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BNS Section 129 · Deep dive

BNS Section 129: Criminal Force - Consent Is the Dividing Line, and Annoyance Is Enough

Section 129 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines CRIMINAL FORCE. Like section 128 it creates no offence and has no First Schedule entry; the offences in this group begin at section 131. Section 128 said what force is and nothing about whether using it is wrong; SECTION 129 IS WHERE WRONGFULNESS ENTERS, and it requires THREE THINGS: that force be used INTENTIONALLY; that it be used WITHOUT THAT PERSON'S CONSENT; and that it be used either to the committing of any offence, or intending or knowing it to be likely to cause INJURY, FEAR OR ANNOYANCE to the person to whom the force is used. TWO FEATURES STAND OUT. CONSENT IS THE DIVIDING LINE - a handshake, a surgical procedure, a contact sport and a crowded train all involve force within section 128 and all are consented to; remove consent and the first two elements are met. AND THE THRESHOLD IS REMARKABLY LOW, because the third element is satisfied by intending or merely KNOWING IT LIKELY that the force will cause ANNOYANCE - not injury, not even fear. A great deal of everyday unpleasantness is capable of falling within the definition. Against IPC section 350 the comparison returns TWO DIFFERENCES, BOTH PUNCTUATION: the operative definition and ALL EIGHT ILLUSTRATIONS (a) to (h) are word for word identical, which matters because at section 120 the Sanhita had dropped an Illustration. Read together those Illustrations work SYSTEMATICALLY THROUGH SECTION 128's DEFINITION, taking each of the three ways of causing force and each branch of the contact limb in turn. Three inherited drafting oddities are recorded: Illustration (c) uses 'to the commission of an offence' where the section says 'committing', it carries a stray full stop, and Illustration (h) is abbreviated so as to omit the knowledge limb - though the section's words govern. Notably the archaic phrasing was NOT modernised here, although section 128's ordinals were, so the Sanhita's tidying was selective. In John Kuriakose v. State of Kerala a charge resting on criminal force was QUASHED because the allegations did not disclose it.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 14 October 2026 22 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 129 — Criminal force
Earlier law (IPC)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 350 · direct
Side-by-side converterIPC 350 → BNS 129

The short answer

Section 129 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines criminal force. Like section 128 before it, it creates no offence and carries no entry in the First Schedule; the offences in this group begin at section 131. S1; S6

Section 128 told us what "force" is, and said nothing about whether using it is wrong. Section 129 is where wrongfulness enters. It requires three things: S1; S4

"Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other."

Two features deserve flagging at once.

The threshold is remarkably low. The third element is satisfied by intending or knowing it likely that the force will cause annoyance. Not injury, not even fear - annoyance will do. A great deal of everyday unpleasantness is capable of falling within this definition. S1

And the section is reproduced from the Penal Code almost exactly. A comparison against IPC section 350 returns two differences, both punctuation. The operative definition and all eight Illustrations are word for word identical. S1; S2

The three elements

Element one: intentional use of force

The force must be used intentionally. Accidental or inadvertent force - a stumble, a jostle in a crowd that nobody meant - is outside the definition however unwelcome. S1

"Force" carries the meaning given by section 128, with all its breadth: motion, change of motion or cessation of motion, caused to the person or to a substance brought into contact with the person, their clothing, something they carry, or something so situated that the contact affects their sense of feeling - and caused by bodily power, by disposing a substance, or by inducing an animal. S1; S4

Element two: without that person's consent

This is the dividing line that section 128 lacked, and it is what keeps the ordinary business of life out of the criminal law. S1; S4

A handshake, a surgical procedure, a contact sport, a crowded train - all involve force within section 128, and all are consented to in the relevant sense. Remove consent and the first two elements of section 129 are met. S1; S4

The section says nothing about what consent requires, who may give it, or when it is vitiated. Those questions are not answered here, and no authority on them was read for this article. S1

Element three: purpose, intention or knowledge

The third element is satisfied in any one of three ways: S1

  • to the committing of any offence - force used as a means to an offence, whatever the offence; or
  • intending by the use of the force to cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom it is used; or
  • knowing it to be likely that the force will cause injury, fear or annoyance to that person.

Three points follow from the wording.

"Annoyance" is the lowest rung, and it is a very low one. The section puts annoyance on the same footing as injury. So force used intentionally and without consent, where the user merely knew it likely to annoy, satisfies the definition. S1

Knowledge of likelihood suffices - the user need not intend the consequence at all under the third limb.

The injury, fear or annoyance must be to the person to whom the force is used. The words are "to the person to whom the force is used", so apprehension or irritation caused to a bystander does not satisfy this element. S1

The eight Illustrations - and what they are doing

Section 129 carries eight Illustrations, (a) to (h), and all eight were carried over from the Penal Code intact. S1; S2

That is worth saying because the Sanhita has not always kept them: at section 120 an illustration present in the Penal Code was dropped. Here nothing was lost. S1

Read together, the Illustrations are not a random assortment. They work systematically through section 128's definition, taking each of the three ways of causing force and each branch of the contact limb in turn: S1; S4

IllustrationThe factsWhat it demonstrates
(a)A unfastens the moorings of Z's boat, which drifts downstreamforce by disposing a substance - s. 128(b)
(b)A lashes Z's carriage horses so they quicken paceforce by inducing an animal - s. 128(c)
(c)A seizes the pole of Z's palanquin and stops it, intending to rob Zcessation of motion, by own bodily power - s. 128(a)
(d)A intentionally pushes against Z in the streetown bodily power, direct contact
(e)A throws a stone at Z, or at Z's clothes, or so as to dash water against themcontact with clothing or things carried, and the water variant
(f)A intentionally pulls up a woman's veilcontact with clothing
(g)A pours boiling water into the bath Z is inthe sense of feeling branch
(h)A incites a dog to spring upon Zinducing an animal again

S1; S4

So the Illustrations are a teaching device: each walks through the two-stage analysis - first, was force used within section 128, and second, were consent absent and the mental element present. Illustration (a) does this most explicitly, reciting the section 128 reasoning in full before turning to consent and purpose. S1; S4

Three drafting oddities in the Illustrations, all inherited

Illustration (c) uses different words from the section. The operative text says "in order to the committing of any offence"; Illustration (c) says "in order to the commission of an offence". Both forms appear in the Penal Code too, so the inconsistency is inherited rather than introduced. Nothing appears to turn on it. S1; S2

Illustration (c) also carries a stray full stop. It reads "...in order to the commission of an offence. A has used criminal force to Z." where the sense requires a comma. That too is in the Penal Code. S1; S2

Illustration (h) is conspicuously abbreviated. Every other Illustration states both limbs of the mental element - "intending or knowing it to be likely" - and walks through the force analysis first. Illustration (h) says only: "Here, if A intends to cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, he uses criminal force to Z." It omits the knowledge limb and the intermediate step. The section's own words govern, and they include the knowledge limb; the abbreviation in the Illustration does not narrow them. S1; S2

Against IPC section 350

The comparison is as close as it gets. A token comparison returns two differences, both punctuation: S1; S2

  • the heading "Illustrations" acquired a full stop; and
  • in Illustration (e), a semicolon became a comma ("A has used force to Z**,** and if he did so" for "A has used force to Z**;** and if he did so").

The operative definition, all three elements, and all eight Illustrations with every example in them are otherwise identical. S1; S2

The modernisation that did not happen

This is worth pausing on, because it sits oddly beside the section immediately before it.

At section 128 the Sanhita did modernise: the Penal Code's archaic ordinals "First.—", "Secondly.—" and "Thirdly.—" became lettered clauses (a), (b) and (c). S4

At section 129 it did not. The phrase "in order to the committing of any offence" is awkward nineteenth-century construction - one would now write "in order to commit any offence" - and it was left exactly as it stood. So were the chariot, the palanquin and the veil in the Illustrations. S1; S2; S4

The modernisation was therefore selective, and two consecutive definitional sections were treated differently. Nothing of substance turns on it, but a reader should not assume that archaic phrasing in the Sanhita has been tidied, and nothing was found explaining why one section was touched and the next was not. S1; S4

No punishment, no classification

Section 129 states no punishment because it creates no offence. There is accordingly no First Schedule row, no compounding Table entry, and no question of cognizability, bail or forum. Section 8(1) on the amount of fines has nothing to operate on, and the sentencing limits in section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita are not engaged. Those questions begin at section 131. S1; S6

How the courts have applied it

No decision construing the elements of criminal force in the abstract was located, and the gap is declared below. Two decisions show the definition being applied.

A charge that failed because criminal force was not made out

In John Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, Alexander Thomas J, 17 September 2015), the petitioner sought to quash proceedings arising from an inspection by officials. One of the charges was under IPC section 353 - assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging his duty. S7

The Court set out IPC sections 349, 350, 351 and 353 and examined the complaint against them. On the allegations - that the petitioner had thrown away an object the official intended to seize, and had abused the officials - the Court found that "there are no serious or substantial allegations on the petitioner having used criminal force or assault" against the official. S7

The proceedings for the offences alleged, including the section 353 charge, were held not sustainable or tenable, and were quashed. S7

The practical lesson for a reader of section 129 is direct: a charge that depends on criminal force fails unless the allegations disclose the use of force within the definition. Abuse and the throwing away of an object were held not to supply it on those facts. S1; S7

The concept is narrower than general notions of "force"

In Shankarlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Madhya Pradesh High Court, S.K. Dubey J, 14 June 1994), a case about dispossession under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court recorded an observation of the Bombay High Court that the word "forcibly" in the relevant procedural provision "cannot be given a restricted meaning of dispossession accompanied by the use of criminal force as defined in Section 350 of the Penal Code", and that it is not necessary that actual force be used to make a dispossession forcible. S8

That passage is the Madhya Pradesh High Court reporting the Bombay High Court's observation, which in turn rested on a Supreme Court decision, rather than a holding of the Madhya Pradesh Court on section 350 itself. It is cited here on that basis and for a narrow purpose: it shows that courts have treated the section 350 concept as a defined and relatively confined one, distinct from looser statutory uses of "force" or "forcibly" elsewhere. Neither the Bombay decision nor the Supreme Court decision behind it was retrieved. S8

Practical distinctions and common misconceptions

Section 129 creates no offence. Nobody is charged under it. It supplies a definition used by sections 131 onwards. S1; S6

Consent is the dividing line. Force plus consent is ordinary life; force without consent, intentionally used, with the required purpose or knowledge, is criminal force. S1; S4

Annoyance is enough. The mental element is satisfied by intending or knowing it likely that the force will cause annoyance. It need not cause or threaten injury. S1

Knowledge suffices - intention is not required. The third limb is "knowing it to be likely". S1

The injury, fear or annoyance must be to the person the force is used against, not to a bystander. S1

Accidental force is excluded. The use of force must be intentional. S1

No contact with the body is needed, because section 128's definition of force does not require it. Illustrations (e) and (f) - the stone and the veil - make the point. S1; S4

Criminal force is not assault. Assault, defined at section 130, requires no contact at all: it is a gesture or preparation causing a person present to apprehend that criminal force is about to be used, and its Explanation says mere words do not amount to an assault. One can be committed without the other. S5

The archaic wording is still there. "In order to the committing of any offence" was not modernised, unlike the ordinals at section 128. S1; S4

Worked examples

Example 1. A shakes Z's hand with Z's agreement. Force under section 128, but not criminal force - consent is present. S1; S4

Example 2. A intentionally shoves Z in a queue, knowing it will irritate Z. Criminal force - intentional force, without consent, with knowledge that annoyance is likely. The low threshold is doing the work. S1

Example 3. A stumbles and knocks into Z. Not criminal force - the use of force was not intentional. S1

Example 4. A throws a stone that strikes Z's coat, intending to frighten Z. Criminal force, on Illustration (e) - contact with clothing suffices. S1

Example 5. A incites a dog to run at Z without Z's consent, intending to frighten Z. Criminal force, on Illustration (h). S1

Example 6. A unfastens the mooring of Z's boat so it drifts, intending to annoy Z. Criminal force, on Illustration (a) - force by disposing a substance. S1

Example 7. A, intending to rob Z, stops Z's vehicle by seizing it. Criminal force, on Illustration (c) - and the "in order to the committing of any offence" limb is satisfied without any need to show intended annoyance. S1

Example 8. A abuses officials and throws away an item they intended to seize. On John Kuriakose, not criminal force on those facts, and a charge resting on it was quashed. S7

Example 9. A raises a fist at Z from a distance and never touches Z or anything of Z's. Not criminal force - no force is used at all - but it may be an assault under section 130. S1; S5

Commencement and which law applies

Section 129 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S9

The transition is immaterial in substance. Section 129 creates no offence and reproduces IPC section 350 with only two punctuation changes, so the content of "criminal force" is the same under either Code. For conduct before that date the applicable definition is IPC section 350; for conduct on or after it, section 129. S1; S2; S9

What may turn on the date is the offence to which the definition is applied - and section 131 onwards did change in places - but that is a question for those sections. S1; S6

  • Section 128 - the definition of force, which section 129 builds on and which supplies the content of its first element. S4
  • Section 130 - assault, which requires no contact and turns on apprehension that criminal force is about to be used. S5
  • Section 131 - the first punishing provision in this group, and the one that builds grave and sudden provocation into the offence. S6

Sources and honest limits

The comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 129 against the India Code text of IPC section 350, including all eight Illustrations, with the section text checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The texts and India Code handles of sections 128, 130 and 131 were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6

What this article does not establish:

  • NO AUTHORITY CONSTRUING THE ELEMENTS IN THE ABSTRACT WAS READ. Searches returned 201 and 63 hits, which were not read exhaustively, and no Supreme Court decision construing the definition of criminal force was located. So this article explains the statutory words but does not state how the courts have construed "intentionally", "annoyance", or the boundaries of the three limbs of the mental element.
  • CONSENT IS NOT ANALYSED. The section says nothing about what consent requires, who may give it, or when it is vitiated, and no authority on those questions was read. They are central in practice and are simply not addressed here.
  • "Annoyance" is identified as a low threshold but not judicially defined. No decision locating its lower limit was found, and the observation that a great deal of everyday unpleasantness could fall within the definition is this article's own.
  • John Kuriakose is a single-Judge decision of one High Court and does not bind elsewhere. Its subsequent treatment was not checked. It is cited for the finding that the allegations did not disclose criminal force and for the outcome.
  • Shankarlal IS CITED WITH AN EXPRESS CAVEAT. The passage relied on is the Madhya Pradesh High Court reporting an observation of the Bombay High Court, which itself rested on a Supreme Court decision; it is not a holding of the Madhya Pradesh Court on section 350. Neither the Bombay decision nor the Supreme Court decision behind it was retrieved, and the point is used only to show that the concept is a defined and relatively confined one.
  • The structural reading of the Illustrations is this article's own. That they work systematically through section 128's three ways and three contact branches is an observation about their arrangement, not something the Act states.
  • Nothing explains the selective modernisation. No travaux were retrieved. A Law Commission search covering the definitions of force and criminal force was run at section 128 and returned nothing bearing on either, so nothing accounts for the ordinals being modernised at section 128 while the archaic phrasing here was left.
  • Sections 130 and 131 are described, not analysed. Their texts were read to show how the group fits together; their own comparisons, Explanations and penalties belong to those sections.
  • Nothing is said about classification, bail, forum, compounding or sentencing, because section 129 creates no offence. No First Schedule row or compounding entry exists to examine, and sections 8(1) and 23 are not engaged.
  • Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.

Section 129 is the hinge of this group. Section 128 defines force so broadly that it catches a handshake; section 129 narrows it to what the criminal law is interested in by adding intention, the absence of consent, and a purpose or foresight of harm. The narrowing is real but it is not severe, because the lowest rung of that third element is annoyance - which means the definition reaches a good deal further than the phrase "criminal force" might suggest. The eight Illustrations, all of them carried over from the Penal Code without alteration, are the best guide to how the two sections work together, and they repay reading in full. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 129 do?
It defines 'criminal force' for the provisions that follow. It creates no offence, imposes no punishment, and has no First Schedule entry; the offences in this group begin at section 131.
+What are the three elements of criminal force?
First, the force must be used intentionally. Second, it must be used without that person's consent. Third, it must be used either to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that it will cause, injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used.
+How is this different from Section 128?
Section 128 defines force neutrally and says nothing about wrongfulness - a handshake is force. Section 129 is where wrongfulness enters, by adding intention, the absence of consent, and a criminal purpose or foresight of harm. Section 129's first element takes its whole content from section 128, including its breadth.
+Why is consent so important?
It is the dividing line that keeps the ordinary business of life out of the criminal law. A handshake, a surgical procedure, a contact sport and a crowded train all involve force within section 128, and all are consented to in the relevant sense. Remove consent and the first two elements of section 129 are met.
+Does the section say what consent means?
No. It says nothing about what consent requires, who may give it, or when it is vitiated. Those questions are central in practice and are not answered by this section; no authority on them was read for this article.
+Is 'annoyance' really enough?
Yes, and it is the striking feature of the definition. The section puts annoyance on the same footing as injury, so force used intentionally and without consent, where the user merely knew annoyance was likely, satisfies the third element. A great deal of everyday unpleasantness is capable of falling within the definition. Note that no decision locating the lower limit of 'annoyance' was found, and that observation is this article's own.
+Must the accused intend the consequence?
No. The third element is satisfied by 'knowing it to be likely' that the force will cause injury, fear or annoyance. Intention is one route; knowledge of likelihood is another; and a purpose of committing any offence is a third.
+Does the injury, fear or annoyance have to be to the person the force is used against?
Yes. The words are 'to the person to whom the force is used', so apprehension or irritation caused to a bystander does not satisfy this element.
+Is accidental force criminal force?
No. The use of force must be intentional, so a stumble or an unintended jostle in a crowd is outside the definition however unwelcome.
+Does the accused have to touch the person?
No, because section 128's definition of force does not require it. Illustration (e) covers a thrown stone striking the person's clothes or something they carry, and Illustration (f) covers pulling up a woman's veil.
+Which IPC section did BNS Section 129 replace?
IPC section 350. The comparison returns two differences, both punctuation: a full stop added after the heading 'Illustrations', and a semicolon becoming a comma in Illustration (e). The operative definition and all eight Illustrations are otherwise identical.
+Were any Illustrations dropped?
No - all eight, (a) to (h), were carried over intact, with every example unaltered. That is worth saying because the Sanhita has not always kept them: at section 120 an Illustration present in the Penal Code was dropped.
+What are the Illustrations actually doing?
Read together they work systematically through section 128's definition. Illustration (a) shows force by disposing a substance; (b) and (h) by inducing an animal; (c) cessation of motion by bodily power; (d) direct contact by bodily power; (e) contact with clothing or things carried, and the water variant; (f) contact with clothing; and (g) the sense-of-feeling branch. Each walks through the two-stage analysis - was force used within section 128, and then were consent absent and the mental element present. This structural reading is this article's own observation about their arrangement.
+Are there drafting oddities in the Illustrations?
Three, all inherited from the Penal Code. Illustration (c) says 'to the commission of an offence' where the section says 'committing'. Illustration (c) also carries a stray full stop where the sense requires a comma. And Illustration (h) is abbreviated, omitting the 'knowing it to be likely' limb that every other Illustration states - but the section's own words govern and they include that limb, so the abbreviation does not narrow the definition.
+Was the archaic wording modernised?
No, and that is a curious contrast. The phrase 'to the committing of any offence' is awkward nineteenth-century construction and was left exactly as it stood, as were the chariot, the palanquin and the veil in the Illustrations. Yet at section 128 the Penal Code's ordinals 'First.', 'Secondly.' and 'Thirdly.' WERE modernised into lettered clauses. The tidying was therefore selective, two consecutive definitional sections were treated differently, and nothing was found explaining why.
+Does Section 8(1) on fines apply?
No. Section 129 states no punishment because it creates no offence, so there is nothing for section 8(1) to quantify, and the sentencing limits in section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita are not engaged either. Those questions begin at section 131.
+How is criminal force different from assault?
Assault, defined at section 130, requires no contact at all: it is a gesture or preparation causing a person present to apprehend that criminal force is about to be used, and its Explanation says mere words do not amount to an assault. Criminal force requires force actually to be used. One can be committed without the other.
+Has a court applied the definition?
Yes. In John Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, 17 September 2015) the petitioner sought to quash proceedings including a charge under IPC section 353, assault or criminal force to deter a public servant. The Court set out IPC sections 349, 350, 351 and 353, examined the complaint, and found 'no serious or substantial allegations on the petitioner having used criminal force or assault'. The proceedings were held not sustainable and were quashed. The lesson is that a charge depending on criminal force fails unless the allegations disclose the use of force within the definition.
+Is the concept of criminal force a narrow one?
It is at least a defined and relatively confined one. In Shankarlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1994) the Court recorded an observation of the Bombay High Court that the word 'forcibly' in a procedural provision cannot be given the restricted meaning of dispossession accompanied by the use of criminal force 'as defined in Section 350 of the Penal Code'. That passage is the Madhya Pradesh Court REPORTING the Bombay Court's observation, which itself rested on a Supreme Court decision, rather than a holding on section 350; it is cited on that basis and only to show that courts treat the section 350 concept as distinct from looser statutory uses of 'force'.
+Has the definition itself been construed by the Supreme Court?
No decision construing the elements in the abstract was located. Searches returned 201 and 63 hits which were not read exhaustively, and no Supreme Court decision construing the definition of criminal force was found. So this article explains the statutory words but does not state how the courts have construed 'intentionally', 'annoyance', or the boundaries of the three limbs of the mental element.
+Which law applies to conduct before 1 July 2024?
IPC section 350 supplies the definition for earlier conduct and section 129 for conduct on or after that date, but the content is identical so nothing turns on it. What may turn on the date is the offence to which the definition is applied, which is a question for the relevant offence section.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 129 - official text of the definition and Illustrations (a) to (h), and the marginal note 'Criminal force.' — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  2. S2The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), section 350 - the repealed text used for the correspondence analysis, including Illustrations (a) to (h) — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  3. S3The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs - used to verify the text of section 129 as enacted — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  4. S4The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 128 - force — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 130 - assault — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  6. S6The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 131 - punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  7. S7John Kuriakose v. State of Kerala, Crl.M.C. No. 3927 of 2013, High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, Alexander Thomas J, judgment dated 17 September 2015 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the High Court of Kerala) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  8. S8Shankarlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, S.K. Dubey J, order dated 14 June 1994, reported 1994 (0) MPLJ 753 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  9. S9Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, appointing 1 July 2024 as the date of commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)

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