What the section says
Section 28 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1S2
28. A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Sanhita,—
(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or
(b) if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
(c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
The official marginal-note title is "Consent known to be given under fear or misconception." S2 It sits in Chapter III, "General Exceptions". S1
A provision that reaches the whole statute
Most of Chapter III protects an accused. Section 28 does not. It is a negative definition that withdraws legal effect from an apparent consent, and it is drafted to operate everywhere: a consent of the kinds described "is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Sanhita". S1
Two consequences follow.
Its reach is not confined to the consent exceptions. Sections 25, 26 and 27 are the obvious beneficiaries of s. 28's operation, but the words "any section" mean that wherever consent matters anywhere in the Sanhita, s. 28 can remove it.
It is not a defence, and the burden question is contextual. Chapter III exceptions are ordinarily proved by the accused under s. 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. S5 But s. 28 is relied on against an accused. Where consent is a defence the accused raises, as under s. 25: the accused must establish a valid consent, and s. 28 is how the prosecution answers it. Where absence of consent is an ingredient the prosecution must prove, s. 28 explains why an apparent consent does not assist the accused. (The allocation of the burden in any given prosecution depends on the offence charged; no judgment addressing s. 108 BSA in relation to s. 28 specifically was located, and this article does not state a general rule.)
Clause (a): two limbs, both required
Clause (a) is the most litigated part of the provision, and its structure is routinely misstated. It contains two requirements that must both be satisfied: S1
| Whose state of mind | What must be shown | |
|---|---|---|
| First limb | the giver of the consent | the consent was given under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact |
| Second limb | the doer of the act | he knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of that fear or misconception |
The Supreme Court stated this expressly in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, decided 20 May 2013, quoting its earlier decision in Deelip Singh: S7
"The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are from the point of view of the victim. The second part of Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused. It envisages that the accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe that the consent was given by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or misconception of fact. Thus, the second part lays emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. … This is the scheme of Section 90 which is couched in negative terminology."
The practical significance is considerable. A person may in fact have consented under a genuine misconception, and the consent may nonetheless stand, if the other party neither knew of the misconception nor had reason to believe the consent flowed from it. Section 28 is not a rule about unilateral mistake; it is a rule about exploited mistake.
"Fear of injury" means fear of illegally caused harm
"Injury" is a defined term. Section 2(14) provides: "'injury' means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property." S1
Three points follow from reading clause (a) with that definition:
- The harm feared must be illegally caused. Fear of a lawful consequence, for example, fear that a lawful step will be taken: is not fear of "injury" within the clause.
- It is not confined to physical harm. Harm to mind, reputation or property is within the definition.
- The contrast with s. 19 is deliberate. Section 19 (necessity) uses the undefined word "harm", which is wider; s. 28(a) uses the defined word "injury", which is narrower because of the word "illegally". The drafter chose different words in neighbouring provisions.
(The last observation is a textual comparison; no authority drawing it was located.)
"Misconception of fact": what the authorities establish
The phrase is undefined, and the case law construing it is substantial. Two limits are firmly established, and they pull in opposite directions.
The phrase is read broadly
In Deepak Gulati the Supreme Court recorded the Madras High Court's observation in N. Jaladu, Re ILR (1913) 36 Mad 453, relied on in Pradeep Kumar Verma, that "the expression 'under a misconception of fact' is broad enough to include all cases where the consent" is obtained in the circumstances there described. S7
But the fact must have immediate relevance
Deepak Gulati also records the limiting principle: "In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance." S7
That requirement of nexus is carried into the leading modern statement of the test.
The two-proposition test
The most frequently applied formulation is in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra, decided 21 August 2019, in the context of a promise to marry: S6
"To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the 'consent' of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the 'consent' was vitiated by a 'misconception of fact' arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
And the distinction on which many such cases turn: S6
"Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a 'misconception of fact' that vitiates the woman's 'consent'. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it."
Deepak Gulati records the same distinction, quoting the earlier observation that "there is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise", and that the court must examine "whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence". It adds that there may be cases where the person "agrees… on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her", or where the accused was unable to keep the promise "on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control", and that "such cases must be treated differently". S7
Outcomes. In Deepak Gulati the appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentences set aside. S7 In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar the proceedings were quashed. S6 Both are therefore cases in which the asserted misconception was held not to vitiate consent: a point worth noting, because the test is often cited as though it were easily satisfied.
(Characterisation: both are Supreme Court decisions construing s. 90 IPC together with the rape provision then in force. They are not decisions on BNS s. 28. Because the operative words of s. 28(a) are materially identical to s. 90, the construction carries across, but the decisions should be cited as IPC decisions. Deelip Singh, Pradeep Kumar Verma and N. Jaladu were not separately examined and are reported only as Deepak Gulati reports them.)
Section 28 is not the only consent provision that matters
A reader who stops at s. 28 will get the law wrong in the area where it is most often invoked, because particular offences contain their own consent provisions, and those operate alongside s. 28.
For the offence of rape, Explanation 2 to s. 63 provides: S1
"Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity."
Three features of that definition are independent of s. 28 and are not supplied by it: consent must be unequivocal and voluntary; it must be communicated; and it must relate to the specific act. The proviso then removes any inference from the absence of physical resistance.
So in such a prosecution there are two distinct questions. First, was there consent of the kind the offence requires: here, the s. 63 Explanation 2 standard? Second, if there was an apparent consent, is it withdrawn by s. 28? Pramod Suryabhan Pawar reflects exactly that structure, setting out both the rape provision and s. 90 before analysing the misconception. S6
(This article does not address the ingredients, exceptions or punishment of s. 63, which are outside its scope and were not analysed.)
Clause (b): incapacity to understand
Clause (b) withdraws consent given by a person who, "from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent". S1
Three observations.
It is the mirror image of ss. 22 and 23. Those provisions excuse an accused who, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication, was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or its wrongfulness. Clause (b) disables a victim in the same two conditions from giving effective consent. S1
But the test is not identical. Sections 22 and 23 ask about incapacity to know "the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law". Clause (b) asks about inability to understand "the nature and consequence" of what is consented to. The vocabularies overlap but are not the same, and clause (b)'s is conjunctive.
Intoxication is not qualified here. Section 23 protects an accused only where the intoxicant was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. Clause (b) contains no such proviso. A person whose intoxication was entirely self-induced is still, under clause (b), unable to give effective consent if he could not understand the nature and consequence of what he was consenting to. S1
That asymmetry is worth stating plainly: intoxication readily destroys a consent but rarely excuses an act. (The asymmetry is a textual comparison of ss. 23 and 28(b); no authority drawing it was located.)
Clause (c): twelve, and the words that qualify it
Clause (c) provides that consent given by a person "under twelve years of age" is not consent: "unless the contrary appears from the context". S1
Both halves matter.
Twelve is low, and it is the general rule only. It is not the age used elsewhere in the consent cluster: s. 25 requires the person harmed to be above eighteen, and s. 27's guardian route applies to persons under twelve. S1
The qualification is real. The opening words mean clause (c) yields where the context indicates otherwise, and the clearest instances of a contrary context are offences that set their own age thresholds. Section 28(c) therefore cannot be read as a statement that a twelve-year-old can consent for all purposes under the Sanhita.
(This article does not state what age governs consent for any particular offence; the offence provisions were not analysed, and the reader should look to the offence charged.)
Comparison with the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 28 corresponds to s. 90 IPC.
| Feature | IPC s. 90 | BNS s. 28 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Structure | One continuous provision with side-headings: the opening words, then "Consent of insane person.—…", then "Consent of child.—…" | Recast as clauses (a), (b) and (c) under a single lead-in; side-headings removed | Restructured |
| Scope words | "as is intended by any section of this Code" | "as is intended by any section of this Sanhita" | Statute name |
| Clause (a) substance | Fear of injury or misconception of fact, with the doer's knowledge or reason to believe | Unchanged | None |
| Clause (b) substance | Unsoundness of mind or intoxication; inability to understand nature and consequence | Unchanged | None |
| Clause (c) substance | Under twelve, unless the contrary appears from the context | Unchanged | None |
| Section number | 90 | 28 | Renumbered |
A programmatic word-level comparison of the two provisions, after normalising whitespace, punctuation and clause labels, returns exactly two classes of difference: "Code" becomes "Sanhita", and the two side-headings "Consent of insane person" and "Consent of child" are removed. S1S4
The removal of "Consent of insane person" is part of a consistent change across the new codes, in which "insane", "lunatic" and "idiot" disappear from the statutory vocabulary while the legal tests remain unaltered.
(A note on the printed text: the Gazette text of s. 28 carries stray full stops after the lead-in and after clauses (a) and (b), "this Sanhita,—." and "…misconception; or.", which appear to be typographical artefacts with no effect on meaning. S1)
No reform, and no rationale located
No section-specific legislative rationale for s. 28 has been located in the official legislative material examined, which is what one would expect for a provision re-enacted without substantive change.
The two-limb structure of clause (a), the "fear of injury or misconception of fact" formula, the incapacity test in clause (b), the age of twelve and its contextual qualification all date from 1860 and survive untouched. The improvement is presentational: three clauses are easier to read, and to cite, than a single sentence with side-headings.
This matters practically. Because s. 28(a) reproduces s. 90's operative words, the body of authority on "misconception of fact" (Deepak Gulati, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar and the cases they discuss) applies to s. 28 directly, with no argument needed about whether the principle survives a change in wording.
Worked examples
Hypotheticals, not decided cases.
Clause (a) satisfied. A person agrees to a harmful act after being told something material and false by the person who then does the act, and that person knows the agreement rests on the falsehood. Both limbs are met, and the consent is not consent. S1
Clause (a) not satisfied: second limb missing. The same person labours under a material misconception arising from a third party or his own error, and the doer neither knows of it nor has reason to believe the consent flowed from it. On Deelip Singh as quoted in Deepak Gulati, the requirements "should be cumulatively satisfied", so the consent stands. S7
Clause (a) not satisfied: no immediate relevance. The misconception concerns a matter with no bearing on the decision to agree. The fact must have "immediate relevance" and bear a direct nexus to the decision. S6S7
Promise versus false promise. An unfulfilled promise is not, without more, a false promise; the maker must have had no intention of keeping it when he gave it, and it must have borne a direct nexus to the decision. S6
Clause (b). A person agrees to something while so intoxicated that he cannot understand what it involves or what will follow. The consent is not consent, and it makes no difference that he chose to drink: clause (b) has no counterpart to the proviso in s. 23. S1
Clause (c). An eleven-year-old purports to consent. Clause (c) applies unless the contrary appears from the context. S1
Section 28 is not the only question. Where the offence charged contains its own consent provision as s. 63 does through Explanation 2: that standard must be satisfied on its own terms, and s. 28 operates in addition. S1
Common misconceptions
"Section 28 is a defence." It is the opposite: a negative definition relied on against an accused. Deelip Singh, as quoted in Deepak Gulati, describes the scheme as "couched in negative terminology". S7
"Any misconception vitiates consent." No. Clause (a) requires in addition that the doer knew, or had reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of the misconception, and the requirements "should be cumulatively satisfied". S7
"The misconception can be about anything." It must have "immediate relevance", or bear a direct nexus to the decision to agree. S6S7
"A broken promise means the consent was obtained by misconception." "A breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise"; the maker must have had no intention of upholding his word when he gave it. S6
"Fear of any consequence counts as fear of injury." "Injury" is defined in s. 2(14) as harm "illegally caused", so fear of a lawful consequence is not fear of injury, though the definition does extend beyond the body to mind, reputation and property. S1
"Self-induced intoxication does not affect the victim's consent." Clause (b) contains no proviso about how the intoxication came about, unlike s. 23. S1
"A twelve-year-old can consent under the Sanhita." Clause (c) states a general rule subject to the context, and particular offences set their own thresholds. S1
"Section 28 is the whole law on consent." It is not. It withdraws consent in three situations; it does not define what consent is. For rape, Explanation 2 to s. 63 supplies a positive definition requiring unequivocal, voluntary, communicated agreement to the specific act. S1
"The BNS changed the law on vitiated consent." It did not. Only "Code" became "Sanhita" and two side-headings were removed. S1S4
Related provisions
- s. 25, consent to harm by a person above eighteen; s. 26, consent in good faith for the person's benefit; s. 27: guardian consent for a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind. Section 28 tests the validity of the consent each of them presupposes.
- s. 29: the exceptions in ss. 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts that are offences independently of harm.
- s. 30: acts in good faith for a person's benefit without consent.
- ss. 22 and 23: unsoundness of mind and involuntary intoxication as exceptions for an accused; the mirror image of clause (b), but differently worded and, in s. 23's case, subject to a proviso clause (b) does not have.
- s. 2(14), "injury"; s. 2(3), "child" means a person below eighteen, a definition clause (c) does not use.
- s. 63, Explanation 2: the positive definition of consent for the offence of rape, with its proviso on absence of physical resistance.
- s. 108 BSA: burden of proving a General Exception.
Sources, verification and limitations
Statutory text verified against the Gazette of India publication of the BNS and independently against
the India Code entry for s. 28 S1S2; commencement verified against MHA Notification S.O. 850(E)
S3; IPC s. 90 verified against the India Code text and compared with s. 28 by programmatic word-level
diff, returning two classes of difference as set out above S4; BSA s. 108 read verbatim S5; two
Supreme Court judgments read in full text S6S7. BNS ss. 2(3), 2(14), 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30 and
s. 63 (Explanations 1 and 2 with the proviso) were read directly in the Gazette text. Law checked as of
the date recorded in lawCheckedAsOf.
Limitations disclosed. No judgment construing BNS s. 28 was located; Deepak Gulati and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar construe s. 90 IPC together with the rape provision then in force and apply to s. 28 because the operative words are materially identical, but they should be cited as IPC decisions. Deelip Singh, Pradeep Kumar Verma and N. Jaladu, Re ILR (1913) 36 Mad 453 were not separately examined and are reported only as Deepak Gulati reports them. The large body of further authority on misconception of fact was not examined; two decisions were selected because they contain the structural statement of clause (a)'s two limbs and the most frequently applied formulation of the test, and adding further names would not have added propositions. The ingredients, exceptions and punishment of s. 63 were not analysed and are outside the scope of this article, which refers to Explanation 2 only to show that a specific offence may supply its own positive definition of consent; nothing here states what the elements of that offence are or how any such case would be decided. The allocation of the burden of proof in relation to s. 28 is not stated as a general rule: it depends on the offence charged, and no judgment addressing s. 108 BSA in relation to s. 28 specifically was located. Three observations are the author's textual comparisons, with no authority drawing them: the contrast between "harm" in s. 19 and "injury" in s. 28(a); the difference in wording between the incapacity tests in ss. 22–23 and clause (b); and the asymmetry that intoxication destroys consent more readily than it excuses an act. This article does not state what age governs consent for any particular offence. No section-specific legislative rationale was located and none is asserted. The stray full stops in the Gazette text are reported as typographical artefacts on the face of the document; no corrigendum was searched for. Judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, which did not resolve at the time of checking.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a particular consent is vitiated depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome is predicted here. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.