The provision in one view
Section 150 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes a person who, by any act or by any illegal omission, conceals the existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India, intending by that concealment to facilitate the waging of such war, or knowing it to be likely that the concealment will facilitate it. The punishment is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and the offender is also liable to fine S1; S3.
Its predecessor is section 123 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 S2. A token-level comparison of the operative text returned a similarity of 0.9855 with a single difference: the Sanhita dropped the comma after "Whoever". The provision is otherwise identical word for word.
Two things make section 150 the most practically important section of this cluster. First, its "illegal omission" limb is not self-explanatory, and the content comes from a duty imposed by a different statute. Second, it is the one section in this cluster on which there is real Supreme Court authority, including a conviction that was sustained and another on identical facts that was refused.
The exact words
"Whoever by any act, or by any illegal omission, conceals the existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India, intending by such concealment to facilitate, or knowing it to be likely that such concealment will facilitate, the waging of such war, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." S1; S3
The elements
The subject matter is a design to wage war. Section 150 does not require that war be waged, attempted, or even prepared for. It requires the existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India, and the accused's concealment of that design's existence.
The conduct may be an act or an omission. This is the critical feature. Concealment "by any act" is straightforward. Concealment "by any illegal omission" is not, because an omission is only illegal if there was a duty to act. Section 150 does not state the duty.
Two alternative mental states, and the second is lower. The accused must either:
- intend by the concealment to facilitate the waging of war; or
- know it to be likely that the concealment will facilitate it.
The second is the easier to establish. It does not require any purpose of assisting the war; knowledge of likely effect is enough.
Where the duty to speak comes from: BNSS section 33
Because section 150 punishes an illegal omission without saying what makes an omission illegal, the section cannot be read on its own. The duty is supplied by the procedure code.
Section 33 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, headed "Public to give information of certain offences", provides that every person aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit, an offence punishable under any of a list of sections of the Sanhita, "shall, in the absence of any reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which excuse shall lie upon the person so aware, forthwith give information to the nearest Magistrate or police officer of such commission or intention" S4.
Three features of that provision matter here.
It expressly covers this Chapter. Clause (iv) of the list reads "sections 147 to 154 (both inclusive) and section 158" S4. Section 150 is within that range, and so are the offences whose concealment section 150 punishes. The duty is therefore not a general civic sentiment; it is a statutory obligation attaching to precisely these offences.
It carries a reverse burden. The duty applies "in the absence of any reasonable excuse", and the burden of proving the excuse lies on the person who was aware S4. A person who stayed silent and relies on a reasonable excuse must establish it.
It reaches conduct outside India. Section 33(2) provides that "offence" includes any act committed at any place out of India which would constitute an offence if committed in India S4.
The list is not the whole Chapter. Clause (iv) covers sections 147 to 154 and section 158, which means sections 155, 156 and 157 are not within the duty S4. The duty was drawn deliberately rather than applied to the Chapter wholesale.
This link is the Supreme Court's own reasoning, not an inference
It would be possible to present the connection between section 150 and the duty to inform as an academic construction. It is not. The Supreme Court made the link expressly.
In State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, the Court set out the text of section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -- the predecessor of BNSS section 33 -- including its clause (i), "Sections 121 to 126, both inclusive, and Section 130 (that is to say offences against the State specified in Chapter VI of the said Code)", and including the reverse-burden words S5. Having quoted the duty, the Court then held:
"Thus, by his illegal omission to apprise the police or Magistrate of the design of Afzal and other conspirators to attack the Parliament which is an act of waging war, the appellant Shaukat has made himself liable for punishment for the lesser offence under Section 123 IPC. If he had given the timely information, the entire conspiracy would have been nipped in the bud." S5
So the route is: the procedure code imposes a duty to inform; failing to inform is therefore an illegal omission; and an illegal omission concealing a design to wage war is an offence under section 123, now section 150. That reasoning transfers directly to the Sanhita, because BNSS section 33 reproduces the duty and the reverse burden in the same words and expressly lists section 150's Chapter S4; S5.
The predecessor duty covered the Chapter by reference, the new one by number
One difference between the old and new duty provisions is worth recording. Section 39 of the 1973 Code described the covered offences as "Sections 121 to 126, both inclusive, and Section 130 (that is to say offences against the State specified in Chapter VI of the said Code)" S5. BNSS section 33 lists "sections 147 to 154 (both inclusive) and section 158" without any descriptive gloss S4.
The drafting is not identical, but the mapping has since been carried out for this collection, and the two lists correspond exactly.
| old law | new law | |
|---|---|---|
| main span | Penal Code ss. 121 to 126 -- that is sections 121, 121A, 122, 123, 124, 124A, 125 and 126, eight provisions | Sanhita ss. 147 to 154, eight provisions |
| appended section | Penal Code s. 130 | Sanhita s. 158 |
The appended section is the one that had to be checked, and it matches: section 130 of the Penal Code is titled "Aiding escape of, rescuing or harbouring such prisoner", word for word the title of section 158 of the Sanhita, and the two operative texts differ by a single comma S4; S5.
So no offence gained or lost the duty to inform in the recodification. The duty was carried across unchanged in scope -- and so was its gap, since sections 155, 156 and 157 of the Sanhita fall outside it exactly as sections 127, 128 and 129 of the Penal Code did.
One caution. The text of section 39 quoted above is taken from a judgment that sets it out; the provision itself was not retrieved from an official source for this collection, and the correspondence of the appended section is established from the titles and texts of sections 130 and 158.
The case law, which is the strongest in this cluster
Section 150's predecessor produced two Supreme Court outcomes on the same facts, and they went opposite ways.
A conviction sustained, and it took the full maximum
Shaukat Hussain Guru was acquitted of the graver charges but convicted under section 123. The Supreme Court recorded the result: "He stands convicted under Section 123 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- and in default of payment of fine he shall suffer RI for a further period of one year. His conviction on other charges is hereby set aside." S5
Two points follow. The sentence was the statutory maximum of ten years, with a substantial fine, imposed on a person acquitted of waging war, conspiracy and preparation. And the conviction rested on an omission -- a failure to inform -- not on any positive act of concealment.
A conviction on the same facts refused
The fourth accused, Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru, had been convicted under section 123 by the trial court and acquitted of everything else. The Supreme Court declined to sustain even that conviction: "The scanty evidence on record does not justify her conviction either on the charges framed against her or under Section 123 IPC for which she was held guilty by the trial Court. The High Court's view is unexceptionable." S5
The pair is instructive. Section 123 was not treated as a residual provision that catches anyone in the vicinity of a conspiracy. It required evidence, and where the evidence was "scanty" the conviction fell, notwithstanding that the accused had some knowledge of suspicious movements.
The charge-framing point
Shoukat Hussain Guru v. State (NCT) Delhi, decided on 14 May 2008, was a curative petition against the section 123 conviction on the ground that no charge under section 123 had ever been framed S6.
The Court rejected it. The absence of a specific charge caused no prejudice, because the charge of waging war and the allied offences were already the subject matter of the charges framed, so the case the accused had to meet under section 123 was no different from the case on the major charges; and the defence available under section 123 had been equally available under sections 121, 121A and 122, with which he had been expressly charged S6.
For a reader of section 150, the practical consequence is that a person charged under sections 147 to 149 may be convicted under section 150 instead, without a separate charge, if the evidence supports the lesser offence. That is how Shaukat's conviction arose.
The comparison with section 123 of the Penal Code
The operative texts are identical but for one comma. A token-level comparison returned 0.9855, and the single reported difference was "Whoever," against "Whoever" S1; S2. Section 150 is therefore the seventh provision in this collection found to have been carried across without substantive alteration, after sections 138, 142, 145, 146, 147 and 149.
The marginal-note pattern breaks here
At sections 147 and 149 the Sanhita's marginal note dropped the definite article before "Government of India" while the operative text retained it. That does not happen at section 150. The Penal Code's marginal note reads "Concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war", and the Sanhita's marginal note reads exactly the same S1; S2.
So the marginal-note change is not uniform across the Chapter. Two of the four sections examined show it and two do not. It is recorded here because the opposite -- asserting a clean Chapter-wide rule -- would have been wrong.
Only one footnote marker appears inside the section 123 block, numbered 1, which attaches to the substitution of "imprisonment for life" for "transportation" elsewhere in the printed page rather than to this section's own ten-year penalty S2. Section 123 therefore shows none of the forfeiture-and-transportation history found at sections 121 and 122, which is consistent with its lower penalty having always been a term of years.
Classification under the First Schedule
The First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 classifies the offence as follows S4:
| Column | Entry |
|---|---|
| Offence | Concealing with intent to facilitate a design to wage war |
| Punishment | Imprisonment for 10 years and fine |
| Cognizable or non-cognizable | Cognizable |
| Bailable or non-bailable | Non-bailable |
| By what court triable | Court of Session |
The punishment column does include the fine, matching the section. The forum is correct: a ten-year maximum is beyond a Magistrate of the first class, and the offence is assigned to the Court of Session.
The Schedule's description does, however, insert the word "a" before "design", which neither the Sanhita's marginal note nor the Penal Code's contains S1; S2; S4. That is a fourth consecutive instance in this Chapter of the Schedule's wording differing from the Sanhita's marginal note, although here the Schedule adds a word rather than restoring one the Sanhita dropped.
The practical point is unchanged: searching the First Schedule using the Sanhita's marginal-note wording, or the reverse, will not produce matches in this Chapter.
Compounding
Section 150 appears in neither table of compoundable offences in section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 S4. The offence is therefore not compoundable.
The word "concealment" does appear three times in the first table, but each occurrence belongs to a property offence -- assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, and fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent distribution among creditors -- and none relates to section 150 S4.
Where section 150 sits in the cluster
| Section | Conduct | Maximum |
|---|---|---|
| 147 | waging, attempting, or abetting war | death S7 |
| 148 | conspiring to wage war, or to overawe a Government by criminal force | imprisonment for life |
| 149 | collecting men, arms or ammunition, or otherwise preparing to wage war | imprisonment for life S8 |
| 150 | concealing a design to wage war | imprisonment for 10 years |
Section 150 is the only section of the cluster whose maximum is a term of years rather than life or death S1; S4; S7; S8. It is the floor of the cluster, and the case law shows it functioning as exactly that: the provision under which a person acquitted of the graver offences was nonetheless convicted.
Commencement and application
Section 150 came into force on 1 July 2024, by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 S9.
Conduct before that date falls under section 123 of the Penal Code; conduct on or after it falls under section 150 S1; S2. Because the operative text is identical but for a comma, the difference is one of citation and procedure rather than substance.
Authority on the temporal question
A decision of the Rajasthan High Court supplies authority for that proposition, though it must be used carefully.
In Tejender Pal Singh alias Timma v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 16 December 2024, the Court quashed a first information report so far as it rested on material published before 1 July 2024, holding:
"In my opinion, the substantive penal provisions of the BNS, 2023 [in this case section 152 and sections 197(1) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023] cannot be retrospectively invoked against the petitioner for the so-called criminal acts done or committed before 01.07.2024, the date of it's coming into force." S10
Three qualifications must be stated.
First, the Court confined that holding to the sections before it. The words in square brackets are the Court's own, and the sections named are 152 and 197(1) -- not section 150. The decision is relied on here for the general reason the Court gave, that the Sanhita's substantive provisions do not operate retrospectively, and not as authority on this section.
Second, the broader statement is a reference to another judgment. The Court went on to record that in Vijay Sharma v. State, a judgment of the same judge, it had been held "that qua the offences committed before 01.07.2024 under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), an FIR cannot be registered under (BNS) after enforcement of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) from 01.07.2024" S10. That judgment was not retrieved for this article, and the proposition is reported only as the Rajasthan High Court recorded it.
Third, the procedural split rests on a quoted decision of a different court. The judgment quotes the Allahabad High Court in Deepu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, summarising the effect of the repeals, the first proposition being that "If an FIR is registered on or after 1.7.2024 for the offence committed prior to 1.7.2024, then FIR would be registered under the provisions of IPC but the investigation will continue as per BNSS" S10. That is a quoted decision of another High Court, not the Rajasthan Court's own formulation, and it was not retrieved either. On it, the offence charged would be the Penal Code provision while the procedure followed would be the new Sanhita's -- a split the bare statement above does not capture.
None of this decides the continuing-conduct case, which is addressed next.
Concealment by omission is, however, a continuing state of affairs rather than a single act, and where a failure to inform began before 1 July 2024 and continued afterwards the question of which provision applies is not one this article addresses. It was not researched and no authority on it was located.
Practical points for readers
- Silence can be the offence. The conduct element is satisfied by an illegal omission, and the Supreme Court has sustained a conviction resting on a failure to inform S1; S5.
- The duty to speak is in the procedure code. BNSS section 33 requires a person aware of an offence under sections 147 to 154 or 158 to inform the nearest Magistrate or police officer forthwith S4.
- The burden of excusing silence is on the person who stayed silent. The duty applies in the absence of a reasonable excuse, and the burden of proving that excuse lies on the person aware S4.
- Knowledge of likely effect is enough. An intention to facilitate the war is not required if the accused knew the concealment was likely to facilitate it S1.
- A separate charge is not essential. A person charged under the graver sections may be convicted under section 150 on the same facts, as happened in the Parliament attack case S6.
- The maximum has been imposed in practice. The section 123 conviction attracted the full ten years with a fine of Rs. 25,000 S5.
- But the section is not a catch-all. On the same facts the Court refused to sustain a conviction where the evidence was "scanty" S5.
- Cognizable, non-bailable, Court of Session, not compoundable S4.
- It is the floor of the cluster. Sections 147 and 149 reach death and imprisonment for life respectively; section 150 is capped at ten years S7; S8.
Limitations of this article
- No mapping of CrPC section 39's list against BNSS section 33's list was carried out. The two describe the covered offences differently, and whether any offence gained or lost the duty in the recodification is left open.
- The expression "illegal omission" was not traced to the Sanhita's own definitional provisions. This article explains it through the duty in BNSS section 33, following the Supreme Court's reasoning, but the Sanhita's general definition of an illegal omission was not examined.
- "Design" is not defined in the section and no judicial definition of it was located.
- The reverse burden in BNSS section 33 is reported as drafted. Its constitutional standing was not researched, and nothing here should be read as a view on it.
- No authority decided under section 150 of the Sanhita was located. The case law discussed is on section 123 of the Penal Code.
- The relationship between section 150 and the offence of harbouring or any similar provision elsewhere in the Sanhita was not examined.
- The Gazette of 1860 has not been retrieved. Only one footnote marker appears in the section 123 block, and no penalty history for this section is asserted.
- No Law Commission or legislative-committee material was located or searched for this section.
- The treatment of a concealment straddling 1 July 2024 was not researched.
- Bail law and committal procedure were not examined beyond recording the Schedule's classification.
- Sections 151 to 158 were not analysed.
- The marginal-note divergence pattern is reported on four sections only, and sections 151 to 158 were not checked.
Frequently asked questions
1. What does section 150 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita punish? Concealing the existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India, by any act or any illegal omission, where the accused intends the concealment to facilitate the waging of war or knows it is likely to do so S1.
2. What is the punishment? Imprisonment of either description for up to ten years, and the offender is also liable to fine S1.
3. Does war have to be waged for this offence to be committed? No. What must exist is a design to wage war, and the accused's concealment of its existence S1.
4. Can staying silent amount to this offence? Yes. The conduct element includes concealment "by any illegal omission", and the Supreme Court has sustained a conviction based on a failure to inform the police or a Magistrate S1; S5.
5. What makes an omission illegal? A duty to act. Section 150 does not state the duty; it comes from section 33 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which requires a person aware of certain offences to give information forthwith to the nearest Magistrate or police officer S4.
6. Does that duty cover this Chapter? Yes, expressly. Clause (iv) of the list in section 33 reads "sections 147 to 154 (both inclusive) and section 158" S4.
7. Does it cover the whole Chapter? No. Sections 155, 156 and 157 are outside the list S4.
8. Who has to prove a reasonable excuse for staying silent? The person who stayed silent. The duty applies "in the absence of any reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which excuse shall lie upon the person so aware" S4.
9. Is that connection between the two statutes just an academic reading? No. The Supreme Court set out the text of the predecessor duty provision, section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and then held the accused liable under section 123 for his "illegal omission to apprise the police or Magistrate" of the design S5.
10. What mental state is required? Either an intention that the concealment facilitate the waging of war, or knowledge that it is likely to do so S1.
11. Which is easier to prove? The second. Knowledge of likely effect does not require any purpose of assisting the war S1.
12. Which section of the Indian Penal Code did this replace? Section 123 S2.
13. Did the wording change? Barely. A comparison returned 0.9855 with a single difference: the comma after "Whoever" was dropped. The provision is otherwise identical S1; S2.
14. Did the marginal note change, as it did at sections 147 and 149? No. The Sanhita's marginal note is identical to the Penal Code's, so the marginal-note change seen at sections 147 and 149 is not uniform across this Chapter S1; S2.
15. Has a conviction under the predecessor actually been upheld? Yes. In the Parliament attack case one accused, acquitted of the graver charges, stood convicted under section 123 and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs. 25,000 S5.
16. That was the maximum, was it not? Yes. Ten years is the statutory maximum, and it was imposed on a person acquitted of waging war, conspiracy and preparation S1; S5.
17. Is the section a catch-all for anyone near a conspiracy? No. In the same judgment the Court refused to sustain a section 123 conviction against another accused because the evidence on record was "scanty" S5.
18. Can a person be convicted under this section without being charged under it? That happened under the predecessor. The Supreme Court held the absence of a specific charge caused no prejudice, because the waging-war and allied charges were already the subject matter of the charges framed S6.
19. Is the offence cognizable? Yes, according to the First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 S4.
20. Is it bailable? No. It is classified as non-bailable S4.
21. Which court tries it? The Court of Session S4.
22. Does the First Schedule record the fine? Yes. The punishment column reads "Imprisonment for 10 years and fine", which matches the section S1; S4.
23. Can the offence be compounded? No. Section 150 appears in neither table of compoundable offences in section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The references to concealment in that section all concern property offences S4.
24. How does section 150 compare with the rest of the cluster? It is the least severely punished. Sections 147, 148 and 149 reach death or imprisonment for life; section 150 is capped at ten years, and it is the provision under which a person acquitted of the graver offences was convicted S1; S7; S8.
This article states the law as published in the sources cited and is for general information only. It is not legal advice. Section 150 can be committed by silence, the duty that makes silence unlawful sits in a different statute, and the burden of establishing a reasonable excuse for silence rests on the person who stayed silent, so the exposure created by this section is easy to underestimate. Anyone affected by, or advising on, a matter under this section should obtain qualified legal advice. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.