The short answer
Section 114 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is one sentence long:
"Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt." S1
Two things about it matter more than anything else.
First, it is not an offence. Section 114 convicts nobody and punishes nothing. It supplies a definition that eleven later sections borrow. There is no sentence in it, no fine, and, correctly, no entry for it in the First Schedule to the BNSS, which is where cognizability, bailability and the trial court are recorded S1; S6. If you are looking for the offence of causing hurt, it is s. 115(2).
Second, it is word for word identical to section 319 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A token-by-token comparison of the two texts produces zero differences, not a comma, not a tense, not a singular made plural S1; S2; S3. The whole of the change is the number on the front: IPC s. 319 became BNS s. 114.
That combination has a practical consequence worth stating at the outset: because the words are unchanged, the body of decisions interpreting "bodily pain, disease or infirmity" under IPC s. 319 continues to speak to s. 114. The Supreme Court's holding in Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) that an injury report is not a precondition, and that "even causing bodily pain can be said to be causing hurt", was delivered on the identical statutory language S7.
Nothing here is legal advice. Whether hurt was caused in any particular case is a question of fact for the court on the evidence before it.
The zero-diff finding, stated precisely
| Text | |
|---|---|
| BNS s. 114 | Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt. |
| IPC s. 319 | Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt. |
The texts were compared token by token against the Gazette of India copy of the Sanhita and the Indian Penal Code. The result is an exact match S1; S2; S3.
One typographic difference exists, and it is outside the section: the sub-heading above the group. The IPC printed it "Of Hurt"; the Sanhita prints it "Of hurt" S2; S3. Nothing turns on the capital letter, and this article does not suggest otherwise. It is recorded only because a reader comparing the two documents will see it.
This makes s. 114 one of the cleanest cases in the Sanhita: renumbered, not amended. Where a provision's words are untouched, the change is in the citation a lawyer writes, not in the law the lawyer applies.
A definition, not an offence, and why that is the most practical thing about it
Section 114 works in tandem with s. 115. The Sanhita separates three things that a careless reading runs together:
| Provision | What it does |
|---|---|
| s. 114 | Defines hurt: the result. No mental element. No punishment. |
| s. 115(1) | Defines "voluntarily to cause hurt": doing an act with the intention of causing hurt, or with the knowledge that one is likely to cause hurt, and thereby causing it S4. |
| s. 115(2) | Creates the offence and prescribes the punishment: imprisonment of either description up to one year, or fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both, except in the case provided for by s. 122(1) S4. |
So s. 114 contains no mental element at all. It describes a consequence. The mental element arrives only at s. 115(1), through the word "voluntarily", and it is satisfied either by intention or by knowledge of likelihood. Anyone who says "section 114 requires intention" has conflated the definition with the offence.
The classification consequence
This is where the definition earns its keep in practice. Under the BNSS First Schedule:
| Offence | Punishment | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Trial court |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| s. 115(2): voluntarily causing hurt | Imprisonment for 1 year, or fine of 10,000 rupees, or both | Non-cognizable | Bailable | Any Magistrate |
| s. 117(2): voluntarily causing grievous hurt | Imprisonment for 7 years and fine | Cognizable | Bailable | Any Magistrate |
Because plain hurt is non-cognizable, the police cannot register and investigate it as of right. BNSS s. 174(1) requires the officer in charge to enter the substance of the information in the prescribed book and refer the informant to the Magistrate; s. 174(2) provides that no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try it or commit it for trial S5.
The Delhi High Court applied exactly that chain in Kunal Yadav v. Manan Kumar Mishra (21 September 2026). The petitioners sought a mandamus to compel registration of a case. The Court found that the only allegation was that the alleged aggressors, none armed with any weapon, "beat, slapped, thrashed and dragged the petitioners", and held that this "at the most constitutes offence of causing hurt, defined under Section 114 BNS, which is a non-cognizable offence". It followed that under BNSS s. 174 only the Magistrate could act, that under s. 174(2) no police officer could investigate, and that the petitioners had an alternative efficacious remedy by filing a complaint case before the Magistrate under BNSS s. 223. The writ was not a fit case for mandamus S8.
Two points of precision about that passage, because they matter:
- The Court's shorthand, "offence of causing hurt, defined under Section 114 BNS", compresses two provisions. Section 114 defines hurt; the offence and its punishment are in s. 115(2). The classification the Court stated is correct: s. 115(2) is non-cognizable and bailable on the First Schedule S6.
- The holding is about the remedy, not about the ingredients. The Court did not decide whether hurt had in fact been caused.
The definitional sections get no Schedule row at all, and that pattern is consistent rather than an oversight. Neither s. 114 (hurt) nor s. 116 (grievous hurt) appears in the First Schedule; the entries run from s. 113(7) straight to s. 115(2), and then to s. 117(2) S6. A section that prescribes no punishment has nothing to classify.
The three limbs: bodily pain, disease, infirmity
Section 114 offers three alternative routes to the same conclusion. Any one of them suffices.
"Bodily pain"
This is the limb that does nearly all the work in practice, and the Supreme Court has set the threshold low.
In Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) (M. R. Shah and D. Y. Chandrachud JJ, 23 July 2021), the complainant had been attacked with lathis and treated at a Government hospital, but no injury report had been issued. The Court said:
"It may be that there might not be any serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the hospital might not have issued the injury report. However, production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC. Section 323 IPC is a punishable section for voluntarily causing hurt. 'Hurt' is defined under Section 319 IPC. As per Section 319 IPC, whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause 'hurt'. Therefore, even causing bodily pain can be said to be causing 'hurt'." S7
The conviction under IPC s. 323 was upheld. Three propositions follow, and they transfer to s. 114 because the defining words are identical:
- No visible injury is required. Pain is enough.
- No medical document is required. An injury report is useful evidence, not a condition of the offence.
- Pain still has to be proved, by whatever evidence the case affords. Lakshman Singh lowered the threshold of what must be shown; it did not remove the requirement of showing it.
"Infirmity"
The leading exposition is old and has been applied recently. In Jashanmal Jhamatmal v. Brahmanand Sarupanand the Court held:
"Infirmity denotes an unsound or unhealthy state of the body or mind and clearly a state of temporary mental impairment or hysteria or terror would constitute infirmity, in our opinion within the meaning of that expression in Section 319 of the IPC." S9
Two Gujarat High Court decisions have applied that passage under the identical language. In Vaghari Amratbhai Karsanbhai v. State of Gujarat (10 December 2025) the Court set out the quotation in full S9. In Kiritkumar Bhupatbhai Pancholi v. State of Gujarat (29 September 2026) the Court added that "the duration of the state of mental infirmity would be immaterial", and that "infirmity" denotes unsoundness or impairment of the state of body or mind, so that a state of mental impairment, hysteria or terror may constitute infirmity within s. 319 S10.
This is the limb most readers get wrong, in both directions. It does not mean that distress or humiliation is hurt. It does mean that a physical injury is not the only route: an unhealthy state of mind, even a short-lived one, can satisfy the definition, but it must be an unsound or unhealthy state, and it must be proved.
"Disease"
Causing disease is the third limb, and it is textually available on the same footing as the other two. No decision applying the "disease" limb of s. 114 or IPC s. 319 was located in the searches run for this article, and none is asserted. Courts applying the definition have tended to say expressly which limb they are using: in Kanhaiyalal Kisan Pardeshi v. State of Maharashtra (2 December 2011), a case of fist blows and kicks, the Bombay High Court recorded that "it is not the case of disease or infirmity to informant in the case on hand. It is the case of hurt i.e. causing bodily pain" S11.
The limit: the definition still has to be satisfied on evidence
Vaghari is the useful negative. The trial court had convicted on the view that "if any injury is caused to the prestige or mind of the body then it can be said that the injury has been taken placed". The High Court held that this finding was "totally dehors to the provision of the law, when there is no iota of evidence on record by the prosecution that by catching hold of the collar of the complainant, he suffered bodily pain", and that both courts below had "committed serious palpable error on the face of the record by misinterpreting the provisions of Section 319 of the IPC". Since it was not even the prosecution case that the complainant suffered temporary mental impairment, hysteria or terror, the conviction was vitiated; the revision was allowed and the applicant acquitted S9.
So the three limbs are alternatives, not invitations. Injury to "prestige" is not one of them, and the infirmity limb is not a general heading for hurt feelings.
Where section 114 sits, and what happened to the family around it
Section 114 opens the sub-heading "Of hurt" within Chapter VI, "Of offences affecting the human body". The preceding sub-heading, "Of offences affecting life", closes at s. 113 (terrorist act). The "Of hurt" group runs from s. 114 to s. 125, after which "Of wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement" begins S2.
The twelve sections of the group are:
| Section | Subject |
|---|---|
| 114 | Hurt (definition) |
| 115 | Voluntarily causing hurt |
| 116 | Grievous hurt (definition) |
| 117 | Voluntarily causing grievous hurt |
| 118 | Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means |
| 119 | Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal act |
| 120 | Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession, or to compel restoration of property |
| 121 | Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to deter public servant from his duty |
| 122 | Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt on provocation |
| 123 | Causing hurt by means of poison, etc., with intent to commit an offence |
| 124 | Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc. |
| 125 | Act endangering life or personal safety of others |
The group was substantially compressed. The IPC's corresponding sub-heading "Of Hurt" contained twenty-two sections: ss. 319 to 338, including ss. 326A and 326B S3. The Sanhita covers the same ground in twelve. The compression was achieved mainly by pairing the simple and grievous versions of an offence inside a single section rather than giving each its own: the Sanhita's ss. 118 to 122 each read "hurt or grievous hurt" where the IPC had two separate sections for the two gravities.
This matters to a reader of s. 114 for one reason. Section 114 itself did not move an inch in substance, but almost everything around it was renumbered and repackaged. That asymmetry is the source of the citation errors discussed next.
A structural point about section 116
Section 116 defines grievous hurt and is the companion definition to s. 114. The Sanhita restyles it with lettered clauses, "(a) Emasculation; (b) Permanent privation of the sight of either eye; (c) Permanent priva…", where the IPC used the ordinals "First.— Secondly.— " and so on S1; S3. The contents of that list, and whether any kind of grievous hurt was added or dropped, belong to the article on s. 116 and are not analysed here.
How the renumbering is going wrong in practice
Because the words of s. 114 are unchanged while the number changed, the characteristic error is a citation error rather than a substantive one. Two instances were found, and the contrast between them is instructive.
The High Court got the substance right and compressed the citation. In Kunal Yadav, the Delhi High Court attributed the "offence of causing hurt" to s. 114, where s. 114 is only the definition, but reached the correct classification and the correct remedy S8.
A trial court got the IPC provenance wrong. In State v. Ujjawal Chouhan (Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, 23 February 2026), the judgment records that "'Hurt' is defined u/s 114 BNS (in the same manner in which it was defined u/s 323 IPC)". That is not right: hurt was defined in IPC s. 319. IPC s. 323 was the punishment for voluntarily causing hurt, and its successor is s. 115(2), not s. 114 S1; S3; S12.
The same judgment then quotes Lakshman Singh, and the quotation as reproduced ends: "no error has been committed by the courts below for convicting the accused under Section 319 IPC" S12. The Supreme Court's own words are "under Section 323 IPC" S7. The substituted number converts the Court's conclusion into one that convicts under a definition.
Neither slip changed the outcome in either case, and neither is offered as a criticism of the courts concerned; both are recorded because they show the specific trap this section sets. Stated as a working rule: s. 114 = IPC s. 319 (definition of hurt); s. 115(2) = IPC s. 323 (punishment for voluntarily causing hurt). Confusing them produces a citation that convicts nobody.
Ujjawal Chouhan is a judgment of a Magistrate and Kunal Yadav a judgment of a High Court; they are not of comparable authority, and nothing in this article treats them as such.
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Section 114 is an offence." It is not. It defines a result. The offence is s. 115(2), and the First Schedule classifies that offence, not s. 114 S1; S4; S6.
"You cannot prove hurt without a medical certificate." Lakshman Singh says otherwise: an injury report is not a sine qua non, and even causing bodily pain can amount to hurt S7. The absence of a report is an evidentiary problem, not a legal bar.
"Hurt requires a visible injury." No. The Supreme Court expressly contemplated the absence of serious or visible injuries S7, and the infirmity limb can be satisfied by an unsound state of mind S9; S10.
"Mental or emotional harm can never be hurt." Too absolute. Jashanmal, as applied in Gujarat, holds that infirmity covers an unsound or unhealthy state of body or mind, and that temporary mental impairment, hysteria or terror can qualify, the duration being immaterial S9; S10. What is not covered is injury to prestige or reputation, and Vaghari set aside a conviction founded on exactly that reasoning S9.
"Section 114 requires intention." It contains no mental element. Intention or knowledge of likelihood enters at s. 115(1) through the word "voluntarily" S1; S4.
"Any hurt case is a police case." Plain hurt under s. 115(2) is non-cognizable. The police must refer the informant to the Magistrate, and no police officer may investigate without a Magistrate's order; the ordinary route is a complaint case S5; S6; S8. Grievous hurt under s. 117(2) is cognizable and is a different matter S6.
"Because the law changed in 2024, the old hurt judgments are gone." The defining words did not change. Decisions on "bodily pain, disease or infirmity" under IPC s. 319 were delivered on language identical to s. 114 and continue to speak to it. The qualification is that this is true of s. 114's own words; it cannot be assumed for the surrounding offences, several of which were merged and repackaged S1; S2; S3.
Worked examples
These are editorial hypotheticals, written to show how the limbs operate. They are not judgments and not predictions. Each states the facts that decide it.
Example 1: pain without a certificate. A is slapped several times during an argument. She feels pain, but there is no bruise and she does not go to a hospital. Assume the slapping and the pain are established by credible evidence. On Lakshman Singh, the absence of an injury report is not fatal and bodily pain can amount to hurt S7. Change one fact (there is no evidence that she felt any pain, and the allegation rests on the indignity of being slapped) and the position is Vaghari's: the definition is not satisfied merely because something humiliating happened S9.
Example 2: the collar. B catches hold of C's collar in a quarrel. Assume no evidence of pain, and no suggestion of temporary mental impairment, hysteria or terror. That is Vaghari on its facts, where the High Court held the conviction vitiated for want of any such evidence S9. Change one fact (C, a cardiac patient, collapses in terror and is unwell for some hours) and the infirmity limb becomes live, since duration is immaterial S10. Whether it is made out would still depend on the evidence.
Example 3: definition versus offence. D pushes E, who stumbles and feels pain. Hurt has been caused within s. 114. Whether D has committed an offence is a separate question governed by s. 115(1): did D act with the intention of causing hurt, or with knowledge that he was likely to cause hurt? S1; S4 Change one fact, D was carrying a heavy load and did not see E at all, and the s. 115(1) mental element is the issue, even though hurt in the s. 114 sense was still caused.
Example 4: the wrong number. An FIR alleges that the accused "committed an offence under section 114 BNS". Section 114 creates no offence. The provision intended is s. 115(2) S1; S4. Whether such a defect is curable, and on what terms, is a procedural question not examined for this article.
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 114
- BNS s. 115: the companion offence, and the only place the mental element appears. Section 114 cannot be applied without it S4.
- BNS s. 116: the definition of grievous hurt, which decides whether a case falls in the one-year bracket or the seven-year bracket S1; S6.
- BNS ss. 117 to 125: the aggravated and specialised members of the "Of hurt" group, including dangerous weapons, extortion of property or confessions, deterring a public servant, provocation, poison, acid, and acts endangering life S1.
- BNS s. 113: the preceding section, which closes the different sub-heading "Of offences affecting life" S2.
- BNSS s. 174: what the police may and may not do when the information discloses only a non-cognizable offence S5.
Sources and honest limits
The statutory texts were read from the Gazette of India copy of the Sanhita and from the Indian Penal Code, and compared token by token. The First Schedule entries were read from the BNSS. Every judgment relied on was read in full from the court's own order, not from a headnote or a summary, and in the one case where a judgment quoted the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court's own text was retrieved and compared, which is how the substituted section number was found.
The material limits are recorded in this article's limitations field. In outline: no decision applying the "disease" limb was located; the case-law searches were targeted rather than exhaustive and result sets were capped; later treatment of the decisions discussed was not traced; Jashanmal Jhamatmal was read only as quoted in the two Gujarat High Court judgments and not from the report itself; and the contents of s. 116 and the detailed mapping of the surrounding offences in ss. 115 to 125 were not analysed and belong to their own articles.
This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text and interpretation of a statutory definition. It is not legal advice and not a prediction of any outcome. Whether bodily pain, disease or infirmity was caused in a given case, and whether the mental element of s. 115(1) is made out, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.