The short answer
Section 120 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the custodial torture provision. Its own illustrations say so: all three are about officials beating people to make them talk or pay. S1
Sub-section (1) punishes hurt caused for the purpose of extorting a confession, or information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or of constraining someone to restore property, satisfy a claim or demand, or give information leading to the restoration of property. It carries up to seven years and a mandatory fine. Sub-section (2) covers grievous hurt caused for any of the same purposes and carries up to ten years and a mandatory fine. S1
Three things a reader should take away.
First, one of the Penal Code's four illustrations has been deleted. IPC section 330 illustrated the offence with a police officer, a police officer again, a revenue officer, and - in illustration (d) - "A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat in order to compel him to pay his rent." That fourth illustration is gone from section 120(1). The words "zamindar" and "raiyat" appear nowhere in the entire Sanhita. S1; S2; S3
Second, the punishments did not change at all. Seven years for hurt, ten years for grievous hurt, mandatory but unquantified fines in both, exactly as IPC sections 330 and 331 provided. No minimum was added and no fine ceiling was introduced. S1; S2; S11
Third, and most consequentially, the First Schedule sends this offence to a court that cannot sentence it properly. Section 120(1) is assigned to a Magistrate of the first class, who may not pass more than three years' imprisonment. In 2018 the Supreme Court held that a three-year sentence for precisely this offence was "grossly insufficient and dis-proportional", and raised it to the statutory maximum of seven years. S12; S13; S16
What the section actually requires
Like section 119, this section has a two-tier mental element: the voluntariness required for hurt, plus a further purpose on top. But the purposes are different ones, and there are four of them. S1
Tier one: voluntarily causing hurt. "Hurt" is bodily pain, disease or infirmity (section 114). "Voluntarily causing hurt" means an act done with intention or knowledge of likelihood which thereby causes hurt (section 115(1)). For sub-section (2), the injury must fall within the closed list of grievous hurt in section 116, and section 117(1) supplies the definition. S4; S5; S6; S7
Tier two: the purpose. The hurt must be caused for the purpose of:
- extorting from the sufferer, or from any person interested in the sufferer, any confession;
- extorting from either of them any information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct;
- constraining either of them to restore or to cause the restoration of any property or valuable security, or to satisfy any claim or demand;
- constraining either of them to give information which may lead to the restoration of any property or valuable security. S1
Sub-section (2) imports all of this by the words "for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1)". S1
Two features of this list repay attention.
"Or misconduct" is wider than crime. The information need not relate to an offence at all. Beating a subordinate to extract an admission of departmental misconduct is within the section on its terms. S1
"To satisfy any claim or demand" is wider than section 119. Section 119 is confined to extorting property or a valuable security, or compelling an illegal act. Section 120 reaches the enforcement of a claim - including, on illustration (c), a perfectly lawful claim. The revenue officer in that illustration is collecting arrears genuinely due, and he is still guilty. The lawfulness of what is being demanded is no defence. That is the point the three illustrations exist to make. No decision construing the "claim or demand" limb specifically was located. S1
The illustrations, and the one that was removed
Section 120(1) carries three illustrations:
(a) A, a police officer, tortures Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section.
(b) A, a police officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen property is deposited. A is guilty of an offence under this section.
(c) A, a revenue officer, tortures Z in order to compel him to pay certain arrears of revenue due from Z. A is guilty of an offence under this section. S1
IPC section 330 carried these three and a fourth:
(d) A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat in order to compel him to pay his rent. A is guilty of an offence under this section. S2
The deletion is the only substantive editorial change in the section. It was verified three ways: by token comparison of the two provisions; by counting the lettered illustrations in each (four against three); and by searching the whole Gazette text of the Sanhita for "zamindar" and for "raiyat", neither of which occurs anywhere in the Act. S1; S2; S3
Does the removal narrow the offence? On the text, no. The operative words of sub-section (1) are unchanged, and they are not limited to public servants - "whoever" is the subject. A landlord who beats a tenant to extract rent is constraining him to satisfy a claim or demand, which is squarely within the operative words. Illustrations explain a provision; they do not confine it. The sensible reading is that an anachronistic example was retired, not that private landlords were licensed. S1; S2
But the removal does change the section's emphasis. All three surviving illustrations concern public officials. A reader coming to section 120 fresh would reasonably take it for an offence about state actors, where the Penal Code's fourth illustration made clear it reaches private economic coercion too. No published document explaining the deletion was located, and nothing here should be read as a claim about why it was made. S1
Sub-section (1) against IPC section 330
A token comparison returns five differences, four of which are typographical:
- The comma after "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt" is gone - the same change made in section 119(1), so across the two purpose-based hurt sections the Sanhita has dropped this comma consistently.
- "Illustrations" acquired a full stop.
- and 4. "police-officer" became "police officer", twice.
- Illustration (d) was deleted. S1; S2
The punishment is word for word identical: "imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." Seven-year maximum, rigorous or simple, and a fine that is mandatory because the section says "shall also be liable to fine". S1; S2
No fine figure is stated, so section 8(1) governs: where no sum is expressed, the fine "is unlimited, but shall not be excessive". IPC section 63 said the same in the same words. The fine exposure is therefore unchanged. This step matters because the Sanhita has handled fines inconsistently across this chapter - section 115(2) multiplied its figure tenfold, section 118(1) introduced a ceiling that actually reduced the maximum, section 117(2) left an unquantified fine unquantified, and sections 119 and 120 leave both of theirs unquantified. Seven provisions, no single rule. S1; S2; S11
Sub-section (2) against IPC section 331
IPC section 331 spelt the purpose clause out in full. Section 120(2) replaces it with "for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1)" - the same drafting economy used in sections 118(2) and 119(2). S1; S2
The punishment is identical: up to ten years and a mandatory fine. As with section 119(2), the compression incidentally tidies a punctuation inconsistency, because IPC section 330 and IPC section 331 placed their commas differently within the same clause; routing sub-section (2) through sub-section (1) leaves one formulation. S1; S2
And note what sub-section (2) does not carry: imprisonment for life. Section 119(2) - grievous hurt to extort property - carries life. Section 120(2) - grievous hurt to extort a confession - carries ten years. So the Sanhita treats torture for property as graver than torture for a confession, which may strike a modern reader as the wrong way round. That ranking is the Penal Code's own, carried forward unaltered: IPC section 329 carried life and IPC section 331 carried ten years. The Sanhita did not revisit it. S1; S2; S8
No minimum sentence appears in section 120 either. This is now a clear pattern of selective insertion within a few consecutive sections: section 118(2) gained a one-year minimum, section 121(2) carries one, and sections 119(2) and 120(2) have none. A reader must check each provision against its own predecessor rather than generalising. S1; S8; S9
No provocation carve-out
Sections 115(2), 117(2) and 118 each contain an express carve-out referring to section 122, which provides much lower punishment for hurt caused on grave and sudden provocation. Sections 119, 120 and 121 contain none. S1; S5; S7; S8; S9; S10
For section 120 the omission is unsurprising: hurt inflicted methodically to extract a confession is not hurt inflicted on sudden provocation. The General Exceptions in Chapter III remain available, and if the purpose element fails but the injury is proved, the charge falls to section 115(2) or section 117(2) - where the carve-out does operate. S1; S5; S7; S10
What the Supreme Court has said
Yashwant v. The State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court of India, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and N.V. Ramana JJ, 4 September 2018) is the most important authority on the predecessor of section 120(1), and it is squarely about the sentence. S16
Police officers took a man named Joinus and his wife Zarina from their house at night and beat them to extract information about a cheating offence - having, as the Court found, already realised that Joinus was not the man they were looking for. Joinus died. The homicide charge failed on the cause of death, and that acquittal was not disturbed; but the conviction under IPC section 330 read with section 34 was upheld, the High Court having found that "injuries were caused by the police officer to extract information, which would squarely fall under the four corners of Section 330 of IPC." The Supreme Court said it found "no material on record to interfere with the conviction of the accused under the aforesaid Section, except for the quantum of punishment". S16
On quantum, the Court quoted the Lahore High Court in Lal Mohammad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 Lah 471:
"conduct of this sort by responsible police officers engaged in the investigation of a crime, is one of the most serious offences known to the law. The result of third degree methods or of actual torture or beating such as in this case must be that innocent persons might well be convicted, confession being forced from them which are false ... It clearly is the duty of the Courts when a case of this kind is proved to pass sentences which may have a deterrent effect." S16
It added that "[s]uch incidents involving police usually tend to deplete the confidence in our criminal justice system much more than those incidents involving private individuals." Then it held that the trial court's three-year sentence "would be grossly insufficient and dis-proportional", and increased it to "the maximum imposable period under Section 330 of IPC i.e., seven years of rigorous imprisonment", maintaining the fine. S16
Two cautions. The Lal Mohammad passage is quoted here as the Supreme Court quoted it; the Lahore High Court's own report was not retrieved. And the Court also quoted a commentary, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, to the same effect - a textbook, not a binding source, and identified as such in the judgment. S16
Ramasamy v. State (Madras High Court, 4 December 2006) is a custodial death case in which the conviction of the first accused under IPC section 330 was expressly sustained, the Court holding that on the evidence his conviction "for extorting a confession from Rajakannu, since deceased and causing injury to him with lathi ... can be legally sustained". It illustrates the same pattern as Yashwant: where a custodial death cannot be brought home as homicide, section 330 - now section 120 - is the provision that holds. S17
No reported decision applying section 120 under its new numbering was located; searches on the new section number returned no parseable result from the search tool used, which is a limitation of the search rather than evidence of absence. S1
The hurt is still indispensable
On the ingredients, the reasoning in Rishab Panikar v. State of Chhattisgarh (Division Bench, 13 May 2026) transfers. That case concerned section 119(1), but the structure of section 120(1) is identical - "voluntarily causes hurt" followed by a purpose clause - and the Court's holding was that "causing hurt is the foundational and indispensable ingredient of the offence", so that a demand accompanied by abuse and intimidation, without hurt, falls outside the section. On that reasoning, an interrogation conducted by threats and shouting, however improper, is not section 120 unless hurt is actually caused. The transfer is an inference from the parallel structure, not a holding on section 120. S1; S18
The mirror point also transfers. In Virendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1998 CriLJ 2170), on IPC section 329, the Court held that the words "for the purposes of extorting" include an attempt, and that the provision "would be attracted even if extortion is not complete". Applied here, the confession need never be made and the property never restored: the purpose is what matters. Again, an inference from parallel wording rather than a decision on this section. S1; S19
So the element has the same two-sided shape as at section 119: the hurt must be complete; the extraction need not be. S16; S18; S19
The sentencing problem, and why it is not abstract
The First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 classifies both sub-sections:
| Section | Offence | Punishment | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Court |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 120(1) | Voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession or information, or to compel restoration of property, etc. | Imprisonment for 7 years and fine | Cognizable | Bailable | Magistrate of the first class |
| 120(2) | Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort confession or information, or to compel restoration of property, etc. | Imprisonment for 10 years and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Court of Session |
Section 23(2) of that Sanhita limits a Magistrate of the first class to imprisonment not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service. Section 23(1) confirms the ceiling binds upward: even a Chief Judicial Magistrate may not pass death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding seven years. S13
At sections 118 and 119 this mismatch could be described as a drafting untidiness. Here it cannot, because the Supreme Court has already ruled on the very point. In Yashwant the trial court imposed three years - exactly what a first-class Magistrate can impose - and the Supreme Court held that sentence "grossly insufficient and dis-proportional" for custodial torture by police, and substituted the full seven years. The First Schedule now routes that offence to a court whose maximum is the sentence the Supreme Court has condemned as inadequate for it. S12; S13; S16
The resolution is procedural. Where a Magistrate concludes during inquiry or trial that the case ought to be tried by a Court of Session, sections 361 and 362 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita provide the route to commit it. But that depends on the Magistrate forming that view and acting on it; nothing in the Schedule flags the problem. No decision considering this mismatch in the context of section 120 was located, so the sections 361 and 362 route is offered as the apparent statutory answer, not an adjudicated one. S14; S15
A bail anomaly worth noticing
Compare three consecutive provisions as the Schedule classifies them:
- section 119(1) - hurt to extort property - 10 years - non-bailable
- section 120(1) - hurt to extort a confession - 7 years - bailable
- section 121(1) - hurt to deter a public servant - 5 years - non-bailable S12
Section 120(1) carries a higher maximum than section 121(1) yet is bailable where section 121(1) is not. So the offence typically committed by a public servant is bailable, while the offence committed against one, on a lower maximum, is not. Whether that is deliberate could not be determined; no official explanation was located. S12
Two standing cautions on reading the Schedule apply here as elsewhere. Column 2 is a label, not a definition - the entry for section 120 ends with "etc.", which is doing a great deal of work for a purpose clause with four limbs. And column 3 drops the statutory words "which may extend to", so "Imprisonment for 7 years" is a maximum, not a fixed term. Work from the section, not the row. S1; S12
The evidence-law counterpart
Section 120 makes the torture a crime. Separately, the law of evidence makes its product unusable.
Under section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." Section 23(2) adds that no confession made by a person while in police custody may be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. S20
Under section 22, a confession is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the court considers it to have been caused by "any inducement, threat, coercion or promise" having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority, sufficient to give the accused reasonable grounds for supposing he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil. S21
Read with section 120, the scheme is coherent: the conduct in illustration (a) is an offence punishable with seven years, and the confession it produces cannot be proved against the person who made it. This article does not compare these provisions with their Indian Evidence Act, 1872 predecessors, because that Act was not retrieved; in particular, no claim is made here as to whether the word "coercion" in section 22 is new. S20; S21
The constitutional dimension - Article 20(3) on self-incrimination and Article 21 on life and personal liberty - is referred to in the authorities but is not analysed in this article, and no constitutional text was cited for it. S16
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
Section 120 is not limited to the police. The subject is "whoever". The illustrations happen to concern a police officer twice and a revenue officer once, and a fourth concerning a zamindar was deleted, but the operative words cover any person. Private actors - employers, moneylenders, landlords - fall within it where the purpose element is satisfied. S1; S2
The claim being enforced may be perfectly lawful. Illustration (c) is decisive: arrears genuinely due, and the officer is still guilty. The vice is the method, not the entitlement. S1
The information sought need not concern a crime. "Offence or misconduct" covers purely disciplinary matters. S1
The extraction need not succeed, on the Virendra Kumar reasoning applied by analogy - but the hurt must actually be caused, on the Rishab Panikar reasoning applied by analogy. Threats alone, however oppressive, are not this offence. S18; S19
Section 120 is not section 119. The difference is the purpose. Confession, information, restoration of property, satisfaction of a claim: section 120. Extorting property or a valuable security, or compelling an illegal act: section 119. Getting this wrong changes the bail position, the trial court and the maximum. S1; S8; S12
Custodial death is not covered by this section. If death results, the homicide provisions apply on their own terms. Yashwant and Ramasamy are both cases in which the homicide charge failed and section 330 held; neither suggests section 120 is the right charge where homicide is made out. S16; S17
The fine is mandatory and unquantified. Both sub-sections say "shall also be liable to fine", so a fine must accompany imprisonment, and section 8(1) sets no figure but forbids excess. A fine alone is not available under either sub-section. S1; S11
Worked examples
Example 1. A police officer beats a suspect to make him confess. Section 120(1), on illustration (a). If the beating causes a fracture, section 120(2), triable by a Court of Session. Any confession obtained is inadmissible under section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. S1; S6; S12; S20
Example 2. A revenue official beats a defaulter to collect arrears actually owed. Section 120(1), on illustration (c). The lawfulness of the demand is irrelevant. S1
Example 3. An employer beats a storekeeper to make him disclose where missing stock went. Section 120(1): information which may lead to the restoration of property, and the section is not confined to public servants. S1
Example 4. An interrogating officer shouts threats for six hours but never touches the suspect. Not section 120, on the Rishab Panikar reasoning, because no hurt is caused. Other provisions, and departmental consequences, may follow. S18
Example 5. A landlord beats a tenant to extract rent. On the operative words, section 120(1) - constraining him to satisfy a claim or demand. This was IPC illustration (d), now deleted; the deletion removes the example, not the liability. S1; S2
Example 6. A officer beats a detainee to extract a confession; the detainee gives nothing and is released. Section 120(1) is still complete, on the Virendra Kumar reasoning applied by analogy: the purpose, not its achievement, is the element. S19
Commencement and which law applies
Section 120 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S22
Conduct before that date is governed by IPC sections 330 and 331; conduct on or after it by section 120. Because the operative words and both punishments are unchanged, the transition determines label and forum but not exposure - the same position as at section 119, and unlike sections 115 and 118. The single substantive difference, the deleted illustration, cannot affect liability, since illustrations explain rather than confine and the operative words are identical. S1; S2; S22
For proceedings instituted on or after 1 July 2024 the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita governs, so the First Schedule classification and the sentencing-power problem discussed above apply whichever substantive Act supplies the offence. S12; S13
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 120
- Section 114 - definition of hurt. S4
- Section 115 - voluntarily causing hurt; the fallback if the purpose element fails. S5
- Section 116 - the closed list of grievous hurt. S6
- Section 117 - voluntarily causing grievous hurt; the fallback for sub-section (2). S7
- Section 119 - hurt to extort property or compel an illegal act; the nearest neighbour, and the one that carries life. S8
- Section 121 - hurt to deter a public servant; the mirror-image offence, and the bail comparison. S9
- Section 122 - hurt on provocation; relevant here by its absence. S10
- Section 8 - the amount of fine where no sum is expressed. S11
- Sections 22 and 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - the inadmissibility of confessions to police and of confessions caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise. S20; S21
- Sections 23, 361 and 362 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - sentencing powers and commitment. S13; S14; S15
Sources and honest limits
The statutory comparisons were made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 120 against the India Code text of IPC sections 330 and 331, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The First Schedule rows were read from the Gazette text of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. India Code handles were read from the verified section inventory and, for the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, resolved by lookup rather than guessed. S1; S2; S3; S12; S20; S21
What this article does not establish:
- No travaux. No Bill-stage document, committee report or Ministry note explaining the deletion of illustration (d), the dropped comma, or the decision not to add a minimum sentence was retrieved.
- The effect of deleting illustration (d) is reasoned, not decided. The conclusion that liability is unchanged rests on the identity of the operative words and on the ordinary principle that illustrations explain rather than confine. No decision on the point was located.
- No decision applying section 120 under its new number was found. Searches on the new numbering returned no parseable result from the search tool, which is a search limitation and not evidence that none exists.
- Two authorities are applied by analogy. Rishab Panikar decided section 119(1) and Virendra Kumar decided IPC section 329. Their transfer to section 120 rests on identity of structure and is identified in the text as an inference.
- Lal Mohammad was not retrieved. It is quoted only as the Supreme Court quoted it in Yashwant.
- The commentary quoted in Yashwant (Ratanlal and Dhirajlal) is a textbook, reported here because the Supreme Court relied on it, not as independent authority.
- The sentencing-power point is an observation. No court has been found to have considered the mismatch between the First Schedule entry for section 120(1) and section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The juxtaposition with Yashwant is this article's own.
- The bail comparison is a reading of the Schedule rows. No official explanation for the differing treatment of sections 120(1) and 121(1) was located.
- No comparison with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was made. That Act was not retrieved, so no claim is made about what in sections 22 and 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam is new - including the word "coercion".
- No constitutional analysis. Articles 20(3) and 21 are mentioned as context from the authorities; no constitutional text was cited and no argument is developed.
- Case-law coverage is partial. The searches surfaced 27 and 6 hits on IPC section 330 which were not read exhaustively, and the IPC-era body of authority on the hurt provisions remains incompletely surveyed across this collection.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita or the First Schedule, are not reflected.
Section 120 is the Penal Code's custodial torture provision carried into the Sanhita essentially intact: same elements, same seven and ten year maxima, same mandatory unquantified fines, minus one colonial illustration. The questions that decide cases under it are unchanged - was hurt actually caused, and was it caused to extract something. What a practitioner must now check is the First Schedule, which makes the hurt offence bailable, assigns it to a Magistrate who cannot impose more than three years, and does so for an offence in which the Supreme Court has held three years to be grossly insufficient. Verify the current text and classification, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.