What Section 93 says
Section 93 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is titled "Exposure and abandonment of child under twelve years of age, by parent or person having care of it." It reads S1:
Whoever being the father or mother of a child under the age of twelve years, or having the care of such child, shall expose or leave such child in any place with the intention of wholly abandoning such child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation.—This section is not intended to prevent the trial of the offender for murder or culpable homicide, as the case may be, if the child die in consequence of the exposure.
That is the whole section. It has no sub-sections, no clauses, no proviso, no Illustration and no Exception. It has exactly one Explanation S1.
The punishment structure matters and is easy to misread. The maximum is seven years. "Imprisonment of either description" means either simple or rigorous, taking its meaning from Section 4(c) of the Sanhita. The fine is an alternative, not an addition: the words are "or with fine, or with both", so a court may impose imprisonment alone, fine alone, or both. And there is no minimum sentence: the words "shall not be less than" appear nowhere in the section S1.
Section 93 came into force on 1 July 2024, by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, which commenced the whole Sanhita on that date with the single exception of sub-section (2) of Section 106 S4.
(A) What the documented record shows about the change
The operative words did not change at all
Section 93 corresponds to Section 317 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. We compared the two operative texts word by word. The comparison returned zero differences S1S3.
Not "broadly similar". Not "substantially the same". Identical: every word, in the same order, including the archaic subjunctive "if the child die in consequence of the exposure".
Two things did change, and neither is in the operative text
First, the title. The IPC heading read "Exposure and abandonment of child under twelve years, by parent or person having care of it". The Sanhita heading reads "Exposure and abandonment of child under twelve years of age, by parent or person having care of it". Two words were added S1S3.
That is a tidying-up, not a change of meaning. "Under twelve years" and "under twelve years of age" mean the same thing, and in any event the operative text has always said "under the age of twelve years" in full. But it is worth recording precisely, because a reader comparing headings would otherwise see a difference and wonder what it did.
Second, and more interestingly, the section changed chapters.
In the IPC, Section 317 sat in Chapter XVI, "OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY", under a long sub-heading: "Of the causing of miscarriage, of injuries to unborn children, of the exposure of infants, and of the concealment of births." S3
In the Sanhita, Section 93 sits in Chapter V, "OF OFFENCES AGAINST WOMAN AND CHILD", and it is the first section under a new sub-heading, "Of offences against child" S2.
So this provision has moved from a chapter organised around a kind of harm into a chapter organised around a class of victim, and it now opens a sub-heading that did not exist in the IPC at all.
Has Section 317 ever been amended? Apparently not
We examined the India Code text of IPC Section 317 for amendment footnote markers: the bracketed digits that mark substituted or inserted words. There were none S3.
On the text examined, these words stood exactly as enacted in 1860 and were carried into the Sanhita untouched. That is a striking survival: a provision about abandoned children, drafted in the middle of the nineteenth century, re-enacted verbatim in 2023.
We record this carefully. The absence of markers in the text we examined is good evidence that the section was never amended, but it is evidence about that text, not a certificate from the legislature.
"Child" is now a defined term, but Section 93 does not use it as one
The Sanhita defines "child" in Section 2(3) as "any person below the age of eighteen years" S1. The IPC had no general definition of either "child" or "minor" S3.
The closest thing the IPC had was a local definition in Section 363A(b), which applied only to that section and was gendered: "minor" meant "(i) in the case of a male, a person under sixteen years of age; and (ii) in the case of a female, a person under eighteen years of age" S3.
Replacing that patchwork with one uniform, gender-neutral, under-eighteen definition is a real improvement in the structure of the law. But note what it does not do here: Section 93 says "a child under the age of twelve years", so the twelve-year cap narrows the defined term for this section only. Within the same sub-heading, Section 97 says "child under the age of ten years", while Sections 95, 96, 98 and 99 use "child" with no further limit S1. The same defined word therefore operates at three different effective ages across one sub-heading.
Where the number 93 can mislead you
The three new codes were numbered independently, and the collisions are real. Section 93 of the BNSS concerns the provisions of that Chapter relating to summons. Section 93 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 concerns electronic records. Neither has anything to do with children S9.
We also searched the BNSS for any cross-reference to "section 93 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita", using a whole-number test so that the digits could not match inside a longer number such as 193. There is no such reference S9.
Section 93 also appears in neither list in Section 2(24), the provision that widens the meaning of "offence" to cover acts punishable under special or local laws for a specified set of sections S1.
(B) Judicial and practical context
Because the words of Section 93 are identical to Section 317, the case law on Section 317 is directly relevant to Section 93. Four decisions were retrieved and read in full.
The leading construction is from 1896: and it is strict
Queen-Empress v. Mirchia, Allahabad High Court, 5 May 1896, equivalent citation (1896) ILR 18 All 364 S5.
The facts are stark. The appellant was the mother of an illegitimate child, six months old. She was wandering, in the company of a blind woman. She persuaded the blind woman to take charge of the child, saying she would fetch some food and return shortly. She then went off to another village. Aikman J. found "there can be no doubt that she had no intention whatever of returning, but that she intended wholly to abandon the child". The blind woman took the child to the nearest police station.
The trial court convicted her and sentenced her to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Three Judges heard the appeal, and they divided.
Blair J. construed the section narrowly and literally:
the words of Section 317 of the Indian Penal Code should be dealt with in the most literal sense. To expose literally means to physically put outside, so that such putting outside involves some physical risk to the person put out.
Applied to a child, he said, this would mean "putting it somewhere where it could not receive the protection necessary for its tender age". And he fixed the threshold of seriousness:
The exposure contemplated by the Act was one by which danger to life might immediately ensue.
Blair J. also drew a comparative point: the English statute was "limited to children under two years of age, while in India they are extended to children under twelve years of age": one reason, in his view, for reading the Indian words strictly.
On the Explanation, he said it "seems to me to indicate with much clearness the scope and purview of the section", because it provides that where injuries actually ensue, the offender is to be punished for the injury inflicted, "i.e., for murder or culpable homicide, as the case may be".
His conclusion on the facts:
Here the blind woman was to some extent capable, of protecting, and did protect, the child. She was a person with whom the child had been left. Upon these findings I must hold that the child was not exposed or left in any place within the meaning of Section 317.
Aikman J. concurred: "I concur with my brother Blair in thinking that this conviction must be quashed."
Knox J. dissented. He took the view that "the appellant is, according to the strict definition of the Indian Penal Code, liable to a conviction for assault" and "would therefore dismiss the appeal and sustain the conviction".
The majority prevailed and the conviction was quashed.
The gap a Judge recorded in 1896
Aikman J. did not pretend the result was comfortable. He accepted that the mother "intended wholly to abandon the child" and that "Her conduct was undoubtedly culpable". Then he added:
In my opinion, if that section does not apply, no other section in the Code does.
That is a Judge of the Allahabad High Court recording, in 1896, that conduct he regarded as plainly culpable fell through the Penal Code altogether. Section 93 reproduces the words that produced that result.
The relationship with the Juvenile Justice Act, and the word "wholly"
Aswathy Narayanan v. State of Kerala, High Court of Kerala, 26 March 2026, Crl.M.C. No. 7194 of 2025, neutral citation 2026:KER:27178 S8.
This order compares Section 317 IPC with Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, and the comparison turns on a single word. Citing its earlier decision in XXX and Another v. State of Kerala and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 7952, the Court recorded:
the word 'wholly' as available in Section 317 IPC is conspicuously absent in Section 75 of the JJ Act. Therefore, even if the abandonment of the child is not 'wholly', the offence under Section 75 of the JJ Act will be attracted. In other words, the offence punishable under Section 317 IPC and the one under Section 75 of the JJ Act are two distinct offences.
The Court also recorded that Section 75 of the JJ Act carries imprisonment up to three years, or a fine of Rs.1,00,000, or both, and that this is "less serious" than Section 317 IPC. It reproduced the JJ Act's Section 2(1) definition of "abandoned child" as "a child deserted by his biological or adoptive parents or guardians, who has been declared as abandoned by the Committee after due inquiry". It discussed Mirchia and confirmed that the Allahabad High Court had set aside the conviction.
An important limit on what we can tell you. Everything in the preceding paragraph about the Juvenile Justice Act comes from the Court's reproduction of that Act, not from the Act itself. This project has not retrieved the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. So treat the JJ Act content here as "what the Kerala High Court set out", not as a verified statement of the statute S8.
What we can say with confidence is this: the Sanhita retains the word "wholly" verbatim S1. So whatever force that distinction had under Section 317, it has under Section 93.
The relationship must be proved, not assumed
State v. Mamouni Kalita, Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate-01, South East, Saket Courts, New Delhi, 29 April 2014, FIR No. 312/2006 S6.
A newborn was found abandoned on the ground floor of a flat in September 2006. The accused was interrogated, admitted guilt during investigation, was medically examined and charged under Section 317. She pleaded not guilty.
She was acquitted. The court's statement of what must be proved is useful precisely because it is unglamorous:
In order to establish the charge against the accused, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused is mother of the child and further that she had exposed or left the child with intention to abandon him. The relation of the accused with the child is sina qua non to establish the charge under section 317 IPC.
(The judgment spells the Latin phrase "sina qua non"; we reproduce it as written.)
The complainant admitted in cross-examination that she "had not seen the person who abandoned the child". The case rested largely on the accused's medical examination. The court held the charge not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Abandonment is not the same as sale
Mrs. Ashalatha Y.K. v. State of Kerala, High Court of Kerala, 16 August 2024, Crl.M.C. No. 4364 of 2015, neutral citation 2024:KER:63376 S7.
The allegation was that parents had sold two infants for money, with the petitioner, an advocate, preparing the agreement. The crime, originally registered under Section 498A, was altered to Sections 317 and 370A IPC and Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
Quoting an earlier decision, the Court described the allegations as "no doubt shocking and revolting to human values and, if true, show the unpardonable moral depravity of the culprits". It then observed:
Not much dilation is required to take a view that on the allegations imputed over the sale of two infants by their parents the aforesaid penal offences may not lie.
And separately:
A mere sale of an infant by a parent for value would not fall as an exploitation of the child under Section 370 of the Penal Code.
One thing we will not do with this case. The State Public Prosecutor "fairly submitted that the allegations imputed in the crime as such would not disclose exposure or abandonment of children covered under Section 317 of the Penal Code". That is counsel's submission. A concession by a prosecutor, however fairly made and however faithfully recorded, is not a holding and is not the law. We report it as a submission and nothing more S7.
A transcription point worth knowing
Two of these judgments reproduce the section inexactly, and the differences are the kind that matter if you are quoting from a judgment rather than from the statute.
- Ashalatha sets the heading out as "Exposure or abandonment of child under twelve years". The official heading says "Exposure and abandonment". We checked: the phrase "Exposure or abandonment" appears nowhere in the IPC text examined S3S7. That order also stops its reproduction at "or with both" and does not set out the Explanation.
- Aswathy Narayanan reproduces the Explanation as "if the child dies in consequence of the exposure". The official text, in both the IPC and the Sanhita, says "die". We checked: "child dies in consequence" appears nowhere in the IPC text examined S1S3S8.
Neither affects the outcome of either case. Both are reasons to quote statutes from the statute.
(C) Editorial analysis: clearly labelled as ours
Everything in this part is our own reading. It is not drawn from any committee report, any statement of objects, or any judgment, and no source is offered for it beyond the statutory texts already cited.
The relocation is the real story, and it is a story about classification rather than liability. Section 93 does not punish anything that Section 317 did not punish, and it does not punish it any more severely. What changed is where the law files the offence. The IPC grouped abandonment with miscarriage, injuries to unborn children and concealment of births: a cluster held together by the idea of harm to a body. The Sanhita groups it with procuration, sale and purchase of children and the hiring of children for crime: a cluster held together by the identity of the victim. A reader looking for the law on children in the IPC had to know to look in a chapter about the human body. A reader looking in the Sanhita can look under "Of offences against child". We regard that as a genuine improvement in findability, and we note that findability is not a small thing in a code of 358 sections.
The strictness of Mirchia sits awkwardly with the new heading. Blair J.'s construction ("physically put outside", "danger to life might immediately ensue") was built in a chapter about offences affecting the human body, and it reads like it. Now that the identical words sit under a heading about offences against children, there is at least an argument that the purposive context has shifted. We do not predict that any court will revisit Mirchia; the words are unchanged, and unchanged words are usually read as carrying their settled meaning. But the argument is now available in a way it was not before, and the Aswathy Narayanan line of reasoning, that "wholly" is doing specific and limiting work, shows courts are still actively engaged with exactly this wording.
The 1896 gap is narrowed, not obviously closed. Aikman J.'s observation that "no other section in the Code does" apply was about the Penal Code of his day. The Sanhita now contains Section 95 (hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence) and Sections 98 and 99 (selling and buying a child for the purposes specified there), and the Juvenile Justice Act operates alongside. But Sections 98 and 99 require a purpose (prostitution, illicit intercourse, or any unlawful and immoral purpose) and the Kerala High Court's observation in Ashalatha that "a mere sale of an infant by a parent for value" fell outside Section 370 suggests that purpose-limited provisions do not catch every disposal of a child. Whether the conduct in Mirchia would today find a home somewhere in the Sanhita or in the Juvenile Justice Act is a question we are not in a position to answer, because we have not retrieved that Act.
The retention of "die" is a small sign of how this re-enactment was done. A drafter rewriting from scratch in 2023 would almost certainly have written "dies". The subjunctive survived because the section was carried across rather than rewritten. That is not a criticism (carrying settled words across preserves settled meaning, which is precisely why Mirchia still matters) but it does mean the Sanhita is, in places, 1860 prose in a 2023 binding.
Twelve years is a choice the Sanhita did not revisit. The age threshold here is twelve, while the Sanhita's own definition of "child" is eighteen, and Section 97's threshold is ten. We have found no documented reason for retaining twelve. It may be that the figure was simply inherited along with the rest of the words. We flag it as an inherited number rather than a reasoned one, while being clear that we have no evidence either way.
What we checked, and what we could not
Checked and verified. The full text and title of Section 93 against this project's verified inventory and, fragment by fragment, against the Gazette text published by the Ministry of Home Affairs S1S2. The word-level comparison with IPC Section 317 S3. The absence of amendment markers in the IPC text S3. The chapter and sub-heading placement in both codes S2S3. Commencement S4. Four judgments, read in full S5S6S7S8. The absence of any BNSS cross-reference, using a whole-number test S9.
Two method notes, recorded because they affected the work. First, the Gazette prints marginal side-notes interleaved into the running text, so a long fragment tested as a single string will often fail even when the text is correct: for instance, the Gazette reads "with the intention of child under of wholly abandoning such child", with the side-note cutting through the sentence. Every failed test here was re-run in halves and resolved; none revealed a discrepancy S2. Second, the Gazette renders the chapter token as "CHAPTERV", with no space, which silently defeats a scan for a spaced chapter heading; we had to locate Chapter V by its title instead S2.
Not checked. Whether the offence is cognizable or bailable, that is set by the First Schedule to the BNSS, which this project has not examined S9. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which has not been retrieved; all JJ Act content above is the Kerala High Court's reproduction S8. The decisions cited within the judgments we read: XXX and Another v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 7952; Suman Vijay v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5268; Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani; and the "Prema" decision quoted in Ashalatha. None of which was retrieved. Any State amendments to IPC Section 317. Whether other courts have construed Section 93 itself; our searches of the public judgment repository returned results at its ten-item display limit, which means the field was not exhausted and more decisions may exist.
How this article was prepared
This article was prepared by comparing the official text of BNS Section 93 with the official text of IPC Section 317 word by word, verifying the Sanhita text against the Gazette fragment by fragment, and reading in full every judgment relied on. Where a search returned results at the repository's display limit, we say so rather than implying the field was surveyed.
Quotations from statutes are taken from the statutory texts, not from judgments. Quotations from judgments are reproduced as written, including the spelling "sina qua non". Where a judgment's reproduction of a statute differs from the statute, we say so and give the statutory reading.
Documented material, judicial material and our own analysis are kept separate and labelled. Where we do not know something, the article says so instead of filling the gap.
This article was prepared with AI assistance. No lawyer has reviewed this article and no human legal review is claimed. Its status is "ready for human review": ready to be checked by a person, not already checked.
This article does not reproduce or alter any existing content on this website.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Whether the ingredients of this section are made out in any given case, whether any statutory exception or defence applies, and what sentence may follow, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.