What Section 99 says
Section 99 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is titled "Buying child for purposes of prostitution, etc." It reads S1:
Whoever buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of any child with intent that such child shall at any age be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such child will at any age be employed or used for any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1.—Any prostitute or any person keeping or managing a brothel, who buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of a female under the age of eighteen years shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have obtained possession of such female with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution.
Explanation 2.— "Illicit intercourse" has the same meaning as in section 98.
It is the mirror of Section 98: Section 98 is the seller's offence, Section 99 the buyer's. The conduct is buying, hiring or otherwise obtaining possession; the mental element is intent, or knowledge of likelihood; and the purposes are prostitution, illicit intercourse with any person, or any unlawful and immoral purpose S1.
The punishment is where the two part company. Not less than seven years; up to fourteen. The fine is discretionary S1.
Section 99 is the last section under the sub-heading "Of offences against child"; Chapter VI begins immediately after it S2. It came into force on 1 July 2024 S4, and appears in neither list in Section 2(24) S1.
(A) What the documented record shows about the change
Eight differences, and two of them are the real story
Section 99 replaces IPC Section 373, "Buying minor for purposes of prostitution, etc." The word-level comparison returns eight differences S3:
| # | IPC s. 373 | BNS s. 99 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | (no minimum) | "shall not be less than seven years but which" | INSERTED |
| 2 | "may extend to ten years" | "may extend to fourteen years" | RAISED |
| 3 | "person under the age of eighteen years" | "child" | substitution |
| 4–5 | "such person" ×2 | "such child" ×2 | consequential |
| 6–7 | "Explanation I" / "II" | "Explanation 1" / "2" | renumbering |
| 8 | "as in section 372." | "as in section 98." | cross-reference repointed |
Differences 1 and 2 are the only substantive punishment change anywhere in Sections 93 to 99.
The Penal Code punished selling and buying identically. The Sanhita does not.
This is worth stating precisely, because it is easy to get wrong.
| IPC | BNS | |
|---|---|---|
| Selling a child | s. 372: up to 10 years, no minimum | s. 98: up to 10 years, no minimum |
| Buying a child | s. 373: up to 10 years, no minimum | s. 99: 7 to 14 years |
We verified the IPC figures on the body text, not on a table-of-contents match: a precaution that matters, because an earlier lookup in this project's research for this very group matched the contents list instead of the body and returned a false answer on exactly this question S3.
So: for the whole life of the Penal Code, these two offences carried the same punishment. Under the Sanhita, buying a child is punished more severely than selling one. Section 98 has no floor at all, while Section 99 has a seven-year floor and a ceiling four years higher S1S3.
Everything else came across unchanged
The three transaction verbs, the three purposes, the alternative of knowledge, the phrase "at any age", the presumption in Explanation 1 and the definition borrowed by Explanation 2 are all carried over word for word S3.
Note what Explanation 1 does not say. It is confined to a prostitute, or a person keeping or managing a brothel, who obtains possession of a female under eighteen. Outside that pairing there is no presumption. And like its counterpart in Section 98, this Explanation remains gendered inside a section whose operative words were made gender-neutral S1.
Provenance, and the same inherited defect
IPC Section 373 carried an insertion bracket marked 4 around the age wording and a bracket marked 5 before its Explanation. The footnote block for that page reads "4. Subs. by s. 2, ibid., for certain words." and "5. Ins. by s. 4, ibid.", where ibid. refers back to Act 18 of 1924, named at footnote 2. So both are Act 18 of 1924 material: the same amending Act that supplied the corresponding wording in Section 372 S3.
What the 1924 Act replaced is not recorded. The footnotes say only "for certain words", and we make no claim about the earlier wording S3.
IPC Section 373 carried the same internal mismatch as Section 372: its heading said "minor" while its post-1924 body said "person under the age of eighteen years", in a Code with no definition of "minor" at all. The Sanhita resolves it by using "child" in both S3.
No purchase-simpliciter offence
As with Section 98, we checked whether the Sanhita added anything to catch buying a child for money with no proscribed purpose. It did not. Only four sections of the whole Code use the word "consideration", and none concerns buying a person; the nearest provision is Section 145, "Habitual dealing in slaves", which requires habitual dealing S1. The Law Commission of India's recommendation on that gap is set out in our Section 98 article.
(B) Judicial and practical context
The three purposes are disjunctive: illicit intercourse need not involve prostitution
Sunny v. State, High Court of Kerala, 8 August 2011, Bail Appl. Nos. 5786, 5947, 5972, 5999 and 6028 of 2011, K.T. Sankaran J. S5
The applicants were among roughly 150 accused in CBCID Crime No. 111/CR/HHWII/EKM/11, arising out of North Paravoor Police Station Crime No. 346 of 2011, with offences alleged under IPC Sections 366-A, 354, 372, 373, 376(2)(g), 506(i), 342 and 202 read with Section 34, and Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Counsel argued that "unless the girl is employed for prostitution, the procurer is not guilty under Section 373, even if he had sexual intercourse with the girl", meaning that "illicit intercourse" had to be read as part of "prostitution".
The Court rejected that, and set out the structure of the section:
The purposes mentioned in the Section are: (a) prostitution; (b) illicit intercourse; or (c) any unlawful and immoral purpose. To attract Section 373 IPC, it is not always necessary that such intent must be established. It is sufficient if the offender knows it to be likely that such person (victim) will at any age be employed or used for any purpose mentioned in the Section.
The expressions "prostitution" and "illicit intercourse" are not used conjunctively in Section 373, but they are used disjunctively. The "illicit intercourse" within the meaning of Section 373 IPC need not be in the process of prostitution. Even in the absence of prostitution, an illicit intercourse would amount to an offence under Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, provided the other essential conditions are satisfied.
The contrary contention was "absolutely unsustainable", and the argument that Explanation I supported it was "without substance" S5.
The bail applications were dismissed, the Court recording that the petitioners were allegedly rich and influential and that there was a likelihood of witness intimidation and flight S5.
One qualification. This was a bail order. The construction above is careful and reasoned, but it was given in that context and not after a trial. We report it for what it is S5.
Explanation 1: the brothel must be kept at the time possession is obtained
Emperor v. Banubai Ardeshir Irani, Bombay High Court, 17 November 1942 S6
The accused were charged under IPC Sections 373 and 114, under Section 366B, and under Section 5 of the Prevention of Prostitution Act XI of 1923, in respect of a girl named Sarwarbai who was under eighteen. The recited findings included that possession of her was obtained in Iran in 1939, that she was imported into British India on 22 December 1939 while still under eighteen, and that the accused kept a brothel in flats near Shivaji Park between December 1939 and October 1940. A sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 was recorded.
The interest of the case for present purposes lies in the grounds on which the Advocate General's certificate, issued over a year after the conviction, suggested further consideration. Those grounds were that the trial Judge, charging the jury on Explanation I to Section 373, had dealt with importation under Section 366B and obtaining possession under Section 373 together; that he "altogether omitted to tell the jury that the explanation was applicable only in respect of the offence under Section 373"; and that he omitted to tell the jury that
before the presumption mentioned in the explanation could be drawn it was necessary for the jury to find that the accused were keeping a brothel at the time when they obtained possession of the girl…
These are the certified grounds on which further consideration was suggested. They are not holdings of the Court, and we do not report them as such S6. What they show is that the timing point, brothel-keeping contemporaneous with obtaining possession, was understood to be a real requirement of the presumption, and that presumption is now Explanation 1 to Section 99 in the same words.
A judgment served six times over
The Section 373 searches surfaced two further document identifiers for the Karnataka High Court judgment of 27 August 2020: at 108,779 and 108,788 characters, with similarity ratios of 0.9998 and 0.9999 against the reference record and material differences only in the cause titles.
That brings the total to six document identifiers for one judgment: four found while researching Sections 96 and 98, and two more here. All six were counted as one, and none of their content is relied on S7. This is why this project now compares full bodies whenever retrieved lengths cluster.
What we did not find
No retrieved decision construes Section 99 of the Sanhita itself, and none addresses the new seven-year minimum. Searches returned at the repository's ten-item display limit, so the field was not exhausted.
(C) Editorial analysis: clearly labelled as ours
Everything in this part is our own reading. No source is offered beyond the texts already cited.
The asymmetry is the thing to notice, and we cannot explain it. The Penal Code treated the seller and the buyer of a child alike for 164 years. The Sanhita has given the buyer a seven-year floor and a fourteen-year ceiling and left the seller at ten years with no floor at all. One might construct arguments either way (that demand drives the market, or that the seller is often a parent in desperate circumstances) but we have found no documented reason for the choice, and we are not going to supply one. We record the asymmetry as a verified fact about the two texts.
A seven-year floor changes how this section will be used, independently of sentencing. Minimum sentences remove the room a court has to calibrate, and they tend to shift pressure onto charging decisions and onto findings on the ingredients. It is worth remembering what those ingredients are: on Sunny, knowledge of likelihood suffices, and the three purposes are disjunctive, so the section is not narrow. A provision that is relatively easy to bring within and carries a mandatory floor is a different instrument from one that is equally easy to bring within and carries none.
The repointed cross-reference is small and genuinely useful. Explanation 2 used to send the reader to "section 372" and now sends them to "section 98". It is the sort of consequential amendment that is easy to miss in a recodification of 358 sections, and getting it right means the definition of "illicit intercourse" still has somewhere to point. We checked it rather than assume it S1S2.
The gendered Explanation sits oddly, in both sections. The Sanhita went to the trouble of replacing "person under the age of eighteen years" with "child" in the operative words of Sections 98 and 99, and left "a female under the age of eighteen years… her… she" standing in Explanation 1 of each. The presumption therefore operates only in respect of female children. Whether that was deliberate we cannot say; the drafting is at least inconsistent with the choice made two lines above it.
"At any age" remains the widest phrase in the section. It survived unchanged from 1860, and it means the prosecution need not show that the intended use was to begin in childhood at all.
What we checked, and what we could not
Checked and verified. The text and title of Section 99, including both Explanations, against this project's verified inventory and, fragment by fragment, against the Gazette, including the new punishment formula and the repointed cross-reference S1S2. The word-level comparison with IPC Section 373 S3. The IPC punishment figures on body-resolved text rather than a contents-list match S3. Amendment provenance to Act 18 of 1924 by marker-to-block correspondence S3. The heading-versus-body mismatch in IPC Section 373 S3. That the Sanhita contains no purchase-simpliciter offence S1. Commencement S4. Two judgments read in full S5S6. A six-way de-duplication S7. The absence of any BNSS cross-reference, by whole-number test S8.
Not checked. Whether the offence is cognizable or bailable. The BNSS First Schedule has not been examined, and that gap matters more here than elsewhere, because a seven-year minimum has consequences the Schedule governs S8. Act 18 of 1924, not retrieved; short title unverified; what it replaced is not recorded. The Prevention of Prostitution Act XI of 1923 and the Juvenile Justice Act, both named in the retrieved judgments, not retrieved. The outcome in Emperor v. Banubai Ardeshir Irani beyond the certified grounds and the recorded sentence. Whether any court has construed Section 99 or its minimum: on the retrieved record, none has, and the field was not exhausted.
How this article was prepared
This article was prepared by comparing the official text of BNS Section 99 with the official text of IPC Section 373 word by word, verifying the Sanhita text against the Gazette fragment by fragment, confirming the old punishment figures on body-resolved text rather than a contents-list match, establishing amendment provenance by marker-to-block correspondence, and reading in full every judgment relied on.
Where a proposition comes from a bail order, the article says so. Where a proposition comes from an Advocate General's certificate rather than from a court's holding, the article says that too, and does not upgrade it.
Where retrieved documents clustered in length, the bodies were compared before anything was counted, which is how six identifiers for one judgment were reduced to one.
Documented material, judicial material and our own analysis are kept separate and labelled. Where we do not know something, including why the Sanhita made buying more serious than selling, the article says so instead of filling the gap.
This article was prepared with AI assistance. No lawyer has reviewed this article and no human legal review is claimed. Its status is "ready for human review": ready to be checked by a person, not already checked.
This article does not reproduce or alter any existing content on this website.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Whether the ingredients of this section are made out in any given case, whether any statutory exception or defence applies, and what sentence may follow, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.