The short answer
Section 130 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines assault. It is the third and last of the definitional provisions in this group, and like sections 128 and 129 it creates no offence and carries no entry in the First Schedule. The offences begin at section 131. S1; S6
"Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault.
Explanation.—Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the words which a person uses may give to his gestures or preparation such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations amount to an assault."
Three things mark this section out.
No contact is required, and no force need ever be used. Assault is the anticipatory stage. If force is actually used, that is criminal force under section 129; assault is complete the moment the apprehension is created. S1; S5
What matters is apprehension, not fear. The section says "apprehend", and the Illustrations speak of causing a person "to believe". That is an expectation, not an emotional state. S1
And the Explanation does the heavy lifting. Mere words are not an assault - but words can give a gesture its meaning, and then the gesture is one. S1
Against IPC section 351 the comparison returns a single difference, and it is punctuation: the heading "Illustrations" acquired a full stop. This is the closest reproduction found anywhere in this collection so far. S1; S2
The elements
A gesture or a preparation
The conduct element is narrow in one way and wide in another. It must be a gesture or a preparation - not words alone, which the Explanation excludes. But "preparation" is a broad notion: Illustration (b)'s example is beginning to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog, which is preparation rather than gesture. S1
Intention or knowledge of likelihood
The maker must intend the apprehension, or know it to be likely. Knowledge of likelihood suffices, exactly as under section 129. S1; S5
A person present
The apprehension must be caused to "any person present". Presence is a requirement of the section, not an incident of it. A threat conveyed to somebody who is elsewhere cannot satisfy this element on the section's words. S1
Apprehension that criminal force is about to be used - to that person
Two limits sit inside this element.
What must be apprehended is criminal force, not force at large. So section 130 is defined by reference to section 129, which is itself defined by reference to section 128. The three provisions stack. To make out an assault one must show that what the person present expected was force that would have been criminal - intentional, without consent, and with the purpose or foresight that section 129 requires. S1; S4; S5
The Madhya Pradesh High Court took exactly that approach in Harendrajeet Singh, setting out the definitions of force, criminal force and assault together and saying that to establish whether an accused "assaulted the complainant or used any criminal force upon him, it is necessary to examine" all three. S8
And the force must be about to be used "to that person" - the person who apprehends it. S1
Apprehension, not fear - and why the distinction matters
Section 129 lists "injury, fear or annoyance" as the consequences its mental element looks to. Section 130 does not use "fear" at all. It uses "apprehend", and Illustrations (a) and (b) gloss it as causing the person "to believe" that force is coming. S1; S5
So on the section's words what is required is an expectation that criminal force is imminent, and not proof that the person was frightened. Whether a court would require more is not something this article can state: no decision drawing that distinction was read, and the point is this article's reading of the words. S1
The Explanation - the heart of the section
The Explanation has two halves, and both matter.
"Mere words do not amount to an assault." However menacing, words on their own fall outside section 130. S1
"But the words which a person uses may give to his gestures or preparation such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations amount to an assault." Words are therefore not irrelevant - they supply the meaning of conduct that would otherwise be equivocal. S1
Illustration (c) is the worked example, and it is carefully built: S1
"A takes up a stick, saying to Z, 'I will give you a beating'. Here, though the words used by A could in no case amount to an assault, and though the mere gesture, unaccompanied by any other circumstances, might not amount to an assault, the gesture explained by the words may amount to an assault."
Neither half on its own is enough. The words could "in no case" be an assault; the gesture alone "might not" be. Together they are. S1
A small drafting inelegance is worth noting and is inherited: the Explanation moves from "gestures or preparation" to "those gestures or preparations" in consecutive clauses, mixing singular and plural. The same wording appears in IPC section 351, so it was not introduced by the Sanhita, and nothing turns on it. S1; S2
The three Illustrations
Section 130 carries three Illustrations, (a) to (c), and all three were carried over from the Penal Code intact. That had to be checked rather than assumed, because at section 120 the Sanhita dropped an Illustration that the Penal Code had contained. S1; S2
| Illustration | Conduct | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | A shakes his fist at Z, intending or knowing it likely that Z will believe A is about to strike him | the paradigm gesture - no contact, assault complete on the apprehension |
| (b) | A begins to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog, intending or knowing it likely that Z will believe A is about to set the dog on him | preparation rather than gesture, and force to be applied through an animal - the section 128(c) route |
| (c) | A takes up a stick saying "I will give you a beating" | the Explanation in operation - words alone no, gesture alone perhaps not, the two together yes |
Read in order they move from the clearest case to the hardest, and (c) exists only to work the Explanation. S1
Against IPC section 351
The comparison was run over the whole provision - the operative definition, the Explanation and all three Illustrations - and returned one difference: the heading "Illustrations" acquired a full stop. S1; S2
The operative definition is identical. The Explanation is identical word for word. All three Illustrations are identical, including the quoted words "I will give you a beating". S1; S2
That makes section 130 the tightest transplant encountered in this collection so far - closer even than section 129, which had two punctuation changes. Nothing of substance changed, and the whole body of authority on IPC section 351 bears on section 130 unaffected. S1; S2
No punishment, no classification
Section 130 states no punishment because it creates no offence. There is therefore no First Schedule row, no compounding Table entry, and no question of cognizability, bail or forum. Section 8(1) of the Sanhita, on the amount of a fine, has nothing to operate on, and the sentencing limits in section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita are not engaged. Those questions begin at section 131, which punishes assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation. S1; S6
How the courts have applied it
The Supreme Court: comments on a Facebook page were not assault
Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka and Another, Supreme Court of India, V. Gopala Gowda and R. Banumathi JJ, judgment delivered by Banumathi J on 20 January 2015, reported at (2015) 7 SCC 423. S7
The appellants, aggrieved by how a Police Inspector had treated them, posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic Police Facebook page accusing him of misbehaviour, and sent an email complaining of harassment. The Inspector complained about the posting, and an FIR was registered under IPC sections 353 and 506. The High Court declined to quash it as premature. S7
On the section 353 charge - assault or criminal force to deter a public servant - the Court set out the provision and held at paragraph 12: S7
"By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out."
The appeal was allowed. S7
This is the most useful authority for a reader of section 130, and it should be read for what it actually decides. The Court did not quote section 351 or its Explanation. It reasoned that no force had been used and that nothing showed either assault or criminal force, and so the ingredients of section 353 failed. S7
But the outcome is a direct modern working-out of the Explanation's first half: conduct consisting of words - here, comments posted online and an email - did not amount to assault or criminal force, and a charge built on them collapsed. That the medium was a Facebook page rather than a shouted threat makes no difference to the analysis, because the section has always required a gesture or preparation and a person present. S1; S7
A conviction set aside where the ingredients were not established
In Harendrajeet Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Sanjay Dwivedi J, 11 April 2023) the appellant had been convicted under IPC section 353 by a Special Judge. S8
The Court set out sections 349, 350 and 351 together, reasoning that all three definitions had to be examined, and observed on the construction of section 351 that "the victim must apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation was about to use criminal force to the victim". S8
On the facts the complainant had himself admitted that at the time of the incident he was not performing any official duty, and that nobody had restrained him from discharging it or assaulted him. The Court also criticised the recording of witness statements three to four years after the incident. It held that the prosecution had failed to establish the material ingredients of section 353, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. S8
A caution for anyone researching this section
Kailash Vijayvargiya and Others v. State of West Bengal and Another (Calcutta High Court, Appellate Side, Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Shampa Dutt (Paul) J, 20 November 2024) is another section 353 decision that sets out the same definitions and cites Manik Taneja. S9
Two points about it are worth recording.
It is a High Court decision, not a Supreme Court one. The case name is one that invites the opposite assumption, and the court was verified from the judgment itself. S9
And its analytical paragraphs are textually identical to those in Harendrajeet Singh. The passages setting out sections 349, 350 and 351, the observation that the victim must apprehend that criminal force was about to be used, and the surrounding reasoning appear in the same words in both judgments. S8; S9
Nothing is suggested about how that came about. The practical point is purely one of research method: a reader who counted these as two independent authorities for the same proposition would be double-counting a single piece of reasoning. This article relies on Harendrajeet Singh, which is the earlier of the two. S8; S9
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
Section 130 creates no offence. Nobody is charged under it. It supplies a definition used from section 131 onwards. S1; S6
No contact is needed, and no force need ever be used. Assault is complete when the apprehension is created. If force is actually used, that is criminal force under section 129. S1; S5
Words alone are never an assault, however menacing - the Explanation says so in terms. S1
But words can make a gesture an assault. Illustration (c) is the point: the stick alone might not be enough, the words alone could never be, the two together may be. S1
Posting words online is not an assault. On Manik Taneja, comments on a Facebook page and an email were held to disclose neither assault nor criminal force, and the charge failed. S7
The person must be present. On the section's words a threat conveyed to someone elsewhere cannot satisfy this element. S1
What must be apprehended is criminal force, so sections 128 and 129 are built into section 130. Absence of consent is part of what has to be expected. S1; S4; S5
It is apprehension, not fear. The section says "apprehend" and the Illustrations say "believe"; it does not require proof that the person was frightened. This is this article's reading of the words, and no decision drawing the distinction was read. S1
Knowledge of likelihood is enough - intention to cause the apprehension is not required. S1
A preparation counts, not only a gesture. Unloosing a dog's muzzle is Illustration (b). S1
Worked examples
Example 1. A shakes his fist at Z, who is standing in front of him, intending Z to believe he is about to be struck. Assault, on Illustration (a) - and no blow need ever land. S1
Example 2. A shouts a menacing threat at Z but makes no gesture or preparation at all. Not an assault - mere words. S1
Example 3. A picks up a stick and says to Z, "I will give you a beating". Assault, on Illustration (c) - the words give the gesture its meaning. S1
Example 4. A begins to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog in front of Z, intending Z to believe the dog will be set on him. Assault, on Illustration (b). S1
Example 5. A posts comments on a police Facebook page accusing an officer of misbehaviour. On Manik Taneja, neither assault nor criminal force, and a section 353-type charge built on it was held not made out. S7
Example 6. A shakes his fist at Z and then strikes him. The striking is criminal force under section 129; the apprehension that preceded it was an assault under section 130. The two are separate. S1; S5
Example 7. A makes a threatening gesture towards Z, who has his back turned and never sees it. The element requiring a person present to apprehend is not satisfied on the section's words, so there is no assault - though no authority on this was read. S1
Example 8. A, a surgeon, raises a scalpel over a consenting patient. Not an assault - what is apprehended is not criminal force, because consent is present and section 129 is not satisfied. S1; S5
Commencement and which law applies
Section 130 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S10
The transition is immaterial in substance. Section 130 creates no offence and reproduces IPC section 351 with one punctuation change, so the content of "assault" is the same under either Code. For conduct before that date the definition is IPC section 351; on or after it, section 130. S1; S2; S10
What may turn on the date is the offence to which the definition is applied, and the punishing provisions from section 131 onwards did change in places. That is a question for those sections. S1; S6
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 130
- Section 128 - the definition of force, which supplies the base of the stack. S4
- Section 129 - criminal force, which is what must be apprehended under section 130, and which contributes the consent requirement. S5
- Section 131 - the first punishing provision in this group, which builds grave and sudden provocation into the offence. S6
Sources and honest limits
The comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 130 against the India Code text of IPC section 351, covering the operative definition, the Explanation and all three Illustrations, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The texts and handles of sections 128, 129 and 131 were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6
What this article does not establish:
- "APPREHENSION, NOT FEAR" IS THIS ARTICLE'S READING OF THE WORDS. It follows from the section using "apprehend" and the Illustrations using "believe", and from section 129 using "fear" while section 130 does not. No decision drawing that distinction was read, and whether a court would require proof of something more than expectation is not addressed here.
- THE "PERSON PRESENT" REQUIREMENT IS NOT JUDICIALLY EXAMINED HERE. The conclusions that a threat conveyed at a distance falls outside the section, and that a person who never perceives the gesture cannot apprehend it, are drawn from the statutory words alone. No authority on either was read.
- MANIK TANEJA DID NOT CONSTRUE SECTION 351 OR ITS EXPLANATION. The Court quoted IPC section 353 and held that no force had been used and that nothing showed assault or criminal force. It is cited for that holding and that outcome. The reading of it as a modern working-out of the Explanation's first half is this article's own, and is marked as such.
- CONSENT IS NOT ANALYSED. Because what must be apprehended is criminal force, absence of consent is built into section 130 - yet nothing in this collection has yet examined what consent requires, who may give it, or when it is vitiated. The gap was declared at section 129 and remains open.
- No authority construing "gesture" or "preparation" was read. Searches returned 127 and 113 hits, which were not read exhaustively, and the breadth of "preparation" is taken from Illustration (b) rather than from case law.
- Harendrajeet Singh is a single-Judge decision of one High Court and does not bind elsewhere. Its subsequent treatment was not checked.
- KAILASH VIJAYVARGIYA IS A CALCUTTA HIGH COURT DECISION, NOT A SUPREME COURT ONE, and its analytical paragraphs are textually identical to those in Harendrajeet Singh. It is cited only to record both of those facts, and not as independent authority for any proposition.
- The later treatment of Manik Taneja was not checked, although the repository records it as cited by 159.
- No travaux were retrieved. A Law Commission search covering force and criminal force was run at section 128 and returned nothing bearing on this group; no separate search was run for assault, so the absence of legislative background is a gap in the research and not a finding.
- Sections 128, 129 and 131 are described, not analysed, beyond what is needed to show how the stack works.
- Nothing is said about classification, bail, forum, compounding or sentencing, because section 130 creates no offence.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.
Section 130 completes a careful three-layer structure. Section 128 defines force so broadly that it catches a handshake. Section 129 narrows it to force used intentionally, without consent, and with a criminal purpose or foresight of injury, fear or annoyance. Section 130 then reaches back one step further in time, to the moment before any force is used at all, and makes it an assault to create in a person present the expectation that criminal force is coming. The Explanation keeps that reach in check: words alone, however ugly, are not an assault - a point the Supreme Court applied in Manik Taneja to comments posted on a Facebook page. But words will lend their meaning to a gesture, and once they do, the gesture speaks. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.