The short answer
Section 129 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines criminal force. Like section 128 before it, it creates no offence and carries no entry in the First Schedule; the offences in this group begin at section 131. S1; S6
Section 128 told us what "force" is, and said nothing about whether using it is wrong. Section 129 is where wrongfulness enters. It requires three things: S1; S4
"Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other."
Two features deserve flagging at once.
The threshold is remarkably low. The third element is satisfied by intending or knowing it likely that the force will cause annoyance. Not injury, not even fear - annoyance will do. A great deal of everyday unpleasantness is capable of falling within this definition. S1
And the section is reproduced from the Penal Code almost exactly. A comparison against IPC section 350 returns two differences, both punctuation. The operative definition and all eight Illustrations are word for word identical. S1; S2
The three elements
Element one: intentional use of force
The force must be used intentionally. Accidental or inadvertent force - a stumble, a jostle in a crowd that nobody meant - is outside the definition however unwelcome. S1
"Force" carries the meaning given by section 128, with all its breadth: motion, change of motion or cessation of motion, caused to the person or to a substance brought into contact with the person, their clothing, something they carry, or something so situated that the contact affects their sense of feeling - and caused by bodily power, by disposing a substance, or by inducing an animal. S1; S4
Element two: without that person's consent
This is the dividing line that section 128 lacked, and it is what keeps the ordinary business of life out of the criminal law. S1; S4
A handshake, a surgical procedure, a contact sport, a crowded train - all involve force within section 128, and all are consented to in the relevant sense. Remove consent and the first two elements of section 129 are met. S1; S4
The section says nothing about what consent requires, who may give it, or when it is vitiated. Those questions are not answered here, and no authority on them was read for this article. S1
Element three: purpose, intention or knowledge
The third element is satisfied in any one of three ways: S1
- to the committing of any offence - force used as a means to an offence, whatever the offence; or
- intending by the use of the force to cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom it is used; or
- knowing it to be likely that the force will cause injury, fear or annoyance to that person.
Three points follow from the wording.
"Annoyance" is the lowest rung, and it is a very low one. The section puts annoyance on the same footing as injury. So force used intentionally and without consent, where the user merely knew it likely to annoy, satisfies the definition. S1
Knowledge of likelihood suffices - the user need not intend the consequence at all under the third limb.
The injury, fear or annoyance must be to the person to whom the force is used. The words are "to the person to whom the force is used", so apprehension or irritation caused to a bystander does not satisfy this element. S1
The eight Illustrations - and what they are doing
Section 129 carries eight Illustrations, (a) to (h), and all eight were carried over from the Penal Code intact. S1; S2
That is worth saying because the Sanhita has not always kept them: at section 120 an illustration present in the Penal Code was dropped. Here nothing was lost. S1
Read together, the Illustrations are not a random assortment. They work systematically through section 128's definition, taking each of the three ways of causing force and each branch of the contact limb in turn: S1; S4
| Illustration | The facts | What it demonstrates |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | A unfastens the moorings of Z's boat, which drifts downstream | force by disposing a substance - s. 128(b) |
| (b) | A lashes Z's carriage horses so they quicken pace | force by inducing an animal - s. 128(c) |
| (c) | A seizes the pole of Z's palanquin and stops it, intending to rob Z | cessation of motion, by own bodily power - s. 128(a) |
| (d) | A intentionally pushes against Z in the street | own bodily power, direct contact |
| (e) | A throws a stone at Z, or at Z's clothes, or so as to dash water against them | contact with clothing or things carried, and the water variant |
| (f) | A intentionally pulls up a woman's veil | contact with clothing |
| (g) | A pours boiling water into the bath Z is in | the sense of feeling branch |
| (h) | A incites a dog to spring upon Z | inducing an animal again |
So the Illustrations are a teaching device: each walks through the two-stage analysis - first, was force used within section 128, and second, were consent absent and the mental element present. Illustration (a) does this most explicitly, reciting the section 128 reasoning in full before turning to consent and purpose. S1; S4
Three drafting oddities in the Illustrations, all inherited
Illustration (c) uses different words from the section. The operative text says "in order to the committing of any offence"; Illustration (c) says "in order to the commission of an offence". Both forms appear in the Penal Code too, so the inconsistency is inherited rather than introduced. Nothing appears to turn on it. S1; S2
Illustration (c) also carries a stray full stop. It reads "...in order to the commission of an offence. A has used criminal force to Z." where the sense requires a comma. That too is in the Penal Code. S1; S2
Illustration (h) is conspicuously abbreviated. Every other Illustration states both limbs of the mental element - "intending or knowing it to be likely" - and walks through the force analysis first. Illustration (h) says only: "Here, if A intends to cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, he uses criminal force to Z." It omits the knowledge limb and the intermediate step. The section's own words govern, and they include the knowledge limb; the abbreviation in the Illustration does not narrow them. S1; S2
Against IPC section 350
The comparison is as close as it gets. A token comparison returns two differences, both punctuation: S1; S2
- the heading "Illustrations" acquired a full stop; and
- in Illustration (e), a semicolon became a comma ("A has used force to Z**,** and if he did so" for "A has used force to Z**;** and if he did so").
The operative definition, all three elements, and all eight Illustrations with every example in them are otherwise identical. S1; S2
The modernisation that did not happen
This is worth pausing on, because it sits oddly beside the section immediately before it.
At section 128 the Sanhita did modernise: the Penal Code's archaic ordinals "First.—", "Secondly.—" and "Thirdly.—" became lettered clauses (a), (b) and (c). S4
At section 129 it did not. The phrase "in order to the committing of any offence" is awkward nineteenth-century construction - one would now write "in order to commit any offence" - and it was left exactly as it stood. So were the chariot, the palanquin and the veil in the Illustrations. S1; S2; S4
The modernisation was therefore selective, and two consecutive definitional sections were treated differently. Nothing of substance turns on it, but a reader should not assume that archaic phrasing in the Sanhita has been tidied, and nothing was found explaining why one section was touched and the next was not. S1; S4
No punishment, no classification
Section 129 states no punishment because it creates no offence. There is accordingly no First Schedule row, no compounding Table entry, and no question of cognizability, bail or forum. Section 8(1) on the amount of fines has nothing to operate on, and the sentencing limits in section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita are not engaged. Those questions begin at section 131. S1; S6
How the courts have applied it
No decision construing the elements of criminal force in the abstract was located, and the gap is declared below. Two decisions show the definition being applied.
A charge that failed because criminal force was not made out
In John Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, Alexander Thomas J, 17 September 2015), the petitioner sought to quash proceedings arising from an inspection by officials. One of the charges was under IPC section 353 - assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging his duty. S7
The Court set out IPC sections 349, 350, 351 and 353 and examined the complaint against them. On the allegations - that the petitioner had thrown away an object the official intended to seize, and had abused the officials - the Court found that "there are no serious or substantial allegations on the petitioner having used criminal force or assault" against the official. S7
The proceedings for the offences alleged, including the section 353 charge, were held not sustainable or tenable, and were quashed. S7
The practical lesson for a reader of section 129 is direct: a charge that depends on criminal force fails unless the allegations disclose the use of force within the definition. Abuse and the throwing away of an object were held not to supply it on those facts. S1; S7
The concept is narrower than general notions of "force"
In Shankarlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Madhya Pradesh High Court, S.K. Dubey J, 14 June 1994), a case about dispossession under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court recorded an observation of the Bombay High Court that the word "forcibly" in the relevant procedural provision "cannot be given a restricted meaning of dispossession accompanied by the use of criminal force as defined in Section 350 of the Penal Code", and that it is not necessary that actual force be used to make a dispossession forcible. S8
That passage is the Madhya Pradesh High Court reporting the Bombay High Court's observation, which in turn rested on a Supreme Court decision, rather than a holding of the Madhya Pradesh Court on section 350 itself. It is cited here on that basis and for a narrow purpose: it shows that courts have treated the section 350 concept as a defined and relatively confined one, distinct from looser statutory uses of "force" or "forcibly" elsewhere. Neither the Bombay decision nor the Supreme Court decision behind it was retrieved. S8
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
Section 129 creates no offence. Nobody is charged under it. It supplies a definition used by sections 131 onwards. S1; S6
Consent is the dividing line. Force plus consent is ordinary life; force without consent, intentionally used, with the required purpose or knowledge, is criminal force. S1; S4
Annoyance is enough. The mental element is satisfied by intending or knowing it likely that the force will cause annoyance. It need not cause or threaten injury. S1
Knowledge suffices - intention is not required. The third limb is "knowing it to be likely". S1
The injury, fear or annoyance must be to the person the force is used against, not to a bystander. S1
Accidental force is excluded. The use of force must be intentional. S1
No contact with the body is needed, because section 128's definition of force does not require it. Illustrations (e) and (f) - the stone and the veil - make the point. S1; S4
Criminal force is not assault. Assault, defined at section 130, requires no contact at all: it is a gesture or preparation causing a person present to apprehend that criminal force is about to be used, and its Explanation says mere words do not amount to an assault. One can be committed without the other. S5
The archaic wording is still there. "In order to the committing of any offence" was not modernised, unlike the ordinals at section 128. S1; S4
Worked examples
Example 1. A shakes Z's hand with Z's agreement. Force under section 128, but not criminal force - consent is present. S1; S4
Example 2. A intentionally shoves Z in a queue, knowing it will irritate Z. Criminal force - intentional force, without consent, with knowledge that annoyance is likely. The low threshold is doing the work. S1
Example 3. A stumbles and knocks into Z. Not criminal force - the use of force was not intentional. S1
Example 4. A throws a stone that strikes Z's coat, intending to frighten Z. Criminal force, on Illustration (e) - contact with clothing suffices. S1
Example 5. A incites a dog to run at Z without Z's consent, intending to frighten Z. Criminal force, on Illustration (h). S1
Example 6. A unfastens the mooring of Z's boat so it drifts, intending to annoy Z. Criminal force, on Illustration (a) - force by disposing a substance. S1
Example 7. A, intending to rob Z, stops Z's vehicle by seizing it. Criminal force, on Illustration (c) - and the "in order to the committing of any offence" limb is satisfied without any need to show intended annoyance. S1
Example 8. A abuses officials and throws away an item they intended to seize. On John Kuriakose, not criminal force on those facts, and a charge resting on it was quashed. S7
Example 9. A raises a fist at Z from a distance and never touches Z or anything of Z's. Not criminal force - no force is used at all - but it may be an assault under section 130. S1; S5
Commencement and which law applies
Section 129 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S9
The transition is immaterial in substance. Section 129 creates no offence and reproduces IPC section 350 with only two punctuation changes, so the content of "criminal force" is the same under either Code. For conduct before that date the applicable definition is IPC section 350; for conduct on or after it, section 129. S1; S2; S9
What may turn on the date is the offence to which the definition is applied - and section 131 onwards did change in places - but that is a question for those sections. S1; S6
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 129
- Section 128 - the definition of force, which section 129 builds on and which supplies the content of its first element. S4
- Section 130 - assault, which requires no contact and turns on apprehension that criminal force is about to be used. S5
- Section 131 - the first punishing provision in this group, and the one that builds grave and sudden provocation into the offence. S6
Sources and honest limits
The comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 129 against the India Code text of IPC section 350, including all eight Illustrations, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The texts and India Code handles of sections 128, 130 and 131 were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6
What this article does not establish:
- NO AUTHORITY CONSTRUING THE ELEMENTS IN THE ABSTRACT WAS READ. Searches returned 201 and 63 hits, which were not read exhaustively, and no Supreme Court decision construing the definition of criminal force was located. So this article explains the statutory words but does not state how the courts have construed "intentionally", "annoyance", or the boundaries of the three limbs of the mental element.
- CONSENT IS NOT ANALYSED. The section says nothing about what consent requires, who may give it, or when it is vitiated, and no authority on those questions was read. They are central in practice and are simply not addressed here.
- "Annoyance" is identified as a low threshold but not judicially defined. No decision locating its lower limit was found, and the observation that a great deal of everyday unpleasantness could fall within the definition is this article's own.
- John Kuriakose is a single-Judge decision of one High Court and does not bind elsewhere. Its subsequent treatment was not checked. It is cited for the finding that the allegations did not disclose criminal force and for the outcome.
- Shankarlal IS CITED WITH AN EXPRESS CAVEAT. The passage relied on is the Madhya Pradesh High Court reporting an observation of the Bombay High Court, which itself rested on a Supreme Court decision; it is not a holding of the Madhya Pradesh Court on section 350. Neither the Bombay decision nor the Supreme Court decision behind it was retrieved, and the point is used only to show that the concept is a defined and relatively confined one.
- The structural reading of the Illustrations is this article's own. That they work systematically through section 128's three ways and three contact branches is an observation about their arrangement, not something the Act states.
- Nothing explains the selective modernisation. No travaux were retrieved. A Law Commission search covering the definitions of force and criminal force was run at section 128 and returned nothing bearing on either, so nothing accounts for the ordinals being modernised at section 128 while the archaic phrasing here was left.
- Sections 130 and 131 are described, not analysed. Their texts were read to show how the group fits together; their own comparisons, Explanations and penalties belong to those sections.
- Nothing is said about classification, bail, forum, compounding or sentencing, because section 129 creates no offence. No First Schedule row or compounding entry exists to examine, and sections 8(1) and 23 are not engaged.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.
Section 129 is the hinge of this group. Section 128 defines force so broadly that it catches a handshake; section 129 narrows it to what the criminal law is interested in by adding intention, the absence of consent, and a purpose or foresight of harm. The narrowing is real but it is not severe, because the lowest rung of that third element is annoyance - which means the definition reaches a good deal further than the phrase "criminal force" might suggest. The eight Illustrations, all of them carried over from the Penal Code without alteration, are the best guide to how the two sections work together, and they repay reading in full. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.