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BNS Section 33 · Deep dive

BNS Section 33: Act Causing Slight Harm (The De Minimis Exception)

BNS Section 33 is the Sanhita's expression of de minimis non curat lex: nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. It is one sentence of forty-one words with no proviso, Explanation or illustration, and it is structurally unlike every other General Exception - a scan of Chapter III confirms it requires neither good faith (which appears in twelve other sections of the chapter) nor consent (Sections 25 to 30), asking only about the magnitude of the harm. The governing authority is Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, a three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court of 31 March 1966, which decided three things. First, the object of the section is 'to exclude from the operation of the Penal Code those cases which from the imperfection of language may fall within the letter of the law, but are not within its spirit', and it is 'intended to prevent penalisation of negligible wrongs or of offences of trivial character'. Second, intention is no bar: the argument that deliberately caused harm falls outside the section 'is belied by the plain terms of s. 95'. Third, 'harm' is undefined and wide, and includes physical injury - and it remains undefined in the Sanhita, which defines 'injury' in Section 2(14) by reference to 'harm' and leaves 'harm' itself alone. The test is multi-factorial and resists arithmetic: triviality depends on 'the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done, and other related circumstances', with 'no absolute standard', and 'cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury'. The Court's examples cut both ways - a soldier assaulting his colonel or a pupil beating his teacher commits an offence whose heinousness is not measured by the injury, because the assault is 'wholly subversive of discipline', while an assault causing injury may be slight given the station and relationship of the parties. The boundary was drawn in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995), where the Court held Section 95 had 'no manner of application' to allegations that the head of a State police force indecently behaved with a senior IAS officer in company and persisted despite her objections - but expressly declined to decide the wider contention that the section can never apply to offences relating to a woman's modesty, a point for which the case is frequently and wrongly cited. Two Kerala decisions of 2024 show the exception still doing practical work at the quashing stage. Section 33 reproduces IPC Section 95 with zero textual differences across 47 tokens.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 29 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 33 — Act causing slight harm
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 95 — Act causing slight harm · renumbered
No earlier equivalent · partly corresponding
Section 81, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 415, 499 — The provisions surveyed in Veeda Menezes when construing the word 'harm' · renumbered
Section 354, 509 — Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty; Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman · renumbered
Section 353 — Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty · renumbered
Section 94 — Act to which a person is compelled by threats · substantively unchanged
Side-by-side converterIPC 95 → BNS 33

What the section says

Section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Act causing slight harm. and reads in full: S1S2

33. Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.

That is the entire provision: one sentence of forty-one words, with no proviso, no Explanation and no illustration. S1 It is the last section of Chapter III before the private-defence group opens at Section 34, and it has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3

Section 33 is the Sanhita's expression of the maxim de minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itself with trifles. The Kerala High Court said so directly in 2024, describing the section as embodying "the principle of 'de minimis non curat lex' meaning that 'law does not take into account trifles'", while adding that "care must be taken before applying the principle." S8

What makes this exception unlike every other in the chapter

Every other General Exception in Chapter III asks something about the actor: his age, his state of mind, his good faith, whether consent was given, whether he was compelled. Section 33 asks none of those things. It asks only one question, and it is a question about the harm: was it so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of it?

Two consequences follow from the drafting, and both are verifiable from the text.

It covers intended harm. The section applies where the act "causes, or … is intended to cause, or … is known to be likely to cause" harm. S1 All three states are expressly included. A person who meant to cause the trivial harm is within the section just as much as one who caused it by accident.

It requires neither good faith nor consent. A scan of Chapter III shows "good faith" appearing in twelve sections: 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36 and 37: and Section 33 is not among them. Nor is it one of the consent provisions, which are Sections 25 to 30. S1 Section 33 is the only exception in the chapter that turns purely on the magnitude of the harm, with no requirement as to the actor's state of mind or the victim's agreement. That characterisation is the author's analysis; no authority stating it was located.

The first of those two points was contested in the Supreme Court and decided. It is worth setting out how.

Veeda Menezes: the governing authority

The leading decision on this provision is Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, decided by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court (Shah, Wanchoo and Sikri, JJ.) on 31 March 1966 and reported as AIR 1966 SC 1773 and 1966 SCR 123, the judgment being delivered by J.C. Shah, J. S6

The facts were domestic and petty. After a quarrel in which the appellant's husband and the first respondent exchanged vulgar abuses, the respondent threw a "file" of papers which caused "a mere scratch" to the appellant, and slapped the appellant's servant Robert on the face. There was history on both sides: the complainant's husband had beaten the respondent's child for rude behaviour, and Robert had been rude to the respondent's wife and said he would repeat his rude words. S6

The object of the section

The Court described the purpose of Section 95 in terms that have been quoted ever since: S6

"It is true that the object of framing s. 95 was to exclude from the operation of the Penal Code those cases which from the imperfection of language may fall within the letter of the law, but are not within its spirit and are considered, and for the most part dealt with by the Courts, as innocent."

And more shortly: "Section 95 is intended to prevent penalisation of negligible wrongs or of offences of trivial character." S6

Intention is no bar

The appellant argued that the section could not apply where harm was intended or foreseen. The Court rejected that squarely: S6

"It cannot however be said that harm caused by doing an act with intent to cause harm or with the knowledge that harm may be caused thereby, will not fall within the terms of s. 95. The argument is belied by the plain terms of s. 95. The section applies if the act causes harm or is intended to cause harm or is known to be likely to cause harm, provided the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm."

This is the single most important thing to understand about Section 33. Deliberateness does not take an act outside it. A trivial harm intended is still a trivial harm.

"Harm" is undefined, and it is wide

The appellant also argued that "harm" in the section excluded physical injury. The Court rejected this too, and in doing so produced a survey of the word across the Code that remains useful: S6

"The expression 'harm' has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code: in its dictionary meaning it connotes hurt, injury; damage; impairment, moral wrong or evil. There is no warrant for the contention raised that the expression 'harm' in s. 95 does not include physical injury."

The Court then listed where the word appears. In Sections 81, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 100, 104 and 106 of the IPC "the expression can only mean physical injury"; in Section 93 "it means an injurious mental reaction"; in Section 415 "it means injury to a person in body, mind, reputation or property"; and in Sections 469 and 499 the harm "is to the reputation of the aggrieved party." It concluded that since "harm" bears a wide connotation in the other general exceptions, "there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to use the expression 'harm' in s. 95 in a restricted sense." S6

That reasoning carries directly to the Sanhita, because "harm" is still undefined. A check of all fifty-two definitions in Section 2 confirms that "harm" is not among them, although "injury" is defined in Section 2(14) as "any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property". S1 So the Sanhita defines "injury" by reference to "harm" and leaves "harm" itself to bear its ordinary meaning: exactly the position Veeda Menezes addressed.

Of the IPC provisions the Court listed, those in the general exceptions have verified counterparts in the Sanhita: Section 81 is now Section 19, 87 is 25, 88 is 26, 89 is 27, 91 is 29, 92 is 30 and 93 is Section 31. Section 415 is now Section 318 and Section 499 is Section 356. S1S4 The remaining provisions in the Court's list: Sections 100, 104, 106 and 469: are not given BNS equivalents here, because that mapping was not individually verified for this article and two BNS sections share the title of IPC Section 104.

The Court's observation that "harm" in Section 93 means "an injurious mental reaction" is worth noting by anyone reading about Section 31, the present successor of Section 93. It is the Supreme Court's characterisation of the kind of harm that provision contemplates: made in passing, in a judgment about a different section, but a characterisation nonetheless.

How triviality is judged

The Court's test is multi-factorial and expressly resists arithmetic: S6

"Whether an act which amounts to an offence is trivial would undoubtedly depend upon the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done, and other related circumstances. There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm which may be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of the harm. It cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes."

The illustrations the Court gave are the memorable part, and they cut both ways. Harm that is physically slight may nevertheless be serious: S6

"A soldier assaulting his colonel, a policeman assaulting his Superintendent, or a pupil beating his teacher, commit offences, the heniousness of which cannot be determined merely by the actual injury suffered by the officer or the teacher, for the assault would be wholly subversive of discipline."

Conversely, harm that is physically real may still be slight in context: an assault "by one child on another, or even by a grown-up person on another, which causes injury may still be regarded as so slight, having regard to the way and station of life of the parties, relation between them, situation in which the parties are placed, and other circumstances in which harm is caused, that the victim ordinarily may not complain of the harm." S6

So the standard is objective, the person of ordinary sense and temper, but it is objectivity situated in the circumstances, not a fixed injury threshold.

What the Court actually decided, and a limit on it

The High Court had held the harm to the appellant and to Robert "trivial" and had acquitted. The Supreme Court maintained that acquittal. But the way it did so should be stated precisely, because it limits how far the decision goes on the facts: S6

"Even granting that a different view may be taken of the evidence, we do not think that we would [be] justified in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution in disagreeing with the order of the High Court."

The Court therefore declined to disturb the High Court's assessment rather than independently holding the harm trivial. The propositions of construction set out above are the Supreme Court's own reasoning and are authoritative; the outcome on the facts rests on the limited scope of review under Article 136. That distinction is the author's reading of the judgment's structure, though the quoted sentence is the Court's own.

The limit: Rupan Deol Bajaj

Section 33 has a boundary, and the Supreme Court drew it in Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, decided on 12 October 1995 and reported as AIR 1996 SC 309 and (1995) 6 SCC 194, the judgment being delivered by M.K. Mukherjee, J. S7

Having held that the FIR prima facie disclosed offences under Sections 354 and 509 of the IPC, now Sections 74 and 79 of the Sanhita, the Court turned to whether Section 95 applied. S1S7 It summarised Veeda Menezes, including that the word "harm" there was held "wide enough to include physical injury as also injurious mental reaction", and reproduced the multi-factor test. Then: S7

"Viewed in the light of the above principles we are of the opinion that Section 95 IPC has no manner of application to the allegations made in the F.I.R. On perusal of the FIR we have found that Mr. Gill, the top most official of the State Police, indecently behaved with Mrs. Bajaj, a Senior lady IAS Officer, in the presence of a gentry and inspite of her raising objections continued with his such behaviour. If we are to hold, on the face of such allegations that, the ignominy and trauma to which she was subjected to was so slight that Mrs. Bajaj, as a person of ordinary sense and temper, would not complain about the same, sagacity will be the first casualty."

Three features of the reasoning matter. The Court weighed the positions of the parties (the head of the State police and a senior IAS officer), the public setting, and the persistence of the behaviour despite objection. None of those is a measure of physical injury. That is Veeda Menezes's multi-factor test applied to deny the exception rather than to grant it.

What the Court expressly did not decide

This is where secondary accounts of the case often go wrong, and the judgment is explicit. Counsel had argued the wider proposition that Section 95 can never apply to an offence relating to a woman's modesty. The Court refused to go there: S7

"In that view of the matter we need not delve into the contention of Mrs. JaiSingh, - much less decide

  • that Section 95 IPC cannot have any manner of application to an offence relating to modesty of woman as under no circumstances can it be trivial."

So Rupan Deol Bajaj is not authority for a blanket rule that the trivial-harm exception is unavailable in modesty cases. It decided that the exception had no application to the allegations in that FIR, and expressly left the categorical question open. Anyone citing the case for the broader proposition is citing it for something the Court declined to decide.

The section in current use

Two decisions of the Kerala High Court from 2024 show the provision working in practice, and both are decisions on Section 95 of the IPC rather than on Section 33 of the Sanhita, because the offences pre-dated 1 July 2024.

In Simil v. State of Kerala, decided on 20 November 2024, the allegation that survived was one of "push and pull" with police officers, with no assault or injury. The Court applied the principle and quashed the proceedings: S8

"The intention behind section 95 IPC is to avoid penalising negligible wrongs or trivial offences. If prosecution is initiated for every triviality, we will have time only for those. Section 95 comes to the aid in such instances."

It held that "having regard to the nature of allegations and in the absence of any assault or injury on the police officers and since the duty of the police officers was not deterred, section 95 IPC can be applied to quash the offence under section 353 IPC": now Section 132 of the Sanhita. S1S8 The Court relied on Veeda Menezes and on two Kerala decisions, Narayanan v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 1265) and Prakash Karat v. State of Kerala (2022 (6) KHC 531); neither of those was retrieved or read for this article, and they appear here only as decisions Simil cites.

One transcription point, recorded rather than passed over: the rendering of Section 95 within the Simil judgment reads "known to cause" where the statute reads "known to be likely to cause". S8 The statutory words are as set out at the top of this article.

In Alex George v. State of Kerala, decided on 19 July 2024, the Court quoted the Veeda Menezes passage on "harm" at length, applied Section 95, and allowed the criminal miscellaneous case, quashing the proceedings. S9

Taken together, the pattern these decisions show is that the exception does practical work at the quashing stage, in cases where the surviving allegation is minor and no real injury is asserted. That observation is the author's reading of four decisions and is not a statement about how courts generally behave.

IPC Section 95 compared with BNS Section 33

The texts were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, the em-dash after the marginal note, the section number and the marginal-note title, then reduced to word lists and compared with a standard unified-diff algorithm. Both sides produce 47 tokens and the diff returns zero differences. S1S4

A methodological note, because the first run did not say that. The raw IPC text carried the following part-heading "Of the Right of Private Defence" immediately after Section 95, and the first diff reported six spurious removals, -of -the -right -of -private -defence, which were not differences in the section at all but the heading of the next group of provisions. Splitting the source on that heading before comparing produced the clean result. The same class of artefact was encountered when comparing IPC Section 510 for an earlier article, and it is recorded here so that a reader repeating the check is not misled by it.

FeatureIPC s. 95BNS s. 33
Marginal-note titleAct causing slight harmAct causing slight harm.
Operative wordsIdentical (47 tokens)Identical (47 tokens)
Mental states coveredcauses / intended / known likelyIdentical
Standardperson of ordinary sense and temperIdentical
Proviso, Explanation, IllustrationNoneNone
"harm" defined?NoNo (s. 2 defines "injury", not "harm")

The classification is renumbered: the rule moved from Section 95 to Section 33 and nothing else happened to it. No section-specific legislative rationale was located, and none is asserted. Because the words are unchanged, Veeda Menezes and Rupan Deol Bajaj construe the same language that now appears in Section 33: but they are decisions on Section 95 of the IPC and must not be described as decisions on Section 33 of the BNS.

Case law under the BNS: none located

No judgment construing Section 33 of the BNS was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page (17,079 bytes) containing the string "No matching results", with zero result entries. The page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search helper's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S10

By contrast the statutory wording of the predecessor returns a substantial body of authority: the exact phrase "no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm" returned 129 documents. S10 Searching the statutory language rather than the section number is what surfaces it.

Who must prove what

Section 33 is a General Exception, so the burden of bringing the case within it lies on the accused under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the successor to Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which also directs that "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances." S5

In practice, however, the question is frequently decided before trial. All four of the decisions discussed above dealt with the exception on the material then available: two on appeal against acquittal or on the construction of the section, two at the quashing stage on the contents of an FIR or complaint. This is a point of contrast with the duress exception in Section 32, where a High Court has held that whether the threshold was met "is to be considered only after taking evidence of the parties during trial". The difference appears to be that triviality can often be assessed from the allegations themselves, whereas compulsion cannot. That comparison is the author's analysis; no authority drawing it was located, and nothing here guarantees that any particular case will or will not be decided before trial.

The standard of proof an accused must meet is conventionally said to be lower than the prosecution's, but that proposition does not appear in the text of Section 108 and no judgment on it was examined for this article.

Common misconceptions

"It only applies to accidents." No. Veeda Menezes holds the opposite in terms: the argument that intended or foreseen harm falls outside the section "is belied by the plain terms of s. 95." S6 The section expressly covers harm that is caused, intended, or known to be likely.

"Trivial means no injury." No. Triviality "cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes", and depends on the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the act was done, and other related circumstances. S6 A slap that leaves no mark may be serious; an injury may be slight in its context.

"A small injury means the case must be dropped." No. The examples in Veeda Menezes make the point a soldier assaulting his colonel or a pupil beating his teacher commits an offence whose "heniousness cannot be determined merely by the actual injury", because the assault "would be wholly subversive of discipline." S6

"The Supreme Court has held that the exception can never apply to offences against a woman's modesty." It has not. In Rupan Deol Bajaj the Court held that Section 95 had "no manner of application to the allegations made in the F.I.R.", and then said expressly that it "need not delve into … much less decide" the contention that the section can never apply to such an offence. S7 The categorical question was left open.

"'Harm' means bodily harm." No. Veeda Menezes rejected a restricted reading, holding that "harm" in the section includes physical injury, and Rupan Deol Bajaj summarised that holding as making the word "wide enough to include physical injury as also injurious mental reaction." S6S7 "Harm" remains undefined in the Sanhita; Section 2(14) defines "injury", not "harm". S1

"The BNS changed this provision." It did not. A word-level diff of IPC Section 95 against BNS Section 33 returns zero differences across 47 tokens on each side. S1S4

Reading the section in practice

  1. Identify the harm complained of. The section operates on harm, not on the actor's culpability.
  2. Do not stop at the medical report. The measure of injury is one factor among several and is not decisive either way.
  3. Weigh the relational and situational factors. The position of the parties, the relationship between them, the setting, the persistence of the conduct, and the knowledge or intention with which it was done all bear on triviality, as Rupan Deol Bajaj shows, they can defeat the exception as readily as establish it.
  4. Apply the objective test in context. Would a person of ordinary sense and temper, placed in these circumstances, complain of this harm?
  5. Remember that intention does not exclude the section, but it is one of the circumstances to be weighed.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff, and the spurious part-heading artefact in the first run is disclosed above so that the check can be repeated reliably.

Four judgments were read in full. Veeda Menezes is a three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court and its propositions of construction are authoritative; but its affirmance on the facts rested on the limited scope of review under Article 136, as the quoted sentence shows. Rupan Deol Bajaj is a Supreme Court decision whose holding on this section is confined to the allegations in that FIR, the categorical question having been expressly left undecided. Simil and Alex George are single-judge decisions of the Kerala High Court, persuasive only, and both are decisions at the quashing stage rather than after trial. All four were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched beyond the citation counts the repository records (Veeda Menezes 32, Rupan Deol Bajaj 877, the two 2024 decisions none).

Narayanan v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 1265), Prakash Karat v. State of Kerala (2022 (6) KHC 531) and James Jose v. State of Kerala (2019 (3) KHC 531) were not retrieved or read, and appear only as decisions cited within the judgments discussed.

Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: that Section 33 is the only exception in Chapter III turning purely on the magnitude of the harm, with no requirement as to the actor's state of mind or the victim's consent; the reading of Veeda Menezes's structure as separating authoritative construction from an Article 136 affirmance; the observation about the pattern across the four decisions; and the comparison with Section 32 on when the question is decided. The BNS counterparts of IPC Sections 100, 104, 106 and 469 are deliberately not stated, that mapping not having been verified for this article.

Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above: in particular, nothing here should be read as a statement about when proceedings can be quashed, which is a question under that Sanhita and not under Section 33. Sections 2(14), 19, 25 to 32, 34, 74, 79, 132, 318 and 356 of the Sanhita are referred to for context; their ingredients were not analysed beyond the words quoted.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether Section 33 applies to a particular harm depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What is BNS Section 33 about?
It is the trivial-harm exception, the Sanhita's expression of the maxim de minimis non curat lex - the law does not concern itself with trifles. Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is 'so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm'. S1 It is a single sentence with no proviso, Explanation or illustration.
+Does Section 33 only cover accidental harm?
No, and this is the most common error about the provision. The section expressly covers harm that is caused, that is intended to be caused, or that is known to be likely to be caused. In Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan the Supreme Court rejected the contrary argument in terms: 'It cannot however be said that harm caused by doing an act with intent to cause harm or with the knowledge that harm may be caused thereby, will not fall within the terms of s. 95. The argument is belied by the plain terms of s. 95.' S1S6 A trivial harm intended is still a trivial harm.
+How does a court decide whether harm is 'slight'?
By a multi-factor assessment that deliberately resists arithmetic. In Veeda Menezes the Supreme Court held that triviality 'would undoubtedly depend upon the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done, and other related circumstances', that 'There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm', and that it 'cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes'. S6 The standard is objective - the person of ordinary sense and temper - but objectivity situated in the circumstances, not a fixed injury threshold.
+Can a physically minor act still be an offence?
Yes. The Supreme Court's own examples make the point: 'A soldier assaulting his colonel, a policeman assaulting his Superintendent, or a pupil beating his teacher, commit offences, the heniousness of which cannot be determined merely by the actual injury suffered by the officer or the teacher, for the assault would be wholly subversive of discipline.' S6 Conversely the Court said an assault causing injury may still be slight 'having regard to the way and station of life of the parties, relation between them, situation in which the parties are placed'.
+What does 'harm' mean in this section?
It is undefined and wide. In Veeda Menezes the Supreme Court held that 'The expression "harm" has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code: in its dictionary meaning it connotes hurt, injury; damage; impairment, moral wrong or evil', and that there was 'no warrant' for the contention that it excludes physical injury. S6 Rupan Deol Bajaj later summarised that holding as making the word 'wide enough to include physical injury as also injurious mental reaction'. S7 The word remains undefined in the Sanhita: a check of all fifty-two definitions in Section 2 confirms 'harm' is not among them, while Section 2(14) defines 'injury' as 'any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property'. S1
+Has the Supreme Court held that this exception can never apply to offences against a woman's modesty?
No, and this is where the leading case is most often misreported. In Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (12 October 1995) the Court held that 'Section 95 IPC has no manner of application to the allegations made in the F.I.R.' - allegations that the top-most official of the State police indecently behaved with a senior lady IAS officer in company and persisted despite her objections. S7 But it then said expressly that it 'need not delve into the contention of Mrs. JaiSingh, - much less decide - that Section 95 IPC cannot have any manner of application to an offence relating to modesty of woman as under no circumstances can it be trivial.' The categorical question was left open.
+What made the harm non-trivial in Rupan Deol Bajaj?
None of the factors the Court weighed was a measure of physical injury. It weighed the positions of the parties - the head of the State police force and a senior IAS officer - the public setting, and the persistence of the behaviour despite objection, concluding that if it were to hold the 'ignominy and trauma' so slight that she would not complain, 'sagacity will be the first casualty'. S7 That is the Veeda Menezes multi-factor test applied to deny the exception rather than to grant it. The offences prima facie disclosed were under IPC Sections 354 and 509, now Sections 74 and 79 of the Sanhita. S1
+Is the provision still being used?
Yes. In Simil v. State of Kerala (20 November 2024) the surviving allegation was 'push and pull' with police officers with no assault or injury, and the Kerala High Court held that 'section 95 IPC can be applied to quash the offence under section 353 IPC' - now Section 132 of the Sanhita - observing that 'The intention behind section 95 IPC is to avoid penalising negligible wrongs or trivial offences. If prosecution is initiated for every triviality, we will have time only for those.' S1S8 In Alex George v. State of Kerala (19 July 2024) the same Court quoted Veeda Menezes at length, applied the section and quashed the proceedings. S9 Both are decisions on Section 95 of the IPC, because the conduct pre-dated 1 July 2024.
+How is Section 33 different from the other General Exceptions?
Every other exception in Chapter III asks something about the actor - his age, his state of mind, his good faith, whether consent was given, whether he was compelled. Section 33 asks only about the harm. A scan of the chapter confirms that 'good faith' appears in twelve sections (14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36 and 37) and Section 33 is not among them, and that it is not one of the consent provisions in Sections 25 to 30. S1 It is the only exception turning purely on the magnitude of the harm. That characterisation is the author's analysis; no authority stating it was located.
+Who has to prove that the harm was trivial?
The accused. Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, successor to Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, places the burden of bringing a case within a General Exception on the accused and directs that 'the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances'. S5 What is unusual here is that the matter to be established is not a fact about the accused but an evaluative judgment about the harm. The standard of proof is conventionally said to be lower than the prosecution's, but that does not appear in the text of Section 108 and no judgment on it was examined for this article.
+Can this exception be raised before trial, or only at trial?
All four decisions discussed in this article dealt with it on the material then available - two on appeal or on the construction of the section, and two at the quashing stage on the contents of an FIR or complaint. S6S7S8S9 That contrasts with the duress exception in Section 32, where a High Court has held that the question 'is to be considered only after taking evidence of the parties during trial'. The suggested explanation - that triviality can often be assessed from the allegations themselves whereas compulsion cannot - is the author's analysis, no authority drawing the comparison having been located. Nothing here guarantees how any particular case will be dealt with, and when proceedings may be quashed is a question under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, which was not examined.
+How did the BNS change IPC Section 95?
Not at all. The texts were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, the em-dash after the marginal note, the section number and the marginal-note title. Both sides produce 47 tokens and the diff returns zero differences. S1S4 One caution is worth recording for anyone repeating the check: the first run reported six spurious removals which turned out to be the part-heading 'Of the Right of Private Defence' appearing immediately after Section 95 in the source text, not differences in the section itself.
+Are there any judgments on BNS Section 33 itself?
None was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase 'section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned a page containing 'No matching results' with zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S10 By contrast the exact statutory phrase 'no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm' returned 129 documents. Because the wording is unchanged, Veeda Menezes and Rupan Deol Bajaj construe the same language that now appears in Section 33 - but they are decisions on Section 95 of the IPC and must not be described as decisions on Section 33 of the BNS.
+Does Section 33 mean minor assaults are legal?
No. The section does not make conduct lawful in the abstract; it provides that a particular act is not an offence 'by reason that' it caused harm of a kind so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain. S1 Whether that threshold is met is a question of fact in each case, assessed on all the circumstances including the relationship and positions of the parties, and the burden lies on the accused. S5S6 Nothing in this article should be read as a prediction about any case, and no outcome is guaranteed.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 33 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S6Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 31 March 1966; equivalent citations AIR 1966 SC 1773, 1966 SCR 123; three-Judge Bench (Shah, J.C.; Wanchoo, K.N.; Sikri, S.M.), judgment delivered by J.C. Shah, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S7Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 12 October 1995; equivalent citations AIR 1996 SC 309, (1995) 6 SCC 194; judgment delivered by M.K. Mukherjee, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S8Simil v. State of Kerala — Kerala High Court, Crl.M.C No. 7951 of 2024, decided 20 November 2024; neutral citation 2024:KER:86736 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  9. S9Alex George v. The State of Kerala — Kerala High Court, Crl.M.C. No. 7694 of 2016, decided 19 July 2024 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  10. S10Indian Kanoon (judgment-text repository) — search result pages for the exact phrases "section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" and "no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm" (accessed 3 October 2026)

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