What the section says
Section 27 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2
27. Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that person:
Provided that this exception shall not extend to—
(a) the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(c) the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration.
A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is within the exception, in as much as his object was the cure of the child.
The official marginal-note title is "Act done in good faith for benefit of child or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent of guardian." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1
The structure: a wide grant, cut back by four provisos
The main limb of s. 27 is generous. It protects anything done in good faith for the benefit of a qualifying person, by or with the guardian's consent, against liability founded on harm caused, intended, or known to be likely. S1 On the face of that opening, even foreseen death would be covered.
The four provisos then take most of that back. Read as a whole, the section works like this:
| Doer's state of mind as to the harm | Within s. 27? |
|---|---|
| Intends death, or attempts to cause death | Never: proviso (a) |
| Knows death to be likely | Only to prevent death or grievous hurt, or to cure a grievous disease or infirmity: proviso (b) |
| Voluntarily causes or attempts grievous hurt | Only for those same purposes: proviso (c) |
| Causes, intends or foresees anything less | Yes, subject to the main limb's requirements |
| Abets an offence the section would not cover | Never: proviso (d) |
So s. 27 does not simply have a ceiling; it has a purpose test built into the ceiling. Serious harm is permitted, but only if it serves one of three named ends.
The most important comparison: a guardian can consent to less than an adult can
This is the point that gives s. 27 its character, and it is easy to miss because the sections look similar.
| s. 26 (the person's own consent) | s. 27 (guardian's consent) | |
|---|---|---|
| Intention to cause death | Excluded | Excluded: proviso (a) |
| Knowledge that death is likely | Permitted without qualification | Permitted only for the three named purposes: proviso (b) |
| Intentionally causing grievous hurt | Permitted (s. 26 does not mention grievous hurt) | Permitted only for the three named purposes: proviso (c) |
| Abetment limit | None stated | Proviso (d) |
Under s. 26, an adult may validly consent to a procedure that the doer knows is likely to kill him, for any benefit at all. Under s. 27, a guardian may consent to such a procedure only where the object is to prevent death or grievous hurt, or to cure a grievous disease or infirmity. S1
The rationale is structural rather than stated: s. 26 rests on the autonomy of the person harmed, and s. 27 rests on someone else's judgment about a person who cannot exercise that autonomy. The law is correspondingly less willing to let serious harm be authorised. (The explanation of the rationale is editorial analysis; no legislative statement to that effect was located.)
The illustration demonstrates the permitted case precisely. A parent authorises an operation "knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death", and is protected because "his object was the cure of the child". S1 Remove the curative object and proviso (b) bites.
Who qualifies, and who may consent
The person protected
Two categories only: a person "under twelve years of age", or a "person of unsound mind". S1
The age of twelve, not eighteen, is the operative figure. That produces a gap worth noticing. A person aged twelve to eighteen is:
- outside s. 25, which requires the person harmed to be above eighteen;
- outside s. 27, which stops at twelve; but
- within s. 26, which states no age requirement at all. S1
So for that age band the statutory route is the person's own consent under s. 26, not a guardian's consent under s. 27. (This reading follows from ss. 25 to 28 read together and is offered as analysis; no authority on the point was located, and separate statutory regimes governing particular procedures and categories of patient were not examined.)
Note also the terminology. IPC s. 89 was headed "Act done in good faith for benefit of child or insane person" and its text read "or of unsound mind"; s. 27 reads "or person of unsound mind" in both. S1S4 That is part of a consistent change across the new codes, in which "insane", "lunatic" and "idiot" disappear entirely from the statutory vocabulary while the legal tests remain unaltered.
The person who may consent
"The guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person." S1
Neither "guardian" nor "lawful charge" is defined in the Sanhita. The word "guardian" appears in only six sections: ss. 27, 29, 30, 64, 137 and 139: and s. 2 contains no definition of it. S1 Its content is therefore left to the general law and to the facts: who in law or in fact had charge of this person.
The limits of the category matter in practice. Section 27 is available only where the person is under twelve or of unsound mind. It gives a relative no authority to consent on behalf of a competent adult. That was the position in Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda and Anr., decided 16 January 2008, where the Supreme Court recorded that the doctor may have thought "the consent by appellant's mother gave her authority" — but the finding remained that "there was no consent by the appellant", who was 44 years old and of sound mind. S6
(Characterisation: Samira Kohli was an appeal in a consumer matter concerning medical negligence and deficiency in service. It decides civil liability and does not construe s. 89 IPC or s. 27 BNS. The statutory explanation of why the mother's consent could not assist, that no s. 27 route existed, is the author's analysis, not the Court's reasoning.)
Two routes, not one
The section covers acts done "by, or by consent of" the guardian. S1 Both the guardian who acts himself and the third party acting with the guardian's consent are protected. The illustration involves both: the parent arranges the operation, and the surgeon performs it.
"Other person having lawful charge": the schoolteacher cases
The one substantial body of authority on the predecessor provision concerns teachers, and it must be read with a large caveat about later legislation.
In Emperor v. G.B. Ghatge, Bombay High Court, 14 September 1948, a teacher was prosecuted for caning a pupil. The Court set out s. 89 IPC in full and then stated the principle that matters here: S7
"When a child is sent by its parent or its guardian to a school, the parent or guardian must be held to have given an implied consent to its being under the discipline and control of the school authorities and to the infliction of such reasonable punishment as may be necessary for the purposes of school discipline or for correcting the child."
The Court recorded that the Rangoon High Court had applied s. 89 to acquit a schoolmaster prosecuted for caning a boy in his charge, in King Emperor v. Maung Ba Thaung (1925) ILR 3 Ran 659. S7
On the facts, however, s. 89 did not apply: the complainant was 15, and "Section 89, Indian Penal Code, however, applies in the case of children under 12 years of age". The Court therefore decided the case under s. 88: now s. 26: holding that a child over twelve going to school "may be assumed" to give implied consent to reasonable and moderate corporal punishment, and that the teacher's act "is covered by Section 88, Indian Penal Code" so that "he is consequently not guilty of any criminal offence". It added that ss. 79 and 92 had no application. S7
What survives, and what must not be assumed to survive. Two things are useful from Ghatge: the holding that the age line in s. 89 (now s. 27) is strict, so that a 15-year-old falls under the self-consent provision instead; and the reasoning that sending a child to school can amount to implied guardian consent to the school's ordinary discipline, which illuminates "other person having lawful charge".
Its conclusion that caning a pupil was lawful is a different matter, and nothing in this article should be read as stating the current position on corporal punishment. Later legislation addresses the subject directly:
- Section 17 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 provides: "(1) No child shall be subjected to physical punishment or mental harassment. (2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be liable to disciplinary action under the service rules applicable to such person." S8
- Section 82 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 makes it an offence for a person in charge of or employed in a child care institution to subject a child to corporal punishment with the aim of disciplining the child: a fine of ten thousand rupees on first conviction, and imprisonment up to three months or fine or both for subsequent offences, with liability to dismissal and debarment from working with children. S9
Note the precise shapes of these provisions. RTE s. 17 prohibits physical punishment of a child but attaches a disciplinary, not a penal, consequence. JJ Act s. 82 creates a criminal offence but is confined to child care institutions. How either interacts with a Chapter III exception in a given prosecution is a question this article does not answer.
(Characterisation of Ghatge: a 1948 High Court decision, persuasive but not binding elsewhere, whose operative holding was on s. 88 rather than s. 89. Maung Ba Thaung was not separately examined and is reported only as Ghatge reports it. The English authorities Ghatge surveys: Regina v. Hopley, Mansell v. Griffin, Cleary v. Booth and others: were not examined and are not relied on. Whether Ghatge's conclusion on corporal punishment survives the RTE Act and the JJ Act has not been researched for this article.)
The two requirements in the main limb
Benefit, and what "benefit" excludes
The act must be done "for the benefit of" the qualifying person. The Explanation to s. 30 restricts the term across this cluster: "Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section." S1 A transaction whose only advantage to the child is financial is therefore outside s. 27.
Good faith
Section 2(11) defines good faith negatively: "Nothing is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention." S1 The guardian's or doer's judgment that the act would benefit the person must have been formed with due care and attention. Parental sincerity is not enough; nor is the guardian's authority a substitute for it. The illustration makes the point by stating the object expressly, the cure of the child, rather than resting on the parent's status.
The three permitted purposes, read closely
Provisos (b) and (c) share a list of purposes, and the wording repays attention: S1
- the preventing of death;
- the preventing of grievous hurt; or
- the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity.
Two observations follow.
The list is closed and is about serious ends. Preventing ordinary hurt is not on it. So a procedure known to be likely to cause death, undertaken to relieve a condition that is neither life-threatening nor grievous, falls outside proviso (b) however benevolently intended.
"Grievous disease or infirmity" is not the same as "grievous hurt". "Grievous hurt" is a closed statutory list of eight kinds of hurt in s. 116, including any fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. S1 "Grievous disease or infirmity" is not defined anywhere in the Sanhita, and the s. 116 list does not govern it: s. 116 defines kinds of hurt, not kinds of disease. The content of the phrase is left to the facts and to medical evidence.
(That distinction is a textual observation. No authority construing "grievous disease or infirmity" was located, and the article does not assert where its boundary lies.)
Proviso (c) is about voluntarily causing grievous hurt, which the Sanhita separately defines. Section 117 deals with voluntarily causing grievous hurt. S1 A surgical amputation to arrest a spreading infection is intentional grievous hurt, "privation of any member or joint" under s. 116(d), and is within proviso (c) because its purpose is to prevent death or grievous hurt. The same amputation for a purpose outside the three-item list is not.
Proviso (d): no laundering of liability through abetment
Proviso (d) excludes "the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend". S1
Its function is to close an obvious circumvention. If s. 27 would not protect the doing of an act, it does not protect procuring, instigating or aiding someone else to do it. Without the proviso, a guardian might argue that although the act itself fell outside the section, his role in arranging it was protected because it was "done in good faith for the benefit" of the child.
Read with s. 46, Explanation 3, which provides that "it is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence", the position is coherent: the incapacity of the child or person of unsound mind neither excuses the abettor nor, via s. 27, protects the guardian. S1
What s. 29 takes away
Section 29 provides that "the exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given". S1
The italicised words are included specifically for s. 27, which is the only one of the three exceptions operating through consent given on another's behalf. The illustration to s. 29 then says so explicitly in a medical context: causing miscarriage otherwise than in good faith to save the woman's life is an offence independently of harm, and "the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act". S1
(Separate legislation governs the medical termination of pregnancy and was not examined for this article; nothing here states when a termination is lawful.)
Who proves what
Section 27 is a General Exception, so s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies: the burden is on the accused and "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5
The accused must establish the main limb. That the person was under twelve or of unsound mind, that the act was for that person's benefit, that it was done in good faith, and that it was done by or with the consent of the guardian or other person having lawful charge, and, where the harm reaches the levels described in provisos (b) or (c), that one of the three permitted purposes was present. The purpose element is the part most likely to be contested on the evidence.
Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 27 corresponds to s. 89 IPC.
| Feature | IPC s. 89 | BNS s. 27 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main limb | "for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or of unsound mind" | "for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or person of unsound mind" | Word "person" added |
| Marginal title | "…benefit of child or insane person, by or by consent of guardian" | "…benefit of child or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent of guardian." | Terminology modernised |
| Provisos | "Provided— First.… Secondly.… Thirdly.… Fourthly.…", each beginning "That this exception shall not extend to…" | "Provided that this exception shall not extend to— (a)… (b)… (c)… (d)…" | Restructured; the repeated lead-in appears once |
| Substance of the four provisos | Intentional death; knowledge of likely death save for the three purposes; voluntary grievous hurt save for the three purposes; abetment | Unchanged | None |
| Illustration | The "cut for the stone" illustration, ending "inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child" | Identical, ending "in as much as his object was the cure of the child" | Spelling split |
| Section number | 89 | 27 | Renumbered |
A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace, punctuation and the proviso labels, returns exactly three classes of difference: the addition of "person" before "of unsound mind"; the removal of the three repetitions of "that this exception shall not extend to" made possible by the single lead-in; and "inasmuch" rendered as "in as much". S1S4
The substantive rule is unchanged. The age of twelve, the two protected categories, the guardian-or-lawful-charge formula, the benefit and good-faith requirements, all four provisos and the illustration are carried over.
No reform, and no rationale located
No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 27 has been located in the official legislative material examined, which is what one would expect for a provision re-enacted without substantive change.
What did change is presentational and terminological: the provisos are easier to read as (a) to (d) than as First to Fourthly, and "insane person" has become "person of unsound mind". Both are genuine improvements in drafting. Neither alters what a guardian may consent to. Describing s. 27 as a modernised child-protection or medical-consent provision would be inaccurate.
Worked examples
Hypotheticals, not decided cases.
Within s. 27: the illustration in modern form. A parent consents to high-risk surgery on a nine-year-old, knowing death is a likely outcome, to remove a life-threatening obstruction. Proviso (b) is satisfied because the object is the prevention of death. S1
Within s. 27: intended grievous hurt. A guardian consents to the amputation of a child's limb to arrest a spreading infection. That is intentional grievous hurt under s. 116(d), but proviso (c) permits it because the purpose is to prevent death or grievous hurt. S1
Outside s. 27: proviso (b). A guardian consents to a procedure known to be likely to cause death, undertaken only to relieve a non-serious condition. Knowledge of likely death is permitted only for the three named purposes, and this is not one of them. S1
Outside s. 27: proviso (a). A guardian consents to an act intended to cause the child's death, for whatever reason. Proviso (a) admits of no purpose-based exception at all. S1
Outside s. 27: benefit. A guardian consents to a harmful act whose only advantage to the child is financial. The Explanation to s. 30 excludes mere pecuniary benefit. S1
Outside s. 27: good faith. A parent authorises a risky intervention on the strength of an unchecked recommendation, without inquiry. Section 2(11) requires due care and attention in forming the belief; parental sincerity is not enough. S1
Outside s. 27: age. A guardian purports to consent on behalf of a fifteen-year-old. Section 27 stops at twelve. The statutory route in that band is the person's own consent under s. 26. S1
Outside s. 27: competent adult. A relative purports to consent on behalf of a 44-year-old of sound mind. No guardian route exists. On the facts of Samira Kohli, the mother's consent gave no authority. S1S6
Outside s. 27: independent offence. An act that is an offence regardless of harm to the child. By s. 29, the exception does not extend to it, and that section expressly covers consent given "on whose behalf the consent is given". S1
Outside s. 27: abetment. A guardian arranges for someone else to do an act that s. 27 would not protect. Proviso (d) excludes the abetment, and s. 46, Explanation 3 confirms that the child's incapacity does not assist. S1
Common misconceptions
"A parent can consent to anything for a child's benefit." No. The four provisos cut the main limb back sharply: intended death never; foreseen death and intended grievous hurt only to prevent death or grievous hurt or to cure a grievous disease or infirmity. S1
"A guardian's consent is as good as the person's own." It is narrower. Section 26 permits an adult to consent to a procedure known to be likely to cause death for any benefit; s. 27 permits a guardian to do so only for the three named purposes. S1
"Section 27 covers all minors." It stops at twelve. Persons aged twelve to eighteen fall outside both s. 25 and s. 27; s. 26, which has no age bar, is the route on the face of the provisions. S1
"A relative can consent for an adult patient." Not under s. 27, which requires the person to be under twelve or of unsound mind. S1S6
"'Grievous disease or infirmity' means the same as 'grievous hurt'." It does not. "Grievous hurt" is a closed list of eight kinds of hurt in s. 116; "grievous disease or infirmity" is undefined in the Sanhita, and s. 116 does not govern it. S1
"If the guardian consented, nothing else matters." Benefit, good faith and the provisos all have to be satisfied, and s. 29 removes the exception where the act is an offence independently of the harm. S1
"Arranging an act is safer than doing it." Proviso (d) excludes abetment of any offence the section would not cover. S1
"The BNS strengthened protection for children here." It reproduced IPC s. 89 without substantive change. The alterations are the restructuring of the provisos, the addition of the word "person" before "of unsound mind", and a spelling split in the illustration. S1S4
Related provisions
- s. 25: consent by a person above eighteen, with a lower ceiling and no benefit requirement.
- s. 26: the person's own consent, in good faith for his benefit; wider than s. 27 on serious harm.
- s. 28, when an apparent consent is not consent, including s. 28(c) on persons under twelve.
- s. 29: the exceptions in ss. 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts that are offences independently of harm, expressly including consent given on another's behalf.
- s. 30: good faith for a person's benefit without consent, where consent cannot be obtained in time; and the Explanation that mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit for ss. 26, 27 and 30.
- s. 2(11), "good faith"; s. 2(3), "child" means a person below eighteen, a definition s. 27 does not use.
- s. 46, Explanation 3: abetment of a person not capable by law of committing an offence.
- s. 116, the closed list of grievous hurt; s. 117, voluntarily causing grievous hurt.
- s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.
Sources, verification and limitations
Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against
the India Code entry for s. 27 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E)
S3; IPC s. 89 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 27 by programmatic word-level
diff, returning three classes of difference as set out above S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5;
Samira Kohli and Emperor v. G.B. Ghatge read in full text S6S7; s. 17 of the Right of Children
to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and s. 82 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 read verbatim from the India Code section-level entries for those Central Acts
S8S9. BNS ss. 2(3), 2(11), 25, 26, 28, 29 (with its Illustration), 30
(with its Explanation), 46, 116 and 117 were read directly in the Gazette text. The s. 2 definitions
were enumerated to confirm that neither "guardian" nor "grievous disease or infirmity" is defined, and
every section using the word "guardian" was identified (ss. 27, 29, 30, 64, 137, 139). Law checked as of
the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.
Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 27 was located. The authority on IPC s. 89 is thin: the searches conducted produced Emperor v. G.B. Ghatge (1948), a 1948 High Court decision which set out s. 89 but decided the case under s. 88 because the pupil was 15, and which is persuasive only. King Emperor v. Maung Ba Thaung (1925) ILR 3 Ran 659 was not separately examined and is reported only as Ghatge reports it; the English authorities Ghatge surveys were not examined and are not relied on. Whether Ghatge's conclusion that caning a pupil was lawful survives the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 has NOT been researched, and the article states expressly that nothing in it should be read as the current position on corporal punishment. RTE s. 17 and JJ Act s. 82 are quoted for their own terms only; the article does not state how either interacts with a Chapter III exception in any prosecution, and no case law on that interaction was sought. Samira Kohli is a consumer appeal deciding civil liability which does not construe s. 89 or s. 27; it is used only for the factual position that a mother's consent gave no authority in respect of a competent adult, and the statutory explanation of why is the author's analysis. The explanation of why the guardian route is narrower than self-consent is editorial analysis; no legislative statement to that effect was located. The reading of the twelve-to-eighteen age gap follows from ss. 25 to 28 read together and is labelled analysis, with no authority located; separate statutory regimes governing particular medical procedures and categories of patient were not examined. "Grievous disease or infirmity" is undefined and no authority construing it was located; the article does not assert where its boundary lies. Legislation on the medical termination of pregnancy was not examined. BNS ss. 46, 64, 116, 117, 137 and 139 are referred to for context; their ingredients and punishments were not analysed beyond the words quoted. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted. Samira Kohli was read from a judgment-text repository rather than an official court portal, which did not resolve at the time of checking.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice, is not medical or professional guidance, and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether s. 27 protects a particular act depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.