What the section says
Section 26 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2
26. Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration.
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z's death, and intending, in good faith, Z's benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Z's consent. A has committed no offence.
The official marginal-note title is "Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person's benefit." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1
This is the provision that makes surgery lawful.
The decisive feature: a far higher ceiling than s. 25
Place s. 26 beside s. 25 and the difference is stark. S1
| s. 25 | s. 26 | |
|---|---|---|
| Excluded by intention | death or grievous hurt | death only |
| Excluded by knowledge of likelihood | death or grievous hurt | nothing |
| Extra requirements | none beyond consent | good faith + for that person's benefit |
| Age requirement | above eighteen | none stated |
Two consequences follow, and the second is the one that does the work.
Grievous hurt may be intended. Section 25 collapses the moment the doer intends or foresees grievous hurt. Section 26 does not mention grievous hurt at all. A surgeon who intends to amputate a limb ("privation of any member or joint", grievous hurt under s. 116(d)) is squarely within s. 26 and hopelessly outside s. 25. S1
Death may be foreseen as likely. The only mental state s. 26 excludes is an intention to cause death. Knowledge that death is likely is expressly permitted: the section protects harm "known by the doer to be likely to cause" death, and the illustration is built on exactly that: the surgeon "knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z… but not intending to cause Z's death". S1
This is a remarkable statutory licence, and it is deliberate. High-risk surgery on a gravely ill patient could not otherwise be performed at all. The line the section draws is between a doctor who accepts a risk of death in pursuit of the patient's benefit, and one who sets out to cause it.
What buys the higher ceiling is the pair of additional requirements: good faith, and the act being done for the benefit of the person harmed. Section 25 asks only for consent; s. 26 asks for consent plus a purpose.
The four ingredients
Section 26 requires: S1
- the act was not intended to cause death;
- it was done for the benefit of the person harmed;
- it was done in good faith; and
- that person consented, expressly or impliedly, either "to suffer that harm" or "to take the risk of that harm".
"Benefit" excludes money
"Benefit" is not defined in s. 26, but the Sanhita restricts it elsewhere. The Explanation to s. 30 provides: "Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section." S1
That Explanation is attached to s. 30 but is expressed to govern s. 26 as well. Its effect is that a transaction whose only advantage to the person harmed is financial cannot be an act "for whose benefit it is done". Benefit here means benefit to the person (health, relief from pain, preservation of function) not profit.
"Good faith" is a demanding, negatively defined standard
Good faith is defined in s. 2(11): "Nothing is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention." S1
Applied to s. 26 this means the doer's judgment that the act would benefit the person must have been formed with due care and attention. An honest but carelessly formed belief is not good faith. For a medical practitioner that ordinarily imports the professional standards governing the decision to operate, though s. 26 measures the care taken in forming the belief, not the skill with which the procedure was then performed. Negligent execution raises different questions, under s. 106 (causing death by negligence) or the hurt provisions, which are offences that do not depend only on consented harm. S1
Consent: express or implied, and scoped to the act
Consent may be express or implied. S1 But what is consented to must cover the harm actually caused. A point the section makes by requiring consent "to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm". S1
The leading Indian authority on how narrowly that scope is read is a civil decision, and it must be handled with care.
Samira Kohli: consent is procedure-specific
In Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda and Anr., decided 16 January 2008, the appellant was admitted for a diagnostic laparoscopy. The consent recorded was for "diagnostic and operative laparoscopy" with the note that "Laparotomy may be needed". While she was unconscious, the respondent performed a hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oopherectomy: removal of the uterus and ovaries. S6
The Supreme Court's findings were specific: S6
"(ii) The appellant was admitted only for diagnostic laparoscopy (and at best for limited surgical treatment that could be made by laproscopy). She was not admitted for hysterectomy or bilateral salpingo-oopherectomy.
(iii) There was no consent by appellant for hysterectomy or bilateral salpingo-oopherectomy."
And its conclusion: S6
"In view of our finding that there was no consent by the appellant for performing hysterectomy and salpingo-oopherectomy, performance of such surgery was an unauthorized invasion and interference with appellant's body which amounted to a tortious act of assault and battery and therefore a deficiency in service."
Strikingly, the Court then characterised the case in almost the language of s. 26: S6
"This is a case of respondent acting in excess of consent but in good faith and for the benefit of the appellant."
Good faith and benefit were treated as mitigating circumstances, not as a complete answer. The respondent was denied the entire fee charged for the surgery and directed to pay Rs 25,000 as compensation; the appeal was allowed in part. S6
Characterisation, and why it matters here. Samira Kohli was an appeal in a consumer matter concerning medical negligence and deficiency in service. It does not construe s. 88 IPC or s. 26 BNS, and it decides civil, not criminal, liability. What it establishes, and what carries across because s. 26 uses the same conceptual building blocks, is that consent is specific to the procedure consented to. A consent obtained for a diagnostic procedure does not authorise radical surgery discovered to be desirable once the patient is under anaesthesia.
Applying that to s. 26 as a matter of statutory reading: where a doctor exceeds the consent given, ingredient 4 fails, because the person has not consented to suffer that harm. Good faith and benefit: ingredients 2 and 3: do not cure the absence of consent; they are additional requirements, not substitutes for it.
(That application of Samira Kohli to s. 26 is the author's analysis. The case is civil; no criminal judgment applying s. 88 or s. 26 to an excess-of-consent surgery was located.)
The relative's consent problem
One detail of Samira Kohli repays attention. The Court recorded that the respondent may have thought "the consent by appellant's mother gave her authority", but the finding remained that there was no consent by the appellant. S6
The Sanhita explains why a relative's consent cannot fill the gap for an adult patient. Section 27 permits acts done by, or with the consent of, "the guardian or other person having lawful charge" only where the person is "under twelve years of age, or person of unsound mind". S1 The appellant in Samira Kohli was 44 and of sound mind, so no guardian-consent route existed. S6
(The statutory explanation is the author's; the Court did not analyse s. 89 IPC.)
The age gap in s. 26
Section 26 states no age requirement at all. S1 Compare the rest of the cluster:
| Provision | Who may consent |
|---|---|
| s. 25 | the person harmed, if above eighteen |
| s. 26 | the person harmed: no age specified |
| s. 27 | a guardian, where the person is under twelve or of unsound mind |
| s. 28(c) | consent by a person under twelve is not consent, "unless the contrary appears from the context" |
Read together, these produce a result that is easy to miss. For a person aged twelve to eighteen, s. 25 is closed (too young) and s. 27 is closed (too old for the guardian route), but s. 26 contains no age bar, and s. 28(c) does not invalidate the consent of someone over twelve. On the face of the provisions, a fifteen-year-old's own consent can therefore support a s. 26 defence to a beneficial procedure, while the same consent would not support a s. 25 defence to a non-beneficial one.
(This reading follows from the text of ss. 25 to 28 read together and is offered as analysis. No authority on the point was located. Separate statutory regimes govern particular medical procedures and particular categories of patient, and those were not examined for this article.)
What s. 29 takes away
Section 29 provides that "the exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent". S1
Its illustration is directly about a medical act: S1
"Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence 'by reason of such harm'; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act."
The point is structural and important: consent plus good faith plus benefit cannot make lawful an act that the law prohibits for reasons other than the harm to the consenting person. Section 88 of the Sanhita makes causing miscarriage an offence unless "caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman". S1 Its exception is built into the offence itself; s. 26 adds nothing.
(Separate legislation governs the medical termination of pregnancy. That legislation was not examined for this article, and nothing here should be read as a statement of when a termination is lawful.)
Who proves what
Section 26 is a General Exception, so s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies: the burden is on the accused and "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5
A practitioner relying on s. 26 must therefore establish four things, and the documentary element is usually decisive on the fourth: that death was not intended; that the act was for the patient's benefit; that the belief it would benefit the patient was formed with due care and attention; and that the patient consented to the harm or to its risk. Samira Kohli illustrates how exactingly the scope of a recorded consent can be read. S6
Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 26 corresponds to s. 88 IPC.
| Feature | IPC s. 88 | BNS s. 26 |
|---|---|---|
| Operative text | "Nothing, which is not intented to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm." | Same, with "intended" correctly spelt |
| Marginal title | "Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person's benefit" | Same, with a terminal full stop |
| Illustration | The surgeon illustration | Identical |
| Ceiling | Intention to cause death only | Unchanged |
| Section number | 88 | 26 |
A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions returns two classes of difference, both immaterial: the India Code text of IPC s. 88 reads "intented" where the BNS reads "intended" (evidently a printing error in the older text, corrected) and apostrophes in "Z's" are rendered differently in the two sources. S1S4 There is no substantive change.
Two renumberings matter for older commentary: the "good faith" definition moved from s. 52 IPC to s. 2(11) BNS, and the pecuniary-benefit Explanation moved from s. 92 IPC (where it referred to "sections 88, 89 and 92") to s. 30 BNS, where it refers to "sections 26, 27 and this section". S1S4
No reform, and no rationale located
No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 26 has been located in the official legislative material examined, which is what one would expect for a verbatim re-enactment.
The ceiling, the good-faith and benefit requirements, the express/implied distinction, the two consent limbs and the surgeon illustration all date from 1860 and survive untouched. Describing s. 26 as a modernised medical-consent provision would be inaccurate, including because the Sanhita did not import any of the informed-consent requirements that Indian civil law has developed in cases such as Samira Kohli. The criminal provision still asks only for "a consent, whether express or implied".
Worked examples
Hypotheticals, not decided cases.
Within s. 26. A surgeon advises a patient with a painful and progressive condition that an operation carries a significant risk of death. The patient consents. The operation is performed competently and the patient dies. Death was not intended; the act was for the patient's benefit; the advice was formed with due care and attention; the patient consented to the risk. Section 26 applies. This is the illustration in modern dress. S1
Within s. 26: intended grievous hurt. A limb is amputated with consent to prevent the spread of infection. Amputation is grievous hurt under s. 116(d) and is intended. Section 25 could never cover it; s. 26 does, because only intention to cause death is excluded. S1
Outside s. 26: excess of consent. Consent is given for a diagnostic procedure; a more radical operation is performed while the patient is unconscious. On the reasoning in Samira Kohli, the patient did not consent to that harm, so ingredient 4 fails. Good faith and benefit do not substitute for consent. S6
Outside s. 26: no benefit. A procedure is performed for the doer's commercial advantage. The Explanation to s. 30 provides that mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit for the purposes of s. 26. S1
Outside s. 26: intention to cause death. A doctor administers a lethal dose intending to end the patient's life, however compassionately and with however clear a consent. The one mental state the section excludes is present. S1
Outside s. 26: good faith absent. A practitioner recommends and performs a risky procedure without examining the patient or considering alternatives. Whatever his honesty, a belief formed without due care and attention is not good faith under s. 2(11). S1
Section 26 cannot help: independent offence. Causing miscarriage otherwise than in good faith to save the woman's life. Section 29 and its illustration say so expressly; the consent of the woman or her guardian does not justify the act. S1
Wrong section: patient cannot consent. An unconscious accident victim needs immediate surgery and no guardian can be reached. Section 26 requires consent; the provision to consider is s. 30, which covers acts done in good faith for a person's benefit without consent where it is impossible to obtain it, subject to its own four provisos. S1
Wrong section: child patient. A nine-year-old needs a procedure and the parent consents. That is s. 27, which permits guardian consent where the person is under twelve or of unsound mind, subject to four provisos. S1
Common misconceptions
"Consent cannot make it lawful to risk a patient's death." It can. Section 26 excludes only an intention to cause death; knowledge that death is likely is expressly within the section, and the illustration is built on it. S1
"Section 26 and s. 25 are alternatives." They have different ceilings and different requirements. Section 26 permits intended grievous hurt and foreseen death but demands good faith and benefit; s. 25 demands neither but collapses at grievous hurt. S1
"A signed consent form settles it." The consent must cover the harm actually caused. In Samira Kohli a recorded consent for "diagnostic and operative laparoscopy" with "Laparotomy may be needed" was held not to extend to hysterectomy and salpingo-oopherectomy. S6
"A relative can consent for an adult patient." Section 27's guardian route is confined to persons under twelve or of unsound mind. In Samira Kohli the mother's consent did not give authority. S1S6
"Good faith means honest intentions." Section 2(11) defines it negatively by reference to due care and attention. S1
"Any benefit will do." Mere pecuniary benefit is excluded by the Explanation to s. 30, which governs s. 26. S1
"Consent plus benefit makes any medical act lawful." Section 29 removes the exception where the act is an offence independently of the harm, and its illustration is a medical one. S1
"The BNS brought in informed consent." It did not. Section 26 reproduces IPC s. 88 and still requires only "a consent, whether express or implied". The informed-consent doctrine discussed in Samira Kohli is a development of civil liability, not a criminal-law requirement imported by the Sanhita. S1S4S6
Related provisions
- s. 25: consent to harm where neither death nor grievous hurt is intended or foreseen; the lower ceiling.
- s. 27: good faith for the benefit of a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind, by or with a guardian's consent, subject to four provisos.
- s. 28, when an apparent consent is not consent.
- s. 29: the exceptions in ss. 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts that are offences independently of harm; its illustration concerns causing miscarriage.
- s. 30: good faith for a person's benefit without consent; also the home of the Explanation that mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit for ss. 26, 27 and 30.
- s. 31: communication made in good faith for the benefit of the person to whom it is made.
- s. 2(11): "good faith".
- s. 88: causing miscarriage, with its own good-faith-to-save-life exception.
- s. 106, causing death by negligence; ss. 114–117, hurt and grievous hurt, including s. 116(d) and (g).
- s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.
Sources, verification and limitations
Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against
the India Code entry for s. 26 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E)
S3; IPC s. 88 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 26 by programmatic word-level
diff, the only differences being the IPC's "intented" for "intended" and apostrophe rendering S4; BSA
s. 108 read verbatim S5; Samira Kohli read in full text S6. BNS ss. 2(11), 25, 27, 28, 29, 30
(including its Explanation), 31, 88, 106 and 116 were read directly in the Gazette text. Law checked as
of the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.
Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 26 was located, and no criminal judgment construing IPC s. 88 in an excess-of-consent surgery was located. Samira Kohli is a consumer appeal deciding civil liability for medical negligence and deficiency in service; it does not construe s. 88 or s. 26, and it is used here only for the proposition that consent is specific to the procedure consented to, with that application to s. 26 expressly labelled as the author's analysis. The statutory explanation of why a relative's consent could not assist in that case is likewise the author's; the Court did not analyse s. 89 IPC. The reading of the age gap for persons aged twelve to eighteen follows from ss. 25 to 28 read together and is labelled analysis, with no authority located; separate statutory regimes govern particular medical procedures and particular categories of patient and were not examined. Legislation on the medical termination of pregnancy was not examined, and nothing here states when a termination is lawful. BNS ss. 88, 106 and 116 are referred to for context; their ingredients and punishments were not analysed beyond the words quoted. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted. Samira Kohli was read from a judgment-text repository rather than an official court portal, which did not resolve at the time of checking.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice, is not medical or professional guidance, and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether s. 26 protects a particular act depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.