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BNS Section 31 · Deep dive

BNS Section 31: Communication Made in Good Faith (The Only General Exception About Words)

BNS Section 31 is the only General Exception in the Sanhita that is about words rather than acts. A programmatic search confirms that no other section in Chapter III contains any form of the word 'communicate', and that the phrase 'made for the benefit' appears in Section 31 and nowhere else in the BNS. The provision is one sentence and one illustration, with no sub-sections, provisos or Explanation: no communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person. The illustration takes the hardest case available - a surgeon tells a patient he is dying, the patient dies of the shock, and the surgeon commits no offence 'though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death'. That exposes the section's structural oddity, verified by comparing all four benefit-based exceptions: Sections 26, 27 and 30 each restrict what may be done where death is intended or foreseen, and Section 31 contains no death-related restriction at all. In that one respect it is the most permissive of the four. In every other respect it is the narrowest, because it is built on an identity - the person who receives the communication must be the person harmed by it and the person for whose benefit it was made. That is why Section 31 is not a defence to defamation, which concerns harm to the reputation of the person spoken about: the Sanhita deals with good-faith reports and cautions separately, in Exceptions 8 and 10 to Section 356. The Patna High Court in Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn stated the two cumulative conditions accurately, and the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew described the section's function in a single sentence, but neither decided anything about its scope, and the Madras High Court in N. Paul applied it to a government servant's report to his superiors on facts that arguably belong to the defamation exception instead. Section 31 reproduces IPC Section 93 with zero textual differences, and the definition of good faith it depends on is also unchanged, so there is no reform here to describe. No judgment construing BNS Section 31 was located; the only search result for the phrase cites a 'Section 31(2)' that does not exist in a provision that creates no offence at all.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 33 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 31 — Communication made in good faith
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 93 — Communication made in good faith · renumbered
Section 52 — "Good faith" · renumbered
Section 91 — Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused · renumbered
Section 92 (Explanation) — Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent — Explanation as to pecuniary benefit · renumbered
Section 88, 89, 92 — The three benefit-based exceptions for acts (consent; guardian's consent; without consent) · substantively unchanged
Section 499 (Eighth and Tenth Exceptions) — Defamation — accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person; caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good · modified
Side-by-side converterIPC 93 → BNS 31

What the section says

Section 31 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Communication made in good faith. and reads: S1S2

31. No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person.

Illustration.

A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death.

That is the whole provision: one sentence of thirty-one words and a single illustration, seventy-seven words in all. It has no sub-sections, no provisos, no Explanation and no exceptions. S1 It sits in Chapter III of the Sanhita, headed "General Exceptions", which runs from Section 14 to Section 44, and it has been in force since 1 July 2024, the date appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E) for the whole of the BNS except Section 106(2). S1S3

Short as it is, Section 31 does something no other provision in the Sanhita does. A programmatic search of the text of every section in Chapter III shows that Section 31 is the only General Exception whose operative words concern a communication at all: no other section between 14 and 44 contains the word "communicate" or any of its forms. A search across the whole Sanhita shows that the phrase "made for the benefit" occurs in Section 31 and nowhere else. S1 Every other exception in the chapter is addressed to acts. This one is addressed to speech.

Why words needed their own exception

The reason for a separate provision becomes clear once one notices what the surrounding sections require. Sections 26, 27 and 30: the three "benefit" exceptions: all protect harm caused by something done, and all three are hedged by provisos tied to death and hurt. S1 A communication does not fit that structure comfortably. Telling someone a true and necessary thing is not an "act" in the sense those sections contemplate, yet it can plainly cause harm: shock, collapse, a cardiac event, death.

The illustration takes the hardest case available. A surgeon tells a patient he is dying. The patient dies of the shock. And the illustration does not merely say the surgeon is innocent. It says he is innocent "though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death." S1 The protection therefore survives the doer's foresight of death. That is a strong form of immunity, and it is worth pausing on how unusual it is in this chapter.

The structural anomaly: no death carve-out

Of the four benefit-based exceptions in Chapter III, three expressly deal with death:

ProvisionDeath-related restriction
s. 26: act by consent for benefitApplies only to something "which is not intended to cause death"
s. 27: act for benefit of child or person of unsound mindProviso excludes "the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death"
s. 30: act for benefit without consentProviso (a) excludes intentional death; proviso (b) excludes "the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death" except for preventing death or grievous hurt or curing a grievous disease or infirmity
s. 31: communication for benefitNo death-related restriction of any kind

This is a verified textual comparison, not an impression: a check of all four sections confirms that ss. 26, 27 and 30 each contain a death carve-out and that Section 31 contains none. S1

The contrast with Section 30(b) is the sharpest. Section 30 expressly withdraws protection from a person who does something "knowing it to be likely to cause death" unless his purpose was preventing death or grievous hurt or effecting a cure. Section 31's illustration protects a surgeon who speaks "though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death", with no equivalent purpose test. S1

In that single respect Section 31 is the most permissive of the four. In every other respect it is the narrowest, because it is confined to communications and to harm suffered by the one person who received the communication. Whether the absence of a death carve-out was a deliberate drafting choice or simply a consequence of nobody thinking words needed one is not something this article can answer: no section-specific legislative rationale for Section 31 was located, and none is asserted below. The comparison in the table is the author's analysis; no authority setting it out was found.

The two conditions, and the one that gets overlooked

The clearest judicial statement of what Section 31's predecessor required comes from the Patna High Court in Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn v. State of Bihar, decided on 1 October 2019. At paragraph 39 the Court said: S7

"Section 93 of the IPC saves certain communication made in [good] faith from criminal liability. The said provision can be applied only if the communication has been made in good faith and for the benefit of the person to whom it is made."

Two features of that sentence repay attention. First, the Court said "certain communication", not all. Second, it stated the requirements as cumulative: "only if" the communication was made in good faith and for the benefit of the person to whom it is made. At paragraph 40 the Court added the observation that "the illustration given in Section 93 of the IPC also speaks of a surgeon", and set the illustration out in full. S7

Two cautions about how much weight that passage can bear. It is a single-judge decision of a High Court, persuasive rather than binding outside Bihar. Nor was it the ground of decision. The Court allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings at paragraphs 55 to 57 on an entirely different basis: that the prosecution was "apparently in conflict with the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court" in Jacob Mathew and Martin F. D'Souza on the threshold of gross negligence for medical practitioners. S7 The passage on Section 93 belongs to the Court's survey of the statutory protections available to doctors, not to its reasoning on the result. It is an accurate statement of the section's requirements by a High Court, but it is an observation, not a holding on the scope of Section 93.

One transcription point, recorded rather than silently corrected: the text of paragraph 39 as available from the judgment-text repository reads "made in food faith", which is why the word is bracketed in the quotation above. It is plainly a typographical error for "good faith", the same judgment using the correct phrase seventeen times elsewhere, including in the very next clause of the same sentence. S7

"To the person to whom it is made"

The condition most often passed over is the one that limits whose harm is excused. Section 31 protects a communication against being an offence "by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made." S1 The harm must be suffered by the recipient. And the benefit must be a benefit "of that person": the same person.

So Section 31 is built on an identity: the person who hears the communication is the person who is harmed by it and the person for whose benefit it was made. All three must be the same individual. That is why the illustration works: the surgeon speaks to the patient, the patient suffers the shock, and the communication was for the patient's own benefit.

The practical consequence is substantial. Section 31 does not protect:

  • a communication made to A that harms B;
  • a communication that harms the recipient but was made for someone else's benefit, or for the maker's own benefit, or for the public benefit;
  • a communication made for the recipient's benefit that happens to harm a third party.

None of those fall within the words of the section. S1 This is a reading of the statutory language rather than a proposition drawn from authority; no judgment deciding any of those three situations under Section 93 or Section 31 was located.

What "good faith" requires

"Good faith" is defined for the whole Sanhita by Section 2(11), and the definition is negative: S1

"good faith".—Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention;

This is word-for-word the definition that stood in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. S4 It is a demanding standard in a way that readers often miss, because it does not ask only whether the speaker was honest. It asks whether he exercised due care and attention. An honestly held but carelessly formed belief is not good faith within the meaning of the Sanhita.

Applied to Section 31, the due-care requirement attaches to the judgment that the communication would benefit the person, and, on the illustration's facts, to the clinical opinion being communicated. A surgeon who tells a patient he cannot live must have formed that opinion with due care and attention. The section protects the communication of a carefully formed opinion, not the careless delivery of an alarming one.

Section 31 is one of twelve provisions in Chapter III that turn on good faith. A check of the chapter shows the concept appearing in Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36 and 37. S1 The same definition in Section 2(11) governs all of them.

What Section 31 is not: the defamation boundary

The most common confusion about this provision is between Section 31 and the good-faith defences to defamation. They are different in kind, and the difference follows from the identity requirement discussed above.

Section 31 is about harm to the recipient of a communication: shock, distress, physical consequences. Defamation is about harm to the reputation of the person spoken about, who is usually not the recipient at all. A communication that lowers B's reputation in A's eyes harms B, not A. Section 31, which excuses only harm "to the person to whom it is made", has nothing to say about it.

The Sanhita deals with that situation separately, in the exceptions to Section 356 (Defamation). Two are directly relevant: S1

Exception 8.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.

Illustration. If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z's master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child, to Z's father, A is within this exception.

Exception 10.—It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good.

Exception 10 is the closer structural parallel to Section 31: a communication to one person, for that person's good, but it operates on the reputational harm to the person warned against, and it widens the permitted purposes to include a person in whom the recipient is interested, or the public good. Section 31 admits no such widening. S1

The operative wording of both exceptions is carried into the BNS unchanged from Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. What changed is presentation: the IPC labelled them "Eighth Exception" and "Tenth Exception" in ordinal words and gave each a side-heading, "Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person" and "Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good", while the BNS numbers them "Exception 8" and "Exception 10" and drops the side-headings. S1S4 The same removal of side-headings occurred in Section 28. The substance is identical.

A court that applied the provision outside medicine

Because the illustration features a surgeon, Section 93 of the IPC acquired a reputation as a medical provision. One judgment shows it being applied to facts with no medical element at all.

In N. Paul v. Vinod Kumar, decided by the Madras High Court on 21 March 2016, government servants faced a private complaint for defamation and related offences after they had reported a shortage of 2.4145 grams of platinum to their superiors, and then lodged a complaint against a senior scientist on their superiors' instructions. The criminal case against the scientist was eventually closed as a mistake of fact, and he responded with a private complaint against the officers under Sections 500, 211, 193 and 195 read with 34 of the IPC. The officers moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash it. S8

Counsel invoked Sections 76, 79 and 93 of the IPC, and the Court set all three out in full, including Section 93 in its entirety. At paragraph 17 it held: S8

"I am of the view, the petitioners had sent a communication to their higher authorities in good faith intimating that there was a shortage of 2.4145 grams of platinum and as per their directions, the petitioners acted in good faith and lodged the complaint against the respondent."

The petition was allowed and the proceedings quashed. S8

A reader should, however, notice a difficulty, and it is offered here expressly as the author's reading of the judgment and not as anything the Court said. On these facts Section 93 does not obviously fit. The communication went to the officers' superiors; the harm complained of was to the reputation of the scientist, who was neither the recipient of the communication nor a person for whose benefit it was made. Section 93 excused harm only "to the person to whom it is made". The provision that matches this fact pattern almost exactly is the Eighth Exception to Section 499: an accusation preferred in good faith to a person having lawful authority over the person accused, whose illustration contemplates precisely a complaint about a subordinate to someone in authority. The Court's conclusion also rests on Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on a finding that the ingredients of Section 499 were not made out, so the result does not depend on Section 93. The judgment is best read as authority that a good-faith report up a chain of command was not criminal on those facts, rather than as a considered construction of Section 93's scope.

What the Supreme Court has said

The Supreme Court has described the function of this provision, though it has not construed it. In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, decided on 5 August 2005, under the heading "Medical Professionals in Criminal Law", the Court observed that the Penal Code "sets out a few vocal examples" of the different treatment of medical professionals, summarised Sections 88 and 92, and then said: S6

"Section 93 saves from criminality certain communications made in good faith."

The Court then reproduced the illustrations to Sections 88, 92 and 93, including the surgeon's communication in full. S6

That is a Supreme Court statement of what Section 93 does, and it is consistent with the Patna High Court's later formulation. But its status should be stated accurately: it is an observation describing the statutory scheme, made while the Court was setting the context for its decision. The holding in Jacob Mathew concerns the standard of criminal negligence applicable to doctors; the Court did not decide any question about the scope of Section 93, and nothing in the judgment addresses the two conditions, the identity requirement, or the absence of a death carve-out. It should not be cited as a ruling on Section 93.

There is, however, a second and more substantive Supreme Court statement about this provision, and it concerns the kind of harm the section contemplates. In Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, a three-Judge Bench decision of 31 March 1966 reported as AIR 1966 SC 1773, the Court was construing Section 95 of the IPC (the trivial-harm exception, now Section 33 of the Sanhita) and in the course of rejecting an argument that "harm" there excluded physical injury it surveyed the word across the Code. It held that "harm" is undefined, that "in its dictionary meaning it connotes hurt, injury; damage; impairment, moral wrong or evil", that in Sections 81, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 100, 104 and 106 "the expression can only mean physical injury" — and that in Section 93 "it means an injurious mental reaction". S10

That is the Supreme Court identifying, in a single phrase, the distinctive character of the harm this provision is about. Sections 26, 27 and 30 are concerned with bodily consequences of things done. Section 31 is concerned with what a communication does to the mind of the person who receives it, and the illustration's patient, who dies "in consequence of the shock", is precisely an injurious mental reaction with a physical outcome. The Rupan Deol Bajaj bench summarised the same holding in 1995 as making the word "wide enough to include physical injury as also injurious mental reaction". S11

Two cautions. The observation was made while construing a different section, and the Court decided nothing about Section 93's requirements; like the Jacob Mathew sentence, it is authority on what the provision is about rather than on when it applies. And the reading of the phrase as illuminating the illustration is the author's, not the Court's.

Two provisions that do not reach Section 31

Readers who have worked through Sections 25 to 30 will expect two familiar limits to apply here. Neither does, and both omissions are verified from the statutory text.

Section 29 does not name Section 31. Section 29 withdraws the protection of the consent-based exceptions from acts that are offences independently of the harm they cause. Its words are: "The exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause..." S1 Section 31 is not in that list. Nor was Section 93 named in the IPC's equivalent, Section 91, which referred to Sections 87, 88 and 89. S4

The omission is readily explicable. Section 29 is framed around consent (it speaks of "the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given") and Section 31 contains no consent requirement at all. Section 31 asks only about good faith and benefit; it never asks whether the recipient agreed to be told. That explanation is the author's analysis; no authority on the point was located.

The Explanation to Section 30 does not reach Section 31 either. That Explanation reads: "Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section." S1 It names three sections, and Section 31 is not among them. So the statutory direction that financial advantage does not count as "benefit" governs Sections 26, 27 and 30: and, on the words used, not Section 31, even though Section 31 uses the same key word "benefit".

What follows from that is genuinely uncertain and this article does not pretend otherwise. One reading is that the omission is deliberate and "benefit" in Section 31 is correspondingly wider. Another is that the Explanation reflects a general understanding of "benefit" that a court would apply to Section 31 anyway. No judgment deciding the point was located, and the question appears not to have arisen. A reader advising on facts where the only benefit of a communication was financial should treat the position as open rather than settled.

IPC Section 93 compared with BNS Section 31

The comparison is the simplest in this part of the chapter. There is no difference at all.

To state that with confidence rather than by impression, the text of IPC Section 93 and the text of BNS Section 31 were compared programmatically. Both were normalised for whitespace, punctuation, the em-dash after the marginal note, curly and straight apostrophes, the section number, and the illustration label, and then reduced to word lists and compared with a standard unified-diff algorithm. Both texts produce exactly 76 tokens, and the diff returns zero differences. S1S4 The method is described here so that a reader can repeat the check rather than take the claim on trust.

FeatureIPC s. 93BNS s. 31
Marginal-note titleCommunication made in good faithCommunication made in good faith.
Operative wordsIdenticalIdentical
IllustrationSurgeon, patient, shock, foreseen deathIdentical
Provisos / ExplanationNoneNone
Death carve-outNoneNone
Named in the "independent offence" sectionNo (s. 91 named 87, 88, 89)No (s. 29 names 25, 26, 27)

The correct classification is therefore renumbered: the rule moved from Section 93 to Section 31 and nothing else happened to it. The definition of good faith it depends on also survived unchanged, moving from Section 52 of the IPC to Section 2(11) of the Sanhita in identical words. S1S4

This matters for how IPC-era material may be used. Where the wording of a provision is unaltered, reasoning developed on the old text continues to apply to the new, because the words being construed are the same words. Jacob Mathew, Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn and N. Paul are all decisions on Section 93 of the IPC. They are not decisions on Section 31 of the BNS, and they should not be described as such. But their reasoning is about language that Section 31 reproduces exactly.

Case law under the BNS: none, and a mis-citation worth knowing about

No judgment construing Section 31 of the BNS was located. That statement was tested rather than assumed, because the risk of asserting an empty field without checking is real.

A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 31 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned exactly one document: an order of the Telangana High Court in Mrs. Jakati Bhargavi v. The State of Telangana, dated 11 June 2025. S9 That order records at paragraph 2 that the petitioner "is arrayed as accused No.1 in Crime No.267 of 2025, registered for the offence punishable under Section 31 (2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023."

That citation cannot be right, for two independent reasons verified from the statute. First, Section 31 has no sub-section (2). It is a single undivided sentence with one illustration. S1 Second, Section 31 is a General Exception: it creates no offence and prescribes no punishment, so there can be no "offence punishable under" it. What provision was actually intended is not identifiable from the order, and this article does not guess. The order contains no discussion of communication, of good faith, or of anything within Section 31's subject-matter; it was disposed of with a direction on a separate point. S9

It is recorded here for two reasons. It is the only search result for the phrase, so a reader who runs the same search should know what it is and what it is not. And it is a useful reminder that in the early years of the transition, section numbers in records, first information reports and even court orders may be wrong, and should be checked against the statute rather than relied on.

A search for the exact statutory phrase "No communication made in good faith is an offence" returned seven documents, of which five are statute pages (the IPC, the BNS, and the Ranbir Penal Code) and two are the judgments discussed above. A search for the distinctive illustration phrase "communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live" returned ten documents, mostly medical-negligence judgments reproducing the Jacob Mathew passage. Searching the statutory wording rather than the section number is what surfaces real authority; section-number searches return provisions of unrelated enactments. S6S7S8

Who must prove what

Section 31 is a General Exception, and the burden of bringing a case within it lies on the accused. That is the effect of Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which succeeds Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and additionally directs that "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances." S5

In practice an accused relying on Section 31 would have to establish three things: that the harm complained of was suffered by the person to whom the communication was made; that the communication was made for that person's benefit; and that it was made in good faith, meaning with due care and attention within Section 2(11). S1S5 On the illustration's facts the third is likely to be the contested one, since it reaches back into how the opinion communicated was formed.

The standard of proof an accused must meet in discharging that burden is conventionally stated as being lower than the prosecution's, but that proposition does not appear in the text of Section 108 and no judgment on it was examined for this article. It is flagged rather than asserted.

Common misconceptions

"Section 31 is a provision for doctors." The illustration features a surgeon and the Supreme Court discussed the section in a medical-negligence case, which is why the association is so strong. But the operative words are not confined to medicine: they protect "no communication made in good faith", whoever makes it. N. Paul shows the provision being invoked for a report by government servants to their superiors. S1S8

"It protects any honest statement." It does not. Good faith under Section 2(11) requires due care and attention, so carelessness defeats the section however honest the speaker. And the communication must be for the recipient's benefit: an honest but purposeless or gratuitously cruel communication is outside the words. S1

"It is a defence to defamation." It is not addressed to that harm at all. Section 31 excuses harm "to the person to whom it is made". Defamation harms the reputation of the person spoken about. The good-faith defences to defamation are in the Exceptions to Section 356, particularly Exceptions 8 and 10. S1

"The BNS strengthened or modernised this provision." It did not touch it. A word-level diff of IPC Section 93 against BNS Section 31 returns zero differences, and the definition of good faith it relies on is also unchanged. S1S4 There is nothing to describe as reform here, and no section-specific legislative rationale was located.

"Foreseeing death defeats the exception." Not under this section. The illustration expressly protects a surgeon who spoke "though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death", and Section 31: unlike Sections 26, 27 and 30: contains no death-related restriction at all. S1

"Telling someone bad news for their family's sake is covered." On the words, no. The benefit must be "of that person", the person to whom the communication is made. A communication for a third party's benefit, including a family member's, is not within Section 31, though Exception 10 to Section 356 does extend to "some person in whom that person is interested" in the defamation context. S1

Reading the section in practice

Where Section 31 is in issue, the questions the words pose, in order, are these:

  1. Is the thing complained of a communication? If the harm flowed from an act rather than from something communicated, Section 31 is the wrong provision; Sections 26, 27 or 30 may be the right ones.
  2. Who suffered the harm? It must be the person to whom the communication was made. If the harm fell on anyone else, Section 31 does not apply on its terms.
  3. Whose benefit was it for? It must be the benefit of that same person. Not the maker's, not a relative's, not the public's.
  4. Was it made with due care and attention? Honesty alone is not good faith under Section 2(11). This includes the care with which the underlying judgment or opinion was formed.

Nothing turns on whether death or hurt resulted, because the section contains no restriction of that kind. And nothing turns on the recipient's consent, because the section never asks for it.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis above rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff, and its method is set out so that it can be repeated.

Five judgments were read in full and are discussed with their limits stated. Jacob Mathew contains a one-sentence description of Section 93's function in a passage setting out statutory context; it is not a ruling on the section's scope. Veeda Menezes and Rupan Deol Bajaj are Supreme Court decisions on Section 95 of the IPC, the trivial-harm exception; the statement that "harm" in Section 93 means "an injurious mental reaction" was made while construing that different section, and neither Court decided anything about Section 93's requirements or scope. Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn states the two cumulative conditions accurately but did so in a survey passage, the case being decided on the Jacob Mathew negligence threshold; it is a single-judge High Court decision, persuasive only. N. Paul applied Section 93 to a non-medical communication and quashed proceedings, but its reasoning also rests on Section 197 CrPC and on Section 499's ingredients, and the observation that the Eighth Exception to Section 499 fits the facts better is the author's reading, not the Court's. All five judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than an official court portal. Later treatment of Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn and N. Paul was not researched beyond noting that the repository records no citing references for either.

Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located for any of them: the comparison showing that Section 31 alone among Sections 26, 27, 30 and 31 lacks a death carve-out; the reading of why Section 29 omits Section 31; the significance of the Section 30 Explanation not naming Section 31; the three consequences drawn from the identity requirement; the reading of N. Paul set out above; and the reading of the phrase "an injurious mental reaction" as illuminating the illustration. The effect of the Section 30 Explanation's omission of Section 31 is identified as genuinely unsettled, not resolved.

No judgment construing BNS Section 31 was located, and the single search result for the phrase "section 31 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" is an order whose citation of that provision cannot be correct, for the reasons given. Professional and ethical regulation of medical communication, disclosure obligations, and the law on breaking bad news to patients were not examined; nothing here is medical or professional guidance. Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above. Section 356 and its Exceptions are referred to for contrast only; their ingredients were not analysed beyond the words quoted.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice, is not medical or professional guidance, and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether Section 31 protects a particular communication depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 31 actually protect?
It protects a communication from being an offence 'by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person'. S1 So three things must line up on the same individual: he received the communication, he suffered the harm, and the communication was made for his benefit. There are no provisos, no Explanation and no exceptions - it is one sentence and one illustration.
+Is Section 31 only for doctors?
No, although the association is strong because the illustration features a surgeon and the Supreme Court discussed the provision in a medical-negligence case. S1S6 The operative words protect 'no communication made in good faith', whoever makes it. In N. Paul v. Vinod Kumar the Madras High Court invoked the predecessor provision for government servants who had reported a shortage of platinum to their superiors. S8 Nothing in this article is medical or professional guidance.
+Does it matter that the surgeon knew the patient might die?
Not under this section. The illustration expressly says the surgeon 'has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death'. S1 A comparison of all four benefit-based exceptions shows why that is striking: Sections 26, 27 and 30 each carry a death-related restriction, and Section 30's proviso (b) specifically withdraws protection from a person who does something knowing it likely to cause death except for three stated purposes - while Section 31 has no death-related restriction at all. That comparison is the author's analysis; no authority setting it out was located.
+What does 'good faith' mean here?
Section 2(11) defines it negatively for the whole Sanhita: nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed 'without due care and attention'. S1 This is word-for-word the old definition in Section 52 of the IPC. S4 It asks more than whether the speaker was honest - an honestly held but carelessly formed belief is not good faith. Under Section 31 that attaches to the judgment that the communication would benefit the person and, on the illustration's facts, to the care with which the clinical opinion was formed.
+Can Section 31 be used as a defence to defamation?
No. Section 31 excuses harm 'to the person to whom it is made'. Defamation harms the reputation of the person spoken about, who is usually not the recipient at all. The good-faith defences to defamation are in the Exceptions to Section 356 - particularly Exception 8, which covers an accusation preferred in good faith to someone having lawful authority over the person accused, and Exception 10, which covers a caution conveyed in good faith for the good of the person warned. S1 Exception 10 is the closer parallel to Section 31 but is wider, extending to a person in whom the recipient is interested, or the public good.
+What if the communication was made for someone else's benefit?
On the words, Section 31 does not apply. The benefit must be 'of that person' - the person to whom the communication was made. A communication made for a relative's benefit, for the maker's own benefit, or for the public benefit falls outside the section, as does a communication to one person that harms another. S1 That is a reading of the statutory language; no judgment deciding any of those situations under Section 93 or Section 31 was located.
+Has the Supreme Court ruled on this provision?
It has described it, not ruled on it. In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (5 August 2005), under the heading 'Medical Professionals in Criminal Law', the Court said that 'Section 93 saves from criminality certain communications made in good faith' and reproduced the illustration in full. S6 But that is an observation setting out statutory context. The holding in Jacob Mathew concerns the standard of criminal negligence for doctors; the Court decided nothing about Section 93's scope and did not address its conditions. It should not be cited as a ruling on the section.
+Has any High Court explained what the section requires?
Yes. In Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn v. State of Bihar (Patna High Court, 1 October 2019), at paragraph 39, the Court said that Section 93 'saves certain communication made in good faith from criminal liability' and that it 'can be applied only if the communication has been made in good faith and for the benefit of the person to whom it is made'. S7 Note 'certain', and note that the conditions are cumulative. Two cautions: it is a single-judge decision, persuasive rather than binding outside Bihar, and it was not the ground of decision - the Court quashed the proceedings on the Jacob Mathew gross-negligence threshold instead, so the passage belongs to its survey of statutory protections rather than to its reasoning on the result.
+Is there any case applying the provision outside medicine?
One. In N. Paul v. Vinod Kumar (Madras High Court, 21 March 2016), government servants who had reported a platinum shortage to their superiors and then lodged a complaint on their instructions faced a private complaint for defamation and related offences. The Court set out Sections 76, 79 and 93 IPC in full, held at paragraph 17 that the petitioners 'had sent a communication to their higher authorities in good faith', and quashed the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. S8 A difficulty should be noticed, and it is offered as the author's reading and not as anything the Court said: the harm complained of was to the reputation of the scientist, who was neither the recipient of the communication nor a person for whose benefit it was made, so Section 93 does not obviously fit - the Eighth Exception to Section 499 matches the facts almost exactly. The result also rests on Section 197 CrPC and on a finding that Section 499's ingredients were not made out.
+Does Section 29 limit Section 31?
No. Section 29 withdraws Sections 25, 26 and 27 from acts that are offences independently of the harm they cause, and it does not name Section 31 - exactly as IPC Section 91 named Sections 87, 88 and 89 and omitted Section 93. S1S4 The omission appears explicable: Section 29 is framed around consent, speaking of 'the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given', whereas Section 31 contains no consent requirement at all and never asks whether the recipient agreed to be told. That explanation is the author's analysis; no authority on it was located.
+Does 'benefit' in Section 31 exclude a purely financial benefit?
The position is genuinely open, and this article does not pretend otherwise. The Explanation to Section 30 provides that 'Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section'. It names three sections and Section 31 is not among them, even though Section 31 turns on the same word. S1 One reading is that the omission is deliberate and 'benefit' in Section 31 is correspondingly wider; another is that a court would apply the same understanding anyway. No judgment deciding the point was located and the question appears not to have arisen.
+How did the BNS change IPC Section 93?
It did not change it at all. The texts of IPC Section 93 and BNS Section 31 were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, the em-dash after the marginal note, apostrophes, the section number and the illustration label. Both produce exactly 76 tokens and the diff returns zero differences. S1S4 The definition of good faith the section depends on is also unchanged, moving from Section 52 IPC to Section 2(11) BNS in identical words. The correct classification is renumbered, and no section-specific legislative rationale was located.
+Are there any judgments on BNS Section 31 itself?
None was located, and that was tested rather than assumed. A search for the exact phrase 'section 31 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned exactly one document: an order of the Telangana High Court dated 11 June 2025 recording a crime 'registered for the offence punishable under Section 31 (2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023'. S9 That citation cannot be right - Section 31 has no sub-section (2), and being a General Exception it creates no offence and prescribes no punishment, so nothing can be 'punishable under' it. S1 What provision was intended is not identifiable from the order, and this article does not guess. The order contains no discussion of communication or good faith. It is a useful reminder that in the transition years section numbers in records and orders should be checked against the statute.
+Who has to prove that Section 31 applies?
The accused. Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which succeeds Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, places the burden of bringing a case within a General Exception on the accused and directs that 'the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances'. S5 In practice that means establishing that the harm was suffered by the recipient of the communication, that it was made for that person's benefit, and that it was made with due care and attention. The standard of proof is conventionally said to be lower than the prosecution's, but that does not appear in the text of Section 108 and no judgment on it was examined for this article.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 31 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S6Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 5 August 2005 (appeal concerning the standard of criminal negligence applicable to medical practitioners) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S7Dr. Hemchandra Lal Karn v. State of Bihar and Anr. — Patna High Court, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 27618 of 2017, decided 1 October 2019 (Ashwani Kumar Singh, J.) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S8N. Paul v. Vinod Kumar — Madras High Court, Crl.O.P. No. 15677 of 2015 and Crl.M.P. No. 2976 of 2016, decided 21 March 2016 (R. Mala, J.) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  9. S9Mrs. Jakati Bhargavi v. The State of Telangana — Telangana High Court, Criminal Petition No. 6406 of 2025, order dated 11 June 2025 (N. Tukaramji, J.) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  10. S10Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 31 March 1966; equivalent citations AIR 1966 SC 1773, 1966 SCR 123; three-Judge Bench (Shah, J.C.; Wanchoo, K.N.; Sikri, S.M.), judgment delivered by J.C. Shah, J. (a decision construing IPC s. 95, the trivial-harm exception, not s. 93) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  11. S11Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 12 October 1995; equivalent citations AIR 1996 SC 309, (1995) 6 SCC 194; judgment delivered by M.K. Mukherjee, J. (a decision on IPC s. 95, not s. 93) (accessed 3 October 2026)

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