is the significant change. Under IPC s. 326 a court could impose a sentence of any length up to ten years, or life; there was no floor. Section 118(2) sets one. Note what it does not do: it leaves "imprisonment for life" available as a distinct alternative, so the sub-section offers a court either life or a determinate term between one and ten years.
The compression of the means-list is worth a word because it is easy to misread as a narrowing. It is not: "any means referred to in sub-section (1)" imports the whole list, including the open catch-all. The Sanhita simply declined to print it twice.
A forum problem on the face of the First Schedule
This is the finding most likely to matter in practice, and it is not visible in s. 118 itself.
| Provision | Punishment | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Trial court (First Schedule) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| s. 118(1) | 3 years, or fine of ₹20,000, or both | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Any Magistrate |
| s. 118(2) | Imprisonment for life, or not less than 1 year up to 10 years, and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Magistrate of the first class |
Now set that against the Magistrates' sentencing powers:
- BNSS s. 23(2): "The Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or of both, or of community service."
- BNSS s. 23(3): a Magistrate of the second class may pass imprisonment "not exceeding one year", or a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees.
- BNSS s. 23(1): even a Chief Judicial Magistrate may not pass a sentence of death, of imprisonment for life, or of imprisonment exceeding seven years S8.
So the First Schedule assigns s. 118(2), an offence carrying imprisonment for life, to a Magistrate who cannot lawfully pass a sentence exceeding three years. The same mismatch, in milder form, affects sub-section (1): a three-year offence is made triable by "any Magistrate", and a Magistrate of the second class is capped at one year S4; S8.
The Sanhita does provide a route out, and it should be stated alongside the problem. The First Schedule's column 6 says which court may try the offence; BNSS s. 23 limits what a Magistrate may pass. Where the two diverge:
- BNSS s. 361, where the evidence in an inquiry or trial before a Magistrate warrants a presumption that he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it, or that the case should be tried or committed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, he stays the proceedings and submits the case to the CJM, who may try it himself, refer it to a subordinate Magistrate, or commit the accused for trial S8.
- BNSS s. 362, if at any stage before signing the judgment it appears to the Magistrate that the case "ought to be tried by the Court of Session, he shall commit it to that Court" S8.
So a first-class Magistrate trying a s. 118(2) case who concludes that a sentence beyond his powers is called for is not stuck; he commits the case upward. The anomaly is therefore one of allocation and efficiency rather than an unresolvable defect, but it means that a serious s. 118(2) case may begin before a court that cannot finish it.
Two qualifications are owed. First, I did not locate in the BNSS any provision corresponding to the old power of a Magistrate to forward an accused to the CJM specifically because he cannot pass a sufficiently severe sentence; a search for that wording returned nothing, and that is recorded as a search result, not as a conclusion that the power was dropped. Second, no decision on this mismatch was located.
One contrast with the previous section is worth noting: the Schedule's column 2 for s. 118(2) does record the carve-out, reading "[except as provided in section 122(2)]" S4. At s. 117(4) the corresponding label omitted an element of the offence. The Schedule's descriptions are therefore inconsistent in their fidelity, which is a reason to read the section rather than the Schedule.
How section 118 is being used
Over-charging under sub-section (2) is the pattern that has reached the High Courts. Both located Sanhita decisions involve s. 118 being added to, or read into, a case that the court thought it did not fit.
In Shripal and 3 others v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, Rajiv Lochan Shukla J, 23 September 2026) the FIR was "initially … lodged for offences under Section 115(2), 351(2) of the BNS. Later during investigation, the police has added Section 118(2) BNS." Counsel's argument was structural: s. 118 "has two parts. One deals with simple hurt being caused by dangerous weapons or means and the other deals with grievous hurt caused by dangerous weapons or means", and "despite there being no grievous injuries suffered by the injured, the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet under Section 118(2)". The Court allowed anticipatory bail on conditions, making clear that its observations were "exclusively for deciding the instant anticipatory bail application" and not an opinion on the merits S9.
That matters because of what sub-section (2) brings with it. Moving a case from s. 118(1) to s. 118(2) raises the maximum from three years to life, introduces a one-year minimum, makes the fine mandatory, and shifts the trial court S1; S4. The grievous/not-grievous question: governed by the closed list in s. 116: is therefore doing a great deal of work.
Tarun Kumar Tiwari, discussed above, is the other: the attempt to apply s. 118(1) to a blow with a bunch of keys failed, and the charge sheet was quashed to that extent only S7.
What this establishes, and what it does not. It establishes that the sub-section boundary is being contested at the threshold stage, and that courts are willing to excise a s. 118 charge while leaving the underlying hurt charge intact. It establishes nothing about the new one-year minimum or the ₹20,000 ceiling: no decision on either was located, and the searches were not exhaustive.
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Section 118 applies whenever a weapon is used to cause hurt." It applies where the means fall within the listed class. On Anwarul Haq the test for the catch-all is the nature of the instrument, not how it was used S5. And Tarun Kumar Tiwari holds that s. 118(1) is not attracted merely because hurt or grievous hurt was caused S7.
"The weapon must be recovered." No. Anwarul Haq upheld a conviction where the knife was never recovered, relying on eyewitness description, the wounds observed and the doctor's opinion S5.
"Section 118 requires a serious injury." Not sub-section (1), which applies to ordinary hurt. The whole design of the provision is to punish by mode rather than gravity, which is why, as the Supreme Court recorded, the Code's authors thought some non-grievous hurts deserved heavier punishment than many grievous ones S5.
"Sub-section (2) is just sub-section (1) with a worse injury." It is, but the consequences are not proportionate to that description: the maximum rises from three years to life, a one-year minimum appears, the fine becomes mandatory and unquantified, and the trial court changes S1; S4.
"The Sanhita raised the fines." Not here. For s. 118(1) it introduced a ceiling of ₹20,000 where IPC s. 324 allowed an unlimited, non-excessive fine S1; S3; S6. Across this family the Sanhita produced five different outcomes on fines, and each provision must be checked against its own predecessor.
"A court can still impose a nominal sentence for grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon." Not under s. 118(2), which sets a one-year floor on the determinate alternative S1.
"The First Schedule tells you which court will sentence." It tells you which court may try. BNSS s. 23 caps what a Magistrate may pass, and where the two diverge BNSS ss. 361 and 362 provide for submission to the CJM or committal to the Court of Session S4; S8.
"Provocation is a defence." Section 122(1) and s. 122(2) are the carve-outs written into sub-sections (1) and (2) respectively. They do not acquit; they substitute lower brackets, and they are conditioned on grave and sudden provocation and on the absence of intention or knowledge as to injuring anyone other than the provoker S1.
Worked examples
These are editorial hypotheticals, written to show how the provisions interact. They are not judgments and not predictions. Each states the facts that decide it.
Example 1: nature of the instrument. A slashes B with a razor, causing a shallow cut that heals in three days. The injury is ordinary hurt, not grievous. But a razor is an instrument for cutting, so s. 118(1) is engaged on its face, and on Anwarul Haq the enquiry is into the nature of the instrument rather than the manner of use S1; S5. Change one fact, A slaps B with an open hand and causes the same pain, and no listed means is involved; the provision is s. 115(2).
Example 2: the sub-section boundary and what rides on it. C strikes D with an iron rod and D suffers a fractured forearm. A fracture is grievous hurt under s. 116(g), so the charge is s. 118(2): life, or not less than one year up to ten years, and a mandatory fine, before a Magistrate of the first class S1; S4. Change one fact (D suffers bruising only, with no clause of s. 116 satisfied) and the charge is s. 118(1): up to three years, or a fine capped at ₹20,000, or both. That is the Shripal contention in miniature S9.
Example 3: the missing weapon. E is alleged to have stabbed F with a knife never recovered. Two eyewitnesses describe the knife and the treating doctor's findings are consistent with a stab wound. On Anwarul Haq non-recovery is not by itself a reason to discard that evidence S5. Change one fact, no witness can say what was used and the wounds are equally consistent with a fall, and the prosecution's difficulty is proving causation by a listed means, which is one of the two things Anwarul Haq says must be established.
Example 4: the fine ceiling, both ways. G is convicted under s. 118(1) in circumstances a court considers to merit a heavy financial penalty rather than imprisonment. The most it may impose is ₹20,000 S1. Under IPC s. 324 the same court faced no stated ceiling, only the requirement that the fine not be excessive S3; S6. Change one fact, the conviction is under s. 118(2), and the fine becomes mandatory and unquantified, while a minimum of one year's imprisonment also applies unless life is imposed.
Example 5: the forum mismatch. H is tried before a Magistrate of the first class under s. 118(2). Midway through, the evidence shows a grave injury inflicted with a firearm, and the Magistrate forms the view that a sentence well beyond three years is called for. He cannot pass it: BNSS s. 23(2) caps him at three years. The route is BNSS s. 362: commit the case to the Court of Session (or s. 361, submission to the Chief Judicial Magistrate S8. Change one fact) the injury turns out not to be grievous, so the offence is s. 118(1) with a three-year maximum, and the Magistrate's powers are adequate, provided he is not a Magistrate of the second class.
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 118
- BNS s. 116: the closed list of grievous hurts, which decides whether a case is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) S10.
- BNS s. 115. The plain-hurt offence that applies where no listed means is involved S1.
- BNS s. 117: grievous hurt without a dangerous weapon: seven years, against s. 118(2)'s life S1; S4.
- BNS s. 122(1) and (2): the carve-outs written into sub-sections (1) and (2) S1.
- BNS s. 8(1): the unlimited-fine default that s. 118(1) now displaces S6.
- BNSS s. 23: what each class of Magistrate may actually sentence; and ss. 361 and 362, the routes upward S8.
Sources and honest limits
The statutory comparison was run against the IPC's operative text, located by distinctive wording rather than section number. Section 118 was token-diffed against the Gazette copy of the Sanhita, and ss. 324 and 326 were read in full. The fine point was established by reading IPC s. 63 and BNS s. 8(1) side by side, so that the change is attributed to s. 118(1) itself and not to a shift in the general rule. The First Schedule rows were read from the BNSS, and the Magistrates' sentencing powers and the two committal routes were read from BNSS ss. 23, 361 and 362. Anwarul Haq was retrieved and read from the Supreme Court's own judgment, not from the High Court decision in which it was found quoted, which is also how the quoted passage could be checked against the original.
The material limits are recorded in this article's limitations field. In outline: no decision on the new one-year minimum or the ₹20,000 ceiling was located; no decision on the Schedule-versus-sentencing-power mismatch was located; no provision corresponding to the old "sufficiently severe sentence" power was found in the BNSS, which is recorded as a search result rather than a conclusion; the tension between Anwarul Haq's nature-of-the-instrument test and Tarun Kumar Tiwari's reliance on the absence of major injury is recorded but not resolved; the IPC-era authority on ss. 324 and 326 beyond Anwarul Haq was not surveyed; the amendment history of IPC s. 324: which was at one time omitted from the statute book and later restored: was deliberately not asserted, because this project has never retrieved an amending Act; and the contents of ss. 116 and 122 are left to their own articles.
This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text and early application of a statutory provision. It is not legal advice and not a prediction of any outcome. Whether an instrument falls within section 118, whether the hurt caused was grievous, which sub-section applies, and what sentence or fine may follow, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.