The provision in one view
Section 147 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes a person who wages war against the Government of India, who attempts to wage such war, or who abets the waging of such war. The punishment is death, or imprisonment for life, and the offender is also liable to fine S1; S3.
The section opens Chapter VII of the Sanhita, headed "Of Offences against the State" S3. It is the first of the twelve sections, 147 to 158, that make up that Chapter S3. It carries the death penalty, and it is only the second provision in this collection to do so, the first being section 140(2) S1.
Its predecessor is section 121 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 S2. The comparison, set out below, produced a result that is easy to state and worth stating plainly: the operative text was carried across word for word. Nothing in the rule that section 147 lays down is new.
The exact words
"Whoever wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration.
A joins an insurrection against the Government of India. A has committed the offence defined in this section." S1; S3
Three verbs, one penalty, one illustration. That is the whole section.
What the section does, and what it does not do
Section 147 creates a single offence with three alternative forms of participation:
- Waging war against the Government of India.
- Attempting to wage such war.
- Abetting the waging of such war.
Two features of that structure deserve attention, because they are unusual.
Attempt is built into the section. Ordinarily, an attempt to commit an offence is punished through the Sanhita's general attempt provision, and usually at a reduced maximum. Section 147 does not work that way. It places the attempt inside the section itself, on the same footing as the completed act, and attaches the same punishment, including death S1. A person who attempts to wage war is exposed to exactly the sentence that a person who succeeds is exposed to.
Abetment is built into the section too. The same point applies. Abetment is normally dealt with by the Sanhita's general abetment provisions. Here the abettor is named in the section and made liable to the identical penalty S1. There is no graded reduction for the person who assists rather than acts.
The practical consequence is that the three forms are not ranked. Whether a person waged, attempted, or abetted, the sentencing range is the same, and the court's task is sentencing within that range rather than the selection of a lesser provision.
What the section does not do is define "waging war". The phrase is left entirely to judicial construction, and the courts have supplied the content. That is the subject of a later part of this article, and it is the single most important thing a reader of section 147 needs to understand, because the words on the page are far broader than the offence the courts have been willing to recognise.
The Chapter this section opens
Section 147 begins a new Chapter, and the Chapter's shape is worth establishing before the section is read in isolation.
In the Penal Code, offences against the State occupied Chapter VI S2. In the Sanhita, the same subject occupies Chapter VII S3. The heading text is identical in both, "Of Offences against the State"; only the Chapter number moved, a consequence of the Sanhita's reorganisation of the material that precedes it. The Chapter number is therefore not a reliable way to cite this body of law across the two statutes, and anyone converting old references should be alert to the shift.
The Chapter runs from section 147 to section 158. Chapter VIII, which follows, is headed "Of Offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force" and begins at section 159 S3. That boundary matters: offences of mutiny and the seduction of service personnel from their duty are not in the offences-against-the-State Chapter, and a search confined to Chapter VII will miss them.
Within Chapter VII, section 147 is the anchor provision. Several of the sections that follow are defined by reference to it. Section 148 punishes conspiracy to commit an offence punishable by section 147 S9. Section 149 punishes the collection of arms with the intention of waging war against the Government of India. Section 150 punishes concealment with intent to facilitate a design to wage war S3. The result is a graded cluster, in which section 147 supplies the core concept and the neighbouring sections reach preparatory and facilitative conduct that would otherwise fall short.
The comparison with section 121 of the Penal Code
A token-level comparison of section 121 of the Penal Code against section 147 of the Sanhita returned a similarity of 0.9735, and a single reported difference S1; S2.
That difference was an artefact. The Penal Code text as published carries a footnote marker between the word "Illustration" and the text of the illustration, and the comparison registered the marker as a difference S2. Once the marker is set aside, the operative text is identical, word for word: the same three verbs, the same object, the same penalty, the same illustration.
So section 147 is, in substance, section 121 renumbered. It is the fifth provision in this collection found to have been carried across without substantive alteration, the earlier four being sections 138, 142, 145 and 146.
One genuine difference, and it is in the marginal note
There is one real change, and it is not in the operative text.
The Penal Code's marginal note to section 121 reads "Waging or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war against the Government of India" S2. The Sanhita's marginal note to section 147 reads "Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against Government of India" S1. The definite article before "Government of India" has been dropped, and three commas have been added.
This produces an oddity inside the Sanhita itself. The marginal note omits "the"; the operative text of the same section retains it, reading "against the Government of India" S1. And the First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which classifies the offence, also retains it, describing the offence as "Waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting the waging of war, against the Government of India" S4.
Three statements of the same heading, in three places, in two statutes passed together, and they do not match. Nothing turns on it as a matter of law: marginal notes are not operative text, and the operative words are clear. But it is a drafting inconsistency, and it is recorded here because readers who search by the marginal note's wording may fail to match the Schedule's wording.
The penalty, and where it came from
The punishment is "death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine" S1.
The Penal Code's footnote apparatus records how that sentence was assembled, and the history is striking S2:
| Change | Instrument |
|---|---|
| "Queen" replaced by "Government of India" | Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 |
| "and shall forfeit all his property" replaced by "and shall also be liable to fine" | Act 16 of 1921, s. 2 |
| "transportation" replaced by "imprisonment for life" | Act 26 of 1955, s. 117 and the Schedule, with effect from 1 January 1956 |
| "Illustrations" replaced by "Illustration" | Act 36 of 1957, s. 3 and the Second Schedule |
| Brackets and the letter "(a)" omitted | Act 36 of 1957, s. 3 and the Second Schedule |
| Illustration (b) omitted | Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 |
Read together, these entries show that the offence as originally enacted in 1860 was punishable with death or transportation, and carried forfeiture of all the offender's property. Forfeiture of the entire estate survived until 1921, when it was replaced by liability to a fine. Transportation survived until 1956, when it became imprisonment for life.
The Sanhita inherited the text in the state it had reached by 1957 and reproduced it unchanged. The "clean" modern provision is the end-product of nearly a century of amendment, none of it the Sanhita's work. This is an inference from the footnote apparatus printed with the Penal Code S2; the 1860 Gazette itself has not been retrieved for this article, and that limitation is recorded below.
Death is a maximum, not a mandatory sentence
The penalty is expressed as "death, or imprisonment for life" S1. The disjunctive is decisive. Death is the maximum available, not the required sentence, and a court may impose imprisonment for life instead. There is no provision in section 147 making death mandatory in any circumstance.
The framework governing when a court may impose a death sentence rather than life imprisonment has not been researched for this article, and nothing here should be read as guidance on capital sentencing. That is a substantial body of law in its own right and it is expressly outside this article's scope.
An ambiguity about the fine
The penalty clause reads "death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine" S1. Grammatically it is not certain whether the liability to fine attaches to both limbs or only to imprisonment for life. On the narrower reading, the fine rides with a life sentence only; on the wider reading, a fine may accompany either.
The First Schedule renders the punishment as "Death, or imprisonment for life and fine" S4, which reproduces the same ambiguity rather than resolving it. No judicial authority resolving the point was located for this article. The ambiguity is noted rather than answered.
What "waging war" means
The words "wages war" are not defined in the Sanhita, and the Penal Code did not define them either. The content comes from the courts, and the leading authority is the Supreme Court's decision in State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, decided on 4 August 2005 S5.
The central test is purpose
The Court held that the most important element is the intention or purpose behind the defiance or rising against the Government. It adopted the old formulation quo animo did the parties assemble, and held that the intention and purpose of the war-like operations directed against the governmental machinery is an important criterion. If the object is to strike at the sovereign authority of the Government to achieve a public and general purpose, as distinct from a private and particular purpose, that is an important indication of waging war. The purpose must be intended to be achieved by the use of force and arms, and by defiance of Government troops or armed personnel deployed to maintain public tranquility S5.
Scale, numbers and ceremony are not decisive
The Court made three further points that matter in practice S5:
- Numbers do not control. A small group, or even a single person, equipped with modern weapons can cause more devastating damage than a large group armed with ordinary weapons.
- No pomp or pageantry is needed. There need not be the formality associated with war, such as offenders forming a battle-line or arraying themselves in a warlike manner.
- Stealth does not disqualify. Even a stealthy operation to overwhelm the armed or other personnel deployed by the Government, and to attain a commanding position from which terms could be dictated to the Government, may be an act of waging war.
The limiting principle, which is the most important part
The same judgment contains an express warning against reading section 121 broadly, and it is the part of the decision most often overlooked S5.
The Court dissociated itself from the older English and Indian authorities to the extent that they laid down "a too general test of attainment of an object of general public nature or a political object". It held that a court must be cautious about an approach that brings within section 121 all acts of lawless violence resulting in the destruction of public property, and all acts of violent resistance to armed personnel undertaken to achieve political objectives. In terms:
"The moment it is found that the object sought to be attained is of general public nature or has a political hue, the offensive violent acts targeted against armed forces and public officials should not be branded as acts of waging war." S5
And further, that the expression should not be stretched to treat all acts disrupting public order and peace, irrespective of magnitude and repercussions, as waging war. A "balanced and realistic approach" is required S5.
The Court also doubted whether the historical treatment of organised violent agitation, for the repeal of an unpopular law or against burdensome taxes, as treason in the form of levying war, is in tune with a modern perspective S5.
The practical effect is significant. A political motive is not enough. Violence against police or armed forces is not enough. Destruction of public property is not enough. Section 147 is reserved for conduct aimed at the sovereign authority of the State itself, pursued by force, on a scale and with an animus that amounts to war in substance.
An illustration of what is not waging war
Navjot Sandhu treats the Patna High Court's decision in Mir Hasan Khan v. The State, reported at AIR 1951 Patna 60, as illustrative of what does not amount to waging war S5.
That case involved a mutiny among sections of the police force, prompted by indignation at the punishment given to a colleague. The accused had taken possession of an armoury and had taken part in resistance to the troops. The conviction under section 121 was set aside. Shearer, J. held that "waging war" means, and can only mean, waging war in the manner usual in war; it is not enough to show that the accused obtained possession of an armoury and used the rifles and ammunition against the troops. It must also be shown that the seizure was part and parcel of a planned operation, and that the intention in resisting the troops was to overwhelm and defeat them and then to crush further opposition S5.
Mir Hasan Khan is cited here as it is reproduced and relied upon in the Supreme Court's judgment S5; the Patna report has not been independently retrieved for this article.
The Sanhita's illustration, read against that law
The Sanhita's own illustration says that a person who joins an insurrection against the Government of India has committed the offence S1. Read against Navjot Sandhu, the illustration is consistent but undemanding: it supplies a clear case at the core of the offence, and leaves every contested case to the judicial test. An insurrection is, by definition, a rising against the authority of the State. The hard questions, which the illustration does not touch, concern conduct short of insurrection.
The concealment route, and a second Supreme Court decision
Because section 147's penalty is so severe, cases sometimes turn on whether an accused falls inside it or inside a neighbouring, lesser provision. The Supreme Court's decision in Shoukat Hussain Guru v. State (NCT) Delhi, decided on 14 May 2008, is an example S6.
The accused had been acquitted of conspiracy to commit terrorist offences and of waging war, but convicted under section 123 of the Penal Code, the offence of concealing a design to wage war, despite no charge having been framed under that section. On a curative petition he argued that he had no notice of, and no opportunity to meet, that charge S6.
The Court recorded its earlier reasoning that, by his illegal omission to inform the police or a Magistrate of the design to attack Parliament, which it described as an act of waging war, the accused had made himself liable for the lesser offence; and that the absence of a specific charge caused him no prejudice, because the charge of waging war and allied offences was already the subject matter of the charges framed, so the case he had to meet under section 123 was no different from the case on the major charges S6.
Two points for the reader of the Sanhita. First, the concealment offence that produced that conviction now appears as section 150 of the Sanhita S3, and it remains available as a lesser alternative where the primary case of waging war fails. Second, the decision is authority on charge framing and the treatment of a minor offence, not on the ingredients of waging war; its statement that the attack on Parliament was an act of waging war is a reproduction of the reasoning in Navjot Sandhu S5; S6.
The overlap with the terrorist act provision, which is new
Navjot Sandhu compared section 121 with section 3(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, and found that the two had overlapping features. The Court said that the degree of animus and the magnitude of the acts would be relevant to whether terrorist acts gave rise to a state of war, but that "the demarcating line is by no means clear, much less transparent. It is often a difference in degree." S5
That observation has acquired a new significance under the Sanhita, and the reason is structural.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act was a separate statute, and it has since been repealed. The Sanhita, however, contains its own terrorist act provision at section 113, which punishes a person who acts with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, sovereignty, security or economic security of India, or to strike terror in the people, by using bombs, explosives, firearms, lethal weapons, poisonous or noxious gases, or other hazardous substances S8. That formula closely tracks the provision the Supreme Court was comparing.
So the overlap the Court identified between waging war and a terrorist act, and described as often a difference only in degree, now sits between two sections of the same Act: section 147 and section 113 of the Sanhita S1; S8. What was previously an interface between two statutes is now an internal question of selection within one. Whether the courts will approach that choice differently now that both provisions are in the same enactment has not been decided, and this article does not predict it.
A further comparison is available in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, whose section 15 defines a terrorist act in terms close to section 113 S10. That Act, however, contains no offence of waging war: a search of its text for that expression produced no result S10. Section 147 therefore has no analogue in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and the two statutes do not overlap on this particular offence.
Sedition: what the text actually shows
No account of Chapter VII is complete without addressing sedition, and the question is best answered from the text rather than from reputation.
First, the formula of section 124A has no successor in the Sanhita. Section 124A of the Penal Code punished a person who, by words, signs or visible representation, brought or attempted to bring into hatred or contempt, or excited or attempted to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India S2. A scan of the operative text of every section of the Sanhita found no section containing the word "disaffection", no section containing the word "sedition", and no section containing the phrase "hatred or contempt" S1. On the text, that formula is gone.
Second, section 152 is a different offence, not a renamed one. Section 152 of the Sanhita punishes a person who, purposely or knowingly, by words, signs, visible representation, electronic communication, the use of financial means or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities, or endangers the sovereignty or unity and integrity of India S7. The differences from section 124A are substantive, not cosmetic:
- The object is different. Section 124A protected the Government from hatred, contempt and disaffection. Section 152 protects the sovereignty, unity and integrity of the State against secession, armed rebellion and subversion. Disaffection towards a government is not, by itself, within section 152.
- A mens rea requirement has been added. Section 152 requires that the act be done "purposely or knowingly" S7. Section 124A contained no such express requirement S2.
- The means have been expanded. Section 152 expressly covers electronic communication and the use of financial means S7.
- The punishment is differently graded. Section 124A offered imprisonment for life, or imprisonment up to three years, or fine S2. Section 152 offers imprisonment for life, or imprisonment up to seven years, and fine S7. The lower alternative is therefore more than twice as long, while the upper limit is unchanged.
Both provisions carry an Explanation protecting comments that express disapprobation with a view to obtaining alteration by lawful means S2; S7. That much is common ground.
Third, and this cuts against the simple narrative, the concept of disaffection survives elsewhere in Indian law. Section 2(o) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 defines "unlawful activity" to include, at sub-clause (iii), any action "which causes or is intended to cause disaffection against India" S10. The same definition also covers action intended to bring about the cession or secession of part of the territory of India, and action which disclaims, questions or disrupts the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India S10.
The honest conclusion is therefore in two parts. The Penal Code's sedition offence has no textual successor in the Sanhita, and section 152 is a materially different and in important respects narrower offence. But "disaffection against India" remains a statutory category in Indian law, as a limb of unlawful activity under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act S10. A reader told simply that sedition has been abolished, without being told the second part, has been given half the picture.
This article does not assess how the courts will construe section 152, and it does not address the constitutional challenges to section 124A or their effect. Those matters have not been researched here.
Classification under the First Schedule
The First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 classifies the offence under section 147 as follows S4:
| Column | Entry |
|---|---|
| Offence | Waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting the waging of war, against the Government of India |
| Punishment | Death, or imprisonment for life and fine |
| Cognizable or non-cognizable | Cognizable |
| Bailable or non-bailable | Non-bailable |
| By what court triable | Court of Session |
Each entry is as one would expect, and the forum entry is correct. A Court of Session can impose any sentence authorised by law, including death, subject to confirmation where required. Assigning a capital offence to the Court of Session is therefore both correct and necessary; no Magistrate could pass such a sentence S4.
This is worth stating because the forum column in the First Schedule has not always matched the punishment in sections examined earlier in this collection. Here it does. The punishment column also reproduces the section's penalty accurately, subject only to the fine ambiguity noted above.
Being cognizable, the offence permits the police to register a first information report and investigate without the order of a Magistrate. Being non-bailable, bail is not a matter of right and falls to the discretion of the court, exercised according to the law governing bail, which has not been examined here.
Compounding
Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 lists the offences that may be compounded, in two tables: those compoundable by the person named, and those compoundable only with the permission of the court. Section 147 appears in neither table S4.
The offence is therefore not compoundable. It cannot be settled or withdrawn by agreement between the accused and any other person, with or without the court's permission. For an offence against the authority of the State, carrying the death penalty, that is the expected result.
Commencement and application
Section 147 came into force on 1 July 2024. The Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 appointed that date for the coming into force of the provisions of the Sanhita, subject to the exception stated in that notification S11.
The date matters because of the ordinary rule against retrospective criminal liability. Conduct before 1 July 2024 falls to be dealt with under section 121 of the Penal Code; conduct on or after that date falls under section 147 S1; S2. Because the operative text is identical, the practical difference is one of citation and procedure rather than of substance. A charge should nonetheless cite the provision in force when the conduct occurred.
Practical points for readers
- The words are wider than the offence. Read on its face, "wages war" could cover a great deal of organised violence. The Supreme Court has held that it does not. A political purpose, violence against the police, and destruction of public property are, individually, not enough S5.
- The question is purpose and scale together. The test is the animus behind the rising, directed at the sovereign authority of the State, pursued by force, on a footing that amounts to war in substance S5.
- Attempt and abetment attract the same maximum. There is no lesser penalty for the attempt or for the abettor S1.
- There are lesser provisions in the same Chapter. Conspiracy falls under section 148, the collection of arms under section 149, and concealment of a design under section 150 S3; S9. Where the case for waging war is not made out, these may be in play, and Shoukat Hussain Guru shows a conviction resting on the concealment provision after acquittal on the war charges S6.
- Section 113 may be the better fit. Where the conduct is a bombing or armed attack intended to strike terror, the terrorist act provision may be the natural charge, and the Supreme Court has said the line between the two is often one of degree S5; S8.
- Do not assume anything about sedition from the heading of this Chapter. Section 147 is not a sedition provision and never was. Sedition was a separate section of the Penal Code, and its treatment under the Sanhita is addressed above S2; S7.
Limitations of this article
The following are stated so that readers do not mistake the scope of what has been verified:
- "Waging war" is not defined by statute, and this article's account of its meaning rests on judicial construction. It reflects the authority located; it does not purport to be exhaustive of the case law.
- Capital sentencing has not been researched. The article establishes that death is the maximum and not mandatory, and goes no further.
- The fine ambiguity is unresolved. No authority was located on whether a fine may accompany a death sentence under this section.
- Mir Hasan Khan was read only as reproduced in the Supreme Court's judgment S5. The Patna report was not independently retrieved.
- The 1860 Gazette has not been retrieved. The account of the original penalty, including forfeiture of all property, is an inference from the footnote apparatus published with the Penal Code S2.
- No Law Commission or legislative-committee material was located or searched for this section, so no documented legislative rationale for retaining section 121 unchanged is offered.
- The constitutional litigation concerning section 124A is not covered, nor is the effect of any order in it.
- Judicial construction of section 152 has not been examined. The comparison with section 124A is textual only.
- Bail law and committal procedure have not been examined, beyond recording the Schedule's classification.
- The relationship between section 147 and section 113 is identified as a question, not answered. No authority decided under the Sanhita was located.
- Sections 149 to 158 have not been analysed. They are described only so far as necessary to locate section 147 within its Chapter.
Frequently asked questions
1. What does section 147 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita punish? Waging war against the Government of India, attempting to wage such war, and abetting the waging of such war S1.
2. What is the punishment? Death, or imprisonment for life, and the offender is also liable to fine S1.
3. Is the death penalty mandatory? No. The section says "death, or imprisonment for life", so death is the maximum available and a court may impose life imprisonment instead S1.
4. Which section of the Indian Penal Code did this replace? Section 121 S2.
5. Did the wording change? The operative text was carried across word for word. A comparison returned a similarity of 0.9735 with a single difference, and that difference was an artefact of a footnote marker in the published Penal Code text S1; S2.
6. So is anything different at all? Only the marginal note, which drops "the" before "Government of India" and adds commas. The operative text of section 147 keeps "the", and so does the First Schedule entry S1; S2; S4.
7. What does "waging war" mean? It is not defined in the statute. The Supreme Court has held that the most important criterion is the intention or purpose behind the rising against the Government, which must be to strike at the sovereign authority of the State for a public and general purpose, pursued by force and arms and by defiance of Government forces S5.
8. Is a political motive enough? No. The Supreme Court held expressly that where the object is of a general public nature or has a political hue, violent acts against armed forces and public officials should not for that reason be branded as waging war S5.
9. Is violence against the police waging war? Not by itself. In the case the Supreme Court treats as illustrative, a police mutiny involving seizure of an armoury and resistance to troops was held not to amount to waging war, and the conviction was set aside S5.
10. Does the number of people involved matter? It is not decisive. The Supreme Court observed that a small group, or a single person with modern weapons, may cause more damage than a large group with ordinary weapons S5.
11. Must the conduct look like a conventional war? No. The Court held that no pomp or pageantry is required, and that even a stealthy operation to overwhelm Government personnel and dictate terms to the Government may qualify S5.
12. Is an attempt punished less severely? No. The attempt is inside the section and carries the same punishment as the completed offence, including death S1.
13. Is an abettor punished less severely? No. Abetment is named in the section and carries the same punishment S1.
14. Is the offence cognizable? Yes, according to the First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 S4.
15. Is it bailable? No. The First Schedule classifies it as non-bailable S4.
16. Which court tries it? The Court of Session S4.
17. Can the offence be compounded or settled? No. Section 147 does not appear in either table of compoundable offences in section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 S4.
18. When did section 147 come into force? 1 July 2024, by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 S11.
19. Which Chapter does it belong to, and has the Chapter number changed? It opens Chapter VII of the Sanhita, "Of Offences against the State", running from sections 147 to 158. The same subject was Chapter VI of the Penal Code. The heading text is identical; only the number moved S2; S3.
20. Is section 147 the sedition provision? No. Sedition was section 124A of the Penal Code, a separate provision S2.
21. Has sedition been retained in the Sanhita? Not in its old form. No section of the Sanhita uses the words "sedition", "disaffection" or "hatred or contempt". Section 152 addresses related ground but is a materially different offence, directed at secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities and endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, and it adds a requirement that the act be done purposely or knowingly S1; S2; S7.
22. So the idea of disaffection has disappeared from Indian law? No, and this is an important qualification. Section 2(o)(iii) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 defines "unlawful activity" to include action which causes or is intended to cause disaffection against India S10.
23. How does section 147 relate to the terrorist act provision in section 113? They overlap. The Supreme Court, comparing waging war with a materially similar terrorist-act provision, said the demarcating line is by no means clear and is often a difference in degree. That comparison was then between two separate statutes; under the Sanhita both provisions sit in the same Act, and no decided authority on choosing between them was located S5; S8.
24. What are the lesser offences in the same Chapter? Conspiracy to commit an offence punishable by section 147 falls under section 148, collecting arms with intent to wage war under section 149, and concealing a design to wage war under section 150 S3; S9.
This article states the law as published in the sources cited and is for general information only. It is not legal advice. Section 147 carries the death penalty, and the meaning of "waging war" does not come from the words of the section but from judicial construction applied to the facts of a particular case, so the gap between what the provision appears to cover and what it actually reaches is unusually wide. Anyone affected by, or advising on, a matter under this section should obtain qualified legal advice. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.