The short answer
Section 113 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 brings the offence of terrorist act into the general criminal code for the first time since the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was repealed. Sub-section (1) defines the offence. Sub-sections (2) to (7) punish seven things: committing a terrorist act; conspiring, attempting, abetting, advising, inciting or knowingly facilitating one; organising training camps or recruiting; being a member of an organisation involved in terrorist act; harbouring or concealing an offender; and knowingly possessing property derived from a terrorist act S1.
Two facts govern everything else about this section.
First, it is lifted almost word for word from the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Sub-section (1) tracks UAPA s. 15(1); (2) tracks s. 16(1); (3) tracks s. 18; (4) merges ss. 18A and 18B; (5) tracks s. 20; (6) tracks s. 19; (7) tracks s. 21 S4; S5; S7; S8; S9; S10; S11; S12. The Calcutta High Court, comparing the two in a forum dispute, described UAPA s. 15 as defining a terrorist act "in the manner broadly equivalent" to what the BNSS First Schedule records for s. 113 S21.
Second, the UAPA was not repealed. It is still in force. So the same conduct can now be charged under two parallel central statutes, and the closing Explanation to s. 113 hands the choice between them to a single police officer: "the officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police shall decide whether to register the case under this section or under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967" S1.
That choice is not a formality. It decides whether a sanction is needed before a court can take cognizance, whether anticipatory bail is available, whether the statutory bail bar applies, how long the investigating agency has before default bail accrues, and which court tries the case. Every one of those differences is set out, with its source, further down.
Nothing here is legal advice. Whether particular conduct amounts to a terrorist act, which statute ought to be invoked, and what follows, are fact-specific questions for a court on the evidence before it.
Where section 113 sits, and why that is surprising
Section 113 is not in Chapter VII, "Of offences against the State". That chapter begins at s. 147 (waging war against the Government of India) S2.
Section 113 is the last section of Chapter VI, "Of offences affecting the human body", under the sub-heading "Of offences affecting life": the run that opens at s. 100 with culpable homicide and closes with ss. 111 (organised crime), 112 (petty organised crime) and 113 (terrorist act) S2. Section 114 begins a new sub-heading, "Of hurt".
So the Sanhita classifies terrorism as an offence affecting life, grouped with murder and organised crime, rather than as an offence against the State. The Calcutta High Court kept the two categories distinct when it analysed a notification that had assigned "Chapters VII and X and Section 113" of the BNS to a Special Task Force: it treated Chapter VII (ss. 147–158) and s. 113 as separate items requiring separate forum analysis S21.
Three practical consequences follow from the placement, and they are worth stating because readers routinely assume the opposite:
- No sedition-style procedural machinery attaches. Section 113 does not borrow anything from Chapter VII.
- The chapter heading does not narrow the section. Sub-section (1) protects "the unity, integrity, sovereignty, security, or economic security of India": interests that are nothing to do with the human body. A heading cannot cut down clear operative words.
- Section 113 is not confined to acts causing death. Sub-section (2)(b) applies "in any other case", and sub-sections (3) to (7) do not require any death or injury at all S1.
The text, unit by unit
Sub-section (1): the definition
Section 113(1) has a threshold mental/risk element and then three alternative routes. Both parts must be satisfied.
The threshold. The act must be done either
- with the intent to threaten, or likely to threaten, the unity, integrity, sovereignty, security, or economic security of India; or
- with the intent to strike terror, or likely to strike terror, in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country S1.
Note carefully what this does. It is not a pure intention requirement. Each limb offers "or likely to" as an alternative to intent. On the plain words, an act objectively likely to threaten India's economic security, or likely to strike terror in a section of the people, can satisfy the threshold even where that intent is not established. This is the single most important feature of the definition for anyone reading it for the first time, and it is identical to the UAPA formula S4.
The three routes. Having crossed the threshold, the act must fall within clause (a), (b) or (c):
Clause (a): using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substance or inflammable substance, firearms or other lethal weapons, poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals, any other substance (whether biological, radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, or by any other means of whatever nature, to cause or likely to cause one of five results:
| Sub-clause | Result |
|---|---|
| (i) | death of, or injury to, any person or persons |
| (ii) | loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property |
| (iii) | disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country |
| (iv) | damage to the monetary stability of India by production, smuggling or circulation of counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or any other material |
| (v) | damage or destruction of property in India or a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India, or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies |
The words "or by any other means of whatever nature" matter: the list of weapons and substances is illustrative, not exhaustive. What limits clause (a) is the five results, not the means.
Clause (b): overawing by means of criminal force or show of criminal force, or attempting to do so; or causing, or attempting to cause, the death of any public functionary.
Clause (c): detaining, kidnapping or abducting any person and threatening to kill or injure that person, or doing any other act, to compel the Government of India, a State Government, the Government of a foreign country, an international or inter-governmental organisation, or any other person, to do or abstain from doing any act S1.
The Explanation to sub-section (1) defines two expressions, and expressly limits itself: "For the purpose of this sub-section"
- "public functionary" means the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary;
- "counterfeit Indian currency" means counterfeit currency as may be declared, after examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority, that such currency imitates or compromises with the key security features of Indian currency S1.
Two drafting points are worth recording, because both are visible on the face of the text:
- The Explanation defines "counterfeit Indian currency", but clause (a)(iv) uses the phrase "counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material". The defined term and the operative term are not identical.
- The definition of "public functionary" is partly dependent on executive notification. "Constitutional authorities" stands on its own, but anyone else becomes a public functionary only on being notified in the Official Gazette. Whether any such notification has been issued under s. 113 was not verified for this article.
Sub-sections (2) to (7): the seven punishment branches
Section 113 does not have one punishment. It has seven. Getting these right matters, because the minimum differs between branches and three branches carry no minimum at all.
| Provision | Conduct | Punishment (statutory words) |
|---|---|---|
| 113(2)(a) | Commits a terrorist act resulting in the death of any person | Death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine |
| 113(2)(b) | Commits a terrorist act, in any other case | Not less than 5 years, may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine |
| 113(3) | Conspires or attempts to commit; or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or knowingly facilitates, the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to one | Not less than 5 years, may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine |
| 113(4) | Organises, or causes to be organised, any camp for imparting training in terrorist act; or recruits, or causes to be recruited, any person for commission of a terrorist act | Not less than 5 years, may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine |
| 113(5) | Is a member of an organisation which is involved in terrorist act | May extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine: no minimum |
| 113(6) | Voluntarily harbours or conceals, or attempts to, any person knowing that such person has committed a terrorist act | Not less than 3 years, may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine: subject to the spouse proviso |
| 113(7) | Knowingly possesses any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act, or acquired through the commission of any terrorist act | May extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine: no minimum |
Four things in that table are easy to misread:
- Fine is mandatory in every branch, but its amount is not fixed. Every sub-section says "and shall also be liable to fine". The conjunction is "and", not "or". No branch of s. 113 permits a fine instead of imprisonment, and no branch specifies an amount or a ceiling.
- Only sub-section (2)(a) carries the death penalty, and only where the terrorist act "has resulted in the death of any person".
- Sub-sections (5) and (7) have no minimum sentence. A court may impose a short term. The maximum is life.
- A proviso protects only the spouse. Section 113(6) does not apply "in any case in which the harbour or concealment is by the spouse of the offender". Parents, children and siblings are not protected S1.
The closing Explanation, and the problem of its scope
After sub-section (7), the section ends with a second, un-numbered Explanation:
"Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police shall decide whether to register the case under this section or under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967." S1
In the Gazette, "37 of 1967" appears as a marginal reference beside this Explanation rather than as a parenthesis in the operative text S2.
Here is the drafting difficulty. The Explanation to sub-section (1) says "For the purpose of this sub-section". This closing Explanation does not. It says "For the removal of doubts". It is placed immediately after sub-section (7), but it is not tied to any sub-section by its own words.
So does it govern the whole of s. 113, or only sub-section (7)? The better reading, on the words used, is that it governs the whole section: it speaks of registering "the case under this section", not under this sub-section, and the drafter demonstrably knew how to confine an Explanation to a single sub-section when that was intended.
This is not an academic point. Before the Gauhati High Court in Amar Ali v. State of Assam (28 May 2025), senior counsel for a bail petitioner submitted that there was no endorsement in the FIR as to whether "the decision which is required to be made by the Superintendent of Police in such cases under explanation to Section 113(7)" had been made, and on that basis raised a question about the maintainability of the FIR itself S22. The submission treated the Explanation as attaching to sub-section (7): the very reading the placement invites.
What the court did and did not do must be stated precisely. The Additional Public Prosecutor responded that the alleged offence was committed "when there was hostility going on between the India and Pakistan" and that there might be further material in the case diary; she also told the court that a case diary had already been called for in a similar matter. The judge held only that perusal of the case diary was necessary, called for it, and listed the matter for 5 June 2025 S22. It is an interim order. It decides nothing about the Explanation. Whether a later order in that matter resolved the point was not traced for this article.
Section 113 against the UAPA: what actually changed
This is the analysis that matters most, because s. 113 is not new law so much as relocated law. The comparison below is drawn from the official text of both statutes.
The wording changes within the transplanted provisions
| BNS s. 113 | UAPA | What changed |
|---|---|---|
| (1) "unity, integrity, sovereignty, security, or economic security of India" | s. 15(1) "unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India" | The same five interests, reordered. No interest added or removed. |
| (1)(a) "explosive substance or inflammable substance… any other substance" | s. 15(1)(a) "explosive substances or inflammable substances… any other substances" | Singular for plural. No change of meaning. |
| (1)(a)(i) "death of, or injury to, any person" | s. 15(1)(a)(i) "death of, or injuries to, any person" | Singular for plural. |
| (1)(a)(iv) counterfeit currency | s. 15(1)(a)(iiia) | Renumbered: UAPA's inserted clause (iiia) becomes a clean (iv), and UAPA's (iv) becomes BNS (v). |
| (1)(a)(iv) "counterfeit Indian paper currency" | s. 15(1)(a)(iiia) "high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency" | "High quality" deleted. See below. This is substantive. |
| (1)(c) "threatening to kill or injure" | s. 15(1)(c) "threatens to kill or injure" | Participle for finite verb; UAPA's dangling "; or" at the end of (c) is also removed. |
| (1) "commit a terrorist act" | s. 15(1) "commits a terrorist act" | A grammatical slip in the Sanhita. The subject is "Whoever". No change of meaning is apparent. |
| Explanation (b): "counterfeit Indian currency"… "key security features of Indian currency" | s. 15 Explanation (b): "high quality counterfeit Indian currency"… "key security features as specified in the Third Schedule" | Two substantive drops. See below. |
| (2) "if such offence has resulted in the death" | s. 16(1)(a) "if such act has resulted in the death" | "Offence" for "act". |
| (2), (3)–(7) "shall be punished with" | ss. 16–21 "shall be punishable with" | Standard Sanhita drafting style. |
| (4) camps "for imparting training in terrorist act" and recruitment, in one sub-section | s. 18A camps "for imparting training in terrorism"; s. 18B recruitment: two sections | Consolidated, and "terrorism" replaced by "terrorist act". |
| (5) "member of an organisation" | s. 20 "member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation" | The most significant single change. See below. |
| (6) harbouring a person "knowing that such person has committed a terrorist act" | s. 19 harbouring a person "knowing that such person is a terrorist" | The object of the guilty knowledge changes from a status to an act. |
| (7) "knowingly possesses" property… "acquired through the commission of any terrorist act" | s. 21 "knowingly holds" property… "acquired through the terrorist fund" | "Possesses" for "holds"; "terrorist fund" dropped. |
| Closing Explanation (SP decides BNS or UAPA) | no counterpart | Wholly new. |
Four changes that are genuinely substantive
1. "High quality" is gone, and so is the Third Schedule anchor. Under the UAPA, the counterfeit-currency route requires high quality counterfeit currency, and the Explanation ties "key security features" to those "specified in the Third Schedule" to that Act S4. Section 113 drops the qualifier and replaces the Schedule reference with the open words "key security features of Indian currency" S1. The threshold is therefore lower on its face and the benchmark is no longer fixed by a statutory list. The forensic-examination requirement survives in both.
The reason for the second drop is structural and verifiable: the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita has no Schedules at all. The word "Schedule" does not appear anywhere in the Gazette text of the Sanhita S2. A Schedule-anchored definition could not have been carried across without creating one.
2. UAPA s. 15(2) has no counterpart. Section 15(2) of the UAPA extends "terrorist act" to "an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule" S4. Section 113 contains nothing equivalent. The treaty-based extension of the definition, India's hook into the international counter-terrorism conventions, exists only under the UAPA. Again, the absence of Schedules in the Sanhita supplies the mechanical explanation S2.
3. Sub-section (5) is untethered from any notification process. This deserves the closest attention of anything in s. 113.
Under the UAPA, s. 20 punishes membership of a "terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation". Both are defined: a "terrorist organisation" is "an organisation listed in the First Schedule or an organisation operating under the same name as an organisation so listed", and a "terrorist gang" is "any association, other than terrorist organisation… which is concerned with, or involved in, terrorist act" S14. The First Schedule is amended by notification under s. 35, and the Central Government may add an organisation only if it believes the organisation is involved in terrorism; every such notification must be laid before Parliament S14.
Section 113(5) punishes membership of "an organisation which is involved in terrorist act" S1. The word "terrorist" before "organisation" is gone. "Terrorist gang" is gone. There is no Schedule, no listing mechanism, no notification, and no parliamentary laying requirement, because the Sanhita has no Schedules S2. The expression "organisation" is not defined in s. 113.
The consequence, on the plain text, is that whether an organisation is "involved in terrorist act" becomes a question of fact in each prosecution rather than a matter settled by a published notification. The UAPA also offers a defence in a related context that s. 113 does not replicate: under UAPA s. 38, a person charged with membership of a terrorist organisation may prove that the organisation was not declared a terrorist organisation when he joined and that he took no part in its activities while it was listed S26. Nothing of the kind appears in s. 113.
I state the textual position and stop there. Whether s. 113(5) will be read down, and how courts will handle the absence of a listing mechanism, are open questions; no decision resolving them was located.
4. Harbouring now turns on an act, not a status. UAPA s. 19 requires knowledge that the person harboured "is a terrorist", and "terrorist" is to be construed by reference to s. 15 S14; S10. Section 113(6) requires knowledge that the person "has committed a terrorist act" S1. In practice the prosecution must now prove the harbourer's knowledge of a completed terrorist act, which is a narrower and more concrete object of knowledge than a status. Both versions protect only the spouse.
What the UAPA has that section 113 simply does not
This list is as important as the comparison table, because it tells you when s. 113 is not available:
| UAPA provision | Subject | Counterpart in s. 113 |
|---|---|---|
| s. 17 | Raising, collecting or providing funds for a terrorist act, from legitimate or illegitimate sources, whether or not actually used | None |
| s. 22 | Threatening a witness | None |
| s. 23 | Enhanced penalties for contravening the Explosives Act, Explosive Substances Act, Inflammable Substances Act or Arms Act, or unauthorised possession of bombs and other lethal substances, with intent to aid a terrorist, terrorist organisation or terrorist gang | None |
| ss. 38, 39, 40 | Membership of, support to, and raising funds for a listed terrorist organisation (10 years / 10 years / 14 years) | None |
| s. 15(2) | Treaty-based extension of "terrorist act" | None |
| ss. 2(1)(g), 2(1)(h) | Defined "proceeds of terrorism" and "property" | None |
Terror financing is the headline absence. UAPA s. 17 is a dedicated funding offence with a five-year minimum, extending to life, and it applies "in India or in a foreign country" whether or not the funds were ever used S6. Section 113 has nothing comparable. The nearest fit is s. 113(3) ("knowingly facilitates… or any act preparatory to"), which would have to be stretched to cover pure funding, or s. 113(7), which requires possessing property derived from a terrorist act: the opposite direction of money flow. A funding case therefore belongs under the UAPA.
Section 23 is the second notable absence, and it is not hypothetical. In Jagdish Singh v. State of Punjab (21 September 2026) the FIR was registered under ss. 25, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act, and a BNS terrorist-act offence was added during investigation S24. On those facts UAPA s. 23: arms-law contravention with intent to aid terrorism: is the provision designed for the situation, and s. 113 contains no equivalent.
The Superintendent of Police's choice: what actually turns on it
Because the UAPA remains in force and s. 113 duplicates much of it, the Explanation's allocation of the choice to an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police has real procedural consequences. Each row below is verified against the provision cited.
| BNS s. 113 | UAPA (Chapter IV offences) | |
|---|---|---|
| Sanction to take cognizance | None required. Section 113 contains no sanction provision. | Required. No court shall take cognizance of a Chapter IV offence "without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government"; sanction must follow an independent review of the evidence by an appointed authority S16. |
| Anticipatory bail | Not excluded. Nothing in s. 113 or the BNSS excludes BNSS s. 482, under which a person apprehending arrest for a non-bailable offence may apply to the High Court or Court of Session S18. | Excluded. "Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act" S15. |
| Bail bar | None. No statutory restriction specific to s. 113. | Applies. A Chapter IV or VI accused in custody cannot be released without the Public Prosecutor being heard, and shall not be released if the court, on the case diary or report, finds reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is prima facie true S15. |
| Default bail clock | 90 days. BNSS s. 187(3)(i): 90 days where the offence is punishable with death, life, or 10 years or more; on expiry the accused "shall be released on bail" on furnishing bail S18. | Up to 180 days. UAPA s. 43D(2) reads "fifteen days", "ninety days" and "sixty days" in s. 167 as "thirty days", "ninety days" and "ninety days", and permits extension to 180 days on the Public Prosecutor's report showing progress and specific reasons S15. |
| Trial court | Court of Session for every sub-section, per the BNSS First Schedule S17; confirmed by the Calcutta High Court S21. | Criminal court having jurisdiction under the Code, including a Special Court under s. 11 or s. 22 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 S14. |
| NIA scheduled offence | No. The NIA Act Schedule, as substituted and amended by the NIA (Amendment) Act, 2019, lists the Explosive Substances Act, Atomic Energy Act, UAPA, Anti-Hijacking Act, and other named statutes, plus specified IPC provisions (Chapter VI ss. 121–130; ss. 370 and 370A; ss. 489-A to 489-E), s. 25(1AA) Arms Act and s. 66F IT Act. No BNS entry appears S19; S20. | Yes. The UAPA is item 2 of the Schedule S19. |
On the last row, two qualifications are owed to the reader. First, references in other enactments to repealed IPC provisions are ordinarily construed as references to the corresponding re-enacted BNS provisions, so the IPC entries in the Schedule continue to operate, but s. 113 has no repealed IPC predecessor, so there is nothing for that principle to map onto. Second, I verified the Schedule against the India Code consolidated copy and against the enacted text of the 2019 amendment, and I did not trace every notification issued after 2019 up to the research cutoff. Treat the "no BNS entry" finding as verified against those two documents, not as the product of an exhaustive amendment search.
The net effect, stated carefully. On the verified provisions above, registering a case under s. 113 rather than the UAPA means: no sanction requirement, anticipatory bail available, no prima-facie-true bail bar, a hard 90-day default-bail limit instead of a possible 180, and trial before an ordinary Court of Session rather than a court that may be an NIA Special Court. Some of those favour the accused and some favour the investigating agency. The point is not that one route is harsher; it is that a single officer's unreviewed choice relocates the case into a materially different procedural regime, and the Explanation supplies no criteria for making it.
Ashok Behera v. State of Odisha (10 April 2025) shows the anticipatory-bail limb operating in practice. The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under BNS ss. 113(2), 126(2), 296, 3(5) and 351(2). The High Court perused the case diary, took the prima facie view that "the offence under Section 113 of BNS is well made out", and nevertheless directed that on surrendering within three weeks and moving for bail the petitioners be released, subject to verification of criminal antecedents S23. Pre-arrest bail of that kind is not available at all for a UAPA offence S15.
There is no IPC counterpart, but the IPC was not silent
Section 113 has no corresponding provision in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The IPC never contained a terrorist-act offence. That is why ipcMappings is empty for this article and the change is classified new_without_direct_equivalent.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that terrorism was previously unregulated, or that s. 113 fills a vacuum. Three corrections:
- The UAPA already covered this ground, and still does. Sections 15 to 23 of the UAPA were in force before, on and after 1 July 2024 S4; S5; S6; S7; S8; S9; S10; S11; S12; S13. Section 113 did not create the offence of terrorist act in Indian law; it added a second home for most of it.
- Dedicated anti-terror statutes preceded both. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 each created terrorist-act offences and each was repealed. Neither statute was retrieved or examined for this article, and nothing in it turns on their contents. The point is only that the pre-2024 position cannot be described by reference to the IPC alone.
- IPC Chapter VI partly overlapped. Offences such as waging or attempting to wage war against the Government of India (IPC s. 121, now BNS s. 147) addressed some conduct that s. 113 would now reach. Those provisions were re-enacted in BNS Chapter VII and are separately mapped in their own articles; they are not counterparts of s. 113 and the mapping between them was not analysed here.
Commencement and temporal application
Section 113 commenced on 1 July 2024. MHA notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, issued under s. 1(2) of the Sanhita, appointed that date for all provisions of the Sanhita "except the provision of sub-section (2) of section 106". Section 113 is not among the excepted provisions S3.
Because s. 113 has no IPC predecessor, conduct before 1 July 2024 cannot be prosecuted under s. 113: Article 20(1) of the Constitution forbids conviction for an offence under a law not in force at the time of the act. For pre-commencement conduct the UAPA route remains the applicable one, and it was equally available before and after that date. For conduct that straddles the date, or for continuing conduct such as membership under s. 113(5) or possession under s. 113(7), the temporal analysis depends on when the constituent facts occurred; that question is fact-specific and no decision resolving it under s. 113 was located.
How section 113 is actually being used so far
The case law is thin, early and mostly interlocutory. No Supreme Court decision on s. 113 was located, and no decision construing the closing Explanation was located. What the searches did reveal is a consistent and instructive pattern: the section is being cited in ways that do not match its text.
Rajarshi Biswas v. State of West Bengal, Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri, 19 June 2026: a Division Bench (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Supratim Bhattacharya JJ). Members of the Jalpaiguri Bar Association challenged State notifications that had created Special Task Force police stations and assigned to them offences under BNS Chapters VII and X and s. 113, the NDPS Act, the Arms Act, the UAPA and other statutes. In the course of holding the notifications unconstitutional and setting them aside, the Court examined the forum each statute already provides, and recorded that "[u]nder the First Schedule of the BNSS, Section 113, BNS offences are triable by a Sessions Court", contrasting that with the Special Court regime under ss. 11 and 22 of the NIA Act for UAPA offences S21. Two points for a reader: this is a Division Bench judgment, not an interim order, but the s. 113 observation is part of a forum analysis in a writ petition about police-station notifications. It is not a construction of the ingredients of s. 113. Its authority is that of a High Court; it binds no other High Court.
Amar Ali v. State of Assam, Gauhati High Court, 28 May 2025: discussed above. An interim bail order in which the Explanation point was raised and the case diary called for; nothing was decided S22.
Ashok Behera v. State of Odisha, Orissa High Court, 10 April 2025: discussed above. Two features of what the order records deserve comment, carefully framed.
The companion offences do not look like terrorism. The case was registered under BNS ss. 113(2), 126(2), 296, 3(5) and 351(2), that is, alongside wrongful restraint, obscene acts, common intention and criminal intimidation. Counsel for the petitioners said that even taking the allegations at face value no offence under s. 113(2) was made out, and that an "exaggerated allegation" had been made because of a counter-FIR S23. Section 113(2)(a) is punishable with death or life imprisonment. A charge of that gravity sitting beside minor offences of that kind is, on its face, incongruous. One plausible explanation is a transposition: s. 115(2) (voluntarily causing hurt) would fit the companion offences exactly, and in the BNSS First Schedule the entry for s. 115(2) follows immediately after the entries for s. 113 S17. I cannot verify the FIR and do not assert that this is what happened; I record that the order as reported says 113(2) and that the combination is difficult to reconcile with the section's text.
The forum does not match the First Schedule. The order records the case as "G.R. No. 506 of 2025 pending in the Court of learned J.M.F.C(O), Bhubaneswar" S23. Under the BNSS First Schedule every sub-section of s. 113 is triable by a Court of Session S17. The mismatch appears on the face of the order. Whether it reflects the pre-committal stage, a recording error, or a mis-labelled offence cannot be determined from the order.
Jagdish Singh v. State of Punjab, Punjab and Haryana High Court, 21 September 2026: a second regular bail petition in an Arms Act case (one pistol, one magazine and one live cartridge recovered from a co-accused; two live .30 bore cartridges from the petitioner). The order records that "Offence under Section 113(a)(5) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 was added in the FIR during investigation", and later refers to whether an offence "under Section 113(a)(v) BNS would be made out" S24. Neither label exists. Section 113 has no clause lettered (a) at the first level; clause (a) sits inside sub-section (1), and the sub-clause is s. 113(1)(a)(v): damage or destruction of property used or intended to be used for the defence of India. Two malformed citations of the same provision appear in a single order. The Court granted bail on the ground of parity with a released co-accused, expressly declining to go into the merits and leaving to the trial court whether the offence "would be made out" S24. It made no finding on the ingredients.
Deepa Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), Delhi High Court, 29 September 2026: an appeal under s. 12 of the MCOCA against refusal of regular bail. The order records that the charge-sheet was filed under NDPS Act ss. 21(b), 22(b), 25 and 29, "Sections 238 and 113 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023", s. 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and ss. 3 and 4 of MCOCA, in a case originating in the recovery of heroin and Tramadol S25. Bail was granted on conditions, with the Court stating that its observations were confined to the decision on bail S25. The order records the s. 113 charge; it does not analyse it.
What this body of material does and does not establish. It establishes that s. 113 is being invoked, that it is reaching bail courts rather than trial courts, and that its seven-layer structure is being cited inaccurately in the records of at least two High Courts. It does not establish any proposition about the ingredients of the offence, and it does not resolve the Explanation question. These searches were not exhaustive; see the limitations recorded with this article.
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Section 113 replaced the UAPA." No. The UAPA was not repealed and remains in force; the closing Explanation to s. 113 presupposes that it is available, since it directs an officer to choose between the two S1.
"The same conduct can be punished twice." The existence of two provisions does not authorise double punishment. What s. 113 creates is a choice of charge, allocated by the Explanation to an officer of or above the rank of Superintendent of Police. Whether and how the protection against double jeopardy operates where both are invoked is a question on which no decision was located, and this article offers no answer.
"Section 113 requires proof of intent to commit terrorism." Only partly. Each limb of the sub-section (1) threshold offers "or likely to" as an alternative to intent S1. And sub-sections (5), (6) and (7) do not require the sub-section (1) threshold intent of the accused at all: they require, respectively, membership, knowledge that a person has committed a terrorist act, and knowing possession of derived property.
"A terrorist act must involve a bomb or a weapon." Clause (1)(a) ends with "or by any other means of whatever nature" S1. And clauses (1)(b) and (1)(c) require no weapon: (b) covers overawing by criminal force or show of criminal force, and causing or attempting to cause the death of a public functionary; (c) covers detention, kidnapping or abduction with a coercive demand.
"Section 113 only applies to acts in India." No. Sub-section (1) refers throughout to effects "in India or in any foreign country": striking terror in people in a foreign country, disrupting essential supplies or services in a foreign country, destroying property in a foreign country used for the defence of India, and compelling the Government of a foreign country or an international organisation S1. How far the Sanhita's general extent and application provisions carry this was not separately examined for this article.
"Family members who shelter an accused are protected." Only a spouse. The proviso to s. 113(6) is confined to "the spouse of the offender" S1.
"The BNSS First Schedule tells you the punishment." Use it for classification, not for sentence. Column 3 of the Schedule records the punishment for s. 113(5) as "Imprisonment for life and fine" and for s. 113(7) as "Imprisonment for life and fine", omitting the Act's words "which may extend to" S17. The operative text of s. 113(5) and (7) provides a maximum of life imprisonment with no minimum S1. Where the Schedule's summary and the Sanhita's text differ, the Sanhita governs. The Schedule is reliable for what it is designed to record: for every sub-section of s. 113 the offence is cognizable, non-bailable, and triable by a Court of Session S17.
Worked examples
These are editorial hypotheticals written to show how the ingredients interact. They are not judgments, not predictions, and not advice. Each specifies the facts that are doing the work.
Example 1: the threshold, without intent. A contractor, to win a tender dispute, sabotages the control system of a regional water-treatment plant, cutting supply to a city for four days. Assume: no intent to strike terror or to threaten India's security is established, but the sabotage was objectively likely to disrupt supplies essential to the life of the community. On the plain words, the "likely to strike terror in… any section of the people" limb and clause (1)(a)(iii) could be engaged without proof of terrorist intent S1. Whether a court would so read a provision carrying a five-year minimum is exactly the question the "or likely to" formula leaves open, and no decision on it under s. 113 was located. Change one fact (the plant served only a private industrial estate, with no disruption of community supplies) and clause (a)(iii) falls away; the prosecution would then have to establish a different sub-clause.
Example 2: sub-section (5) without a notification. A person is an active member of a political association. Two of its members, on their own, carry out a bombing. Assume: the association has never been notified or listed anywhere, and the member took no part in the bombing and did not know of it. Under UAPA s. 20 the prosecution would have to show a "terrorist organisation" (listed in the First Schedule) or a "terrorist gang" S14. Under s. 113(5) the prosecution need only establish that the organisation "is involved in terrorist act" as a fact S1, and s. 113(5) carries no equivalent of the UAPA s. 38 defence about joining before listing S26. Change one fact, the two members acted at the association's direction, and the question of the organisation's involvement becomes materially stronger. This example illustrates why the deletion of the word "terrorist" before "organisation" is the most consequential change in the section.
Example 3: the harbouring proviso. A man's wife shelters him after he has committed a terrorist act, knowing what he has done. His brother does the same. The proviso to s. 113(6) excludes the wife. It does not exclude the brother, who is exposed to a minimum of three years S1. Change one fact, neither knew what he had done, and the knowledge element required by s. 113(6) is absent for both.
Example 4: why the choice of statute matters before arrest. Two persons are suspected of identical conduct. For the first, the Superintendent of Police directs registration under s. 113; for the second, under UAPA s. 16. The first may apply for anticipatory bail under BNSS s. 482; the second cannot, because UAPA s. 43D(4) excludes it S15; S18. If both are arrested, the first must be released on default bail at 90 days if the investigation is incomplete; the second may be detained up to 180 days on a Public Prosecutor's report S15; S18. And no sanction is needed to prosecute the first, while cognizance of the second requires previous Government sanction after an independent review of the evidence S16. Nothing in s. 113 tells the officer how to choose between these two regimes.
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 113
- BNS s. 111 (organised crime) and s. 112 (petty organised crime): the two sections immediately preceding s. 113, completing the Sanhita's new trio of group-criminality offences at the end of the "offences affecting life" run S2.
- BNS s. 147 (waging war against the Government of India): the opening section of Chapter VII, "Of offences against the State", which the Calcutta High Court treated as a separate category from s. 113 S2; S21.
- BNS s. 3(5) (common intention): invoked alongside s. 113(2) in Ashok Behera S23.
- BNS s. 238 (causing disappearance of evidence): charged with s. 113 in Deepa Singh S25.
- BNSS s. 187 (default bail periods) and s. 482 (anticipatory bail). The two procedural provisions that do most of the work in distinguishing s. 113 from the UAPA route S18.
Outside the Sanhita, the provisions that actually matter in a s. 113 case are UAPA ss. 15 to 23, 38 to 40, 43D and 45 S4; S5; S6; S7; S8; S9; S10; S11; S12; S13; S15; S16; S26, and the Schedule to the NIA Act, 2008 as amended in 2019 S19; S20.
Sources and honest limits
Everything asserted above is tied to a numbered source listed with this article, with the provision, paragraph or page relied on. The statutory text was read from the Gazette of India copy of the Sanhita and from the India Code text of the UAPA; the procedural comparison was read from the UAPA, the BNSS and the NIA Act; the case material was read from the judgments themselves, not from headnotes or summaries.
The material limits on this article are recorded in its limitations field and are summarised here so that no reader is misled: no Supreme Court decision on s. 113 was located; no decision construing the closing Explanation was located; the case-law searches were targeted, not exhaustive, and result sets were capped; later treatment of the five orders discussed was not traced; no notification defining "public functionary" for s. 113 was retrieved; the TADA and POTA statutes were not examined; and the "no BNS entry in the NIA Schedule" finding rests on the India Code consolidated copy and the enacted 2019 amendment, not on an exhaustive search of post-2019 notifications.
This article was prepared with AI assistance and has not been reviewed by a human lawyer. It is educational material about the text, structure and early treatment of a statutory provision. It is not legal advice, and it is not a prediction of any outcome. Whether conduct falls within s. 113, which statute ought to be invoked on given facts, and what consequences follow, are matters for a court on the evidence before it: consult a qualified advocate before acting.