The short answer
Section 115 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 does two jobs in two sub-sections:
- s. 115(1) defines what it means to cause hurt voluntarily: doing an act with the intention of causing hurt, or with the knowledge that one is likely to cause hurt, and thereby causing hurt S1.
- s. 115(2) creates the offence and punishes it: imprisonment of either description up to one year, or fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both: "except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122" S1.
This is the ordinary assault-causing-injury provision of Indian criminal law, and the one most people actually meet. Three things are worth knowing before anything else.
First, it is a merger. The Indian Penal Code kept these two jobs in two separate sections: s. 321 defined "voluntarily to cause hurt" and s. 323 punished it. The Sanhita folded them into one section with two sub-sections S2; S3.
Second, the definition did not change at all, but the fine did, tenfold. A token-by-token comparison shows s. 115(1) is word for word identical to IPC s. 321, zero differences. And s. 115(2) differs from IPC s. 323 in exactly three respects, of which only one matters: the maximum fine rose from one thousand rupees to ten thousand rupees S1; S2; S3. The one-year imprisonment maximum is untouched.
Third, it is non-cognizable. Under the BNSS First Schedule, s. 115(2) is non-cognizable, bailable, and triable by any Magistrate S4. The police therefore cannot register and investigate it as of right, which in practice decides whether anything happens at all.
Nothing here is legal advice. Whether hurt was voluntarily caused in any particular case, and whether any general exception applies, are questions of fact and law for the court on the evidence before it.
The merger, and exactly what changed
| IPC | BNS | |
|---|---|---|
| Definition of "voluntarily to cause hurt" | s. 321 | s. 115(1) |
| Offence and punishment | s. 323 | s. 115(2) |
s. 115(1) against IPC s. 321: zero differences
Both read:
"Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said 'voluntarily to cause hurt'." S1; S3
A token comparison of the two texts produces not one difference S1; S2; S3. This matters for a practical reason: the whole body of learning on what "voluntarily" means in the hurt context was built on these exact words and continues to apply to s. 115(1).
s. 115(2) against IPC s. 323: three differences, one substantive
| IPC s. 323 | BNS s. 115(2) | Character of the change |
|---|---|---|
| "except in the case provided for by section 334" | "except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122" | Consequential renumbering. IPC s. 334 (voluntarily causing hurt on grave and sudden provocation) became BNS s. 122(1). The carve-out is the same carve-out. |
| "by section 334**,** voluntarily causes hurt" | "of section 122 voluntarily causes hurt" | A dropped comma. See below. |
| "fine which may extend to one thousand rupees" | "fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees" | SUBSTANTIVE: a tenfold increase. |
Everything else is identical, including the opening "Whoever, except in the case provided for by", the words "voluntarily causes hurt", "shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year", and the closing "or with both".
The tenfold fine increase: the one change that matters
Under IPC s. 323 a court could fine an offender at most one thousand rupees. Under s. 115(2) the ceiling is ten thousand rupees S1; S3. The custodial maximum did not move.
This is not a theoretical ceiling that courts never reached. In Tushar Nath v. State of Assam the Sessions Judge, Bongaigaon had sentenced the appellant, for the offence under IPC s. 323, to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of exactly Rs. 1,000, the statutory maximum, with fifteen days' simple imprisonment in default S5. The old cap was a real constraint, and it was being hit.
The same tenfold uplift appears in the carve-out provision. IPC s. 334 allowed a fine up to five hundred rupees for voluntarily causing hurt on grave and sudden provocation; BNS s. 122(1) allows up to five thousand rupees. In both provisions the imprisonment maximum, one month, is unchanged S1; S3.
So in the two provisions actually compared for this article, the pattern is consistent: imprisonment untouched, fines multiplied by ten. I state it for those two provisions and go no further. Whether the Sanhita applied the same multiplier across the rest of the hurt group, or across the Code, was not checked, and no such general claim is made here.
One further caution. A fine ceiling tells you what a court may impose, not what it will. Section 115(2) also leaves the court free to impose imprisonment alone, or a fine alone, or both. The structure is "imprisonment … or with fine … or with both" S1. Nothing in the increase obliges a court to fine anyone more heavily than before.
A dropped comma in the enacted text
IPC s. 323 opened: "Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334**,** voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished…". The two commas enclosed the exception as a parenthesis.
Section 115(2) opens: "Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122 voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished…". The closing comma is gone, leaving the parenthesis unclosed S1; S2.
This was verified in both directions: in the India Code text of the section and in the Gazette of India copy of the enacted Act, which prints "by sub-section (1) of section 122 voluntarily causes hurt" with no comma S1; S2.
Nothing turns on it. The sense is not in doubt: the exception attaches to the cross-reference, not to the verb. It is recorded because this is a deep-dive on the text of the section, a reader comparing the two Codes will see it, and an article that silently tidied up the enacted wording would be misrepresenting it.
The three components of the offence
Section 115(2) punishes a person who "voluntarily causes hurt". Unpacking that through ss. 114 and 115(1), the prosecution must establish three things:
1. Hurt: the result. Bodily pain, disease or infirmity, as defined in s. 114 S6. The threshold is low but it is not nothing. In Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) the Supreme Court held that production of an injury report "is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC", that there might be no serious or visible injuries, and that "even causing bodily pain can be said to be causing 'hurt'": upholding the conviction S7. That holding was delivered on IPC ss. 319 and 323, whose words survive unchanged in ss. 114 and 115.
2. Causation. Section 115(1) requires that the accused "does thereby cause hurt". The hurt must result from the act S1.
3. The mental element: intention or knowledge. Either the intention of thereby causing hurt, or the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt S1. These are alternatives, and they are not interchangeable: intention is a purpose, knowledge of likelihood is an awareness of risk. A charge that pleads only intention does not thereby plead knowledge, and a court finding only knowledge has still found the element satisfied.
What is not required: that the accused intended the particular hurt that resulted. The definition speaks of causing hurt "to any person", and both limbs are framed around hurt generally rather than a specified injury S1. Section 115(1) is also silent about motive, which is not an element.
The section 122(1) carve-out
Section 115(2) applies "except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122". That is the only exception written into the section, and it is worth understanding properly because it is commonly misdescribed.
Section 122(1) punishes a person who "voluntarily causes hurt on grave and sudden provocation, if he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause hurt to any person other than the person who gave the provocation", with imprisonment up to one month, or fine up to five thousand rupees, or both S1.
Three points:
- It is not a defence; it is a different, lower bracket. A person within s. 122(1) is still convicted of voluntarily causing hurt. The effect of the carve-out is that the one-year/ten-thousand-rupee bracket of s. 115(2) does not apply to him, and the one-month/five-thousand-rupee bracket of s. 122(1) does instead. Acquittal is not the consequence.
- It is tightly conditioned. The provocation must be grave and sudden, and the accused must neither intend nor know himself likely to cause hurt to anyone other than the provoker. Hurt to a bystander takes the case outside s. 122(1).
- Grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact that is frequently rejected. In Tushar Nath the Division Bench held, on the facts before it, that "the aspect of grave and sudden provocation as a defence would not apply" S5. That was said in the context of the homicide charge in that case, not of s. 323, and it is recorded here only to make the point that the plea is not self-proving.
Classification, and why it decides whether anything happens
Under the BNSS First Schedule:
| Offence | Punishment (Schedule column 3) | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Trial court |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| s. 115(2) voluntarily causing hurt | Imprisonment for 1 year or fine of 10,000 rupees, or both | Non-cognizable | Bailable | Any Magistrate |
| s. 117(2) voluntarily causing grievous hurt | Imprisonment for 7 years and fine | Cognizable | Bailable | Any Magistrate |
Note that the Schedule's column 3 reproduces the ten thousand rupee figure, so the Schedule and the section agree here: unlike the mismatch found elsewhere in the Schedule S1; S4.
Because s. 115(2) is non-cognizable, BNSS s. 174 governs the police response. On information of a non-cognizable offence the officer in charge must enter its substance in the prescribed book and refer the informant to the Magistrate; and under s. 174(2) no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try it or commit it for trial. Section 174(3) allows an officer acting on such an order to exercise the same powers as in a cognizable case, except the power to arrest without warrant S8.
The Delhi High Court applied that chain in Kunal Yadav v. Manan Kumar Mishra (21 September 2026). The allegation was that the aggressors, none of them armed, "beat, slapped, thrashed and dragged the petitioners". The Court held this "at the most constitutes offence of causing hurt … which is a non-cognizable offence", that under BNSS s. 174 only the Magistrate could act and under s. 174(2) no police officer could investigate, and that the petitioners' remedy was a complaint case before the Magistrate under BNSS s. 223. Mandamus to register and investigate was refused S9.
The practical consequence, stated plainly. Whether a case is plain hurt or grievous hurt is the difference between a complaint the complainant must himself file before a Magistrate, and a police case. That makes s. 116, the definition of grievous hurt, the most consequential provision in this group, and it is analysed in its own article, not here.
The general exceptions: when voluntarily causing hurt is not an offence
Section 115 has to be read with Chapter III of the Sanhita. Several general exceptions bear directly on hurt, and ignoring them is the commonest way to get this provision wrong. The following were read for this article; the list is not exhaustive and none of them is analysed in depth here.
Section 33: act causing slight harm. "Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm" S10. This is the de minimis answer to the trivial hurt complaint, and it sits in direct tension with how low Lakshman Singh sets the bodily-pain threshold. The two are reconciled by their different questions: Lakshman Singh asks whether hurt was caused, s. 33 asks whether the harm is too slight to be an offence at all.
Section 25: harm by consent. Where an act is not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, it is not an offence by reason of harm caused to a person above eighteen years of age who has consented, expressly or impliedly, to suffer that harm or to take the risk of it. The section's own illustration is two people agreeing to fence for amusement S10. This is the provision that makes contact sports and comparable consensual activity lawful. Note the age limit and note that it does not extend to grievous hurt.
Sections 26 and 30: medical and benefit cases. Section 26 covers an act not intended to cause death, done in good faith for the benefit of a person who has consented: the surgeon's exception. Section 30 covers an act done in good faith for a person's benefit without consent, where it was impossible for that person to signify consent or he was incapable of giving it and no guardian was available in time, subject to a proviso excluding the intentional causing of death S10.
Section 18: accident. Nothing is an offence done by accident or misfortune, without criminal intention or knowledge, in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution S10. Note how this dovetails with s. 115(1): if there was neither intention nor knowledge of likelihood, the mental element of s. 115(1) is missing in any event.
Section 19: harm risked in good faith to prevent other harm. An act done with knowledge that it is likely to cause harm is not an offence merely for that reason, if done without criminal intention and in good faith to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property; the Explanation makes the gravity and imminence of the harm avoided a question of fact S10.
Sections 34 to 44: private defence. Section 35 gives every person a right, subject to the restrictions in s. 37, to defend his own body and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the human body S10. Section 115 is in Chapter VI, "Of offences affecting the human body", so an assault that would otherwise fall within s. 115 can itself attract the right of private defence in the person resisting it. The extent of that right, and when it extends to causing death, are governed by ss. 37 to 44 and are not analysed here.
How section 115 is actually being used
The case law is plentiful but thin in substance: s. 115(2) appears constantly as one charge among several in bail and quashing matters, and rarely as the provision a court is construing. Three illustrations, each read in full:
Chandrakant Ghodeswar v. State of Maharashtra, Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, Division Bench, 23 December 2025. An application under BNSS s. 528 to quash an FIR registered under BNS ss. 74, 75, 352, 115(2) and 49 with POCSO Act ss. 8, 12 and 17. The Court held that because the FIR and statements contained "averments regarding assault or use of criminal force and causing hurt", the offences under ss. 74, 75 and 115(2) were prima facie made out, and declined to quash S11. It is an illustration of the threshold at the quashing stage, not a construction of the ingredients.
Somasundaran K v. State of Kerala, Kerala High Court, 4 December 2024. A bail application under BNSS s. 483 in a crime registered under BNS ss. 118(1), 110, 190, 191(3), 351(2) and 115(2), the prosecution case being that the accused formed an unlawful assembly and attacked the complainant and his friend S12. Again, s. 115(2) as a companion charge.
Tushar Nath v. State of Assam, Gauhati High Court, Division Bench (Sanjay Kumar Medhi and Marli Vankung JJ), 30 April 2025, neutral citation 2025:GAU-AS:5226. A criminal appeal against conviction under IPC ss. 302, 341 and 323. Two features are useful here. The judgment supplies the IPC-to-BNS correspondences in square brackets as it goes: ss. 302/341/323 IPC "corresponding to Sections 103/126/115 of BNS", s. 304 Part II corresponding to s. 105 BNS, CrPC s. 374(2) to BNSS s. 415, CrPC s. 357A to BNSS s. 396: which is judicial corroboration of the s. 323 to s. 115 mapping. And it records the Rs. 1,000 fine imposed under s. 323, the IPC ceiling. The Court altered the s. 302 conviction to one under s. 304 Part II and modified the sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with a Rs. 5,000 fine; the appeal was partly allowed S5. The judgment does not address the s. 323 conviction in its operative part, and this article does not suggest it was either affirmed or disturbed.
What this material does and does not show. It shows s. 115(2) in live use across several High Courts within months of commencement, consistently as a companion charge in assault cases. It does not contain any decision construing the ingredients of s. 115, any decision on the tenfold fine increase, or any decision on the s. 122(1) carve-out. These searches were not exhaustive.
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Section 115 and section 114 are the same thing." No. Section 114 defines hurt and creates no offence. Section 115(1) defines voluntarily causing it, and s. 115(2) is the offence. A charge under s. 114 alone cites a definition S1; S6.
"The punishment for hurt went up under the new law." Only the fine. Imprisonment remains a maximum of one year, exactly as under IPC s. 323. The fine ceiling rose from one thousand to ten thousand rupees S1; S3.
"A fine of ten thousand rupees is now payable." It is a ceiling, not a tariff. The court may impose imprisonment alone, fine alone, or both, anywhere within the limits S1.
"Hurt requires intention." Knowledge that one is likely to cause hurt is sufficient and is an independent alternative S1.
"Without a medical certificate there is no case." Lakshman Singh holds an injury report is not a sine qua non S7. The absence of one is an evidentiary difficulty, not a legal bar.
"Any pain is an offence." Section 33 says nothing is an offence by reason of harm so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it S10.
"Provocation is a defence to hurt." Section 122(1) is not an acquittal provision. It relocates the case into a lower sentencing bracket, one month or five thousand rupees, and it requires grave and sudden provocation plus the absence of intention or knowledge as to hurting anyone other than the provoker S1.
"The police must register an FIR for any assault." Plain hurt under s. 115(2) is non-cognizable: the informant is referred to the Magistrate and no police officer may investigate without a Magistrate's order S4; S8; S9. Grievous hurt under s. 117(2) is cognizable and the position is different S4.
"Consent makes any injury lawful." Section 25 is limited: the act must not be intended or known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, and the consenting person must be above eighteen S10.
Worked examples
These are editorial hypotheticals written to show how the elements interact. They are not judgments and not predictions. Each states the facts that decide it.
Example 1: knowledge, not intention. A hurls a stone at a closed shutter to make a noise, knowing people are standing just beyond it. The stone strikes B, who suffers pain. Assume A did not intend to hurt anyone but knew he was likely to. The second limb of s. 115(1) is satisfied, knowledge of likelihood, and hurt was caused S1. Change one fact: A believed, with good reason, that nobody was anywhere near, and took care to check. Neither intention nor knowledge of likelihood is present, and s. 18 (accident in doing a lawful act) may additionally be in play depending on whether the act was lawful S1; S10.
Example 2: slight harm. C, squeezing past D in a crowded corridor, bumps D's shoulder, causing momentary discomfort. Hurt in the s. 114 sense may technically have been caused. Section 33 asks a different question: is the harm so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it? S10 Change one fact: C deliberately shoves D hard enough to wind him, and the answer to the s. 33 question changes.
Example 3: consent, and its limit. E and F agree to spar in a boxing club. E, boxing fairly, causes F bruising and pain. Assume F is twenty-five, consented, and the harm was neither intended nor known to be likely to be grievous. Section 25 applies on its own terms, and its illustration is the closely analogous case of agreeing to fence for amusement S10. Change one fact: E deliberately strikes after the bell and fractures F's jaw. If that is grievous hurt, s. 25 is unavailable by its own words, and the offence is in the s. 117 bracket, not s. 115.
Example 4: the carve-out, and its condition. G, immediately on being gravely and suddenly provoked by H, strikes H and causes him pain. If G neither intended nor knew himself likely to hurt anyone other than H, the case is within s. 122(1), one month or five thousand rupees, and outside s. 115(2) S1. Change one fact: G swings wildly, knowing bystanders are within reach, and strikes J as well. The condition in s. 122(1) is not met and the carve-out does not operate.
Example 5: why the classification matters before anything else. K alleges that L slapped him, causing pain but no lasting injury. On that allegation the offence is s. 115(2), which is non-cognizable: the station officer records the substance of the information and refers K to the Magistrate, and no officer investigates without a Magistrate's order S4; S8. Change one fact: the injury is one of the kinds designated grievous by s. 116. The offence becomes s. 117(2), which is cognizable, and the police may act S4.
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 115
- BNS s. 114: the definition of hurt that s. 115 presupposes S6.
- BNS s. 116: the definition of grievous hurt, which decides the bracket and, through the First Schedule, whether the offence is cognizable at all S4.
- BNS s. 117: voluntarily causing grievous hurt, the seven-year counterpart S4.
- BNS s. 122(1): the only carve-out written into s. 115(2): hurt on grave and sudden provocation, one month or five thousand rupees S1.
- BNS ss. 18, 19, 25, 26, 30, 33 and 34 to 44: the general exceptions that most often decide whether voluntarily causing hurt is an offence at all S10.
- BNSS ss. 174 and 223: the police and complaint routes for a non-cognizable offence S8; S9.
Sources and honest limits
The statutory texts were read from the Gazette of India copy of the Sanhita and from the Indian Penal Code and compared token by token; the three differences between s. 115(2) and IPC s. 323, and the absence of any difference between s. 115(1) and IPC s. 321, were established that way rather than by eye. The First Schedule entries and BNSS s. 174 were read from the BNSS. Every judgment relied on was read in full from the court's own order.
The material limits are recorded in this article's limitations field. In outline: no decision construing the ingredients of s. 115, the fine increase, or the s. 122(1) carve-out was located; the case-law searches were targeted rather than exhaustive and result sets were capped; later treatment of the decisions discussed was not traced; the tenfold fine pattern is asserted only for the two provisions actually compared and is not claimed as a general feature of the Sanhita; the amendment history of IPC ss. 321, 323 and 334 was not retrieved; the general exceptions are introduced but not analysed, and the restrictions on private defence in ss. 37 to 44 are not examined; and the contents of s. 116, which decide the plain-versus-grievous question, are left to their own article.
This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text and early application of a statutory provision. It is not legal advice and not a prediction of any outcome. Whether hurt was voluntarily caused, whether a general exception applies, whether a case falls within s. 115(2) or s. 122(1) or the grievous-hurt bracket, and what sentence may follow within the limits the section allows, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.