What the section says
Section 29 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2
29. The exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.
Illustration.
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence "by reason of such harm"; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
The official marginal-note title is "Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1
Why the section exists: the four words it is built on
Section 29 looks like an afterthought. It is in fact a clarification of something already built into the drafting of the three exceptions it names, and the clue is in the quotation marks in its illustration.
Read the operative words of each of the three: S1
- s. 25: "Nothing … is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause … to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent …"
- s. 26: "Nothing … is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause … to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent …"
- s. 27: "Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or person of unsound mind … is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause …"
Each exception is expressed to negate liability by reason of harm, and nothing else. None of them says "nothing is an offence"; each says nothing is an offence by reason of the harm. So an offence whose definition does not depend on harm to the consenting person was never within their scope in the first place.
The illustration confirms this reading, and does so with deliberate punctuation: causing miscarriage "is not an offence 'by reason of such harm'": the phrase placed in quotation marks because it is being lifted out of the exceptions themselves. S1
Section 29 therefore does not create a new restriction. It makes explicit a limit that the words "by reason of … harm" already impose, and it does so because the point is easy to miss. (That reading of the section's function is editorial analysis, drawn from comparing the four provisions; no authority stating it was located.)
The test: is the offence defined by the harm, or independently of it?
The question s. 29 poses is structural rather than factual. One does not ask how serious the harm was, or whether the consent was genuine. One asks: does the offence charged depend, as a matter of its definition, on harm to the person who consented?
| Offence defined by the harm | Offence defined independently of the harm | |
|---|---|---|
| Example of what is protected by consent | Hurt caused to a consenting adult in a sparring bout | — |
| Example of what is not | — | Affray; causing miscarriage otherwise than to save the woman's life |
| Whose interest the offence protects | the person harmed | the public, the State, or a third interest |
| Does consent of the person harmed answer it? | Potentially, via ss. 25–27 | No |
Two concrete illustrations follow: one from the section itself, one from elsewhere in the Sanhita.
The section's own example: causing miscarriage
Section 88 of the Sanhita provides: S1
"Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
Explanation. — A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section.
Two features explain why s. 29's illustration uses it.
The offence carries its own good-faith exception. The words "if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman" are part of the offence definition itself. Section 26 therefore adds nothing: the only good-faith route is the one inside s. 88. S1
Consent is expressly irrelevant. The illustration states that "the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act". S1 The reference to the guardian is pointed: it closes the s. 27 route as well as the s. 25 and s. 26 routes.
(Separate legislation governs the medical termination of pregnancy. That legislation was not examined for this article, and nothing here states when a termination is lawful. The discussion is confined to why s. 29's illustration works as an illustration.)
A second example: affray
Section 194 provides that "when two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace, they are said to commit an affray", punishable with imprisonment up to one month, or a fine up to one thousand rupees, or both. S1
An affray is an offence against public peace. Its definition does not refer to harm to either fighter; two people can commit it without injuring each other at all. So however freely they consented, their consent is irrelevant to that charge, while s. 25 may still answer a charge founded on the hurt one caused the other.
(No judgment applying ss. 29 and 194 in combination was located; the example is drawn from the two texts read together.)
The words "or on whose behalf the consent is given"
These words are included for s. 27, which is the only one of the three exceptions that operates through consent given by somebody else. S1
Without them, there would be an argument that s. 29 bites only where the person harmed consented personally, leaving guardian-consent cases untouched. The illustration removes any doubt by naming the guardian expressly.
Section 30 is not on the list
Section 29 names ss. 25, 26 and 27. It does not name s. 30, the exception for acts done in good faith for a person's benefit without consent. S1
The omission appears deliberate rather than accidental, for two reasons. First, s. 29 is addressed to consent: it speaks of "the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given", words that have no application to a provision which operates precisely where no consent exists. Second, s. 30 carries its own four provisos, which restrict it more tightly than s. 27's restrict s. 27.
That second point repays a moment. The three benefit-based exceptions form a descending ladder, and the restrictions tighten as the person's own participation recedes: S1
| Doer's state of mind as to the harm | s. 26 (own consent) | s. 27 (guardian's consent) | s. 30 (no consent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intends death | Excluded | Excluded: (a) | Excluded: (a) |
| Knows death likely | Permitted, any benefit | Only to prevent death or grievous hurt, or cure a grievous disease or infirmity: (b) | Same three purposes: (b) |
| Voluntarily causes grievous hurt | Permitted | Only those three purposes: (c) | Caught by the hurt rule below |
| Voluntarily causes ordinary hurt | Permitted | Permitted | Only "for the purpose of preventing death or hurt": (c) |
| Abets an offence not covered | — | Excluded: (d) | Excluded: (d) |
The sharpest contrast is the bottom two rows. Section 27's proviso (c) restricts only grievous hurt, and allows three purposes. Section 30's proviso (c) restricts any hurt, and allows only two: preventing death or hurt, with no curative limb. So a person acting without consent may do less than a guardian may authorise, which in turn is less than an adult may consent to for himself.
(The ladder is the author's comparison of the three provisions' texts and provisos; no authority setting it out was located. The reading of why s. 30 is omitted from s. 29 is likewise editorial analysis.)
What s. 29 does not do
Three limits are worth stating, because the section is sometimes read more widely than it is drafted.
It does not touch the other Chapter III exceptions. Sections 14 to 24 and 30 to 44 are unaffected by its terms. A person relying on, say, s. 19 (necessity) or s. 22 (unsoundness of mind) does not meet s. 29 at all. S1
It does not make consent irrelevant to the harm-based charge. Where one set of facts gives rise to two charges (one depending on the harm, one not) s. 29 removes the exception only from the second. Consent may still answer the first.
It does not decide whether a particular offence is "independent of harm". That is a question of construing the offence charged. Section 29 supplies the test, not the answer.
Who proves what
Section 29 operates against an accused: it withdraws an exception he would otherwise rely on.
The ordinary burden rule in s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 places on the accused the burden of proving circumstances bringing his case within a General Exception, and directs that the court shall presume their absence. S5 That applies to establishing the ingredients of ss. 25, 26 or 27. Section 29 then raises a different kind of question, whether the offence charged is one defined independently of harm, which is a matter of construction of the offence rather than a fact to be proved.
(No judgment addressing s. 108 BSA in relation to s. 29 specifically was located; this article does not state a general rule about how the two interact.)
Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 29 corresponds to s. 91 IPC.
| Feature | IPC s. 91 | BNS s. 29 |
|---|---|---|
| Operative text | "The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given." | Identical, save that the cross-references read "sections 25, 26 and 27" |
| Marginal title | "Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm cause" | "Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused." |
| Illustration | The causing-miscarriage illustration | Identical |
| Section number | 91 | 29 |
A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace and punctuation, returns only the three renumbered cross-references: 87, 88 and 89 becoming 25, 26 and 27. S1S4 Nothing else in the section changed, including the illustration.
The marginal note was also tidied: the IPC's heading read "…independently of harm cause", evidently a printing slip, and the BNS reads "harm caused". S1S4
No reform, and no rationale located
No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 29 has been located in the official legislative material examined, which is what one would expect for a provision whose only alteration is the updating of three cross-references.
It follows that the whole of the IPC-era understanding of s. 91 applies to s. 29 directly. It also follows that describing s. 29 as a new safeguard, or as a tightening of the consent exceptions, would be inaccurate: the restriction has stood since 1860, and the recodification left it untouched.
Judicial interpretation: honestly, a near-empty field
No judgment construing BNS s. 29 was located. The section has been in force since 1 July 2024, the date appointed by MHA Notification S.O. 850(E), which commenced the whole Sanhita except s. 106(2). S3
No judgment construing IPC s. 91 was located either. The one relevant trace found is negative and is worth recording precisely: in Emperor v. G.B. Ghatge, Bombay High Court, 14 September 1948, the Court held that the teacher's act was covered by s. 88 IPC and added that it was "of opinion that these sections have no application to the facts of this case" in relation to ss. 79 and 92. S6 Section 91 was not in issue there.
This is a provision that, on the material located, has not been the subject of judicial construction. Its content therefore rests on its own text, on the wording of the three exceptions it limits, and on the illustration Parliament attached to it. Saying so is more useful to a reader than assembling citations that do not construe it.
Worked examples
Hypotheticals, not decided cases.
Section 29 bites. Two adults agree to fight in a public street and cause each other minor hurt. A charge of affray under s. 194 does not depend on harm to either of them; s. 29 means ss. 25 to 27 cannot answer it. S1
Section 29 does not bite on the other charge. On the same facts, a charge founded on the hurt one caused the other is a charge "by reason of" the harm. Section 25 may answer that, if its ingredients are established. S1
The illustration's situation. A miscarriage is caused otherwise than in good faith to save the woman's life. Section 88 contains its own good-faith exception, and the illustration states that the consent of the woman or of her guardian "does not justify the act". S1
Guardian consent closed off too. Where consent is given by a guardian under s. 27 rather than by the person harmed, s. 29 still applies: it covers the person "on whose behalf the consent is given". S1
Section 29 is the wrong provision. An accused relies on s. 19 (necessity) or s. 22 (unsoundness of mind). Section 29 names only ss. 25, 26 and 27 and has no application. S1
Section 30 not on the list. A doctor treats an unconscious patient without consent. Section 29 does not name s. 30, but s. 30's own provisos restrict it, and on ordinary hurt they restrict it more tightly than s. 27 restricts guardian consent. S1
Common misconceptions
"Section 29 is a general limit on all the Chapter III exceptions." It names ss. 25, 26 and 27 only. S1
"It creates a new restriction." It makes explicit a limit already carried by the words "is an offence by reason of any harm" in each of the three exceptions, which is why its illustration puts "by reason of such harm" in quotation marks. S1
"If both parties consented, no offence of any kind is committed." Consent answers only charges that depend on harm to the consenting person. Affray is the clearest counter-example. S1
"The exclusion applies only where the person harmed consented personally." It expressly covers the person "on whose behalf the consent is given", and the illustration names the guardian. S1
"Section 29 tells you which offences are independent of harm." It supplies the test; whether a particular offence qualifies is a matter of construing that offence. S1
"Section 30 is subject to s. 29." Section 29 does not name it. Section 30 is instead restricted by its own four provisos, which on ordinary hurt are stricter than s. 27's. S1
"The BNS tightened the consent exceptions here." The only change is that three cross-references were renumbered. S1S4
Related provisions
- s. 25, consent to harm by a person above eighteen; s. 26, consent in good faith for the person's benefit; s. 27: guardian consent for a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind. These are the three exceptions s. 29 limits, and each is phrased "is an offence by reason of any harm".
- s. 28, when an apparent consent is not consent; the companion control on the same three exceptions, operating on validity rather than scope.
- s. 30: acts in good faith for a person's benefit without consent, with its own four provisos; not named in s. 29.
- s. 88: causing miscarriage, with its own good-faith-to-save-life exception; the subject of s. 29's illustration.
- s. 194: affray; an offence against public peace that does not depend on harm to the participants.
- s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.
Sources, verification and limitations
Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against
the India Code entry for s. 29 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E)
S3; IPC s. 91 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 29 by programmatic word-level
diff, returning only the three renumbered cross-references S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5; Emperor
v. G.B. Ghatge read in full text S6. BNS ss. 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 (with its four provisos and
Explanation), 88 and 194 were read directly in the Gazette text. Law checked as of the date recorded in
lawCheckedAsOf.
Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 29 was located, and no judgment construing IPC s. 91 was located either. The only judicial trace recorded is negative: Ghatge held that IPC ss. 79 and 92 had no application on its facts, and s. 91 was not in issue there. The article therefore rests on the statutory text, on the wording of the three exceptions limited, and on the attached illustration, and says so rather than assembling citations that do not construe the provision. Three propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: the reading that s. 29 makes explicit a limit already carried by the words "by reason of … harm"; the explanation of why s. 30 is omitted from s. 29's list; and the three-tier ladder comparing the provisos of ss. 26, 27 and 30. The affray example is drawn from ss. 29 and 194 read together, no judgment applying them in combination having been located. Legislation governing the medical termination of pregnancy was NOT examined, and nothing here states when a termination is lawful; s. 88 is discussed only to explain why the illustration works. The ingredients and punishments of ss. 88 and 194 were not analysed beyond the words quoted. The interaction between s. 108 BSA and s. 29 is not stated as a general rule, no judgment on the point having been located. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted. Ghatge was read from a judgment-text repository rather than an official court portal, which did not resolve at the time of checking.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a particular offence is one defined independently of harm is a question of construction that only a court can decide in the case before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.