The short answer
Section 119 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes hurt that is inflicted as a means to an end. The end is either squeezing property or a valuable security out of someone, or forcing someone to do something illegal or something that would help an offence along. Sub-section (1) deals with hurt and carries up to ten years plus a mandatory fine. Sub-section (2) deals with grievous hurt caused for any of the same purposes and carries imprisonment for life, or up to ten years, plus a mandatory fine. S1
Two things make this section different from the hurt provisions that precede it. First, it has a two-tier mental element: the ordinary voluntariness required for hurt, plus a further purpose that sits on top. Second, unlike sections 115, 117 and 118, it carries no provocation carve-out at all. S1; S5
Against the Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 119 is one of the most faithful transplants in the whole chapter. Sub-section (1) reproduces IPC section 327 with a single dropped comma. Sub-section (2) reproduces IPC section 329 with the purpose clause compressed into a cross-reference. Neither punishment changed in any respect. S1; S2
That last point deserves emphasis, because the section immediately before it went the other way. Section 118(2) acquired a brand-new one-year minimum sentence that IPC section 326 never had. Section 119(2), carrying the identical maximum of life imprisonment, acquired no minimum at all. Whatever drove the drafters to add minimum sentences, it was not applied across the chapter. S1; S2; S23
The structure: hurt plus a purpose
Read slowly, sub-section (1) has two distinct components, and the second is what the section is really about.
Component one: voluntarily causing hurt. "Hurt" is defined in section 114 as bodily pain, disease or infirmity. "Voluntarily causing hurt" is defined in section 115(1) as doing an act with the intention of causing hurt, or with the knowledge that one is likely to cause hurt, and thereby causing hurt. Both halves must be satisfied. S3; S4
Component two: the purpose. The hurt must be caused "for the purpose of" one of the following:
- extorting from the sufferer any property or valuable security;
- extorting from any person interested in the sufferer any property or valuable security;
- constraining the sufferer to do anything which is illegal;
- constraining any person interested in such sufferer to do anything which is illegal;
- constraining either of them to do anything which may facilitate the commission of an offence. S1
Sub-section (2) replaces the first component with grievous hurt and imports the second component wholesale: "for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1)". Grievous hurt is defined by the closed list in section 116, and voluntarily causing grievous hurt by section 117(1). S1; S6; S7
This structure matters practically, and three consequences follow from it.
The hurt must actually be caused
The purpose does not substitute for the injury. This is the single most litigated point about the provision, and the Chhattisgarh High Court decided it squarely under the Sanhita in Rishab Panikar v. State of Chhattisgarh (Division Bench, Ramesh Sinha CJ and Ravindra Kumar Agrawal J, 13 May 2026). S8
The allegation there was that the petitioner demanded money from the complainant for liquor at a Durga pandal, abused him when he refused, showed a knife and threatened to kill him. The police registered an offence under section 119(1), among others. The Division Bench held that "the sine qua non for attracting Section 119(1) of the BNS is voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt for the purpose of extorting property or compelling a person to commit an illegal act. Thus, causing hurt is the foundational and indispensable ingredient of the offence." S8
Because the first information report alleged no hurt whatsoever, the Court held that "one of the essential ingredients required for constituting an offence under Section 119(1) of the BNS is glaringly absent," and that "mere allegation of demand of money accompanied by abuse or intimidation, without any allegation of voluntarily causing hurt, would not bring the act within the ambit of Section 119(1)". To hold otherwise, it said, "would amount to giving an unwarranted and impermissibly expansive interpretation to the penal statute." The first information report was quashed. S8
So a threat backed by a weapon, with money demanded, is not section 119. It may well be criminal intimidation, or extortion, or an offence under section 118 if hurt by a dangerous weapon is actually caused - but section 119 needs the hurt. S8; S1; S23
The extortion need not succeed
The mirror image is equally settled, and it cuts the other way. The purpose is a purpose, not a result. Under IPC section 329, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held in Virendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (R.P. Gupta J, 3 May 1997, reported at 1998 CriLJ 2170) that in that provision "the words 'for the purposes of extorting' are most important". The Court continued: "This will include an attempt to extort also. This provision would be attracted even if extortion is not complete. Section 329, I.P.C. deals with grievous hurts caused for the particular purpose that is extortion or other purposes mentioned in the section. The offence of extortion may or may not have been completed." S9
Because the purpose clause of IPC section 329 survives into section 119(2) unchanged in substance - it is simply imported by cross-reference from sub-section (1) - that reasoning transfers directly. The accused who beats a victim to make him hand over a property document commits the offence whether or not the document is ever handed over. S1; S2; S9
Put the two propositions side by side and the element has a clean shape: the hurt must be complete; the extortion need not be. S8; S9
The purpose is measured against the statutory meaning of extortion
Where the prosecution relies on the extortion limb, the word carries its statutory sense. Extortion is defined in section 308(1) of the Sanhita: intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to that person or any other, and thereby dishonestly inducing the person so put in fear to deliver property, a valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security. S10
A very old but instructive decision shows the consequence of failing that element. In Emperor v. Bhagwan Din (Allahabad High Court, 10 August 1908), the accused had administered dhatura and grievous hurt had resulted. On the question whether IPC section 329 was made out, the Court observed that extortion "is defined in Section 383, Indian Penal Code, and although we think that grievous hurt was caused to Sidhua, it was not for the purpose of 'extortion' within the meaning of Section 329." The conviction was altered to one under IPC section 325 - ordinary voluntarily causing grievous hurt - and the sentence maintained. S11
The modern equivalents of that fallback are section 117(2) of the Sanhita for grievous hurt and section 115(2) for hurt. Where the purpose element fails but the injury is proved, the case does not collapse; it drops to the ordinary hurt provision. S6; S4; S11
The person hurt and the person squeezed need not be the same
This is easy to miss and it materially widens the section. The property or valuable security may be extorted "from the sufferer, or from any person interested in the sufferer", and the person constrained to do the illegal act may likewise be the sufferer "or any person interested in such sufferer". S1
So beating a child to make a parent part with money falls within sub-section (1) on its terms, as does injuring an employee to force an employer into an illegal act. The Sanhita does not define "person interested in the sufferer", and no decision construing that phrase under section 119 was located. S1
Sub-section (1) against IPC section 327: one comma
A token-level comparison of section 119(1) with IPC section 327 returns exactly one difference, and it is a mark of punctuation.
IPC section 327 read: "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt**,** for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer ...". Section 119(1) reads: "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer ...". The comma after "hurt" is gone. Everything else - the list of persons, "any property or valuable security", the constraining limb, "anything which is illegal or which may facilitate the commission of an offence" - is word for word identical. S1; S2
The punishment is identical too: "imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." Ten-year maximum, either description of imprisonment (so rigorous or simple), and a fine that is mandatory rather than discretionary, because the section says "shall also be liable to fine". S1; S2
No figure is attached to that fine, and that is itself a finding. Where the Sanhita expresses no sum, section 8(1) governs: "Where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive." IPC section 63 said the same thing in the same words. So the fine exposure under section 119 is unchanged, and it is unlimited subject to the excessiveness control. S12
That is worth contrasting with the section immediately before. Section 118(1) introduced a ceiling of twenty thousand rupees where IPC section 324 had expressed no sum - which, counter-intuitively, reduced the maximum fine, because an unquantified fine is unlimited. Section 119 does the opposite by doing nothing: it leaves both sub-sections unquantified, so section 8(1) continues to apply exactly as IPC section 63 did. S1; S12; S23
The collection of fine changes across this chapter now shows no pattern at all. Section 115(2) multiplied its figure by ten. Section 122(1) also multiplied by ten; section 122(2) by five. Section 117(2) left an unquantified fine unquantified. Section 118(1) introduced a ceiling where none existed, cutting the maximum. Section 119 left both fines unquantified. Six provisions in one chapter; no single rule describes them. S1; S4; S5; S6; S12; S23
Sub-section (2) against IPC section 329: a minimum that did not arrive
Sub-section (2) is where the drafting changed shape, though not meaning.
IPC section 329 spelt the purpose clause out in full: "Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer or from any person interested in the sufferer any property or valuable security, or of constraining the sufferer or any person interested in such sufferer to do anything that is illegal or which may facilitate the commission of an offence, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." S2
Section 119(2) compresses all of that into eleven words: "Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1), shall be punished with ...". S1
This is the same drafting economy used in section 118(2), which replaced IPC section 326's repeated list of dangerous means with a cross-reference to its own sub-section (1). It is a genuine improvement in readability and, so far as the operative words go, it changes nothing. S1; S23
It does tidy one small inconsistency. IPC section 327 said "anything which is illegal"; IPC section 329 said "anything that is illegal". By routing sub-section (2) through sub-section (1), the Sanhita leaves a single formulation - "which is illegal" - governing both limbs. Nothing turns on it, but the two slightly different IPC phrasings are now one. S1; S2
The punishment is identical in every respect: "imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." The India Code consolidated text of IPC section 329 prints "imprisonment for life" inside amendment brackets, which record the substitution of those words for "transportation for life" by an earlier amending Act; the operative words in 1860-as-amended and in the Sanhita are the same. That bracketing is an artefact of the consolidated text, not a difference between the two Acts. S2
And here is the point the chapter forces on a reader who has just come from section 118. Section 118(2) and section 119(2) carry the same maximum - life, or up to ten years, plus fine. Section 118(2) gained a minimum sentence of one year that IPC section 326 never contained. Section 119(2) gained nothing: a search of the section text for any minimum-sentence formula returns nothing. S1; S23
Whatever the rationale for inserting minimum sentences, it was applied selectively rather than systematically. A reader should not generalise from one provision in this chapter to the next. No published document explaining why section 118(2) received a minimum and section 119(2) did not was located. S1; S23
No provocation carve-out
Sections 115, 117 and 118 each open with, or contain, a carve-out referring to section 122, which deals with hurt and grievous hurt caused on grave and sudden provocation and carries dramatically lower punishment. Checking the whole family of provisions for that cross-reference produces a clear result:
| Section | Carve-out for provocation |
|---|---|
| s. 115(2) voluntarily causing hurt | yes, refers to s. 122(1) |
| s. 117(2) voluntarily causing grievous hurt | yes, refers to s. 122(2) |
| s. 118 hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons | yes, refers to both s. 122(1) and s. 122(2) |
| s. 119 hurt or grievous hurt to extort property | none |
| s. 120 hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession | none |
| s. 121 hurt or grievous hurt to deter public servant | none |
This tracks the IPC exactly - sections 327 and 329 never referred to the old provocation provisions in IPC sections 334 and 335 - and the omission makes sense. Section 119 requires the hurt to be inflicted for the purpose of extracting property or compelling an illegal act. Hurt inflicted on grave and sudden provocation is, almost by definition, hurt inflicted for no further purpose at all. The two mental states do not comfortably coexist. S1; S2; S5
The practical consequence is still worth stating plainly: a person charged under section 119 cannot argue down into the one-month bracket of section 122(1) or the three-year bracket of section 122(2) by pleading provocation. The ordinary General Exceptions in Chapter III remain available, and in an appropriate case a successful plea on the purpose element drops the charge to section 115(2) or section 117(2), where the provocation carve-out does operate. S1; S4; S5; S6
A forum problem on the face of the First Schedule
The First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 classifies both sub-sections. The rows read:
| Section | Offence | Punishment | Cognizable? | Bailable? | Court |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 119(1) | Voluntarily causing hurt to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal act | Imprisonment for 10 years and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Magistrate of the first class |
| 119(2) | Voluntarily causing grievous hurt for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1) | Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine | Cognizable | Non-bailable | Court of Session |
Both sub-sections are cognizable and non-bailable, so the police may register and investigate without a Magistrate's order and bail is not a matter of right. S15
The entry for sub-section (1) creates the same difficulty flagged at section 118. A Magistrate of the first class is limited by section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service. The Schedule assigns a ten-year offence to a court that cannot impose more than three years of it. S15; S16
What makes section 119 a sharper illustration than section 118 is that the inconsistency is visible inside a single section. Sub-section (2), carrying life imprisonment, is correctly sent to a Court of Session. Sub-section (1), carrying ten years, is sent to a Magistrate capped at three. The Schedule got the graver sub-section right and the lesser one wrong, in adjacent rows.
The comparison with section 118 is more pointed still. Section 118(2) also carries imprisonment for life, and the Schedule assigns it to a Magistrate of the first class - whereas section 119(2), carrying the identical maximum, goes to a Court of Session. Two life-carrying offences in consecutive sections are assigned to different levels of court. Even on the Schedule's own approach, the section 118(2) entry looks anomalous. S15; S16
None of this leaves a prosecution stranded, and the resolution is procedural rather than substantive. Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita confirms the ceiling applies upward too: even a Chief Judicial Magistrate may not pass a sentence of death, of imprisonment for life, or of imprisonment exceeding seven years. Where a Magistrate concludes that a heavier sentence is warranted than he is competent to pass, sections 361 and 362 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita provide the route to submit the proceedings to, or commit the accused to, a court competent to pass it. S16; S17; S18
Two cautions on reading the Schedule. Column 2 is a label, not a definition: the row for sub-section (1) compresses the whole purpose clause into "to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal act", dropping the valuable-security limb and the "facilitate the commission of an offence" limb entirely. And column 3 drops the statutory words "which may extend to", so the Schedule's "Imprisonment for 10 years" is a maximum, not a fixed term. Always work from the section, not the row. S1; S15
How section 119 is being used
Reported decisions under the new numbering remain thin, which is expected for a provision that commenced on 1 July 2024. S19
Rishab Panikar, discussed above, is the substantial one, and it is useful beyond its holding. Counsel in that case set out the correspondence expressly - "Sections 119(1), 296 and 351(2) of the BNS, 2023 corresponding to Sections 327, 294 and 506 of the IPC" - which is a court record confirming the IPC section 327 to BNS section 119(1) mapping independently of any concordance table. S8
The IPC-era counterpart worth reading is Ashish Hiralal Choudhari v. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, Division Bench, 25 July 2025). The allegation was that the applicants abused, slapped and gave fist and kick blows to the informant, and that one of them snatched a gold beads necklace from the informant's mother. The Court held that although IPC section 327 had been invoked, "its essential ingredients ... are not establishing from the charge sheet," and quashed the charge sheet. S20
That is a valuable illustration precisely because a property-taking was alleged. Hurt followed by a snatching is not automatically section 327, now section 119(1): the hurt must be inflicted to extract the property. A beating and a theft occurring in the same incident may be separate offences rather than this compound one. S20; S1
A transcription warning
One feature of Rishab Panikar should be flagged, because it is the third instance of the same phenomenon encountered in this chapter. At paragraph 18 the Division Bench set out to "reproduce Section 119(1) of the BNS, 2023" and printed: "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt**,** for the purpose of extorting ...". S8
That comma is IPC section 327's. The Gazette text of section 119(1) does not contain it. The Court has quoted the Penal Code's punctuation under the Sanhita's heading. S1; S2; S8; S22
Nothing turns on it - the comma carries no meaning, and the holding is unaffected. But it independently corroborates the diff reported above, and it is a reminder worth internalising: during the transition, judgments sometimes reproduce the old text under the new label. The same thing was found in the decision reproducing Lakshman Singh with a substituted section number, and in a judgment quoting Anwarul Haq at second hand. Verify statutory text against the Gazette or India Code, not against a quotation in a judgment. S1; S8
A smaller instance appears in Ashish Hiralal Choudhari itself, whose paragraph 7 paraphrase of IPC section 327 omits the verb "constraining" and runs the two limbs together as "for the purpose of extorting any property or valuable security, or to do anything, which is illegal". It is a paraphrase in a judgment allowing an application, not a holding on construction, and the statutory text is as set out above. S2; S20
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
Section 119 is not extortion. Extortion under section 308 is complete when fear of injury dishonestly induces delivery of property. Section 119 is an aggravated hurt offence: the gravamen is the injury, and the extortionate purpose aggravates it. One can be committed without the other. Threatening without hurting may be extortion and is not section 119 (Rishab Panikar). Hurting with an extortionate purpose is section 119 even if nothing is ever delivered (Virendra Kumar). S1; S8; S9; S10
"Valuable security" is not limited to money. The section covers "any property or valuable security", and section 308(1) separately contemplates "anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security". Forcing a signature on a blank paper by beating is squarely within the mischief. S1; S10
The illegal-act limb is independent of property. The third and fourth purposes have nothing to do with extracting anything. Hurt inflicted to force someone to commit an illegal act, or to do something that would facilitate an offence, is within sub-section (1) even where no property is in view at all. This limb is easily overlooked because the marginal note leads with extortion. S1
Section 119 is not the confession provision. Hurt inflicted to extract a confession or information, or to compel restoration of property, is section 120, not section 119. The Schedule classifies section 120(1) at seven years and - unlike section 119(1) - as bailable; section 120(2) carries ten years and is non-bailable and triable by a Court of Session. Choosing between sections 119 and 120 is therefore not a formality; it changes the bail position. S13; S15
Grievous hurt is a closed list. Sub-section (2) is engaged only if the injury falls within one of the categories in section 116. A severe beating that leaves no fracture, no permanent impairment and does not endanger life or cause twenty days of incapacity may be hurt only. Note too that section 116(h) now reads fifteen days where IPC section 320 read twenty. S7
"Either description" matters. Both sub-sections permit rigorous or simple imprisonment, so a court is not obliged to award rigorous imprisonment even for the ten-year offence. S1
The fine is mandatory, not optional. "Shall also be liable to fine" in both sub-sections means a fine must accompany the sentence of imprisonment; the quantum is governed by section 8(1). S1; S12
Worked examples
Example 1. A demands money from B at a festival, abuses him when he refuses and brandishes a knife, but does not touch him. Not section 119, because no hurt is caused. This is Rishab Panikar on its facts, and the first information report was quashed as to that section. Criminal intimidation and the extortion provisions may still apply. S8
Example 2. A beats B with his fists to make B hand over the title deed to B's house. B refuses throughout and hands over nothing. Section 119(1) is made out. Hurt is caused, the purpose is extorting a valuable security, and completion of the extortion is not required. S1; S9
Example 3. A fractures B's arm to force B's father to withdraw a complaint - an illegal act, assume, in the relevant sense. Section 119(2), on two counts: the injury is grievous hurt under section 116(g), and the person constrained is a person interested in the sufferer rather than the sufferer himself. Triable by a Court of Session. S1; S7; S15
Example 4. A slaps B during a quarrel and, while B is reeling, snatches B's chain and runs. On Ashish Hiralal Choudhari, this is not automatically section 119(1): the slap was not shown to have been delivered to extract the chain. Separate charges for hurt and for the property offence are the likelier analysis. S1; S20
Example 5. A causes grievous hurt to B intending to frighten B's family into paying, but on the evidence the purpose is not established as extortion within the statutory sense. On Bhagwan Din, the conviction does not fail; it falls to section 117(2) for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. S6; S11
Example 6. A causes hurt to B to extort money, in circumstances of grave and sudden provocation by B. The provocation carve-out in section 122 is unavailable, because section 119 contains no cross-reference to it. If the purpose element is disproved, the charge becomes section 115(2) - where the carve-out does apply. S1; S4; S5
Commencement and which law applies
Section 119 commenced on 1 July 2024, the date appointed for the Sanhita by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S19
For conduct before that date, IPC sections 327 and 329 continue to govern the offence, the charge and the sentence; for conduct on or after it, section 119 applies. Because both the definitions and the punishments are identical in substance - the only textual changes being a dropped comma and a compression into cross-reference form - the practical stakes of the transition are lower here than almost anywhere else in the chapter. There is no new minimum to argue about, no altered maximum, and no changed fine ceiling. S1; S2
The procedural law is a different matter: for proceedings instituted on or after 1 July 2024 the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita governs, so the First Schedule classification and the sentencing-power provisions discussed above are the ones that apply, whichever substantive Act supplies the offence. S15; S16
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 119
- Section 114 - definition of hurt. S3
- Section 115 - voluntarily causing hurt; the definition in sub-section (1) and the residual offence in sub-section (2). S4
- Section 116 - the closed list of grievous hurt. S7
- Section 117 - voluntarily causing grievous hurt; the fallback where the purpose element fails. S6
- Section 118 - hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means; the comparison that shows the minimum-sentence asymmetry. S1; S23
- Section 120 - hurt or grievous hurt to extort a confession or to compel restoration of property; the provision most often confused with this one. S13
- Section 121 - hurt or grievous hurt to deter a public servant from his duty. S14
- Section 122 - hurt or grievous hurt on provocation; relevant here by its absence. S5
- Section 308 - extortion, which supplies the statutory sense of the word used in section 119. S10
- Section 8 - the amount of fine where no sum is expressed. S12
- Chapter III (sections 14 to 44) - General Exceptions, which apply to section 119 by force of section 3(1) even though not repeated in it. S21
Sources and honest limits
The statutory comparisons in this article were made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 119 against the India Code text of IPC sections 327 and 329, and the section text was checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The First Schedule rows were read from the Gazette text of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. S1; S2; S15; S22
What this article does not establish:
- No travaux. No Bill-stage document, Select Committee report, Law Commission report or Ministry explanatory note accounting for the dropped comma, the compression of sub-section (2), or the decision not to add a minimum sentence was retrieved. The comparisons are textual; the reasons behind them are not documented here.
- No authority on "person interested in the sufferer". The phrase is not defined in the Sanhita and no decision construing it in the context of section 119 or IPC sections 327 and 329 was located.
- The forum point is an observation, not a holding. No decision was located in which a court has considered the mismatch between the First Schedule entry for section 119(1) and the sentencing power in section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The sections 361 and 362 route is offered as the apparent statutory resolution, not as an adjudicated one.
- The section 118 and 119 comparison is textual. That one received a minimum sentence and the other did not is verifiable from the texts. Why is not, and nothing here should be read as a claim about legislative intent.
- Case law coverage is partial. Rishab Panikar is a High Court Division Bench decision at the first-information-report stage, not a trial on merits, and not a Supreme Court ruling. Virendra Kumar and Bhagwan Din are single-Judge and colonial-era High Court decisions respectively on the IPC provisions. No Supreme Court authority construing IPC section 327 or 329 was located in the searches run. The IPC-era body of authority on these provisions has not been exhaustively surveyed.
- Bhagwan Din is 1908. It is cited for a narrow proposition about the purpose element and the fallback conviction, and its other reasoning reflects the law and the forms of punishment of its time.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date stated in the article metadata. Reported decisions dated after that date, and any amendment to the Sanhita or to the First Schedule, are not reflected.
Section 119 is, in substance, IPC sections 327 and 329 carried forward intact. The questions that decide real cases under it are the questions that decided them before: was hurt actually caused, and was it caused for one of the stated purposes. The answers have not been changed by renumbering. The one genuinely new thing a practitioner must check is the First Schedule entry, which sends a ten-year offence to a Magistrate who cannot impose more than three years of it, and which treats this section's life-carrying sub-section differently from the one in the section immediately before. Verify the current text and classification, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.