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BNS Section 118 · Deep dive

BNS Section 118: Hurt by Dangerous Weapons - A New One-Year Minimum, and a Fine Ceiling That Came Down

Section 118 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes causing hurt BY A PARTICULAR CLASS OF MEANS - instruments for shooting, stabbing or cutting, any instrument which used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause death, fire or heated substances, poison or corrosives, explosives, deleterious substances, or any animal - regardless of how serious the injury proves to be. It MERGES IPC ss. 324 and 326 into two sub-sections: (1) hurt by those means, up to 3 years or a fine up to TWENTY THOUSAND RUPEES or both; (2) grievous hurt by the same means, IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE or not less than ONE YEAR up to 10 years, and a mandatory fine S1; S3. TWO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES RUN IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS. A ONE-YEAR MINIMUM WAS ADDED to sub-section (2): IPC s. 326 had NO minimum at all, so a court can no longer impose a token sentence for grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon S1; S3. BUT THE MAXIMUM FINE UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) WAS CUT: IPC s. 324 said merely 'or with fine', and under IPC s. 63 an unexpressed fine was 'unlimited, but shall not be excessive' - s. 118(1) caps it at twenty thousand rupees, and because BNS s. 8(1) reproduces that default in identical terms the reduction is attributable to s. 118(1) itself S1; S3; S6. Across this family the Sanhita has now produced FIVE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES on fines, so no general claim about fines rising is safe. THE PROVISION PUNISHES BY MODE, NOT BY GRAVITY - which was the original design. In Anwarul Haq v. State of Uttar Pradesh the Supreme Court, construing the identical IPC wording, held that 'an instrument, which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death' must be construed 'with reference to the NATURE OF THE INSTRUMENT AND NOT THE MANNER OF ITS USE'; that the prosecution need establish only that the accused voluntarily caused hurt and did so by a listed means; that the catch-all read with the marginal note means a dangerous weapon likely to cause death; and that NON-RECOVERY of the weapon is not fatal where witnesses describe it and the medical evidence supports it. The Court also quoted the Code's authors on why mode matters more than classification S5. Under the Sanhita, the Calcutta High Court has held that s. 118(1) is NOT attracted merely because hurt or grievous hurt was caused, and that a bunch of keys was not a dangerous weapon in the circumstances S7; and in Allahabad, s. 118(2) added during investigation despite no grievous injury drew anticipatory bail S9. A FORUM ANOMALY APPEARS ON THE FACE OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE: s. 118(2) carries IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE yet is made triable by a MAGISTRATE OF THE FIRST CLASS, who under BNSS s. 23(2) cannot pass a sentence exceeding THREE YEARS. BNSS ss. 361 and 362 supply the route upward - submission to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or committal to the Court of Session - so the problem is one of allocation rather than an unresolvable defect, but a serious case may begin before a court that cannot finish it S4; S8.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 14 October 2026 29 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 118 — Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means
Earlier law (IPC)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 324 · direct
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 326 · direct
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 324, Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 326 · consolidated

The short answer

Section 118 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes causing hurt by a particular class of means, weapons and substances capable of killing, regardless of how serious the injury turns out to be. It merges two Indian Penal Code sections into two sub-sections S1; S3:

ConductPunishmentIPC source
s. 118(1)Voluntarily causing hurt by the listed means, except in the case provided for by s. 122(1)Up to 3 years, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or bothIPC s. 324
s. 118(2)Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by any means referred to in sub-section (1), except in the case provided for by s. 122(2)Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for not less than one year up to ten years, and mandatory fineIPC s. 326

Three findings, and two of them run in opposite directions.

A one-year minimum was added. IPC s. 326 carried "imprisonment for life, or … a term which may extend to ten years" with no minimum at all. Section 118(2) reads "not less than one year but which may extend to ten years" S1; S3. A court can no longer impose a token sentence for causing grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon.

But the maximum fine under sub-section (1) was cut. IPC s. 324 said simply "or with fine", naming no figure, and under IPC s. 63, where no sum is expressed, "the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive". Section 118(1) caps the fine at twenty thousand rupees, and BNS s. 8(1) carries the identical unlimited-fine default, so the contrast is real and not an artefact of a changed general rule S1; S3; S6. For this offence the ceiling on fines came down.

The provision punishes by mode, not by gravity. That was the original design. In Anwarul Haq v. State of Uttar Pradesh the Supreme Court quoted the Authors of the Penal Code: "an offender who has used a knife or a hot iron for the purpose of wreaking his hatred is a [far] worse and more dangerous member of a society than he [who] has only used his fist… many hurts which would not, according to our classification, be designated as grievous ought yet, on account of the mode in which [they] are inflicted, to be punished more severely than many grievous hurts" S5.

Nothing here is legal advice. Whether an instrument falls within s. 118 and whether the hurt caused was grievous are questions of fact for the court on the evidence before it.


The listed means

Sub-section (1) sets out the class, and sub-section (2) simply refers back to it:

"…by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal" S1

This list is reproduced from IPC s. 324 word for word. Two points of structure:

  • It is a closed class of means, not of injuries. The gravity of the injury is what separates sub-section (1) from sub-section (2); the means are identical for both.
  • The second item is the open one. "Any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death" is the catch-all, and it is the item that litigation turns on.

What the Supreme Court has said about that catch-all

Anwarul Haq (Supreme Court, 26 April 2005) is the controlling authority on the identical IPC wording, and because s. 118(1) reproduces it exactly, the construction carries across S1; S3; S5.

The test is the nature of the instrument, not how it was used. "The expression 'an instrument, which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death' should be construed with reference to the nature of the instrument and not the manner of its use" S5. So the question is whether the thing is of a kind likely to cause death if used as a weapon, not whether the accused in fact wielded it dangerously.

What the prosecution must prove. "What has to be established by the prosecution is that the accused voluntarily caused hurt and that such hurt was caused by means of an instrument referred to in this Section" S5. Two elements, and no more: voluntarily causing hurt, and causation by a listed means.

The marginal note is part of the construction. The Court held that the catch-all, "when read in the light of marginal note to Section 324, means dangerous weapon which if used by the offender is likely to cause death" S5. That reasoning survives the recodification: the Sanhita's marginal note to s. 118 is "Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means" S2.

Non-recovery of the weapon is not fatal. In Anwarul Haq the knife was never recovered. The Court held that "merely because the knife has not been recovered during investigation same cannot be a factor to discard the evidence of PWs. 1 & 2", that the wounds noticed by the doctor "throw considerable light", and that the doctor's opinion about the weapon, "though theoretical, cannot be totally wiped out". The conviction under s. 324 was upheld and the appeals dismissed S5.

And the point has to be taken at trial. The Court noted that "the plea that the weapon used was not a dangerous weapon had never been urged before the trial court or the High Court", and declined to permit it for the first time on appeal S5.

What courts have held is not enough

Under the Sanhita, the Calcutta High Court has already policed the boundary. In Tarun Kumar Tiwari v. State of West Bengal the victim had been struck with a bunch of keys on the head, back and waist. The Court rejected the Public Prosecutor's submission that s. 118(1) "is attracted in cases involving voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt", and held that a bunch of keys could not, "in the facts and circumstances of the present case, be regarded as a dangerous weapon or dangerous means within the meaning of Section 118(1) of the BNS, 2023, particularly when the injury report does not suggest that the victim suffered any major injury". The charge sheet was quashed only in so far as it related to s. 118(1), the remaining offences proceeding to trial S7.

Two cautions about that order. It is expressly tied to "the facts and circumstances of the present case", so it is not a ruling that keys can never qualify. And its reliance on the absence of major injury sits a little awkwardly with Anwarul Haq's instruction to look at the nature of the instrument rather than the manner of its use: a tension this article records without attempting to resolve, since no decision reconciling the two was located.


Sub-section (1) against IPC s. 324: the fine ceiling came down

IPC s. 324BNS s. 118(1)Character
"except in the case provided for by section 334""except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122"Consequential renumbering: the same carve-out
"or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance""…explosive substance**,** or by means of any substance"A comma added
"or with fine""or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees"SUBSTANTIVE: a new ceiling
"three years""three years"Unchanged

S1; S3

The third row is the one that matters, and it is counter-intuitive, so it is worth setting out the chain:

  1. IPC s. 324 stated no fine figure.
  2. IPC s. 63: "Where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive" S3.
  3. So a court sentencing under s. 324 could impose any fine that was not excessive.
  4. BNS s. 8(1) reproduces that default rule in identical terms S6, so the general law did not change.
  5. But s. 118(1) now expresses a sum: twenty thousand rupees. The default no longer applies, and the ceiling binds.

The practical effect is that the maximum fine for this offence fell from "unlimited but not excessive" to ₹20,000. Whether that was intended is not something this article can say, no legislative material was retrieved, but the textual position is clear, and it is the opposite of what happened at s. 115(2), where a stated figure of one thousand rupees was multiplied tenfold.

This is now the fourth distinct pattern found in this family, and together they dispose of any general claim about the Sanhita and fines:

ProvisionIPC predecessorWhat happened to the fine
s. 115(2)s. 323: ₹1,000×10 to ₹10,000
s. 122(1)s. 334: ₹500×10 to ₹5,000
s. 122(2)s. 335: ₹2,000×5 to ₹10,000
s. 117(2)s. 325: unquantifiedno change: still unquantified
s. 118(1)s. 324: unquantifieda ceiling introduced, reducing the maximum

S1; S3


Sub-section (2) against IPC s. 326: a minimum where there was none

IPC s. 326BNS s. 118(2)Character
"except in the case provided for by section 335""except in the case provided for by sub-section (2) of section 122"Consequential renumbering
The full list of means repeated"by any means referred to in sub-section (1)"Drafting economy; no change of substance
"imprisonment for life, or … a term which may extend to ten years""imprisonment for life, or … a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years"SUBSTANTIVE: a one-year minimum added
"and shall also be liable to fine""and shall also be liable to fine"Unchanged, mandatory, unquantified

S1; S3

The one-year minimum is the significant change. Under IPC s. 326 a court could impose a sentence of any length up to ten years, or life; there was no floor. Section 118(2) sets one. Note what it does not do: it leaves "imprisonment for life" available as a distinct alternative, so the sub-section offers a court either life or a determinate term between one and ten years.

The compression of the means-list is worth a word because it is easy to misread as a narrowing. It is not: "any means referred to in sub-section (1)" imports the whole list, including the open catch-all. The Sanhita simply declined to print it twice.


A forum problem on the face of the First Schedule

This is the finding most likely to matter in practice, and it is not visible in s. 118 itself.

ProvisionPunishmentCognizable?Bailable?Trial court (First Schedule)
s. 118(1)3 years, or fine of ₹20,000, or bothCognizableNon-bailableAny Magistrate
s. 118(2)Imprisonment for life, or not less than 1 year up to 10 years, and fineCognizableNon-bailableMagistrate of the first class

S4

Now set that against the Magistrates' sentencing powers:

  • BNSS s. 23(2): "The Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or of both, or of community service."
  • BNSS s. 23(3): a Magistrate of the second class may pass imprisonment "not exceeding one year", or a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees.
  • BNSS s. 23(1): even a Chief Judicial Magistrate may not pass a sentence of death, of imprisonment for life, or of imprisonment exceeding seven years S8.

So the First Schedule assigns s. 118(2), an offence carrying imprisonment for life, to a Magistrate who cannot lawfully pass a sentence exceeding three years. The same mismatch, in milder form, affects sub-section (1): a three-year offence is made triable by "any Magistrate", and a Magistrate of the second class is capped at one year S4; S8.

The Sanhita does provide a route out, and it should be stated alongside the problem. The First Schedule's column 6 says which court may try the offence; BNSS s. 23 limits what a Magistrate may pass. Where the two diverge:

  • BNSS s. 361, where the evidence in an inquiry or trial before a Magistrate warrants a presumption that he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it, or that the case should be tried or committed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, he stays the proceedings and submits the case to the CJM, who may try it himself, refer it to a subordinate Magistrate, or commit the accused for trial S8.
  • BNSS s. 362, if at any stage before signing the judgment it appears to the Magistrate that the case "ought to be tried by the Court of Session, he shall commit it to that Court" S8.

So a first-class Magistrate trying a s. 118(2) case who concludes that a sentence beyond his powers is called for is not stuck; he commits the case upward. The anomaly is therefore one of allocation and efficiency rather than an unresolvable defect, but it means that a serious s. 118(2) case may begin before a court that cannot finish it.

Two qualifications are owed. First, I did not locate in the BNSS any provision corresponding to the old power of a Magistrate to forward an accused to the CJM specifically because he cannot pass a sufficiently severe sentence; a search for that wording returned nothing, and that is recorded as a search result, not as a conclusion that the power was dropped. Second, no decision on this mismatch was located.

One contrast with the previous section is worth noting: the Schedule's column 2 for s. 118(2) does record the carve-out, reading "[except as provided in section 122(2)]" S4. At s. 117(4) the corresponding label omitted an element of the offence. The Schedule's descriptions are therefore inconsistent in their fidelity, which is a reason to read the section rather than the Schedule.


How section 118 is being used

Over-charging under sub-section (2) is the pattern that has reached the High Courts. Both located Sanhita decisions involve s. 118 being added to, or read into, a case that the court thought it did not fit.

In Shripal and 3 others v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, Rajiv Lochan Shukla J, 23 September 2026) the FIR was "initially … lodged for offences under Section 115(2), 351(2) of the BNS. Later during investigation, the police has added Section 118(2) BNS." Counsel's argument was structural: s. 118 "has two parts. One deals with simple hurt being caused by dangerous weapons or means and the other deals with grievous hurt caused by dangerous weapons or means", and "despite there being no grievous injuries suffered by the injured, the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet under Section 118(2)". The Court allowed anticipatory bail on conditions, making clear that its observations were "exclusively for deciding the instant anticipatory bail application" and not an opinion on the merits S9.

That matters because of what sub-section (2) brings with it. Moving a case from s. 118(1) to s. 118(2) raises the maximum from three years to life, introduces a one-year minimum, makes the fine mandatory, and shifts the trial court S1; S4. The grievous/not-grievous question: governed by the closed list in s. 116: is therefore doing a great deal of work.

Tarun Kumar Tiwari, discussed above, is the other: the attempt to apply s. 118(1) to a blow with a bunch of keys failed, and the charge sheet was quashed to that extent only S7.

What this establishes, and what it does not. It establishes that the sub-section boundary is being contested at the threshold stage, and that courts are willing to excise a s. 118 charge while leaving the underlying hurt charge intact. It establishes nothing about the new one-year minimum or the ₹20,000 ceiling: no decision on either was located, and the searches were not exhaustive.


Practical distinctions and common misconceptions

"Section 118 applies whenever a weapon is used to cause hurt." It applies where the means fall within the listed class. On Anwarul Haq the test for the catch-all is the nature of the instrument, not how it was used S5. And Tarun Kumar Tiwari holds that s. 118(1) is not attracted merely because hurt or grievous hurt was caused S7.

"The weapon must be recovered." No. Anwarul Haq upheld a conviction where the knife was never recovered, relying on eyewitness description, the wounds observed and the doctor's opinion S5.

"Section 118 requires a serious injury." Not sub-section (1), which applies to ordinary hurt. The whole design of the provision is to punish by mode rather than gravity, which is why, as the Supreme Court recorded, the Code's authors thought some non-grievous hurts deserved heavier punishment than many grievous ones S5.

"Sub-section (2) is just sub-section (1) with a worse injury." It is, but the consequences are not proportionate to that description: the maximum rises from three years to life, a one-year minimum appears, the fine becomes mandatory and unquantified, and the trial court changes S1; S4.

"The Sanhita raised the fines." Not here. For s. 118(1) it introduced a ceiling of ₹20,000 where IPC s. 324 allowed an unlimited, non-excessive fine S1; S3; S6. Across this family the Sanhita produced five different outcomes on fines, and each provision must be checked against its own predecessor.

"A court can still impose a nominal sentence for grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon." Not under s. 118(2), which sets a one-year floor on the determinate alternative S1.

"The First Schedule tells you which court will sentence." It tells you which court may try. BNSS s. 23 caps what a Magistrate may pass, and where the two diverge BNSS ss. 361 and 362 provide for submission to the CJM or committal to the Court of Session S4; S8.

"Provocation is a defence." Section 122(1) and s. 122(2) are the carve-outs written into sub-sections (1) and (2) respectively. They do not acquit; they substitute lower brackets, and they are conditioned on grave and sudden provocation and on the absence of intention or knowledge as to injuring anyone other than the provoker S1.


Worked examples

These are editorial hypotheticals, written to show how the provisions interact. They are not judgments and not predictions. Each states the facts that decide it.

Example 1: nature of the instrument. A slashes B with a razor, causing a shallow cut that heals in three days. The injury is ordinary hurt, not grievous. But a razor is an instrument for cutting, so s. 118(1) is engaged on its face, and on Anwarul Haq the enquiry is into the nature of the instrument rather than the manner of use S1; S5. Change one fact, A slaps B with an open hand and causes the same pain, and no listed means is involved; the provision is s. 115(2).

Example 2: the sub-section boundary and what rides on it. C strikes D with an iron rod and D suffers a fractured forearm. A fracture is grievous hurt under s. 116(g), so the charge is s. 118(2): life, or not less than one year up to ten years, and a mandatory fine, before a Magistrate of the first class S1; S4. Change one fact (D suffers bruising only, with no clause of s. 116 satisfied) and the charge is s. 118(1): up to three years, or a fine capped at ₹20,000, or both. That is the Shripal contention in miniature S9.

Example 3: the missing weapon. E is alleged to have stabbed F with a knife never recovered. Two eyewitnesses describe the knife and the treating doctor's findings are consistent with a stab wound. On Anwarul Haq non-recovery is not by itself a reason to discard that evidence S5. Change one fact, no witness can say what was used and the wounds are equally consistent with a fall, and the prosecution's difficulty is proving causation by a listed means, which is one of the two things Anwarul Haq says must be established.

Example 4: the fine ceiling, both ways. G is convicted under s. 118(1) in circumstances a court considers to merit a heavy financial penalty rather than imprisonment. The most it may impose is ₹20,000 S1. Under IPC s. 324 the same court faced no stated ceiling, only the requirement that the fine not be excessive S3; S6. Change one fact, the conviction is under s. 118(2), and the fine becomes mandatory and unquantified, while a minimum of one year's imprisonment also applies unless life is imposed.

Example 5: the forum mismatch. H is tried before a Magistrate of the first class under s. 118(2). Midway through, the evidence shows a grave injury inflicted with a firearm, and the Magistrate forms the view that a sentence well beyond three years is called for. He cannot pass it: BNSS s. 23(2) caps him at three years. The route is BNSS s. 362: commit the case to the Court of Session (or s. 361, submission to the Chief Judicial Magistrate S8. Change one fact) the injury turns out not to be grievous, so the offence is s. 118(1) with a three-year maximum, and the Magistrate's powers are adequate, provided he is not a Magistrate of the second class.


  • BNS s. 116: the closed list of grievous hurts, which decides whether a case is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) S10.
  • BNS s. 115. The plain-hurt offence that applies where no listed means is involved S1.
  • BNS s. 117: grievous hurt without a dangerous weapon: seven years, against s. 118(2)'s life S1; S4.
  • BNS s. 122(1) and (2): the carve-outs written into sub-sections (1) and (2) S1.
  • BNS s. 8(1): the unlimited-fine default that s. 118(1) now displaces S6.
  • BNSS s. 23: what each class of Magistrate may actually sentence; and ss. 361 and 362, the routes upward S8.

Sources and honest limits

The statutory comparison was run against the IPC's operative text, located by distinctive wording rather than section number. Section 118 was token-diffed against the Gazette copy of the Sanhita, and ss. 324 and 326 were read in full. The fine point was established by reading IPC s. 63 and BNS s. 8(1) side by side, so that the change is attributed to s. 118(1) itself and not to a shift in the general rule. The First Schedule rows were read from the BNSS, and the Magistrates' sentencing powers and the two committal routes were read from BNSS ss. 23, 361 and 362. Anwarul Haq was retrieved and read from the Supreme Court's own judgment, not from the High Court decision in which it was found quoted, which is also how the quoted passage could be checked against the original.

The material limits are recorded in this article's limitations field. In outline: no decision on the new one-year minimum or the ₹20,000 ceiling was located; no decision on the Schedule-versus-sentencing-power mismatch was located; no provision corresponding to the old "sufficiently severe sentence" power was found in the BNSS, which is recorded as a search result rather than a conclusion; the tension between Anwarul Haq's nature-of-the-instrument test and Tarun Kumar Tiwari's reliance on the absence of major injury is recorded but not resolved; the IPC-era authority on ss. 324 and 326 beyond Anwarul Haq was not surveyed; the amendment history of IPC s. 324: which was at one time omitted from the statute book and later restored: was deliberately not asserted, because this project has never retrieved an amending Act; and the contents of ss. 116 and 122 are left to their own articles.

This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text and early application of a statutory provision. It is not legal advice and not a prediction of any outcome. Whether an instrument falls within section 118, whether the hurt caused was grievous, which sub-section applies, and what sentence or fine may follow, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 118 cover?
Causing hurt or grievous hurt by a listed class of means: any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting; any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death; fire or any heated substance; any poison or corrosive substance; any explosive substance; any substance deleterious to the human body to inhale, swallow or receive into the blood; or any animal. Sub-section (1) deals with hurt, sub-section (2) with grievous hurt S1.
+Which IPC sections correspond to BNS Section 118?
Sections 324 and 326 - s. 324 punished hurt by dangerous weapons or means and s. 326 grievous hurt by the same means. The Sanhita merges them into sub-sections (1) and (2), printing the list of means once and cross-referring to it S1; S3.
+What is the punishment under Section 118?
Sub-section (1): imprisonment of either description up to three years, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both. Sub-section (2): imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for not less than one year but up to ten years, and the offender shall also be liable to fine - so in sub-section (2) the fine is mandatory and unquantified S1.
+What changed from IPC Sections 324 and 326?
Three things in each, and two of them matter. Sub-section (2) adds a ONE-YEAR MINIMUM that IPC s. 326 did not have. Sub-section (1) introduces a TWENTY-THOUSAND-RUPEE CEILING on the fine where IPC s. 324 stated no figure. The rest is consequential renumbering of the carve-outs, a comma, and the compression of the means-list in sub-section (2) S1; S3.
+Is it true that the maximum fine for this offence went DOWN?
Yes, for sub-section (1). IPC s. 324 said only 'or with fine', and IPC s. 63 provided that where no sum is expressed the fine 'is unlimited, but shall not be excessive'. Section 118(1) now expresses a sum - twenty thousand rupees - so the default no longer applies. BNS s. 8(1) reproduces the unlimited-fine default in identical terms, so the change comes from s. 118(1) itself and not from any shift in the general rule S1; S3; S6.
+So did the Sanhita raise fines or lower them?
Both, depending on the provision - which is why no general claim is safe. In this family alone: s. 115(2) multiplied IPC s. 323's fine tenfold; s. 122(1) multiplied s. 334's tenfold; s. 122(2) multiplied s. 335's fivefold; s. 117(2) left an unquantified fine unquantified; and s. 118(1) introduced a ceiling where none existed, reducing the maximum. Each provision must be checked against its own predecessor S1; S3.
+Does Section 118 require a serious injury?
Not sub-section (1), which applies to ordinary hurt. The provision punishes by MODE rather than gravity. In Anwarul Haq the Supreme Court quoted the Code's authors: an offender who uses a knife or a hot iron 'is a [far] worse and more dangerous member of a society than he [who] has only used his fist', and many non-grievous hurts 'ought yet, on account of the mode in which [they] are inflicted, to be punished more severely than many grievous hurts' S5.
+How do courts decide whether something is a dangerous weapon?
On Anwarul Haq, the expression 'an instrument, which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death' is to be construed 'with reference to the nature of the instrument and not the manner of its use'. The Court also held that the catch-all, read with the marginal note, 'means dangerous weapon which if used by the offender is likely to cause death'. That marginal-note reasoning survives, because the Sanhita's marginal note to s. 118 still reads 'by dangerous weapons or means' S2; S5.
+What must the prosecution prove under Section 118?
On Anwarul Haq, two things: 'that the accused voluntarily caused hurt and that such hurt was caused by means of an instrument referred to in this Section'. For sub-section (2) the hurt must additionally be grievous within s. 116 S1; S5; S10.
+Does the weapon have to be recovered?
No. In Anwarul Haq the knife was never recovered, and the Supreme Court held that 'merely because the knife has not been recovered during investigation same cannot be a factor to discard the evidence' of the eyewitnesses; the wounds observed by the doctor threw 'considerable light', and the doctor's opinion about the weapon, 'though theoretical, cannot be totally wiped out'. The conviction was upheld S5.
+Can the accused argue for the first time on appeal that the weapon was not dangerous?
In Anwarul Haq the Court noted that the plea 'had never been urged before the trial court or the High Court' and declined to permit it to be raised for the first time before it. Whether a weapon is dangerous is a factual question, so it needs to be contested where facts are found S5.
+Is Section 118(1) attracted whenever hurt is caused in a fight?
No. In Tarun Kumar Tiwari the Calcutta High Court expressly rejected the Public Prosecutor's submission that s. 118(1) 'is attracted in cases involving voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt', and held that a bunch of keys could not, in the facts and circumstances, be regarded as a dangerous weapon or dangerous means within s. 118(1), particularly where the injury report suggested no major injury. The charge sheet was quashed only as to s. 118(1) S7.
+Is there any tension between those two decisions?
Arguably. Anwarul Haq directs attention to the nature of the instrument rather than the manner of its use, while Tarun Kumar Tiwari relied in part on the absence of major injury. This article records the tension and does not resolve it: no decision reconciling the two was located, and the Calcutta order is expressly tied to the facts and circumstances of that case S5; S7.
+Why does it matter so much whether a case is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)?
Because the consequences are not proportionate to the difference in injury. Moving from (1) to (2) raises the maximum from three years to imprisonment for life, introduces a one-year minimum, makes the fine mandatory and unquantified, and changes the trial court. Whether the hurt is grievous is governed by the closed list in s. 116 S1; S4; S10.
+Is Section 118 cognizable and bailable, and which court tries it?
Under the BNSS First Schedule both sub-sections are COGNIZABLE and NON-BAILABLE. Sub-section (1) is triable by any Magistrate; sub-section (2) by a Magistrate of the first class S4.
+How can a Magistrate try an offence punishable with life imprisonment?
That is a real problem on the face of the Schedule. BNSS s. 23(2) caps a Magistrate of the first class at three years' imprisonment, and s. 23(1) prevents even a Chief Judicial Magistrate from passing life imprisonment - yet the Schedule assigns s. 118(2) to a first-class Magistrate. The Schedule says who may TRY; BNSS s. 23 says what may be PASSED. Where they diverge, BNSS s. 361 lets the Magistrate submit the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and BNSS s. 362 requires him to commit it to the Court of Session if it appears the case ought to be tried there. So the anomaly is one of allocation rather than an unresolvable defect - but a serious case may begin before a court that cannot finish it. No decision on this mismatch was located S4; S8.
+Does the same mismatch affect sub-section (1)?
In milder form. Sub-section (1) carries three years and is triable by 'any Magistrate', but a Magistrate of the second class may pass only one year's imprisonment under BNSS s. 23(3). The fine is not a problem: a first-class Magistrate may impose up to fifty thousand rupees, well above s. 118(1)'s twenty-thousand-rupee ceiling S1; S4; S8.
+Did the list of means get narrower when sub-section (2) stopped repeating it?
No. 'By any means referred to in sub-section (1)' imports the whole list, including the open catch-all. The Sanhita simply declined to print it twice - IPC s. 326 had repeated it in full S1; S3.
+What are the Section 122 carve-outs in Section 118?
Sub-section (1) excepts the case provided for by s. 122(1) and sub-section (2) the case provided for by s. 122(2) - hurt and grievous hurt respectively on grave and sudden provocation, where the accused neither intends nor knows himself likely to injure anyone other than the provoker. They do not acquit; they substitute lower brackets. IPC ss. 324 and 326 carried the equivalent carve-outs to ss. 334 and 335 S1; S3.
+Has any court considered the new one-year minimum or the twenty-thousand-rupee ceiling?
No decision on either was located in the searches run. The two Sanhita decisions found both concern whether s. 118 applied at all, not what follows once it does. These searches were targeted, not exhaustive S7; S9.
+Can the one-year minimum be applied to an assault committed before 1 July 2024?
A minimum sentence is a heavier penalty than a law permitting none, and Article 20(1) of the Constitution bars subjecting a person to a greater penalty than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the act. For pre-commencement conduct the IPC s. 326 position, with no floor, governs. Article 20(1) was not re-read for this article and no decision applying it to this change was located S1; S3.
+Did Section 118 commence with the rest of the Sanhita?
Yes. MHA notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 appointed 1 July 2024 for all provisions of the Sanhita except s. 106(2), and s. 118 is not among the excepted provisions S11.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 118 - official text of sub-sections (1) and (2); read with section 122 for the carve-outs — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  2. S2The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, published 25 December 2023 (the enacted text as authenticated) — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  3. S3The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), sections 63, 324 and 326 - the repealed text used for the correspondence check and for the fine analysis — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  4. S4The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), First Schedule - the classification entries for sections 118(1) and 118(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  5. S5Anwarul Haq v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 26 April 2005, reported AIR 2005 SC 2382 — Indian Kanoon (repository copy of the Court's own judgment) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  6. S6The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 8 - amount of fine, liability in default of payment of fine, etc. — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  7. S7Tarun Kumar Tiwari and Anr v. The State of West Bengal and Anr, CRR 4034 of 2025, High Court at Calcutta, Appellate Side (Kausik Chanda J), order dated 15 July 2026 — Indian Kanoon (repository copy of the Court's own order) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  8. S8The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), section 23 (sentences which Magistrates may pass), section 361 (procedure in cases which Magistrate cannot dispose of) and section 362 (procedure when, after commencement of inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be committed). Cited at the India Code handle for section 23; ss. 361 and 362 are at handles 123456789/546452 and 123456789/546661 — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  9. S9Shripal and 3 others v. State of U.P. and Another, anticipatory bail application, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Rajiv Lochan Shukla J), order dated 23 September 2026 — Indian Kanoon (repository copy of the Court's own order) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  10. S10The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 116 - the closed list of kinds of grievous hurt — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  11. S11Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, appointing 1 July 2024 as the date of commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)

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