What the section says
Section 18 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reads in full: S1S2
18. Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.
Illustration.
A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing by. Here, if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an offence.
The official marginal-note title is "Accident in doing a lawful act." S2
The odd section out in Chapter III
Sections 14, 15 and 17 each have the same architecture: an actual-state limb and a good-faith belief limb, so that a person who was mistaken may still be protected. Section 19, which follows, turns on acting "in good faith" to prevent other harm.
Section 18 has no belief limb at all. The words "good faith" appear eight times in the run of sections from s. 14 to s. 19: and not once in s. 18. S1 Nothing in s. 18 asks what the accused thought, believed, or intended to achieve. It asks what he actually did and how carefully he did it.
That makes s. 18 purely objective, and it explains why the section is so much harder to satisfy than its plain-sounding title suggests. "It was an accident" is not a defence under s. 18. It is one of seven things that must all be true.
The point is reinforced by the drafting: the phrase "proper care and caution" appears exactly once in the entire Sanhita: here, in s. 18. S1 It is not the same test as the "due care and attention" that s. 2(11) requires for good faith, and it is not applied to the same thing: good faith measures how a belief was formed, while proper care and caution measures how the act was done.
The seven cumulative requirements
Thirty-eight words contain seven conditions, every one of which must be satisfied:
- the act must be done by accident or misfortune;
- without any criminal intention;
- without any criminal knowledge;
- in the doing of a lawful act;
- in a lawful manner;
- by lawful means; and
- with proper care and caution.
Requirements 4, 5 and 6 are worth pausing on. The legislature could have written "a lawful act" and stopped. Instead it required the act, the manner and the means each to be lawful. A lawful object pursued by unlawful means is outside the section; so is a lawful act performed in an unlawful manner.
Neither "accident" nor "misfortune" is defined. Both words were searched for in the s. 2 definitions: neither appears. S1 In the Sanhita as a whole "accident" appears five times and "misfortune" three times, the other occurrences being in the illustration to s. 30, in s. 100 (where the provocation exception speaks of death caused "by accident or misfortune"), in s. 209 and in s. 331. S1 So the content of both words is left to be worked out on the facts.
The standard is that of a prudent and reasonable man
The leading authority on what requirement 7 demands is Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra, 9 March 2004, reported at AIR 2004 SC 1966 and (2005) 9 SCC 71. S6 The Court stated:
The primordial requirement of Section 80 is that the act which killed the other person must have been done "with proper care and caution".
and:
The amount of care and circumspection taken by an accused must be one taken by a prudent and reasonable man in the circumstances of a particular case.
So the yardstick is external. It is not what this accused thought sufficient; it is what a prudent and reasonable person would have done in those circumstances.
The Court added a gateway point that disposes of many attempted reliances on the section:
Where the act of the accused is itself criminal in nature the protection under Section 80 is not available.
That is requirement 4 doing its work. A person engaged in a criminal act who causes an unintended result cannot reach s. 18 at all, however genuinely unintended the result was.
Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar: facts, reasoning and outcome
The facts. On the accused's own case, guests had been invited for dinner; he told the deceased not to leave; to scare him he picked up a gun, loaded it with blank cartridges, and in a scuffle, as the deceased pulled the barrel, it went off. The prosecution case, supported by two eyewitnesses, was that he picked up the gun, unlocked it, loaded it with cartridges and fired from a range of about four or five feet, aimed at the chest. After the shooting the body was carried away in a gunny bag and thrown into a well. S6
On s. 80. The Court held: "Certainly in view of unimpeachable evidence of PWs 2 and 3, Section 80 has no application." The deliberate sequence of picking up, unlocking, loading and aiming at a vital part from close range was incompatible with proper care and caution. S6
On the general exceptions generally. The Court set out a framework that applies to the whole of Chapter III, not merely to the accident exception: S6
The "general exceptions" contained in Sections 76 to 106 make an offence a non-offence. The "general exceptions" enacted by IPC are of universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature by Section 6 IPC enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every offence contained in IPC, but the burden to prove their existence lies on the accused.
Two translations into Sanhita terms are needed here, both verified:
- IPC Chapter IV ("General Exceptions"), ss. 76 to 106, corresponds to BNS Chapter III, ss. 14 to 44. S1S4
- IPC s. 6 corresponds to BNS s. 3(1), which provides that throughout the Sanhita every definition of an offence, every penal provision and every illustration "shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled General Exceptions, though those exceptions are not repeated". The two texts were compared and say the same thing. S1S4
So the reasoning carries over directly: by force of s. 3(1), the general exceptions are read into every offence definition in the Sanhita, while the burden of establishing one rests on the accused.
On the presumption. The Court said that where the accused pleads the s. 80 exception "there is a presumption against him and the burden to rebut the presumption lies on him", referring to K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra. S6 This aligns with the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s. 108, under which the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within a General Exception is on the accused and "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances". S5
The outcome. The accident plea failed and so did a plea under s. 304A. The Court nevertheless held the offence to be covered by s. 304 Part II rather than s. 302, fixed a custodial sentence of eight years, and upheld the convictions under s. 201 and under s. 25(1A) of the Arms Act. The appeal was "allowed to the extent indicated above". S6 So the appellant succeeded on the classification of the homicide, not on accident.
Cases referred to in that judgment. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar refers to Bhupendrasinh A. Chaudasama v. State of Gujarat, recorded there as 1998 (2) SCC 603, as holding that where the accused shot his own colleague at close range without knowing the identity of his target, the act "smacked of utter dearth of any care and caution". It also refers to K. M. Nanavati and distinguishes Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh v. State of Pepsu (recorded as AIR 1954 SC 271) on the ground that there the gun was not aimed at the victim and there was evidence of a scuffle. None of those three decisions was separately examined for this article; they are mentioned only as Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar reports them, with the citations as they appear in that text. (The name of the first is spelled "Chaudasama" in the judgment text and "Chudasama" in the repository's case title; it is given here as the judgment spells it.)
The boundary with negligence, and why it now matters more
Section 18 and the negligence offences occupy adjacent ground. If the accused fails on requirement 7: proper care and caution. The natural consequence is not acquittal but liability for a negligence offence.
That boundary has become more consequential under the Sanhita, because the penalty on the other side of it rose sharply:
| IPC s. 304A | BNS s. 106(1) | |
|---|---|---|
| Conduct | causing death by any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide | same |
| Imprisonment | up to 2 years | up to 5 years |
| Fine | "or with fine, or with both" | "and shall also be liable to fine" |
| Special lower limb | — | registered medical practitioner performing a medical procedure: up to 2 years and fine |
Section 106(2) is new in form and severe: causing death by rash and negligent driving of a vehicle not amounting to culpable homicide and escaping without reporting it to a police officer or Magistrate soon after the incident is punishable with imprisonment up to ten years and fine. S1S4
So the practical stakes of the s. 18 enquiry have risen: the maximum for simple negligent killing is now two and a half times what it was, and the fine is no longer an alternative to imprisonment.
A note on scope: Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar's discussion of s. 304A: that it applies only where there is neither intention nor knowledge, and that where either is present s. 304A has no application: is reported here as the Court's reasoning on the IPC provision. The corresponding BNS provisions on culpable homicide and murder were not examined for this article, and nothing is asserted about how the boundary between s. 106 and those provisions now falls.
The illustration, read closely
The hatchet illustration is conditional, and the condition is the whole point: "if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an offence." It does not say that a flying hatchet head is always an accident. It says the act is excusable provided proper caution was not wanting. A worker using an obviously defective hatchet, or swinging it beside a bystander, fails the condition.
The illustration also uses the word "excusable". That sits interestingly beside s. 17, which speaks of being "justified" by law. The Sanhita does not set up a formal taxonomy of justification and excuse, and nothing in this article turns on one; but the two words are in the statute, and they point at a real difference. Section 17 says the act was rightly done. Section 18 says the act was not rightly done but the actor is not to be blamed for its outcome.
Worked examples
1. The hatchet. A tool fails during ordinary work and kills a bystander. Section 18 applies if the work was lawful, done lawfully and by lawful means, there was no criminal intention or knowledge, and proper care and caution were observed, including as to the condition of the tool and the position of bystanders.
2. A firearm deliberately aimed. Picking up a gun, loading it and firing from a few feet at a person's chest is incompatible with proper care and caution, whatever the actor says about his purpose. This is Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar. S6
3. Shooting without identifying the target. On the case referred to in that judgment, firing at close range without knowing who the target was showed an "utter dearth of any care and caution". S6
4. An unintended death during an unlawful act. The protection is unavailable: the act was not a lawful act, and "[w]here the act of the accused is itself criminal in nature the protection under Section 80 is not available". S6
5. A lawful act by unlawful means. A person entitled to do something achieves it by a means the law forbids, and harm follows. Requirement 6 fails even though requirement 4 is satisfied.
6. Genuine accident, but carelessness. The harm was unintended and unforeseen, but a prudent and reasonable person would have taken a precaution that was not taken. Section 18 fails on requirement 7, and the exposure is to a negligence offence: now s. 106(1), carrying up to five years.
7. Who must prove it. In every case the accused bears the burden under BSA s. 108, and the court presumes the absence of the circumstances until he establishes them. S5
Common mistakes
- Treating "it was an accident" as the test. Accident or misfortune is one of seven cumulative requirements.
- Overlooking that the act, the manner and the means must each be lawful. Three separate conditions, not one.
- Looking for a good-faith or belief limb. There is none. Section 18 is purely objective, and "good faith" does not appear in it.
- Confusing "proper care and caution" with "due care and attention". The latter is the s. 2(11) good-faith standard and measures how a belief was formed; the former measures how the act was done, and appears only once in the whole Sanhita.
- Applying a subjective standard of care. The measure is a prudent and reasonable man in the circumstances of the particular case.
- Invoking s. 18 where the underlying act was criminal. The protection is then unavailable altogether.
- Reading the illustration as unconditional. It turns on there having been "no want of proper caution".
- Expecting the prosecution to disprove accident. Under BSA s. 108 the burden is on the accused, with a presumption against him.
- Treating failure under s. 18 as acquittal. The usual consequence is exposure to a negligence offence, and BNS s. 106(1) now carries up to five years against IPC s. 304A's two.
- Citing Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar as a case where the appeal failed outright. The accident plea failed, but the conviction was altered from s. 302 to s. 304 Part II and the appeal was allowed to that extent.
- Assuming the BNS changed this provision. Section 18 is word-for-word IPC s. 80, illustration included.
Comparison with IPC Section 80
The main provision (38 words) and the illustration (41 words) were each compared with IPC s. 80 by programmatic word-level diff, using both the Gazette text and the independently retrieved India Code text of s. 18. Both are identical. S1S2S4
| IPC s. 80 | BNS s. 18 | |
|---|---|---|
| Main provision | — | identical (38 words) |
| Illustration | — | identical (41 words) |
| Marginal title | "Accident in doing a lawful act" | same, with a full stop |
| General exceptions read into every offence by | s. 6 | s. 3(1), same effect |
| Chapter | Chapter IV, ss. 76–106 | Chapter III, ss. 14–44 |
| Burden of proof | on the accused | on the accused: BSA s. 108 |
| Classification | — | substantively unchanged; renumbered |
Like s. 17, this is a complete carry-over. The changes that matter around s. 18 are outside it: the renumbering of the chapter and of the provision that reads the exceptions into every offence, and the increased punishment for the negligence offence that lies on the other side of the line.
Status of authority
No judgment on BNS s. 18 was located; the section has been in force only since 1 July 2024 under notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S3
Because BNS s. 18 reproduces IPC s. 80 exactly, Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar applies to s. 18 without textual qualification, subject only to translating the section numbers it uses: s. 6 to s. 3(1), and ss. 76 to 106 to ss. 14 to 44. It should be cited as a 2004 decision on IPC s. 80.
No attempt has been made to survey the whole body of authority on IPC s. 80. One Supreme Court decision squarely construing the section was located and verified in full: its facts, the propositions it states, the evidence on which the accident plea was rejected, and its disposition. Nothing is asserted about cases not examined, and the three decisions referred to within that judgment are reported only as it reports them.
Related sections
- BNS s. 2(11): definition of "good faith": due care and attention, a different standard from "proper care and caution".
- BNS s. 3(1). The general exceptions are to be read into every definition of an offence and every penal provision (← IPC s. 6).
- BNS s. 2(24): definition of "offence", extending Chapter III to special and local law offences.
- BNS s. 17: Act done by a person justified by law: "justified" against this section's "excusable".
- BNS s. 19: Act likely to cause harm but done without criminal intent and to prevent other harm: the next section, which does turn on good faith.
- BNS s. 106: Causing death by negligence (← IPC s. 304A): the offence that lies on the other side of the proper-care-and-caution line.
Law checked as of 2 October 2026. The text of s. 18 was read both from the Gazette of India publication of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 hosted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and from the India Code entry for the section, and was compared with IPC s. 80 by programmatic word-level diff: the main provision and the illustration are identical. BNS ss. 2(11), 2(24)(a), 3(1), 17, 19 and 106 and IPC ss. 80, 6 and 304A were read directly; "accident", "misfortune" and "proper care and caution" were counted across the whole Sanhita and in the s. 2 definitions. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 was read for s. 108. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra was read in full from a judgment-text repository, including the facts, the passages on s. 80 and on the general exceptions, the treatment of s. 304A and the disposition; the official report was not accessible at the time of checking, and the citations given are those appearing in that text. Bhupendrasinh A. Chaudasama v. State of Gujarat, K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra and Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh v. State of Pepsu were not separately examined and are reported only as that judgment reports them. The BNS provisions on culpable homicide and murder were not examined.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.