What the section says
Section 16 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads in full: S1
16. Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court; if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.
The official marginal-note title is "Act done pursuant to judgment or order of Court.", confirmed from the India Code entry for the section. S2
The semicolon after "a Court" is in the enacted text. It is discussed below, because it is not where a reader expects it to be.
Who this section protects
Section 16 is the companion to s. 15, and the division between them is the single most useful thing to understand about either.
- Section 15 protects the Judge who makes the order.
- Section 16 protects the person who acts on it.
Section 16 is not confined to officials. The words are "the person doing the act", not the officer, not the bailiff, not the public servant. Anyone who does something in pursuance of, or warranted by, a court's judgment or order can rely on it. A private party who takes possession under a decree, or a third party who does something a court order requires of him, is within the section's language.
This matters because the acts s. 16 protects would often otherwise be offences. Entering land, seizing goods, dispossessing an occupant, detaining a person. Each has an obvious penal counterpart. Section 16 is what makes the routine execution of court orders lawful rather than merely tolerated.
The four elements
1. There must be a judgment or order of a Court. "Court" is a defined term. Section 2(5) provides that "Court" means "a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially". S1 So a direction from a body that is not a Court within that definition is not an order of a Court for this purpose, however official it looks.
2. The act must be done "in pursuance of", or be "warranted by", that judgment or order. Two limbs, and they are not the same:
- in pursuance of: the act carries out what the order directs;
- warranted by. The act is authorised by the order, though not expressly directed by it.
The second limb is wider and does real work, because orders rarely specify every step needed to give effect to them. But both limbs are limits. An act that goes beyond what the order directs or authorises is protected by neither. Section 16 covers execution of the order, not conduct merely occasioned by it.
3. The act must be done "whilst such judgment or order remains in force". This is a timing condition, and it cuts both ways:
- An act done before the order was made, or after it ceased to be in force, because it expired, was satisfied, was recalled, stayed or set aside: is outside the section.
- But an order that was in force when the act was done does not lose its protective effect merely because it is set aside later. The question is the state of affairs at the time of the act. That is the natural reading of "whilst… remains in force", and it is what makes the section workable: an officer executing a subsisting order cannot be expected to anticipate its future fate.
4. Where the Court lacked jurisdiction, the person must have believed in good faith that it had jurisdiction. This is the saving clause, and its structure is frequently misread. It is examined next.
The jurisdiction clause, and an asymmetry worth noticing
The closing words are: "notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction."
Read carefully, this produces an asymmetry:
| Did the Court have jurisdiction? | Is good faith required? |
|---|---|
| Yes | No. The protection operates on the first three elements alone. |
| No | Yes. The proviso applies, and the person must have believed in good faith that it had jurisdiction. |
So good faith is not a freestanding requirement of s. 16. It is the price of the jurisdictional indulgence. A person who executes an order made by a court that plainly had jurisdiction need not prove anything about his state of mind; a person who executes an order the court had no power to make must.
This is a different architecture from ss. 14, 15 and 17, each of which pairs an actual-state limb with a good-faith-belief limb covering the case where the actual state was absent. Section 16 instead gives a single protection and attaches a good-faith condition to one specific defect: want of jurisdiction.
And "good faith" is demanding, because s. 2(11) defines it negatively: S1
"good faith".—Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention;
So the belief in the Court's jurisdiction must have been arrived at with due care and attention. That standard reproduces IPC s. 52 without change. S4 What due care requires of a person executing an order will plainly differ between a court officer serving process in the ordinary course and a party acting on an order he has reason to doubt; the section supplies the standard, not its application.
Note also what the proviso does not cover. It saves want of jurisdiction. It says nothing about an order that is irregular, erroneous, procured by fraud, or defective for some other reason. Whether such cases fall within the first three elements at all is a question of construction on which no authority is cited here.
Comparison with IPC Section 78
Section 16 corresponds to IPC s. 78. The two were compared word by word after whitespace normalisation. There are three differences, and all three are presentational. S1S4
| IPC s. 78 | BNS s. 16 | |
|---|---|---|
| Marginal title | "Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court" | "Act done pursuant to judgment or order of Court." |
| The tribunal | "a Court of Justice," | "a Court;" |
| Punctuation after it | comma | semicolon |
| Operative requirements | — | unchanged |
The "Court of Justice" change is not peculiar to this section. The phrase appears 39 times in the Indian Penal Code and zero times in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which uses "Court" throughout and defines it in s. 2(5) in materially the same words IPC s. 20 used to define "Court of Justice". S1S4 The substance of the definition was carried over under a new name.
So nothing in the operative requirements of s. 78 was altered: the two trigger limbs, the in-force condition, the jurisdictional saving and the good-faith proviso are all carried over as they stood.
The semicolon
IPC s. 78 read: "…warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court of Justice**,** if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence…"
BNS s. 16 reads: "…warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court**;** if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence…"
The sentence is built as "Nothing … is an offence", with two qualifying phrases inserted between the subject and the verb, each set off by commas. Replacing the first of those closing commas with a semicolon severs the subject "Nothing" from its verb "is an offence" with a mark normally used between independent clauses, and the words that follow the semicolon are not an independent clause. On a strict reading the sentence no longer parses.
Two points of discipline about this.
First, it is genuinely in the enacted text, not an artefact of how the text was extracted. The Gazette of India publication hosted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the India Code entry for the section, two independently retrieved sources, both carry the semicolon. S1S2
Second, it does not change the meaning. The structure of the provision is recoverable without difficulty: the qualifying phrase is plainly a condition on the protection, exactly as the comma made clear in IPC s. 78. Nobody reading s. 16 is in real doubt about what it requires. It is a drafting blemish, and it is recorded here because a reader who notices it should know it is in the statute rather than wonder whether the text has been mistranscribed, not because anything turns on it. No suggestion is made that it creates ambiguity in the law, and no documented explanation for the change was located.
Section 16 in the Chapter III scheme
| Section | IPC | Protects | Operative concept |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 | s. 76 | anyone | bound by law |
| 15 | s. 77 | a Judge acting judicially | a power given by law |
| 16 | s. 78 | anyone acting on a court's order | the judgment or order itself |
| 17 | s. 79 | anyone | justified by law |
A defect in a court's jurisdiction is therefore addressed twice over, from two directions: the Judge who assumed it may be within s. 15 if his belief in the power was held in good faith, and the person who executed the resulting order may be within s. 16 if his belief in the Court's jurisdiction was held in good faith. The two are independent: one may succeed where the other fails.
Two chapter-wide rules apply, as for every section in Chapter III:
- Scope. Section 2(24)(a) names Chapter III first among the provisions in which "offence" means a thing punishable under the Sanhita or under any special law or local law. So s. 16 is available on a prosecution under a special or local enactment. S1
- Burden of proof. Section 16 says nothing about proof. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s. 108, the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within a General Exception is on the accused, "and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5
Worked examples
1. An officer executes a warrant issued by a court with jurisdiction. Within the section on the first three elements. The proviso never arises, because there was no want of jurisdiction, so nothing turns on the officer's state of mind.
2. An officer executes a warrant issued by a court that had no jurisdiction to issue it. The jurisdictional saving applies, but only if the officer in good faith believed the court had jurisdiction: a belief which, under s. 2(11), must have been formed with due care and attention.
3. An officer executes an order he has good reason to know the court could not make. The proviso fails. A belief held without due care and attention, or no belief at all, is outside s. 2(11).
4. An officer does more than the order authorises. Suppose an order directs seizure of specified goods and the officer also seizes other property. The excess is neither done "in pursuance of" nor "warranted by" the order, and is unprotected, even though the rest of the execution is protected.
5. An act done after the order was set aside. Outside the section: the judgment or order no longer "remains in force". Whether the person knew of the setting aside is a separate question, and s. 16's proviso does not address it, being directed to want of jurisdiction.
6. An act done while the order was in force, which is set aside afterwards. Within the section. The condition is tested at the time of the act, which is what allows officers to act on subsisting orders.
7. A private party acts under a decree. Section 16 applies. It is not limited to officials: the words are "the person doing the act".
8. A direction from a body that is not a Court. Section 16 does not apply, because there is no judgment or order of a Court within s. 2(5). Whether any other exception assists (s. 14 if the person was bound by law, or s. 17 if he was justified by law) would have to be considered separately.
Common mistakes
- Confusing s. 16 with s. 15. Section 15 protects the Judge who makes the order; s. 16 protects the person who acts on it.
- Treating good faith as a general requirement of s. 16. It is not. It is the condition attached to the want-of-jurisdiction saving. Where the court had jurisdiction, the protection does not depend on the actor's belief.
- Treating good faith as mere honesty. Section 2(11) excludes anything believed "without due care and attention".
- Assuming the section protects whatever is done in connection with an order. The act must be done in pursuance of, or be warranted by, the order. An excess beyond it is unprotected.
- Overlooking the second limb. "Warranted by" is wider than "in pursuance of" and covers steps authorised by the order though not expressly directed.
- Reading the in-force condition as defeated by a later setting aside. The condition is tested when the act is done.
- Thinking the section covers any defect in the order. The saving is for want of jurisdiction only.
- Assuming s. 16 is confined to public servants. It applies to "the person doing the act".
- Reading "Court" loosely. It is defined in s. 2(5); "Court of Justice" no longer appears anywhere in the Sanhita.
- Expecting the prosecution to disprove the exception. Under BSA s. 108 the burden is on the accused.
- Assuming the BNS changed this provision. The operative requirements are unchanged; the three differences from IPC s. 78 are the dropped "the" in the title, "Court of Justice" becoming "Court", and a comma becoming a semicolon.
Status of authority
No judgment on BNS s. 16 was located. The section has been in force only since 1 July 2024 under notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S3
No decision squarely construing IPC s. 78 was located either. The search conducted was a keyword search of a judgment-text repository restricted to Supreme Court decisions, combining "section 78", "Indian Penal Code", "judgment or order" and "jurisdiction"; the results returned concerned other questions. That is a statement about the search performed, not a claim that no such authority exists: a fuller search of law reports and of High Court decisions was not undertaken, and no view is offered on what it would show.
No case is cited, in preference to citing one that does not decide the point. The analysis above rests on the statutory text and on the definitions the section depends on, each of which was read directly. Because the operative requirements of s. 16 are identical to IPC s. 78, and because s. 2(11) reproduces IPC s. 52 and s. 2(5) carries over the substance of IPC s. 20, authority on IPC s. 78 would be expected to apply to s. 16 without qualification.
Statutes conferring protection on judicial officers and on persons executing process outside the penal law were not examined for this article, and nothing is asserted about them.
Related sections
- BNS s. 2(5): definition of "Court", replacing IPC s. 20's "Court of Justice".
- BNS s. 2(11): definition of "good faith": due care and attention.
- BNS s. 2(24): definition of "offence", extending Chapter III to special and local law offences.
- BNS s. 14: Act done by a person bound by law.
- BNS s. 15: Act of a Judge when acting judicially: the counterpart protecting the Judge who makes the order.
- BNS s. 17: Act done by a person justified by law.
Law checked as of 2 October 2026. The statutory text was read from the Gazette of India publication of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 hosted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and independently from the India Code entry for the section, both of which carry the semicolon discussed above. BNS ss. 14 to 17, 2(5), 2(11) and 2(24)(a) and IPC ss. 78, 77, 52 and 20 were read directly, and BNS s. 16 was compared with IPC s. 78 by programmatic word-level diff. Both codes were searched in full for the phrase "Court of Justice". The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 was read for s. 108. No case is cited: no decision squarely construing IPC s. 78 was located in the search described above.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.