What the section says
Section 15 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads in full: S1
15. Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.
Thirty-five words, no illustrations, no provisos. The official marginal-note title is "Act of Judge when acting judicially.", cross-checked against the India Code entry for the section. S2
It is the second section of Chapter III, General Exceptions (ss. 14 to 44), and it follows the same two-limb architecture as s. 14: an actual-power limb and a good-faith-belief limb.
The three requirements
Every word of s. 15 is a condition. The protection applies only where all three are satisfied.
1. The person must be a "Judge". This is a defined term, considered below. It is not limited to persons called "Judge", but neither does it extend to every official exercising some decision-making function.
2. The act must be done "when acting judicially". This is the central limitation. Section 15 does not protect everything a Judge does. It protects what a Judge does in the judicial capacity. An act done in an administrative capacity (managing court establishment, dealing with staff, exercising powers of appointment or discipline) is not done "when acting judicially" and falls outside the section, whatever the actor's office.
3. The act must be in the exercise of a power which either (a) is given to him by law, or (b) which in good faith he believes to be given to him by law. As in s. 14, the second limb covers the case where the power did not in fact exist. A Judge who acts beyond jurisdiction is not thereby without protection, provided the belief in the power was held in good faith.
Note what limb (b) does not say. It is not a general immunity for error. Good faith is defined in s. 2(11), and the definition is negative: S1
"good faith".—Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention;
So the belief in the power must have been arrived at with due care and attention. A Judge who assumes a jurisdiction carelessly, without applying his mind to whether the law gives it, is outside the second limb. This definition reproduces IPC s. 52 without change. S4
Who is a "Judge"?
Section 15 turns on the word "Judge", and the Sanhita defines it in s. 2(16): S1
"Judge" means a person who is officially designated as a Judge and includes a person,—
(i) who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or
(ii) who is one of a body or persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.
Two features matter in practice.
The test is the power to give a definitive judgment, not the job title. A person officially designated a Judge is one; so is a person who, though not so designated, is empowered by law to give a judgment which is definitive, or which would be definitive if not appealed against or if confirmed by some other authority. Clause (ii) extends this to a member of a body of persons empowered to give such a judgment, so a member of a multi-member adjudicating body can be a Judge for this purpose even though the body, not the member, gives the judgment.
It is the finality of the decision that counts, not its appealability. The definition expressly accommodates judgments that are subject to appeal or require confirmation. The question is whether the decision disposes of the proceeding, not whether it is the last word in the system.
The illustrations the BNS did not carry over
IPC s. 19 defined "Judge" in materially the same substance, though it was differently constructed: "The word 'Judge' denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person" who is empowered to give a definitive judgment, or who is one of a body of persons so empowered. The BNS recasts this in the conventional "means… and includes" form with lettered clauses. Nothing of substance turns on the recasting. S1S4
But IPC s. 19 also carried four illustrations, and the BNS carries none. They were: S4
| IPC s. 19 illustration | Effect | |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | A Collector exercising jurisdiction in a suit under Act 10 of 1859 | is a Judge |
| (b) | A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power to sentence to fine or imprisonment | is a Judge |
| (c) | A member of a panchayat with power under Regulation VII, 1816, of the Madras Code to try and determine suits | is a Judge |
| (d) | A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power only to commit for trial to another Court | is not a Judge |
Illustrations (a) and (c) referred to enactments of 1859 and 1816 and were long obsolete; dropping them loses nothing. Illustrations (b) and (d) are different. Read together they drew a line that the bare definition leaves to inference: a Magistrate who can dispose of the charge is a Judge, while a Magistrate who can only commit the case for trial elsewhere is not. That is the clearest available worked example of the "definitive judgment" test, and the negative illustration (d) in particular did real interpretive work.
The line itself should survive, because it follows from the definition. A power only to commit for trial is not a power to give a definitive judgment. But the Sanhita now leaves it to be reasoned from the definition rather than stating it. This is an observation about the loss of drafting guidance; it is not a claim that the law changed, and no documented legislative rationale for omitting the illustrations was located.
A note on a textual oddity: clause (ii) reads "one of a body or persons, which body of persons is empowered by law". The intended sense is plainly "a body of persons", as the immediately following words show. The same wording appears in the published text of IPC s. 19, so this is not a change introduced by the BNS; it appears to be a long-standing printing artefact carried forward. Nothing turns on it. S1S4
Comparison with IPC Section 77
BNS s. 15 and IPC s. 77 were compared word by word after whitespace normalisation. Both run to exactly thirty-five words and the texts are identical. S1S4
| IPC s. 77 | BNS s. 15 | |
|---|---|---|
| Operative text | — | identical, 35 words |
| Marginal title | "Act of Judge when acting judicially" | "Act of Judge when acting judicially." |
| "Judge" defined at | s. 19, with four illustrations | s. 2(16), with no illustrations |
| "Good faith" defined at | s. 52 | s. 2(11), same words |
| Applies to special/local law offences | yes | yes: s. 2(24)(a) names Chapter III |
| Classification | — | substantively unchanged; renumbered |
So the only changes affecting s. 15 are the relocation of the two definitions it depends on and the omission of the "Judge" illustrations.
What Section 15 does not do
It is easy to read s. 15 as a general judicial immunity. It is not. Three limits are worth stating plainly.
It is an exception in the penal law only. Section 15 provides that certain conduct is not an offence. It says nothing about civil liability, about disciplinary or administrative consequences, or about the removal of a Judge. Other enactments confer protections on judicial officers; none of them was examined for this article, and nothing is asserted here about their content or scope.
It does not cover administrative acts. The words "when acting judicially" are a condition, not a description of the office.
It does not protect bad faith. The second limb is expressly conditioned on good faith, and s. 2(11) makes that a standard of due care and attention. A Judge who knows he lacks the power, or who does not trouble to consider it, cannot bring himself within limb (b). The first limb is not a route around this, because it requires the power to have actually existed.
Two chapter-wide rules also apply, both established in the article on s. 14:
- Scope. Section 2(24)(a) names Chapter III first among the provisions in which "offence" means a thing punishable under the Sanhita or under any special law or local law, so s. 15 is available on a prosecution under a special or local enactment. S1
- Burden of proof. Section 15 says nothing about proof. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s. 108, the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within a General Exception is on the accused, "and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5
Section 15 compared with Sections 14, 16 and 17
The opening sections of Chapter III form a deliberate sequence, and distinguishing them is more useful than memorising each.
| Section | IPC | Who is protected | Operative concept |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 | s. 76 | anyone | bound by law to do the act |
| 15 | s. 77 | a Judge, acting judicially | a power given to him by law |
| 16 | s. 78 | anyone acting on a court's judgment or order | the judgment or order of a Court |
| 17 | s. 79 | anyone | justified by law in doing the act |
Section 15 protects the person who makes the order; s. 16 protects the person who carries it out. That division is the practical point of having both. Section 16 goes further in one respect: it protects an act done in pursuance of a judgment or order while it remains in force "notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order", provided the person doing the act in good faith believes the Court had jurisdiction. S1 So a defect in the Court's jurisdiction is addressed twice over: once for the Judge under s. 15, and once for the executing officer under s. 16.
Each of ss. 14, 15 and 17 contains a good-faith belief limb, and in each the belief must be about a different thing: being bound (s. 14), having the power (s. 15), being justified (s. 17).
Worked examples
1. A Judge passes a sentence the law authorises. Within limb (a): the power existed. No question of belief arises.
2. A Judge assumes a jurisdiction he does not have, after considering the point. Limb (a) fails because the power did not exist. Limb (b) is available if the belief that the law gave him the power was held in good faith, which, under s. 2(11), requires due care and attention. Having applied his mind to the question of jurisdiction is what makes the limb arguable.
3. A Judge assumes a jurisdiction without considering whether he has it. Limb (b) is not satisfied. An honest but careless belief is excluded by the definition of good faith.
4. A Magistrate empowered only to commit the case for trial elsewhere. On the s. 2(16) definition he is not giving a definitive judgment, so he is not a "Judge" for this purpose: the position IPC s. 19 illustration (d) stated expressly and which must now be reasoned from the definition.
5. A member of a multi-member tribunal empowered by law to give a definitive judgment. Clause (ii) of s. 2(16) applies: the member is a "Judge" even though the judgment is the body's.
6. A Judge acting in an administrative capacity. Section 15 does not apply, because the act was not done "when acting judicially". Whether any other protection applies is outside the scope of this article and was not examined.
7. A prosecution under a special enactment. Section 15 remains available, because s. 2(24)(a) extends Chapter III to offences under special and local laws. The accused bears the burden under BSA s. 108.
Common mistakes
- Treating s. 15 as a general immunity for Judges. It is an exception in the penal law, confined to acts done when acting judicially.
- Ignoring the words "when acting judicially". They exclude administrative acts.
- Assuming the good-faith limb excuses any error of jurisdiction. Section 2(11) requires due care and attention; a careless assumption of jurisdiction is not good faith.
- Reading "Judge" as the job title. Section 2(16) turns on the power to give a definitive judgment, and expressly includes members of a body of persons empowered to give one.
- Assuming a decision must be unappealable to be "definitive". The definition covers a judgment which would be definitive if not appealed against, or if confirmed by some other authority.
- Treating a Magistrate who can only commit for trial as a Judge. He is not: the point IPC s. 19 illustration (d) made expressly.
- Confusing s. 15 with s. 16. Section 15 protects the Judge who makes the order; s. 16 protects the person who acts on it.
- Expecting the prosecution to disprove the exception. Under BSA s. 108 the burden is on the accused.
- Assuming the BNS changed this provision. Section 15 is word-for-word IPC s. 77.
Status of authority
No judgment on BNS s. 15 was located. The section has been in force only since 1 July 2024 under notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S3
No decision squarely construing IPC s. 77 was located either. The search conducted was a keyword search of a judgment-text repository restricted to Supreme Court decisions, combining "section 77", "Indian Penal Code" and the phrase "acting judicially"; the results that came back concerned other questions. That is a statement about the search performed, not a claim that no such authority exists: a more thorough search of law reports and High Court decisions was not undertaken, and no view is offered on what it would show.
Rather than cite a case that does not decide the point, this article relies on the statutory text and the definitions it depends on, each of which was read directly. Because s. 15 reproduces IPC s. 77 exactly, and because s. 2(11) reproduces IPC s. 52 and s. 2(16) carries over the substance of IPC s. 19, any authority on IPC s. 77 would be expected to apply to s. 15 without qualification.
Related sections
- BNS s. 2(11): definition of "good faith": due care and attention.
- BNS s. 2(16): definition of "Judge", replacing IPC s. 19.
- BNS s. 2(24): definition of "offence", extending Chapter III to special and local law offences.
- BNS s. 14: Act done by a person bound by law: the chapter opener, and the "bound" counterpart.
- BNS s. 16: Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of a Court: protects the person who executes the order this section protects the Judge for making.
- BNS s. 17: Act done by a person justified by law.
Law checked as of 2 October 2026. The statutory text was read from the Gazette of India publication of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 hosted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and cross-checked against India Code. BNS ss. 15, 16, 17, 2(11), 2(16) and 2(24)(a) and IPC ss. 77, 78, 52 and 19 (including its four illustrations) were read directly, and BNS s. 15 was compared with IPC s. 77 by programmatic word-level diff. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 was read for s. 108. No case is cited: no decision squarely construing IPC s. 77 was located in the search described above, and none on BNS s. 15 exists to be found. Statutes conferring protection on judicial officers outside the penal law were not examined, and nothing is asserted about them.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.