What the section says
Section 32 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Act to which a person is compelled by threats. and reads: S1S2
32. Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence:
Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1.—A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
Explanation 2.—A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.
This is the Sanhita's provision on duress: the defence of a person who committed a crime because someone threatened to kill him on the spot if he refused. It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions", and has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3
The structure has four parts that must be kept separate: a carve-out at the front excluding two categories of offence; a main limb setting the conditions; a proviso denying the defence to a person who brought the constraint on himself; and two Explanations that work as a matched pair, Explanation 1 refusing the defence and Explanation 2 granting it.
The threshold: instant death, and nothing less
Everything in Section 32 turns on the level of the threat. The main limb requires threats which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence. S1 Four things are packed into that phrase.
It must be death. Not hurt, not grievous hurt, not injury to property, not ruin, not disgrace. The proviso confirms this by contemplating "harm to himself short of instant death" as a distinct and lesser thing. S1
It must be instant. A threat to kill next week is not within the words. The apprehension must be of death following immediately on refusal.
It must exist at the time of the act. The words "at the time of doing it" fix the moment at which the apprehension must be operating.
It must be apprehension of death to that person. The threat must be directed at the person doing the act. The section says "instant death to that person", and "that person" refers back to "a person who is compelled to do it". S1
That last point has a consequence worth stating plainly, and it is offered as a reading of the statutory language rather than as a proposition supported by authority, none having been located. On the words, a threat to kill someone else (the actor's child, spouse or parent) does not engage Section 32. A person who commits a crime because a gun is held to his daughter's head is outside the literal terms of the section, however sympathetic his position. Nothing in the text extends it to threats against third parties, and nothing in the two Explanations does either.
The narrowness is not accidental drafting. The Sanhita shows elsewhere that its drafters knew how to include lesser threats when they wanted to. Section 309, defining robbery, speaks of "fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint", and Section 43(c) uses the same three-level formula for the continuance of private defence against robbery. S1 Section 32 takes only the top level. A programmatic scan confirms that "instant death" appears in just three sections of the whole Sanhita: 32, 43 and 309: and that only Section 32 confines itself to death. The phrase "compelled to do it by threats" is unique to Section 32. S1
The carve-out: which offences can never be excused
Section 32 opens by removing two categories from its protection: murder, and offences against the State punishable with death. S1 Both are narrower than they first appear, and both were checked against the Sanhita rather than assumed.
Murder is defined by Section 101 and punished by Section 103(1), which prescribes "death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine". S1
Offences against the State are the subject of Chapter VII of the Sanhita, headed "Of Offences Against the State", which runs from Section 147 to Section 158: Chapter VIII, on offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force, begins at Section 159. A check of every section in Chapter VII shows that only Section 147 (waging, attempting to wage, or abetting the waging of war against the Government of India) is punishable with death. S1 The remaining eleven sections of the chapter are not.
So the carve-out, in practical terms, excludes murder and waging war against the Government of India. The position under the Indian Penal Code was structurally identical: murder under Sections 300 and 302, and, within Chapter VI on offences against the State, Section 121 alone carried death. S4
One genuine uncertainty should be recorded rather than glossed over. Section 160 of the Sanhita, abetment of mutiny where mutiny is committed in consequence, is also punishable with death, but it sits in Chapter VIII, not in the chapter headed "Of Offences Against the State". S1 Whether the phrase "offences against the State punishable with death" in Section 32 is confined to the Chapter VII heading or extends in substance to an offence like Section 160 is not resolvable from the text alone, and no authority on the question was located. A reader facing the point should treat it as open.
How the carve-out actually operates
The carve-out is easy to misread as meaning "duress is no defence if someone ends up dead". It does not mean that, and the most substantial decision located on the point holds the opposite.
In Bachchan Lal v. The State, a criminal appeal heard with a connected reference and decided by the Allahabad High Court on 19 October 1956 and reported as AIR 1957 All 184, the accused had woken the victim Nainsukh at another man's asking and gone with him to a grove. When he protested at the treatment Nainsukh was receiving, he was threatened that he would be put to death if he did not hold Nainsukh's feet. He held the legs, and another man cut Nainsukh's neck with a gandasa and killed him. S6
The Court's reasoning on the carve-out is the part that matters: S6
"He had reasonable cause to apprehend that instant death to him would result if he would not hold the legs of Nainsukh. To hold the legs under such circumstances is not an offence when such holding did not amount to the commission of the offence of murder or any offence against the State punishable with death. Only such offences, even if committed under the apprehension of instant death, are not excused on the ground of committing them under such threat."
The carve-out therefore attaches to the offence the accused himself committed, not to the outcome of the episode as a whole. The accused's own act was holding the legs: at most abetment of murder, since the Court found no common intention and no shared object. Abetment of murder is not murder, so the carve-out did not bite, and Section 94 protected him.
The Court rejected the State's contrary argument expressly: S6
"It has been contended for the State that when the accused held the legs of Nainsukh during the commission of his murder by others, he too should be deemed to have intended to cause the death of Nainsukh and that therefore he would be guilty of the offence of murder. We, do not agree."
It added that his act "was not a voluntary act. It was committed under duress. His primary intention at the time was simply to save his life", and that this was "a case where intention of the accused cannot be presumed from the natural consequences of his conduct". In support it referred to the English decision R. v. Steane [1947] 1 All ER 813, where a man who assisted the enemy under duress was held not to have done so with the intention of assisting. S6 Steane is an English authority relied on by the Allahabad High Court; it is reported here as that Court used it, and its standing in Indian law was not independently researched.
The Court also held that duress answered the group-liability charges: the accused "could not be said to be a member of the unlawful assembly because he had no common object with them to commit an offence. Even if he was a member of the unlawful assembly, it was under duress and Section 94, I. P. C. will protect him." S6 The convictions under Sections 147 and 302 read with 149 of the IPC were held bad, the appeal was allowed, the order of the court below was set aside and the accused was acquitted and released. The corresponding provisions today are Sections 191 (rioting), 190 (common object) and 101 with 103 (murder) of the Sanhita. S1S6
Bachchan Lal also referred to Umadasi Dasi v. Emperor, ILR 52 Cal 112 : AIR 1924 Cal 1031, as having taken a similar view. That earlier decision was not retrieved or read for this article, and is mentioned only as a case which Bachchan Lal cites. S6
The other side of the carve-out
The contrast with a recent decision shows the carve-out doing its intended work. In Shri Vasant alias Vasheppa v. The State of Karnataka, a bail petition decided by the Karnataka High Court on 13 April 2023, the petitioner argued that his assaulting the deceased was covered by Sections 94 and 104 of the IPC. The Court set out both provisions and held at paragraph 10: S8
"These two provisions does not include, but exclude the offence of murder i.e. death. Therefore these two provisions will not help the petitioner seeking bail under those provisions."
Bail was refused, partly because the sole eyewitness would be at risk, with liberty to apply again after that witness was examined. S8
Read together, the two decisions are consistent, and the distinction between them is the one the statutory words draw. Where the offence the accused is charged with committing is murder, the carve-out applies and Section 32 cannot assist. Where the accused's own act amounts to something less (abetment, rioting, membership of an unlawful assembly, destruction of evidence) the carve-out does not apply merely because a death occurred in the course of the episode. That reconciliation is the author's analysis; no judgment setting the two decisions side by side was located.
The proviso: duress you walked into
The proviso denies the defence to a person who "did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint." S1 Read without the double negative, it means: the defence is lost if you put yourself in the situation voluntarily, or did so to avoid some lesser harm.
Both limbs matter. The first covers the person who freely joined the dangerous enterprise. The second is subtler: a person who placed himself under the constraint to escape harm short of instant death (a beating, a financial loss) also loses the defence. Only someone who was already facing instant death when he entered the situation escapes the proviso.
The two Explanations: a matched pair
The Explanations are best read together, because they are the same facts with the entry route changed.
Explanation 1 denies the defence to a person who "of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character". He cannot later say his associates compelled him. S1 This is the proviso worked out on concrete facts: joining of one's own accord engages the proviso's first limb, and joining because of a threatened beating engages the second, a beating being harm short of instant death. The words "knowing their character" matter: the denial rests on his having joined with knowledge of what the gang was.
Explanation 2 grants the defence to a person "seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death", and gives the example of "a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it". S1 He did not choose to be there, he was seized, and the threat was of instant death, not a beating.
The pair therefore isolates the single variable the section cares about: how the person came to be under the constraint, and at what level of threat. The smith and the gang member may do identical physical acts. One is excused and the other is not.
It is worth noticing that the smith's offence is house-breaking and facilitating plunder, not murder. Explanation 2 does not and could not grant the defence if the dacoits had compelled the smith to kill, because the carve-out would then apply.
Duress must last as long as the offence
A threat that has passed cannot excuse what is done afterwards. That point was decided by the Allahabad High Court in Mirza Zahid Beg v. Emperor, reported as AIR 1938 All 91 and decided on 8 October 1937. Two men, Dwarka and Man Khan, said they had removed a body under threat of being shot, so as to prevent a proper post-mortem examination. The question was whether their statements amounted to confessions, which turned on whether the facts they alleged disclosed an offence under Section 201 of the IPC or were covered by Section 94. The Court held: S7
"If we are to accept their statements as a whole, they began to commit the offence under threat of being shot and at that stage it may be said that they could claim the protection of the provisions of Section 94, Penal Code, but they both admit that the Sub-Inspector left them after they had gone a short distance, and if at that stage they had left the body or had taken it to some place where it could be recovered immediately, no harm would have been done. They certainly completed the offence when all danger of instant death had been removed."
Their statements were accordingly held to amount to confessions. S7 The reasoning gives practical content to the words "at the time of doing it": where an offence is committed over a period, the apprehension of instant death must subsist for as long as the conduct constituting the offence continues. A person released from the threat who carries on is acting on his own. The modern counterpart of Section 201 IPC is Section 238 of the Sanhita. S1
Bachchan Lal contains a glimpse of the same problem from the other direction. On the charge of removing the dead body, the Court declined to convict even assuming the accused was no longer under apprehension of instant death, but did so on fair-trial grounds. He had not been charged with that offence, had not been questioned about it, and "[i]n all probability if he had been questioned he might have answered that he removed the dead body on account of the fear of instant death at the hands of the murderers." S6 That is a decision about procedural fairness, not about the scope of Section 94.
Duress is decided at trial, not before it
A modern decision makes a practical point that matters to anyone advising on this section. In Vinod Malewar v. The Enforcement Directorate, Raipur, a criminal revision decided by the Chhattisgarh High Court on 17 June 2022, the applicants said they had held tainted money under threat or compulsion. The Court set out Section 94 of the IPC in full and held: S9
"In the present case, in view of Section 94 of IPC, the defence of the applicants that they kept the tainted money of Alok Kumar Agrawal under threat or compulsion, whether there was any threat of instant death, is to be considered only after taking evidence of the parties during trial."
The revision petitions were dismissed as "without any substance". S9
Two things are useful here. First, the provision was invoked in a financial-offence context, far from dacoits and gandasas. The section is not confined to violent-crime facts. Second, and more importantly, whether a threat of instant death existed is a question of fact requiring evidence. It is not a matter on which proceedings will ordinarily be quashed or an accused discharged at a preliminary stage. An accused who intends to rely on Section 32 should expect to establish it at trial.
Who must prove what
Section 32 is a General Exception, so the burden of bringing the case within it lies on the accused. That follows from Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the successor to Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which also directs that "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances." S5
In practice the accused must establish that he was compelled by threats; that the threats reasonably caused an apprehension of instant death; that the apprehension existed at the time of the act and, on Mirza Zahid Beg, throughout it; that the threatened death was to himself; and that he did not place himself in the situation of his own accord or to escape some lesser harm. S1S5S7 The last element, the proviso, is where the prosecution will usually concentrate, since prior association with the threateners is often the easiest thing to prove.
The standard of proof an accused must meet in discharging that burden is conventionally said to be lower than the prosecution's, but that proposition does not appear in the text of Section 108 and no judgment on it was examined for this article. It is flagged rather than asserted.
IPC Section 94 compared with BNS Section 32
The texts were compared programmatically, after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes and the double-hyphens used in the Sanhita's typesetting, apostrophes, the section number and the marginal-note title, then reduced to word lists and compared with a standard unified-diff algorithm. IPC Section 94 yields 203 tokens and BNS Section 32 yields 204. The diff returns exactly one difference: the word "that", added after "Provided". S1S4
"Provided the person doing the act did not…" has become "Provided that the person doing the act did not…". That is a grammatical tidy-up and nothing more.
| Feature | IPC s. 94 | BNS s. 32 |
|---|---|---|
| Carve-out | Murder; offences against the State punishable with death | Identical |
| Threshold | Apprehension of instant death to that person | Identical |
| Timing words | "at the time of doing it" | Identical |
| Proviso | "Provided the person doing the act…" | "Provided that the person doing the act…" |
| Explanation 1 (gang of dacoits) | Present | Identical |
| Explanation 2 (the smith) | Present | Identical |
| Offences within the carve-out | Murder (ss. 300, 302); waging war (s. 121) | Murder (ss. 101, 103); waging war (s. 147) |
The correct classification is substantively unchanged, with the single added conjunction the only textual event. No section-specific legislative rationale for Section 32 was located, and none is asserted.
Because the operative words are identical, reasoning developed on Section 94 construes the same language that now appears in Section 32. Bachchan Lal, Mirza Zahid Beg, Vinod Malewar and Vasant are all decisions on Section 94 of the IPC. They are not decisions on Section 32 of the BNS and must not be described as such, but what they construe is wording the Sanhita reproduces.
Case law under the BNS: none located
No judgment construing Section 32 of the BNS was located, and that was tested rather than inferred. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 32 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a response reading "No matching results", with zero result entries on the page. The distinction between a genuine nil return and a failed request was checked explicitly, because a failed search must never be reported as an empty field. S10
By contrast, searches for the statutory wording of the predecessor provision did return authority: the phrase "apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence" returned ten documents, of which four are statute pages and the remainder judgments; "place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint" returned nine; and the Explanation 2 phrase "a smith compelled to take his tools" returned four. S6S7S8S9 Searching the statutory language rather than the section number is what surfaces real authority.
Common misconceptions
"Duress is no defence if someone died." Wrong as stated. The carve-out excludes murder as the offence the accused himself committed. Bachchan Lal applied Section 94 to a man who physically held the victim's legs while others killed him, because his own act was not murder. S6 What the carve-out does exclude is reliance on duress by a person charged with murder, as Vasant confirms. S8
"A serious threat is enough." It is not. The threat must be of death, and of instant death. The proviso's reference to "harm to himself short of instant death" shows that lesser threats are a different category, and Sections 309 and 43 show that the Sanhita includes "instant hurt" and "instant wrongful restraint" where it means to. Section 32 does not. S1
"A threat against my family counts." On the words, no. Section 32 requires apprehension of instant death "to that person": the person doing the act. Nothing in the section or either Explanation extends to threats against others. This is a reading of the statutory language; no authority on the point was located, and a reader facing such facts should not assume the section is available.
"If I was threatened, the case will be quashed." Unlikely. Vinod Malewar holds that whether there was a threat of instant death "is to be considered only after taking evidence of the parties during trial". S9 Duress is a trial issue, and the burden is on the accused under Section 108 BSA. S5
"Once threatened, everything that follows is excused." No. Mirza Zahid Beg holds that where the offence was completed after "all danger of instant death had been removed", the protection is not available for the completed offence. S7 The apprehension must subsist while the conduct continues.
"Joining the gang under pressure preserves the defence." Explanation 1 says the opposite where the pressure was a threat of being beaten: a person who joins a gang of dacoits "by reason of a threat of being beaten", knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of the exception. S1 Only a threat of instant death at the point of entry escapes the proviso.
"The BNS tightened or liberalised duress." It did neither. The only textual change from IPC Section 94 is the insertion of "that" after "Provided". S1S4
Reading the section in practice
The questions the words pose, in order:
- What offence is the accused himself charged with committing? If it is murder, or waging war against the Government of India, Section 32 is unavailable whatever the threat.
- Was there compulsion by threats, and of what? Only an apprehension of instant death will do.
- To whom was the threatened death? On the words, to the person doing the act.
- When did the apprehension exist? At the time of the act, and, on Mirza Zahid Beg, for as long as the offence continued.
- How did he come to be under the constraint? If of his own accord, or to avoid harm short of instant death, the proviso defeats him; Explanation 1 is the worked example.
- Can it be proved? The burden is on the accused, and the court is directed to presume the absence of the circumstances.
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff and the method is set out so that it can be repeated. The chapter boundaries of Chapter VII and the identification of Section 147 as the only death-carrying offence in it were verified against the Gazette text rather than inferred from section titles.
Four judgments were read in full and are discussed with their limits stated. Bachchan Lal (Allahabad High Court, 1956) is the most substantial, but it is a High Court decision of 1956, persuasive rather than binding outside Uttar Pradesh, and the reconciliation of it with Vasant offered above is the author's analysis. Mirza Zahid Beg (1937) is a pre-Constitution decision of the same Court, and its holding on the continuance of duress arose in deciding whether statements were confessions rather than on a plea of duress at trial. Vinod Malewar (Chhattisgarh High Court, 2022) decided only that the question must await evidence; it did not decide whether duress was available on those facts. Vasant (Karnataka High Court, 2023) is an order refusing bail, not a decision after trial. All four were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched beyond noting the citation counts the repository records.
R. v. Steane [1947] 1 All ER 813 is reported only as Bachchan Lal used it; the English report was not read, and the standing of that decision in Indian law was not researched. Umadasi Dasi v. Emperor, ILR 52 Cal 112 : AIR 1924 Cal 1031, was not retrieved or read, and appears here only as a case Bachchan Lal cites as taking a similar view.
Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: that Section 32 does not on its words extend to threats against third parties; that the drafting of Sections 309 and 43 shows the narrowness of Section 32's threshold to be deliberate; the reconciliation of Bachchan Lal with Vasant; and the reading of the two Explanations as a matched pair isolating the entry route. Whether the phrase "offences against the State punishable with death" extends to Section 160, which carries death but sits outside Chapter VII, is identified as unresolved.
Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above. Sections 101, 103, 147, 160, 189, 190, 191, 238, 309 and 43 of the Sanhita are referred to for context; their ingredients were not analysed beyond the words quoted. Whether and how Section 32 interacts with pleas of private defence, or with liability under Section 3(5) or Section 190, was not examined beyond what Bachchan Lal decided.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether Section 32 protects a particular act depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.