The short answer
Section 128 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 opens a new group of provisions - those concerning criminal force and assault - and it does one job only: it defines "force". S1; S3
It creates no offence, imposes no punishment, and carries no entry in the First Schedule, because there is no offence for the Schedule to classify. S1; S6
Two points are worth grasping before anything else.
Using force is not, by itself, wrongful. Section 128 is morally and legally neutral. A handshake, a tap on the shoulder, a doctor's examination and a shove in a queue all involve "force" within this definition. What makes the use of force criminal is supplied separately, by section 129, which adds intention, absence of consent, and a criminal purpose or consequence. S1; S4
And the definition is reproduced from the Penal Code essentially word for word. A comparison against IPC section 349 shows the substance unchanged. The only alteration is one of drafting style: the Penal Code's archaic ordinals - "First.—", "Secondly.—", "Thirdly.—" - have become lettered clauses (a), (b) and (c). S1; S2
What the definition says
The section has two limbs: what force is, and the three ways it may be caused. S1
Limb one: motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion
"A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling". S1
Read carefully, that is much wider than touching a person. Force is used if the accused causes motion, change of motion or cessation of motion either:
- to the other person directly - setting them in motion, altering their motion, or stopping their motion; or
- to any substance, so as to bring that substance into contact with:
- any part of the other's body; or
- anything the other is wearing or carrying; or
- anything so situated that the contact affects the other's sense of feeling.
So three features of the drafting deserve attention. S1
Stopping motion counts. "Cessation of motion" is on the same footing as causing it. Bringing a person or a thing to a halt is as much the use of force as pushing it.
Contact with the person is not required. Contact with clothing, or with something being carried, suffices. Snatching at a bag, striking an umbrella a person is holding, or pulling at a garment is the use of force even if the body is never touched.
The third branch is wider still. "Anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling" reaches contact with something the person is neither wearing nor carrying - a chair they are sitting on, for instance - provided the contact is felt. The operative test in that branch is the effect on the sense of feeling, not ownership or possession.
Limb two: the three ways force may be caused
The proviso restricts the definition. The motion, change of motion or cessation of motion must be caused in one of exactly three ways: S1
"(a) by his own bodily power;
(b) by disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person;
(c) by inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move."
Clause (a) is the paradigm - a push, a blow, a grasp.
Clause (b) covers the set-and-leave case. The accused arranges a substance so that motion follows without further act by him or anyone else. It is the trap, the released weight, the thing propped to fall. The words "without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person" matter: the chain from the accused's act to the motion must run without further human intervention.
Clause (c) covers inducing an animal. Setting a dog on someone, or driving cattle at them, is the use of force by the person who induced the animal.
Because the proviso says the motion must be caused "in one of the following three ways", the list is exhaustive rather than illustrative. Force caused in some way falling outside all three would not be within section 128 - though it is difficult to construct a realistic example, since clause (a) is very broad. S1
Against IPC section 349
The comparison is short, and the result is clean: the substance is unchanged. S1; S2
Every operative word of the definition - the motion formula, the three branches of contact, the reference to the sense of feeling, and the content of all three ways of causing motion - is identical to IPC section 349. S1; S2
What changed is the enumeration style. The Penal Code read:
"...causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described: First.—By his own bodily power. Secondly.—By disposing any substance... Thirdly.—By inducing any animal..." S2
The Sanhita reads "in one of the following three ways, namely:— (a) by his own bodily power; (b) by disposing any substance...; (c) by inducing any animal...". S1
So "hereinafter described" became "following ... namely", and the ordinals became letters. The three ways are the same three ways, in the same order, with the same content. S1; S2
That is a purely formal modernisation, and it is worth recording for two reasons. It confirms that nothing substantive was intended or achieved here. And it is a reminder that the Penal Code's ordinal headings appear in several definitional provisions, so a mechanical text comparison will throw up differences of this kind that mean nothing at all. S1; S2
No fine, no term, no Schedule entry
Section 128 states no punishment because it creates no offence. There is accordingly no First Schedule row for it, and no question of cognizability, bail, forum or compounding arises. Those questions begin at section 131, the first punishing provision in this group. S1; S6
It follows that section 8(1), which supplies the amount of a fine where no sum is expressed, has nothing to operate on here. S1
How this group is arranged
The Sanhita's arrangement in this group is worth setting out, because it differs from the one immediately before it. S1; S4; S5; S6; S7
| Section | Function |
|---|---|
| 128 | defines force - no offence |
| 129 | defines criminal force - no offence |
| 130 | defines assault - no offence |
| 131 onwards | the offences and their punishments |
So this group uses three consecutive definitional sections followed by the offence sections. S1; S4; S5; S6
That is not the pattern used at sections 126 and 127, where each definition was paired with its own punishment in the same section - section 126 holding wrongful restraint and its penalty, section 127 holding wrongful confinement and its penalties. S7
The Sanhita's drafting approach is therefore not uniform even within this part of the Code. Where a definition serves a single offence it was paired with it; where a definition serves several offences - as "force" and "criminal force" and "assault" each do - it was left standing alone. That is a sensible explanation of the difference, and it is this article's reading rather than anything stated in the Act. S1; S4; S5; S6; S7
The chain from force to liability
Because section 128 is only the first link, it helps to see the whole chain. S1; S4; S5; S6
Section 128 - force. Motion, change of motion or cessation of motion, caused in one of three ways. Neutral.
Section 129 - criminal force. Force used intentionally, without the other's consent, and either to commit an offence, or intending or knowing it likely to cause injury, fear or annoyance. Still a definition, but now the conduct is wrongful. S4
Section 130 - assault. A gesture or preparation intending or knowing it likely to cause a person present to apprehend that criminal force is about to be used. Its Explanation records that mere words do not amount to an assault, though words may give a gesture or preparation a meaning that makes it one. So assault needs no contact at all - it is the apprehension that matters. S5
Section 131 onwards - the offences. Section 131 punishes assault or criminal force "otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation", with up to three months, or a fine up to one thousand rupees, or both, and carries Explanations limiting when provocation will mitigate. S6
Two observations follow, both from the texts. S4; S5; S6
Each step adds a requirement. Force is neutral; criminal force adds intention, absence of consent and a criminal purpose or consequence; assault adds apprehension but subtracts contact.
Provocation is handled differently here than in the hurt provisions. In the hurt group, grave and sudden provocation operated through a separate reduced-punishment section with express carve-outs in the general provisions. Here it is built into the offence itself - section 131 punishes assault or criminal force committed "otherwise than on" grave and sudden provocation - with Explanations qualifying it. The mechanism is not the same, and reasoning from one to the other would be unsafe. S6
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
Section 128 creates no offence. Nobody is charged under it. It supplies a definition used by later sections. S1
Using force is not unlawful. The definition is neutral, and lawful everyday contact falls within it. Criminality begins at section 129. S1; S4
Touching the person is not required. Contact with clothing, with something carried, or with anything so situated that the contact is felt is enough. S1
Stopping something counts as much as starting it. "Cessation of motion" is expressly included. S1
Force can be used without the accused touching anything. Clause (b) covers arranging a substance so that motion follows without further act; clause (c) covers inducing an animal. S1
The three ways are exhaustive, because the proviso requires the motion to be caused "in one of the following three ways". S1
Nothing changed from the Penal Code except the numbering style. The ordinals became letters. S1; S2
Consent is not part of section 128. It enters at section 129. A consensual act involving motion is still "force" within this section. S1; S4
Worked examples
Example 1. A shakes Z's hand. Force within section 128 - A has caused motion to Z. Not criminal force, because section 129's requirements are absent. S1; S4
Example 2. A snatches at the strap of a bag Z is carrying, without touching Z. Force - the contact is with something Z is carrying. S1
Example 3. A brings Z's moving bicycle to a halt by grabbing the frame. Force - cessation of motion, caused by A's own bodily power under clause (a). S1
Example 4. A props a bucket of water so that it tips onto Z when Z opens a door, A having left the scene. Force under clause (b) - A disposed a substance so that the motion took place without any further act by A or anyone else. S1
Example 5. A sets a dog to run at Z. Force under clause (c) - A induced an animal to move. S1
Example 6. A makes a threatening gesture at Z from across a room and never comes near. Not force at all, because no motion is caused to Z or to any substance contacting Z. But it may be an assault under section 130, which requires no contact. S1; S5
Example 7. A shouts abuse at Z and nothing more. Not force, and on section 130's Explanation mere words do not amount to an assault either - though words can give a gesture or preparation the meaning that makes it one. S1; S5
Commencement and which law applies
Section 128 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S8
The transition is immaterial in substance. Because section 128 creates no offence and reproduces IPC section 349 without substantive change, nothing turns on whether conduct occurred before or after 1 July 2024: the content of "force" is the same under either Code. For conduct before that date the applicable definition is IPC section 349; for conduct on or after it, section 128. S1; S2; S8
What may turn on the date is the offence to which the definition is applied, and that is a question for the relevant offence section rather than for this one. S1; S6
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 128
- Section 129 - criminal force, which adds intention, absence of consent and a criminal purpose or consequence to the definition in this section. S4
- Section 130 - assault, which needs no contact and turns on apprehension; its Explanation records that mere words do not amount to an assault. S5
- Section 131 - the first punishing provision in this group, and the one that builds grave and sudden provocation into the offence itself. S6
- Section 127 - wrongful confinement, the last section of the preceding group, and the comparator for the Sanhita's differing arrangement of definitions and offences. S7
Sources and honest limits
The comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 128 against the India Code text of IPC section 349, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The texts and India Code handles of sections 129, 130, 131 and 127 were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6; S7
What this article does not establish:
- NO AUTHORITY CONSTRUING THE DEFINITION WAS READ. A search on the predecessor provision returned 77 hits, which were not read exhaustively, and no Supreme Court decision construing the definition of force was located. The decisions that surfaced mention the provision among lists of charges rather than interpreting it. So this article explains the statutory words but does not state how the courts have construed "motion", "cessation of motion", "sense of feeling", or the boundaries of the three ways in the proviso.
- The third branch of the contact limb is not judicially explored here. What it means for contact with a thing to affect a person's "sense of feeling", and how remote the thing may be, are not addressed by any decision located; the examples given are this article's own.
- Whether the three ways are truly exhaustive in practice is reasoned, not decided. It follows from the proviso's words, but no authority on the point was located.
- NO TRAVAUX WERE RETRIEVED. A Law Commission search covering the definition of force and criminal force was run and returned nothing bearing on either, so nothing explains why the enumeration style was modernised or confirms that no substantive change was intended.
- The explanation for the Sanhita's differing arrangement is this article's reading. That definitions serving several offences were left standing alone while a definition serving one offence was paired with it is a sensible account of the difference between this group and sections 126 and 127, but the Act says nothing about it.
- Sections 129, 130 and 131 are described, not analysed. Their texts were read for the purpose of showing how the chain from force to liability works. Their own comparisons with the Penal Code, their Illustrations, and section 131's Explanations on provocation are not examined here and belong to those sections.
- Nothing is said about classification, bail, forum or compounding, because section 128 creates no offence and those questions begin at section 131.
- Consent is not analysed. It is not an element of section 128, and its content and limits under section 129 are outside this article's scope.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.
Section 128 is a definition and nothing more, carried into the Sanhita from the Penal Code with its ordinals turned into letters and not a word of substance altered. Its value to a reader is in how wide it is: force does not require touching a person, it covers stopping motion as much as starting it, and it can be used by arranging an object or setting an animal in motion rather than by any act on the body at all. What it does not do is make anything unlawful. For that, the definition has to be read forward into section 129 and the offences that follow. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.