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BNS Section 120 · Deep dive

BNS Section 120: Torture to Extract a Confession - Carried Over Intact, Minus One Colonial Illustration

Section 120 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the custodial torture provision, and its own illustrations say so: all three concern officials beating people to make them talk or pay. Sub-section (1) punishes hurt caused for the purpose of extorting a confession, or information which may lead to the detection of an offence OR MISCONDUCT, or of constraining a person to restore property, SATISFY ANY CLAIM OR DEMAND, or give information leading to the restoration of property; it carries up to seven years and a mandatory fine. Sub-section (2) covers grievous hurt caused for any of the same purposes and carries up to ten years and a mandatory fine. Three findings stand out. FIRST, ONE OF THE PENAL CODE'S FOUR ILLUSTRATIONS WAS DELETED: IPC section 330's illustration (d), 'A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat to compel him to pay his rent', is gone, and the words 'zamindar' and 'raiyat' appear nowhere in the entire Sanhita. Because the operative words are identical and the subject is 'whoever', the deletion removes an anachronistic example rather than narrowing liability - a landlord who beats a tenant for rent is still constraining him to satisfy a claim or demand. SECOND, NOTHING ELSE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGED: seven and ten year maxima, mandatory unquantified fines governed by section 8(1) exactly as IPC section 63 governed them, no minimum sentence, no fine ceiling. Note that sub-section (2) carries only ten years where section 119(2) carries life, so the Sanhita treats torture for property as graver than torture for a confession - the Penal Code's own ranking, carried forward. THIRD, AND MOST CONSEQUENTIALLY, THE FIRST SCHEDULE SENDS THIS OFFENCE TO A COURT THAT CANNOT SENTENCE IT. Section 120(1) is assigned to a Magistrate of the first class, capped at three years by section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita - yet in Yashwant v. State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court, 4 September 2018) the Court held a three-year sentence for this very offence 'grossly insufficient and dis-proportional' and raised it to the statutory maximum of seven years. The Schedule also makes section 120(1) BAILABLE on a seven-year maximum while section 121(1), on five years, is non-bailable. On the elements, the hurt must actually be caused but the extraction need not succeed. Separately, sections 22 and 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 make the product of such torture unusable: no confession made to a police officer may be proved, and a confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise is irrelevant.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 14 October 2026 31 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 120 — Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession, or to compel restoration of property
Earlier law (IPC)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 330 · direct
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 331 · direct
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 330, Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 331 · consolidated

The short answer

Section 120 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the custodial torture provision. Its own illustrations say so: all three are about officials beating people to make them talk or pay. S1

Sub-section (1) punishes hurt caused for the purpose of extorting a confession, or information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or of constraining someone to restore property, satisfy a claim or demand, or give information leading to the restoration of property. It carries up to seven years and a mandatory fine. Sub-section (2) covers grievous hurt caused for any of the same purposes and carries up to ten years and a mandatory fine. S1

Three things a reader should take away.

First, one of the Penal Code's four illustrations has been deleted. IPC section 330 illustrated the offence with a police officer, a police officer again, a revenue officer, and - in illustration (d) - "A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat in order to compel him to pay his rent." That fourth illustration is gone from section 120(1). The words "zamindar" and "raiyat" appear nowhere in the entire Sanhita. S1; S2; S3

Second, the punishments did not change at all. Seven years for hurt, ten years for grievous hurt, mandatory but unquantified fines in both, exactly as IPC sections 330 and 331 provided. No minimum was added and no fine ceiling was introduced. S1; S2; S11

Third, and most consequentially, the First Schedule sends this offence to a court that cannot sentence it properly. Section 120(1) is assigned to a Magistrate of the first class, who may not pass more than three years' imprisonment. In 2018 the Supreme Court held that a three-year sentence for precisely this offence was "grossly insufficient and dis-proportional", and raised it to the statutory maximum of seven years. S12; S13; S16

What the section actually requires

Like section 119, this section has a two-tier mental element: the voluntariness required for hurt, plus a further purpose on top. But the purposes are different ones, and there are four of them. S1

Tier one: voluntarily causing hurt. "Hurt" is bodily pain, disease or infirmity (section 114). "Voluntarily causing hurt" means an act done with intention or knowledge of likelihood which thereby causes hurt (section 115(1)). For sub-section (2), the injury must fall within the closed list of grievous hurt in section 116, and section 117(1) supplies the definition. S4; S5; S6; S7

Tier two: the purpose. The hurt must be caused for the purpose of:

  • extorting from the sufferer, or from any person interested in the sufferer, any confession;
  • extorting from either of them any information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct;
  • constraining either of them to restore or to cause the restoration of any property or valuable security, or to satisfy any claim or demand;
  • constraining either of them to give information which may lead to the restoration of any property or valuable security. S1

Sub-section (2) imports all of this by the words "for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1)". S1

Two features of this list repay attention.

"Or misconduct" is wider than crime. The information need not relate to an offence at all. Beating a subordinate to extract an admission of departmental misconduct is within the section on its terms. S1

"To satisfy any claim or demand" is wider than section 119. Section 119 is confined to extorting property or a valuable security, or compelling an illegal act. Section 120 reaches the enforcement of a claim - including, on illustration (c), a perfectly lawful claim. The revenue officer in that illustration is collecting arrears genuinely due, and he is still guilty. The lawfulness of what is being demanded is no defence. That is the point the three illustrations exist to make. No decision construing the "claim or demand" limb specifically was located. S1

The illustrations, and the one that was removed

Section 120(1) carries three illustrations:

(a) A, a police officer, tortures Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section.

(b) A, a police officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen property is deposited. A is guilty of an offence under this section.

(c) A, a revenue officer, tortures Z in order to compel him to pay certain arrears of revenue due from Z. A is guilty of an offence under this section. S1

IPC section 330 carried these three and a fourth:

(d) A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat in order to compel him to pay his rent. A is guilty of an offence under this section. S2

The deletion is the only substantive editorial change in the section. It was verified three ways: by token comparison of the two provisions; by counting the lettered illustrations in each (four against three); and by searching the whole Gazette text of the Sanhita for "zamindar" and for "raiyat", neither of which occurs anywhere in the Act. S1; S2; S3

Does the removal narrow the offence? On the text, no. The operative words of sub-section (1) are unchanged, and they are not limited to public servants - "whoever" is the subject. A landlord who beats a tenant to extract rent is constraining him to satisfy a claim or demand, which is squarely within the operative words. Illustrations explain a provision; they do not confine it. The sensible reading is that an anachronistic example was retired, not that private landlords were licensed. S1; S2

But the removal does change the section's emphasis. All three surviving illustrations concern public officials. A reader coming to section 120 fresh would reasonably take it for an offence about state actors, where the Penal Code's fourth illustration made clear it reaches private economic coercion too. No published document explaining the deletion was located, and nothing here should be read as a claim about why it was made. S1

Sub-section (1) against IPC section 330

A token comparison returns five differences, four of which are typographical:

  1. The comma after "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt" is gone - the same change made in section 119(1), so across the two purpose-based hurt sections the Sanhita has dropped this comma consistently.
  2. "Illustrations" acquired a full stop.
  3. and 4. "police-officer" became "police officer", twice.
  4. Illustration (d) was deleted. S1; S2

The punishment is word for word identical: "imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." Seven-year maximum, rigorous or simple, and a fine that is mandatory because the section says "shall also be liable to fine". S1; S2

No fine figure is stated, so section 8(1) governs: where no sum is expressed, the fine "is unlimited, but shall not be excessive". IPC section 63 said the same in the same words. The fine exposure is therefore unchanged. This step matters because the Sanhita has handled fines inconsistently across this chapter - section 115(2) multiplied its figure tenfold, section 118(1) introduced a ceiling that actually reduced the maximum, section 117(2) left an unquantified fine unquantified, and sections 119 and 120 leave both of theirs unquantified. Seven provisions, no single rule. S1; S2; S11

Sub-section (2) against IPC section 331

IPC section 331 spelt the purpose clause out in full. Section 120(2) replaces it with "for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1)" - the same drafting economy used in sections 118(2) and 119(2). S1; S2

The punishment is identical: up to ten years and a mandatory fine. As with section 119(2), the compression incidentally tidies a punctuation inconsistency, because IPC section 330 and IPC section 331 placed their commas differently within the same clause; routing sub-section (2) through sub-section (1) leaves one formulation. S1; S2

And note what sub-section (2) does not carry: imprisonment for life. Section 119(2) - grievous hurt to extort property - carries life. Section 120(2) - grievous hurt to extort a confession - carries ten years. So the Sanhita treats torture for property as graver than torture for a confession, which may strike a modern reader as the wrong way round. That ranking is the Penal Code's own, carried forward unaltered: IPC section 329 carried life and IPC section 331 carried ten years. The Sanhita did not revisit it. S1; S2; S8

No minimum sentence appears in section 120 either. This is now a clear pattern of selective insertion within a few consecutive sections: section 118(2) gained a one-year minimum, section 121(2) carries one, and sections 119(2) and 120(2) have none. A reader must check each provision against its own predecessor rather than generalising. S1; S8; S9

No provocation carve-out

Sections 115(2), 117(2) and 118 each contain an express carve-out referring to section 122, which provides much lower punishment for hurt caused on grave and sudden provocation. Sections 119, 120 and 121 contain none. S1; S5; S7; S8; S9; S10

For section 120 the omission is unsurprising: hurt inflicted methodically to extract a confession is not hurt inflicted on sudden provocation. The General Exceptions in Chapter III remain available, and if the purpose element fails but the injury is proved, the charge falls to section 115(2) or section 117(2) - where the carve-out does operate. S1; S5; S7; S10

What the Supreme Court has said

Yashwant v. The State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court of India, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and N.V. Ramana JJ, 4 September 2018) is the most important authority on the predecessor of section 120(1), and it is squarely about the sentence. S16

Police officers took a man named Joinus and his wife Zarina from their house at night and beat them to extract information about a cheating offence - having, as the Court found, already realised that Joinus was not the man they were looking for. Joinus died. The homicide charge failed on the cause of death, and that acquittal was not disturbed; but the conviction under IPC section 330 read with section 34 was upheld, the High Court having found that "injuries were caused by the police officer to extract information, which would squarely fall under the four corners of Section 330 of IPC." The Supreme Court said it found "no material on record to interfere with the conviction of the accused under the aforesaid Section, except for the quantum of punishment". S16

On quantum, the Court quoted the Lahore High Court in Lal Mohammad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 Lah 471:

"conduct of this sort by responsible police officers engaged in the investigation of a crime, is one of the most serious offences known to the law. The result of third degree methods or of actual torture or beating such as in this case must be that innocent persons might well be convicted, confession being forced from them which are false ... It clearly is the duty of the Courts when a case of this kind is proved to pass sentences which may have a deterrent effect." S16

It added that "[s]uch incidents involving police usually tend to deplete the confidence in our criminal justice system much more than those incidents involving private individuals." Then it held that the trial court's three-year sentence "would be grossly insufficient and dis-proportional", and increased it to "the maximum imposable period under Section 330 of IPC i.e., seven years of rigorous imprisonment", maintaining the fine. S16

Two cautions. The Lal Mohammad passage is quoted here as the Supreme Court quoted it; the Lahore High Court's own report was not retrieved. And the Court also quoted a commentary, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, to the same effect - a textbook, not a binding source, and identified as such in the judgment. S16

Ramasamy v. State (Madras High Court, 4 December 2006) is a custodial death case in which the conviction of the first accused under IPC section 330 was expressly sustained, the Court holding that on the evidence his conviction "for extorting a confession from Rajakannu, since deceased and causing injury to him with lathi ... can be legally sustained". It illustrates the same pattern as Yashwant: where a custodial death cannot be brought home as homicide, section 330 - now section 120 - is the provision that holds. S17

No reported decision applying section 120 under its new numbering was located; searches on the new section number returned no parseable result from the search tool used, which is a limitation of the search rather than evidence of absence. S1

The hurt is still indispensable

On the ingredients, the reasoning in Rishab Panikar v. State of Chhattisgarh (Division Bench, 13 May 2026) transfers. That case concerned section 119(1), but the structure of section 120(1) is identical - "voluntarily causes hurt" followed by a purpose clause - and the Court's holding was that "causing hurt is the foundational and indispensable ingredient of the offence", so that a demand accompanied by abuse and intimidation, without hurt, falls outside the section. On that reasoning, an interrogation conducted by threats and shouting, however improper, is not section 120 unless hurt is actually caused. The transfer is an inference from the parallel structure, not a holding on section 120. S1; S18

The mirror point also transfers. In Virendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1998 CriLJ 2170), on IPC section 329, the Court held that the words "for the purposes of extorting" include an attempt, and that the provision "would be attracted even if extortion is not complete". Applied here, the confession need never be made and the property never restored: the purpose is what matters. Again, an inference from parallel wording rather than a decision on this section. S1; S19

So the element has the same two-sided shape as at section 119: the hurt must be complete; the extraction need not be. S16; S18; S19

The sentencing problem, and why it is not abstract

The First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 classifies both sub-sections:

SectionOffencePunishmentCognizable?Bailable?Court
120(1)Voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession or information, or to compel restoration of property, etc.Imprisonment for 7 years and fineCognizableBailableMagistrate of the first class
120(2)Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort confession or information, or to compel restoration of property, etc.Imprisonment for 10 years and fineCognizableNon-bailableCourt of Session

S12

Section 23(2) of that Sanhita limits a Magistrate of the first class to imprisonment not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service. Section 23(1) confirms the ceiling binds upward: even a Chief Judicial Magistrate may not pass death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding seven years. S13

At sections 118 and 119 this mismatch could be described as a drafting untidiness. Here it cannot, because the Supreme Court has already ruled on the very point. In Yashwant the trial court imposed three years - exactly what a first-class Magistrate can impose - and the Supreme Court held that sentence "grossly insufficient and dis-proportional" for custodial torture by police, and substituted the full seven years. The First Schedule now routes that offence to a court whose maximum is the sentence the Supreme Court has condemned as inadequate for it. S12; S13; S16

The resolution is procedural. Where a Magistrate concludes during inquiry or trial that the case ought to be tried by a Court of Session, sections 361 and 362 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita provide the route to commit it. But that depends on the Magistrate forming that view and acting on it; nothing in the Schedule flags the problem. No decision considering this mismatch in the context of section 120 was located, so the sections 361 and 362 route is offered as the apparent statutory answer, not an adjudicated one. S14; S15

A bail anomaly worth noticing

Compare three consecutive provisions as the Schedule classifies them:

  • section 119(1) - hurt to extort property - 10 years - non-bailable
  • section 120(1) - hurt to extort a confession - 7 years - bailable
  • section 121(1) - hurt to deter a public servant - 5 years - non-bailable S12

Section 120(1) carries a higher maximum than section 121(1) yet is bailable where section 121(1) is not. So the offence typically committed by a public servant is bailable, while the offence committed against one, on a lower maximum, is not. Whether that is deliberate could not be determined; no official explanation was located. S12

Two standing cautions on reading the Schedule apply here as elsewhere. Column 2 is a label, not a definition - the entry for section 120 ends with "etc.", which is doing a great deal of work for a purpose clause with four limbs. And column 3 drops the statutory words "which may extend to", so "Imprisonment for 7 years" is a maximum, not a fixed term. Work from the section, not the row. S1; S12

The evidence-law counterpart

Section 120 makes the torture a crime. Separately, the law of evidence makes its product unusable.

Under section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." Section 23(2) adds that no confession made by a person while in police custody may be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. S20

Under section 22, a confession is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the court considers it to have been caused by "any inducement, threat, coercion or promise" having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority, sufficient to give the accused reasonable grounds for supposing he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil. S21

Read with section 120, the scheme is coherent: the conduct in illustration (a) is an offence punishable with seven years, and the confession it produces cannot be proved against the person who made it. This article does not compare these provisions with their Indian Evidence Act, 1872 predecessors, because that Act was not retrieved; in particular, no claim is made here as to whether the word "coercion" in section 22 is new. S20; S21

The constitutional dimension - Article 20(3) on self-incrimination and Article 21 on life and personal liberty - is referred to in the authorities but is not analysed in this article, and no constitutional text was cited for it. S16

Practical distinctions and common misconceptions

Section 120 is not limited to the police. The subject is "whoever". The illustrations happen to concern a police officer twice and a revenue officer once, and a fourth concerning a zamindar was deleted, but the operative words cover any person. Private actors - employers, moneylenders, landlords - fall within it where the purpose element is satisfied. S1; S2

The claim being enforced may be perfectly lawful. Illustration (c) is decisive: arrears genuinely due, and the officer is still guilty. The vice is the method, not the entitlement. S1

The information sought need not concern a crime. "Offence or misconduct" covers purely disciplinary matters. S1

The extraction need not succeed, on the Virendra Kumar reasoning applied by analogy - but the hurt must actually be caused, on the Rishab Panikar reasoning applied by analogy. Threats alone, however oppressive, are not this offence. S18; S19

Section 120 is not section 119. The difference is the purpose. Confession, information, restoration of property, satisfaction of a claim: section 120. Extorting property or a valuable security, or compelling an illegal act: section 119. Getting this wrong changes the bail position, the trial court and the maximum. S1; S8; S12

Custodial death is not covered by this section. If death results, the homicide provisions apply on their own terms. Yashwant and Ramasamy are both cases in which the homicide charge failed and section 330 held; neither suggests section 120 is the right charge where homicide is made out. S16; S17

The fine is mandatory and unquantified. Both sub-sections say "shall also be liable to fine", so a fine must accompany imprisonment, and section 8(1) sets no figure but forbids excess. A fine alone is not available under either sub-section. S1; S11

Worked examples

Example 1. A police officer beats a suspect to make him confess. Section 120(1), on illustration (a). If the beating causes a fracture, section 120(2), triable by a Court of Session. Any confession obtained is inadmissible under section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. S1; S6; S12; S20

Example 2. A revenue official beats a defaulter to collect arrears actually owed. Section 120(1), on illustration (c). The lawfulness of the demand is irrelevant. S1

Example 3. An employer beats a storekeeper to make him disclose where missing stock went. Section 120(1): information which may lead to the restoration of property, and the section is not confined to public servants. S1

Example 4. An interrogating officer shouts threats for six hours but never touches the suspect. Not section 120, on the Rishab Panikar reasoning, because no hurt is caused. Other provisions, and departmental consequences, may follow. S18

Example 5. A landlord beats a tenant to extract rent. On the operative words, section 120(1) - constraining him to satisfy a claim or demand. This was IPC illustration (d), now deleted; the deletion removes the example, not the liability. S1; S2

Example 6. A officer beats a detainee to extract a confession; the detainee gives nothing and is released. Section 120(1) is still complete, on the Virendra Kumar reasoning applied by analogy: the purpose, not its achievement, is the element. S19

Commencement and which law applies

Section 120 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S22

Conduct before that date is governed by IPC sections 330 and 331; conduct on or after it by section 120. Because the operative words and both punishments are unchanged, the transition determines label and forum but not exposure - the same position as at section 119, and unlike sections 115 and 118. The single substantive difference, the deleted illustration, cannot affect liability, since illustrations explain rather than confine and the operative words are identical. S1; S2; S22

For proceedings instituted on or after 1 July 2024 the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita governs, so the First Schedule classification and the sentencing-power problem discussed above apply whichever substantive Act supplies the offence. S12; S13

  • Section 114 - definition of hurt. S4
  • Section 115 - voluntarily causing hurt; the fallback if the purpose element fails. S5
  • Section 116 - the closed list of grievous hurt. S6
  • Section 117 - voluntarily causing grievous hurt; the fallback for sub-section (2). S7
  • Section 119 - hurt to extort property or compel an illegal act; the nearest neighbour, and the one that carries life. S8
  • Section 121 - hurt to deter a public servant; the mirror-image offence, and the bail comparison. S9
  • Section 122 - hurt on provocation; relevant here by its absence. S10
  • Section 8 - the amount of fine where no sum is expressed. S11
  • Sections 22 and 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - the inadmissibility of confessions to police and of confessions caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise. S20; S21
  • Sections 23, 361 and 362 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - sentencing powers and commitment. S13; S14; S15

Sources and honest limits

The statutory comparisons were made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 120 against the India Code text of IPC sections 330 and 331, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The First Schedule rows were read from the Gazette text of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. India Code handles were read from the verified section inventory and, for the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, resolved by lookup rather than guessed. S1; S2; S3; S12; S20; S21

What this article does not establish:

  • No travaux. No Bill-stage document, committee report or Ministry note explaining the deletion of illustration (d), the dropped comma, or the decision not to add a minimum sentence was retrieved.
  • The effect of deleting illustration (d) is reasoned, not decided. The conclusion that liability is unchanged rests on the identity of the operative words and on the ordinary principle that illustrations explain rather than confine. No decision on the point was located.
  • No decision applying section 120 under its new number was found. Searches on the new numbering returned no parseable result from the search tool, which is a search limitation and not evidence that none exists.
  • Two authorities are applied by analogy. Rishab Panikar decided section 119(1) and Virendra Kumar decided IPC section 329. Their transfer to section 120 rests on identity of structure and is identified in the text as an inference.
  • Lal Mohammad was not retrieved. It is quoted only as the Supreme Court quoted it in Yashwant.
  • The commentary quoted in Yashwant (Ratanlal and Dhirajlal) is a textbook, reported here because the Supreme Court relied on it, not as independent authority.
  • The sentencing-power point is an observation. No court has been found to have considered the mismatch between the First Schedule entry for section 120(1) and section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The juxtaposition with Yashwant is this article's own.
  • The bail comparison is a reading of the Schedule rows. No official explanation for the differing treatment of sections 120(1) and 121(1) was located.
  • No comparison with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was made. That Act was not retrieved, so no claim is made about what in sections 22 and 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam is new - including the word "coercion".
  • No constitutional analysis. Articles 20(3) and 21 are mentioned as context from the authorities; no constitutional text was cited and no argument is developed.
  • Case-law coverage is partial. The searches surfaced 27 and 6 hits on IPC section 330 which were not read exhaustively, and the IPC-era body of authority on the hurt provisions remains incompletely surveyed across this collection.
  • Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita or the First Schedule, are not reflected.

Section 120 is the Penal Code's custodial torture provision carried into the Sanhita essentially intact: same elements, same seven and ten year maxima, same mandatory unquantified fines, minus one colonial illustration. The questions that decide cases under it are unchanged - was hurt actually caused, and was it caused to extract something. What a practitioner must now check is the First Schedule, which makes the hurt offence bailable, assigns it to a Magistrate who cannot impose more than three years, and does so for an offence in which the Supreme Court has held three years to be grossly insufficient. Verify the current text and classification, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 120 cover?
Causing hurt or grievous hurt to extract something. Specifically: to extort a confession, or information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or to constrain a person to restore property or a valuable security, to satisfy any claim or demand, or to give information leading to the restoration of property. Sub-section (1) deals with hurt and carries up to seven years; sub-section (2) deals with grievous hurt and carries up to ten years. Both carry a mandatory fine.
+Which IPC sections did BNS Section 120 replace?
IPC sections 330 and 331. Section 120(1) corresponds to IPC section 330 and section 120(2) to IPC section 331. The Sanhita merged them into one section and states the purpose clause once.
+Is it true that an illustration was deleted?
Yes. IPC section 330 had four lettered illustrations; section 120(1) has three. The missing one is illustration (d): 'A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat to compel him to pay his rent. A is guilty of an offence under this section.' This was verified by token comparison, by counting the illustrations in each provision, and by searching the whole Gazette text of the Sanhita - the words 'zamindar' and 'raiyat' occur nowhere in the Act.
+Does deleting that illustration mean landlords are no longer covered?
No. The operative words of sub-section (1) are identical to IPC section 330's, the subject is 'whoever' rather than any class of official, and illustrations explain a provision rather than confine it. A landlord who beats a tenant to extract rent is constraining him to satisfy a claim or demand, which is squarely within the operative words. The sensible reading is that an anachronistic example was retired. No decision on the point was located, so this is reasoned rather than decided.
+Is Section 120 only about the police?
No. All three surviving illustrations concern public officials - two police officers and a revenue officer - but the section applies to 'whoever'. Employers, moneylenders and landlords fall within it where the purpose element is satisfied. The deletion of the zamindar illustration does shift the section's apparent emphasis towards state actors, which is a reason to read the operative words rather than the examples.
+Did the punishment change from the IPC?
No, not in any respect. Section 120(1) carries the same seven-year maximum and mandatory fine as IPC section 330, and section 120(2) the same ten-year maximum and mandatory fine as IPC section 331. No minimum sentence was added and no fine figure was introduced.
+How much can the fine be?
Neither sub-section states a figure, so section 8(1) applies: the fine is 'unlimited, but shall not be excessive'. IPC section 63 said the same in the same words, so the position is unchanged. The fine is mandatory because both sub-sections say 'shall also be liable to fine', and a fine alone is not available under either.
+Why does sub-section (2) carry only ten years when Section 119(2) carries life?
Because that is the ranking the Penal Code adopted and the Sanhita carried forward without revisiting it. IPC section 329, grievous hurt to extort property, carried life; IPC section 331, grievous hurt to extort a confession, carried ten years. So the law treats torture for property as graver than torture for a confession, which may strike a modern reader as the wrong way round. No document explaining the choice was located.
+Is there a minimum sentence under Section 120?
No. The insertion of minimum sentences in this part of the Sanhita was selective: section 118(2) gained a one-year minimum that IPC section 326 never had, and section 121(2) carries one, while sections 119(2) and 120(2) have none. Check each provision against its own predecessor rather than generalising.
+Must hurt actually be caused, or is a threatening interrogation enough?
Hurt must actually be caused. In Rishab Panikar v. State of Chhattisgarh the Division Bench held, on the identically structured section 119(1), that 'causing hurt is the foundational and indispensable ingredient of the offence', so that a demand accompanied by abuse and intimidation without hurt falls outside the section. Applied here, six hours of shouted threats without any touching is not section 120. That transfer is an inference from the parallel structure, not a holding on section 120.
+Does the confession have to be obtained?
No. The section requires a purpose, not a result. In Virendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, on IPC section 329, the Court held that the words 'for the purposes of extorting' include an attempt and that the provision is attracted 'even if extortion is not complete'. Applied by analogy, the confession need never be made and the property never restored. So the hurt must be complete; the extraction need not be.
+What if the money or property being demanded is genuinely owed?
It makes no difference. Illustration (c) is decisive: a revenue officer tortures Z to compel him to pay arrears of revenue actually due from Z, and 'A is guilty of an offence under this section'. The vice is the method, not the entitlement. The section covers constraining a person to 'satisfy any claim or demand', which is wider than section 119's extortion limb.
+Does the information sought have to be about a crime?
No. The section says 'any information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct'. Purely disciplinary matters are included, so beating a subordinate to extract an admission of departmental misconduct is within the section on its terms.
+What has the Supreme Court said about this offence?
In Yashwant v. The State of Maharashtra (4 September 2018) police officers took a man and his wife from their home at night and beat them to extract information, having already realised he was not the person they wanted; he died. The homicide charge failed on the cause of death, but the conviction under IPC section 330 was upheld. On sentence, the Court quoted Lal Mohammad v. Emperor that such conduct by investigating officers 'is one of the most serious offences known to the law', held the trial court's three-year sentence 'grossly insufficient and dis-proportional', and increased it to the statutory maximum of seven years' rigorous imprisonment.
+Which court tries an offence under Section 120?
The First Schedule assigns section 120(1) to a Magistrate of the first class and section 120(2) to a Court of Session. The entry for sub-section (1) is problematic: it is a seven-year offence, but section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita limits a Magistrate of the first class to three years' imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service.
+Why is that forum problem worse here than at Sections 118 and 119?
Because the Supreme Court has already ruled on the point. In Yashwant the trial court imposed three years - exactly what a first-class Magistrate can impose - and the Supreme Court held that sentence grossly insufficient for custodial torture by police and substituted the full seven years. The First Schedule now routes that offence to a court whose maximum is the sentence the Supreme Court condemned as inadequate for it. At sections 118 and 119 the mismatch could be called a drafting untidiness; here it has a reported consequence.
+How is the mismatch resolved?
Procedurally. Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita confirms the ceiling binds upward - even a Chief Judicial Magistrate may not pass death, life, or imprisonment exceeding seven years. Where a Magistrate concludes during inquiry or trial that the case ought to be tried by a Court of Session, sections 361 and 362 provide the route to commit it. But that depends on the Magistrate forming and acting on that view, and nothing in the Schedule flags the problem. No decision considering this in the context of section 120 was located.
+Is Section 120 bailable?
Section 120(1) is cognizable and BAILABLE; section 120(2) is cognizable and non-bailable. The bailability of sub-section (1) produces an oddity: section 120(1) carries a seven-year maximum and is bailable, while section 121(1) - hurt to deter a public servant - carries only five years and is non-bailable. So the offence typically committed by a public servant is bailable, while the offence committed against one, on a lower maximum, is not. No official explanation for this was located.
+Can a confession obtained by such torture be used in evidence?
No. Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence, and section 23(2) that no confession made in police custody may be proved against the maker unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 22 separately makes a confession irrelevant where the court considers it caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise from a person in authority. So the conduct is an offence and its product is unusable.
+Does Section 120 cover custodial death?
No. If death results, the homicide provisions apply on their own terms. Both Yashwant and Ramasamy v. State are cases in which the homicide charge failed and the section 330 conviction held instead; neither suggests this section is the right charge where homicide is made out.
+What is the difference between Section 119 and Section 120?
The purpose. Section 119 covers hurt to extort property or a valuable security, or to compel an illegal act. Section 120 covers hurt to extort a confession or information, or to compel restoration of property or satisfaction of a claim or demand. The distinction matters practically: section 119(1) carries ten years and is non-bailable, while section 120(1) carries seven years and is bailable, and section 119(2) carries life where section 120(2) carries ten years.
+Can provocation reduce a Section 120 charge?
Not through section 122. Sections 115(2), 117(2) and 118 contain express carve-outs referring to section 122, which provides reduced punishment for hurt on grave and sudden provocation; sections 119, 120 and 121 contain none. The omission is intuitive here, since hurt inflicted methodically to extract a confession is not hurt inflicted on sudden provocation. The General Exceptions in Chapter III remain available, and if the purpose element fails the charge falls to section 115(2) or section 117(2), where the carve-out does operate.
+When is the injury grievous hurt for sub-section (2)?
Only if it falls within the closed list in section 116 - for example a fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth, permanent disfiguration of the head or face, or a hurt which endangers life. A severe beating that leaves no listed injury may be hurt only, in which case sub-section (1) applies.
+Are there traps in reading the First Schedule entry?
Two. Column 2 is a label, not a definition: the entry ends with 'etc.', which is doing a great deal of work for a purpose clause with four limbs. And column 3 drops the statutory words 'which may extend to', so 'Imprisonment for 7 years' is a maximum, not a fixed term. Work from the section, not the row.
+When did Section 120 come into force?
On 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. Conduct before that date is governed by IPC sections 330 and 331. Because the operative words and both punishments are unchanged, the transition affects the label and the forum but not the exposure.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 120 - official text of sub-sections (1) and (2) with the three illustrations, and the marginal note 'Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession, or to compel restoration of property.' — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  2. S2The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), sections 63, 323, 329, 330 and 331 - the repealed text used for the correspondence analysis — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  3. S3The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs - used to verify the text of section 120 as enacted and to search the whole Act — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  4. S4The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 114 - definition of hurt — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 115 - voluntarily causing hurt, definition and offence — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  6. S6The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 116 - the closed list of kinds of grievous hurt — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  7. S7The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 117 - voluntarily causing grievous hurt — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  8. S8The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 119 - voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal act — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  9. S9The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 121 - voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to deter public servant from his duty — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  10. S10The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 122 - voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt on provocation — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  11. S11The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 8 - amount of fine where no sum is expressed — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  12. S12The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), First Schedule - the classification entries for sections 120(1), 120(2), 119(1) and 121(1) — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  13. S13The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), section 23 - sentences which Magistrates may pass — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  14. S14The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), section 361 - procedure when, after commencement of inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be committed — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  15. S15The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), section 362 - conviction or commitment on evidence partly recorded by one Magistrate and partly by another — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  16. S16Yashwant etc. v. The State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal Nos. 385-386 of 2008 and connected appeals, Supreme Court of India, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and N.V. Ramana JJ (judgment authored by N.V. Ramana J), judgment dated 4 September 2018 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the Supreme Court of India) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  17. S17Ramasamy, Anthonysamy and Veerasamy v. State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Madras High Court, judgment dated 4 December 2006 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the Madras High Court) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  18. S18Rishab Panikar v. State of Chhattisgarh, CRMP No. 3184 of 2025, High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, Division Bench of Ramesh Sinha CJ and Ravindra Kumar Agrawal J, order dated 13 May 2026, 2026:CGHC:22561-DB — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  19. S19Virendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, R.P. Gupta J, judgment dated 3 May 1997, reported 1998 CriLJ 2170 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  20. S20The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023), section 23 - confession to police officer — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  21. S21The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023), section 22 - confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  22. S22Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, appointing 1 July 2024 as the date of commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)

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