What Section 101 says
Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is titled "Murder." It opens S1:
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
Four lettered limbs follow, then five Exceptions, two Explanations (both unnumbered) and Illustrations appearing under four separate headings: two plural, two singular. We counted each of these in the text rather than describing them from memory.
Two things about that opening sentence matter before anything else.
First, murder is defined as a subset of culpable homicide. The section does not define murder from scratch. It begins from Section 100, and says that culpable homicide is murder if one of four conditions is met, unless an Exception applies. You cannot read Section 101 without Section 100 S1.
Second, this section punishes nothing. There is no "shall be punished" clause anywhere in it. We tested for one, rather than assuming. The punishment for murder is in Section 103 S1S3.
The four limbs
The act must be done
- (a) with the intention of causing death; or
- (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or
- (c) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, where the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
- (d) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and committed without any excuse for incurring the risk S1.
The five Exceptions
There are exactly five, and we counted them in both texts rather than relying on recollection S1S3:
- grave and sudden provocation;
- exceeding the right of private defence in good faith;
- a public servant exceeding lawful power in good faith;
- sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, without premeditation and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner;
- death suffered, or the risk of death taken, with the consent of a person "being above the age of eighteen years."
Section 101 came into force on 1 July 2024 S4, and appears in neither list in Section 2(24) S1.
(A) What the documented record shows about the change
The mapping was verified, not assumed
Section 101 corresponds to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: alone. It is tempting to treat it as a merger of IPC Sections 300 and 302, since those two sections together did what Sections 101 and 103 now do. That would be wrong, and we checked it: Section 101 contains "Except in the cases hereinafter excepted" and contains no punishment clause at all, while IPC Section 302's punishment wording reappears in BNS Section 103 S1S3.
The titles are identical: "Murder" in both.
Twenty-one differences, and not one of them changes the ingredients
The word-level comparison returns twenty-one differences S3. That number looks alarming for a provision of this importance. It is not, and the reason is the most useful single finding in this article: every one of them is about layout, labelling, punctuation or spelling. None of them changes what the prosecution must prove.
Each was tested against the Gazette before being reported S2.
1. The clause labels were replaced, and the ellipsis was spelled out.
The IPC labelled its four limbs 1stly, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. The Sanhita letters them (a), (b), (c), (d) S3.
More than relabelling happened. The IPC's second, third and fourth limbs opened elliptically, "If it is done with the intention of…", where "it" referred back to the act mentioned in the first limb. The Sanhita replaces that with the full phrase in each limb: "if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of…" S3.
Gazette check: 1stly, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly are all absent, and "(b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention" is present S2.
2. Exception 1's inline side-heading was deleted.
In the IPC, Exception 1 was preceded by the inline side-heading "When culpable homicide is not murder". That phrase is absent from the Gazette S2. The same tidying-up of inline side-headings appears at Section 90 of the Sanhita, which this collection covered earlier.
3. Exception 1's three provisos became one.
This is the largest structural change, and it runs in the opposite direction to the first.
The IPC ended Exception 1 with: "The above exception is subject to the following provisos:— First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked… Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law… Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence."
The Sanhita replaces all of that with a single proviso carrying lettered clauses: "Provided that the provocation is not— (a)… (b)… (c)…" S3.
Gazette check: "The above exception is subject to the following provisos", "First.—That" and "Secondly.—That" are all absent; "Provided that the provocation is not" is present S2.
So in the main limbs the drafters added repetition (spelling out "the act by which the death is caused" three extra times), and in Exception 1 they removed it (collapsing three repetitions of "That the provocation is not" into one). Both moves are defensible drafting; they are simply not the same instinct.
4. A spelling change, and it is Code-wide.
The IPC spelled it inasmuch. The Sanhita spells it in as much S3. We checked whether this was local to Section 101: the Gazette contains "in as much" twelve times and "inasmuch" not once S2. It is a house-style decision applied throughout the Sanhita, not a change to this section.
5. The only substantive wording change is in an Illustration, and the Exception itself is untouched.
This is the finding most likely to be reported incorrectly elsewhere, so it is worth being precise.
Exception 5 itself is identical in both Codes, including the words "being above the age of eighteen years" S3. The Sanhita did not replace that phrase with "child".
What changed is Exception 5's Illustration S3:
IPC: "A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide."
BNS: "A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide."
Since Section 2(3) of the Sanhita defines "child" as any person below the age of eighteen years, the Illustration means exactly what it meant before. It is shorter, and it uses the Code's own defined term.
A caution we impose on ourselves. Neither sentence places a closing comma after the age description: both read "…a child to commit suicide" and "…a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide" without one. It would be easy to report that as a Sanhita drafting slip. It is inherited from the IPC, and we tested the predecessor before saying anything about it S3.
6. Punctuation on the Illustration headings.
Every Illustration heading in the section acquired a full stop. In the Sanhita text the plural heading Illustrations. appears twice and the singular Illustration. twice: four headings, all now stopped S1S3. Gazette-confirmed S2.
We state those counts because an earlier draft of this article said the plural form appeared three times. Counting the text showed two. The figure is corrected here rather than left to stand.
7. A defect in our own data, not in the statute.
Two of the twenty-one differences were not features of the Sanhita at all. This project's section inventory had dropped apostrophes in two places: it read "Zs nose" where the Gazette reads "Z's nose", and "offenders having taken undue advantage" in Exception 4 where the Gazette reads "offender's having taken undue advantage" S2.
Both were confirmed both ways against the Gazette: the correct form present, the inventory's form absent. These are recorded as defects in our transcription and are not reported as anything the legislature did. This is the third such defect class this project has found in its own inventory, and we log them rather than quietly correcting them.
Elsewhere in the section the inventory uses a straight apostrophe where the Gazette uses a curly one. That is a character-encoding difference, not a legal change, and we say so rather than counting it as a finding.
The section was never amended
The India Code slice for IPC Section 300 carries no amendment footnote markers at all S3. On the text examined, the definition of murder stood exactly as enacted in 1860 for 164 years. The slice measured 6,516 characters against the Sanhita's 6,434: within the band we asserted before reading the result S3.
The BNSS makes no reference to Section 101 of the Sanhita, tested with a whole-number search S9.
(B) Judicial and practical context
What we have not surveyed
The case law on IPC Section 300 is, with Section 299, the foundation of Indian homicide law. The authority on the four clauses, on the boundary with culpable homicide, on Exception 1 and Exception 4, on "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature", runs to decades of Supreme Court and High Court decisions. This project has not surveyed that body of case law, and nothing below is a summary of it.
What we did find, and the pattern is the finding
We searched for decisions referring to Section 101 of the Sanhita itself. The search was exhausted (fewer results than the repository's display limit, so we saw all of them) and returned six documents, of which four actually engage Section 101 S5S6S7S8.
In all four, Section 101 appears as a parallel citation to IPC Section 300. Not one of them construes Section 101's own words. The courts are applying the Penal Code to conduct that predates 1 July 2024, and noting the new section number in brackets.
The clearest example is Savita Devi v. The State of Bihar (Patna High Court, Cr. App (DB) No. 1307 of 2024, judgment of 17 July 2026, Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Kumar Manish JJ.) S5. The Court found that the quarrel "had taken place all of a sudden"; that the weapons were an iron rod and lathi "which are normally kept in the house of the villagers"; and that although one accused struck the deceased on the head with an iron rod, fracturing the temporal region, "there was no repetition of blow on the head." It concluded:
The quarrel seems to have taken place in the spur of the moment, there was no intention on the part of the accused persons to kill… therefore, the charge under Section 302 IPC would not be established beyond all reasonable doubts. This would make this case a culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It will fall under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC (now Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita).
And then it quoted Section 300: with the old labels. The judgment sets out "2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury…" and "3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury…" S5. That is the elliptical, ordinal-numbered form the Sanhita replaced with lettered clauses. A judgment delivered in 2026 cites the new section number and reproduces the old text, because the old text is the one that governed the conduct.
The same Court used the identical practice for procedure, writing "Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 468 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita)" S5. On the order: one respondent was taken into custody to undergo the remaining sentence, two others were released to the extent of the period already undergone, and the appeal was allowed to the extent indicated S5. The Court relied on Gopal Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 1 PLJR 236, for the proposition that such a case is decided on broad probabilities: a decision this project has not retrieved, so we report only that it was cited and for what.
Udayakumar v. State Rep. By (High Court of Judicature at Madras, Crl. A. No. 85 of 2022, S.M. Subramaniam J.) shows the same thing on the other side of the line S6:
The requirements of clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC (Sec. 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) are fully satisfied and the offence committed is that of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC (Sec.103 of … The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita).
Again: the old label, "clause thirdly", with the new section number appended.
A caution about this citation. The repository displays this document as decided on 20 February 2019: which cannot be the date of a judgment citing the Sanhita. Reading the text, 20.02.2019 is the date of the judgment under appeal; the appeal is numbered Crl. A. No. 85 of 2022. We therefore cite the case number and do not assert the repository's displayed date S6.
Karam Singh and Others v. State of Haryana and Another must be reported carefully, because what it contains is an argument, not a holding S7. The judgment records that "Counsel for the petitioner has argued" that a charge under Section 109 of the Sanhita could not be framed because "a specific defence under explanation 4 of Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 would be available to the petitioners."
Two points, and both matter:
- This is counsel's submission as recorded. It is not the law, and we do not report it as the law.
- The submission as recorded mis-describes the provision. Section 101 has two Explanations, both unnumbered, and five Exceptions, numbered 1 to 5. There is no "explanation 4": we counted both series in the text. The reference is evidently to Exception 4, the sudden-fight exception. We note this not to criticise anyone but because a reader searching for "explanation 4 of Section 101" will not find it, and should know why.
The facts recorded were that the petitioners' niece was said to have eloped on 15 June 2025 and been recovered the same day, and that the FIR arose from an incident on 29 June 2025, "almost fifteen days thereafter" S7.
Chetna Trivedi v. Reserve Bank of India and Others shows the practice reaching outside the criminal courts S8. In a succession dispute turning on Section 25 of a 1956 Act, the question was whether a person had murdered another "within the statutory meaning, scope and ambit of word 'murder' as defined in Section 300 IPC (Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023)." It cites Jagdish Lal Sharma v. Nirmala, 2008 (4) SCT 776, which this project has not retrieved.
The remaining two documents in the result set contain no reference to Section 101 at all and are not relevant.
(C) Editorial analysis: clearly labelled as ours
Everything in this part is our own reading.
The headline is that the hardest provision in the Code was redrafted without being redefined. Twenty-one textual differences and not one ingredient changed. In our view that is the right call for a provision whose every phrase ("sufficient in the ordinary course of nature", "so imminently dangerous", "grave and sudden") has been argued over for generations. The drafters improved the typography of the definition of murder and left the definition alone.
The clause relabelling is the change practitioners will feel, and it is a genuine improvement. 1stly to 4thly is archaic, and the elliptical "If it is done" required a reader to carry "the act by which the death is caused" forward from the first limb. Spelling it out in each clause makes each limb independently readable, which matters when a charge is framed under one limb alone. The cost is real but temporary: an enormous body of authority is organised around the phrase "clause thirdly", and the two judgments above show courts still using it. For some years, anyone working in this area needs to be fluent in both labelling systems and to know that clause (c) is the old "3rdly".
The two drafting instincts pulling in opposite directions are worth noticing. In the main limbs, repetition was added for clarity. In Exception 1, repetition was removed for concision. Both are reasonable; applied in the same section they are a little incongruous. We record the observation without suggesting either is wrong.
The Exception 5 Illustration shows the "child" definition doing quiet work. By defining "child" once in Section 2(3), the Sanhita can shorten a dozen provisions. Here it saves five words in an Illustration and changes nothing legally. The Exception itself still says "being above the age of eighteen years". This is the benign face of a technique that elsewhere in this collection produced real substantive change: at Sections 98 and 99 the same substitution resolved a long-standing mismatch between section headings that said "minor" and bodies that said "under eighteen", and at Section 96 it extended protection to boys for the first time since 1923.
The parallel-citation pattern tells you something about where the law actually is. Two years after commencement, the courts citing Section 101 are not construing it. They are deciding cases under Section 300 and signposting the successor. That is exactly what one would expect when the words are unchanged and the conduct predates commencement, and it means the first judgment that genuinely turns on Section 101's own language is probably still some way off. When it comes, it will almost certainly reach the same result as the Section 300 authority, because the ingredients are the same words.
On our own data. Finding two dropped apostrophes in our inventory, in the section defining murder, is not a comfortable thing to publish. We publish it because the alternative is to correct it silently, and a reader has no way of knowing which approach we took unless we say. The test that caught it was the same one we run on every section: check each reported difference against the Gazette both ways before asserting it.
What we checked, and what we could not
Checked and verified. The text and title of Section 101, including all five Exceptions, against this project's inventory and against the Gazette S1S2. That the mapping is to IPC Section 300 alone, by testing for the presence of "Except in the cases hereinafter excepted" and the absence of any punishment clause, and by confirming that IPC Section 302's wording reappears in Section 103 S1S3. That both texts have exactly five Exceptions, counted in each, and that s. 101 has two unnumbered Explanations and four Illustration headings, also counted S1S3. That s. 101 contains NO punishment clause, by testing for 'shall be punished', 'punished with' and even the bare word 'imprisonment' - all absent S1. All twenty-one word-level differences, on a line-scoped extraction with a length-band assertion (6,516 characters, in band) S3. Each reported difference against the Gazette, positively and negatively S2. That "in as much" is Code-wide, by counting both spellings across the whole Gazette S2. That Exception 5 itself is unchanged, so the "child" substitution is confined to the Illustration S3. That the missing comma in that Illustration is inherited from the IPC, by testing the predecessor S3. The absence of amendment markers S3. The four judgments, read in full S5S6S7S8. Commencement S4. The absence of a BNSS cross-reference, by whole-number test S9.
Not checked, and material. The case law on IPC Section 300 has NOT been surveyed, and this article offers no summary of it. Gopal Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 1 PLJR 236: not retrieved; reported only as cited. Jagdish Lal Sharma v. Nirmala, 2008 (4) SCT 776: not retrieved. The date of the Udayakumar judgment. The repository's displayed date is demonstrably not the High Court's, and we do not assert a date. Whether the offence is cognizable or bailable: the question attaches to Section 103, and the BNSS First Schedule has never been examined by this project S9. Any State amendments to IPC Section 300. The relationship between Exception 5 and Section 108 of the Sanhita on abetment of suicide, which we flag and do not map.
How this article was prepared
This article was prepared by comparing the official text of BNS Section 101 with the official text of IPC Section 300 word by word, then testing every reported difference against the Gazette in both directions before asserting it, and reading the four relevant judgments in full.
Three of this project's standing rules did visible work here. Test the predecessor before calling anything a drafting error, which is why the missing comma in the Exception 5 Illustration is reported as inherited rather than as a Sanhita slip. A proposition recorded as counsel's submission is never reported as the law, which is why Karam Singh appears as an argument. Check the repository's metadata against the document, which is why no date is asserted for Udayakumar.
The two dropped apostrophes we found in our own data are reported as our defects, not as features of the statute.
Where a body of authority exists but has not been surveyed, the article says so plainly rather than offering a thin summary that would read like a survey.
Documented material, judicial material and our own analysis are kept separate and labelled. Where we do not know something, the article says so instead of filling the gap.
This article was prepared with AI assistance. No lawyer has reviewed this article and no human legal review is claimed. Its status is "ready for human review": ready to be checked by a person, not already checked.
This article does not reproduce or alter any existing content on this website.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Whether the ingredients of this section are made out in any given case, whether any Exception or other defence applies, and what sentence may follow, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.