What the section says
Section 14 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads: S1
14. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
Illustrations.
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.
The official marginal-note title is "Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law.", cross-checked against the India Code entry for the section. S2
Where this section sits
Section 14 is the opening section of Chapter III, "General Exceptions", which runs from s. 14 to s. 44. The chapter heading and both boundaries were read from the Gazette text: s. 13 closes Chapter II (Of Punishments), and s. 45 opens Chapter IV (Of Abetment, Criminal Conspiracy and Attempt). S1
Two structural points follow, and they matter for the whole chapter, not just this section.
First, the general exceptions reach beyond the Sanhita. Section 2(24) defines "offence" as a thing made punishable by the Sanhita, "but — (a) in Chapter III and in the following sections… the word 'offence' means a thing punishable under this Sanhita, or under any special law or local law". Chapter III is named first in that list. S1 So the defence in s. 14 is available on a prosecution under a special or local law, not only on a prosecution under the Sanhita. This is a notable contrast with s. 13, which was examined in the previous article and is not in the s. 2(24) lists.
Second, the burden of proof lies on the accused. Section 14 supplies no rule about proof. That is in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s. 108: where a person is accused of any offence, "the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023… is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5 So a person relying on s. 14 must establish it; the court starts from the presumption that the exception does not apply. (The corresponding provision of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was not accessed for this article and is therefore not cited.)
The two limbs
Section 14 is a single sentence covering two different people. Separating them is the key to the section.
Limb 1: the person who is bound by law. No question of belief arises at all. If the law in fact obliged the person to do the act, the act is not an offence. The hangman who executes a lawful death warrant, the police officer who makes an arrest the law requires him to make, the official who complies with a binding lawful direction: none of them needs to prove a state of mind.
Limb 2: the person who believes himself bound by law. This is the mistake-of-fact defence, and it carries three cumulative conditions:
- the belief must be that he was bound by law to do the act;
- the belief must arise by reason of a mistake of fact, and
- it must be held in good faith.
The phrase "and not by reason of a mistake of law" is a limitation, not a flourish. A person who knows all the facts but is wrong about what the law requires gets nothing from s. 14. Only a mistaken view of facts can support the defence.
"Good faith" is a demanding test, and it is defined
The Sanhita defines good faith in s. 2(11), and the definition is negative: S1
"good faith".—Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention;
So good faith here is not mere honesty or absence of malice. It imports due care and attention. A person whose belief was honestly held but carelessly arrived at is outside s. 14, because the statute excludes from "good faith" anything believed without due care and attention.
This definition is identical in substance to IPC s. 52, which read: "Nothing is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention." S4 The standard has not changed.
Illustration (b) is built around exactly this. The officer arrests the wrong man, Z instead of Y, and is protected, but the illustration is careful to say he did so "after due enquiry". Remove the due enquiry and the illustration no longer works, because the good-faith requirement fails. The words are doing legal work, not narrative decoration.
The authority: State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh
The decision most directly concerned with the first illustration is State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh & Ors, Supreme Court of India, 25 August 1981, reported at AIR 1981 SC 1917, (1982) 1 SCR 360 and (1981) 4 SCC 2. The Bench was Chandrachud C.J. and V. Balakrishna Eradi J, the judgment being delivered by Chandrachud C.J. S6
Police officers were prosecuted for the deaths of two brothers during a night operation. Their defence was that fire had been opened under the orders of a superior officer, a Deputy Commissioner of Police. The trial judge convicted; the High Court acquitted; the State petitioned for special leave.
The Court's reasoning on s. 76 is directly useful for reading s. 14's two limbs. After setting out the section and the illustration, the judgment says: S6
The occasion to apply the provisions of the section does not arise in the instant case since the question as to whether the accused believed in good faith on account of a mistake of fact that he was bound by law to do the act which is alleged to constitute an offence, would arise only if, to the extent relevant in this case, the order or command of the superior officer is not justified or is otherwise unlawful.
And earlier in the same passage: S6
If that order was justified and is therefore lawful, no further question can arise as to whether the respondents, who acted in obedience to that order, believed or did not believe that order to be lawful. Such an enquiry becomes necessary only when the order of the superior officer, which is pleaded as a defence, is found not to be in conformity with the commands of the law.
The point is a clean one, and it maps onto the structure of s. 14. Where the superior's order is itself lawful, the subordinate is within limb 1. He is bound, and his beliefs are irrelevant. The good-faith and mistake-of-fact enquiry under limb 2 becomes necessary only when the order is not in conformity with law. The Court also noted of illustration (a) that if a soldier fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer "in conformity with the commands of the law, he commits no offence", adding: "That is the purport of the illustration to section 76."
Citation discipline on this case
Two cautions, both taken from the judgment itself and both of which are commonly overlooked.
The Court expressly declined to rest its judgment on this reasoning. Immediately after the passage above, the judgment continues: "But considering that a little politics appears to have got mixed up with the trial of this case, it would be more satisfactory not to rest our judgment on this aspect of the matter and to consider whether the evidence led by the prosecution is such on which a conviction can safely be founded." S6 The Court then held the evidence insufficient. The witnesses had deposed nearly nine years after the incident, their evidence suffered from material contradictions, and a key witness was missing from the complainant's own list, and dismissed the Special Leave Petition, leaving the acquittal standing.
So the s. 76 analysis is reasoned, is delivered by the Chief Justice, and is summarised in the statutory note to the report ("S. 76 — Scope of — Command of superior officer to open fire… Enquiry into — When arises"). But it is not the ground on which the case was decided. It should be cited as considered reasoning on the scope of the section that the Court chose not to make the basis of its decision, not as the holding.
The Court did not decide the wider question of superior orders. Counsel had cited Russell on Crime, Granville Williams, Smith & Hogan, Colin Howard and a South African case on the general defence of obedience to superior orders. The judgment says: "It is unnecessary for us to go into that question." S6 The case therefore settles nothing about orders that are unlawful, which is precisely the situation in which limb 2 would have to be worked out.
Section 14 compared with Section 17
The two are routinely confused. The difference is one word.
| BNS s. 14 (← IPC s. 76) | BNS s. 17 (← IPC s. 79) | |
|---|---|---|
| Operative word | bound by law | justified by law |
| Nature | a legal obligation to act | a legal entitlement to act |
| Mistake limb | believes himself bound | believes himself justified |
| Typical case | executing a warrant; obeying a lawful command | effecting a lawful arrest one is permitted but not obliged to make |
Both sections share the same architecture, an actual-state limb and a mistake-of-fact-in-good-faith limb, and both exclude mistake of law. Section 17's text was read and uses "justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law". S1S4 Where a defence is available at all it will often be arguable under whichever of the two fits, but the distinction between being obliged and being permitted is real and should not be elided.
The surrounding sections complete the cluster: s. 15 (act of a Judge acting judicially, ← IPC s. 77), s. 16 (act done pursuant to the judgment or order of a Court, ← IPC s. 78), and s. 18 (accident, ← IPC s. 80). S1S4
Comparison with IPC Section 76
The main provision and illustration (a) were compared with IPC s. 76 word by word after whitespace normalisation. Both are identical. S1S4
Illustration (b) is not identical. There are two differences:
| IPC s. 76, illustration (b) | BNS s. 14, illustration (b) | |
|---|---|---|
| Who the officer serves | "an officer of a Court of Justice" | "an officer of a Court" |
| Punctuation | "ordered by that Court to arrest Y and, after due enquiry" | "ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry" |
The comma is immaterial. The first change is not peculiar to this section. It is one instance of a change running through the whole code.
"Court of Justice" is gone from the statute book
The phrase "Court of Justice" appears 39 times in the Indian Penal Code and zero times in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Both texts were searched in full. S1S4 The BNS uses "Court" throughout, and defines it in s. 2(5):
"Court" means a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially;
IPC s. 20 had defined "Court of Justice" in materially the same words: "The words 'Court of Justice' denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially." S4
So the substance of the definition is carried over and the change is terminological. One thing was dropped: IPC s. 20 carried an illustration about a Panchayat acting under Regulation VII, 1816 of the Madras Code. The words "Panchayat" and "Regulation VII" appear zero times in the BNS. S1S4 A definition in s. 2 does not carry illustrations, and the example referred to a regulation of 1816; nothing of substance is lost.
The practical consequence for a reader is modest but real: in BNS s. 14 and throughout the Sanhita, "Court" is a defined term bearing the s. 2(5) meaning. It is not a loose reference to any official body. An order from something that is not a Court within s. 2(5) is not an order of a Court for the purposes of illustration (b) or of s. 16.
Summary of the change
| IPC s. 76 | BNS s. 14 | |
|---|---|---|
| Main provision | — | identical |
| Illustration (a) | — | identical |
| Illustration (b) | "Court of Justice" | "Court" (defined in s. 2(5) in the same substance as IPC s. 20) |
| "Good faith" | IPC s. 52 | BNS s. 2(11), same words |
| Exception applies to special/local law offences | yes (IPC s. 40) | yes (BNS s. 2(24)(a), Chapter III named) |
| Classification | — | substantively unchanged; renumbered |
Worked examples
1. A lawful order to open fire. A police constable fires on the order of a superior officer, and the order is lawful in the circumstances. He is within limb 1: he was bound to obey a lawful command, and no enquiry into his beliefs is required. This is the situation Shew Mangal Singh addresses.
2. An unlawful order to open fire. The order is not in conformity with law. Limb 1 is unavailable, because the law did not bind him to do it. He must then establish limb 2: that by reason of a mistake of fact, in good faith, he believed himself bound. Whether, and how far, obedience to an unlawful order can be made out is exactly the question Shew Mangal Singh said it was unnecessary to go into.
3. Arresting the wrong person after due enquiry. An officer of a Court, ordered to arrest Y, makes due enquiry and arrests Z in the honest and careful belief that Z is Y. Illustration (b): no offence. The mistake is one of fact (identity), and good faith is satisfied by the due enquiry.
4. Arresting the wrong person without enquiry. Same facts, but the officer makes no enquiry and acts on a casual assumption. Section 14 does not protect him. His belief may be honest, but s. 2(11) excludes from "good faith" what is believed "without due care and attention".
5. A mistake about the law. An official knows exactly who the person is and what the order says, but wrongly believes the law obliges him to detain the person for a further week. This is a mistake of law, and s. 14 expressly excludes it.
6. A prosecution under a special law. A person charged under a special enactment relies on s. 14. The defence is available, because s. 2(24)(a) extends "offence" in Chapter III to things punishable under any special or local law.
7. Who must prove it. In each of the above, the person relying on s. 14 bears the burden under BSA s. 108, and the court presumes the absence of the circumstances until he establishes them.
Common mistakes
- Collapsing the two limbs. A person who is bound by law need not prove good faith or any mistake. The belief enquiry belongs only to limb 2.
- Treating good faith as mere honesty. Section 2(11) defines it negatively by reference to due care and attention. A careless belief is not in good faith, however sincere.
- Overlooking the words "after due enquiry" in illustration (b). They are the reason the illustration works.
- Relying on a mistake of law. Section 14 covers mistake of fact and expressly not mistake of law.
- Confusing s. 14 with s. 17. Section 14 is about being bound; s. 17 is about being justified: obligation against entitlement.
- Citing Shew Mangal Singh as a holding on s. 76. The Court expressly declined to rest its judgment on that aspect and decided the case on the sufficiency of the evidence, dismissing the Special Leave Petition.
- Citing Shew Mangal Singh for a general defence of superior orders. The Court said it was unnecessary to go into that question.
- Assuming the prosecution must disprove the exception. Under BSA s. 108 the burden is on the accused and the court presumes the exception's absence.
- Reading "Court" loosely. It is defined in s. 2(5). "Court of Justice" no longer appears anywhere in the Sanhita.
- Assuming Chapter III applies only to Sanhita offences. Section 2(24)(a) names Chapter III first, extending it to special and local law offences.
Status of authority on BNS Section 14
No judgment on BNS s. 14 was located. The section has been in force only since 1 July 2024 under notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S3
Because the main provision and illustration (a) are word-for-word identical to IPC s. 76, and the definition of good faith in s. 2(11) reproduces IPC s. 52, IPC-era authority on s. 76 would be expected to apply to s. 14 without qualification. Shew Mangal Singh is cited here as an IPC-era decision on IPC s. 76 and should be cited as such, with the two cautions set out above. No attempt has been made in this article to survey the whole body of authority on IPC s. 76; one decision directly concerned with illustration (a) was located and verified in full, and nothing is asserted about cases not examined.
Related sections
- BNS s. 2(5): definition of "Court", replacing IPC s. 20's "Court of Justice".
- BNS s. 2(11): definition of "good faith", the operative standard in limb 2.
- BNS s. 2(24): definition of "offence", extending Chapter III to special and local law offences.
- BNS s. 15: Act of Judge when acting judicially.
- BNS s. 16: Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of a Court.
- BNS s. 17: Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law: the "justified" counterpart to this section's "bound".
- BNS s. 18: Accident in doing a lawful act.
Law checked as of 2 October 2026. The statutory text was read from the Gazette of India publication of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 hosted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and cross-checked against India Code. BNS ss. 14 to 19, 2(5), 2(11) and 2(24), the Chapter III boundaries, and IPC ss. 76, 79, 52 and 20 were read directly, and the main provision and illustrations of s. 14 were compared with IPC s. 76 by programmatic word-level diff. Both codes were searched in full for the phrase "Court of Justice". The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 was read for s. 108; the corresponding provision of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was not accessed and is not cited. State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh was read in full from a judgment-text repository, including the statutory note, the headnote, the passage on s. 76 and the disposition; the official report was not accessible at the time of checking, and the citations given are those appearing in that text.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.