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BNS Section 96 · Deep dive

BNS Section 96: Three Words Changed, and Boys Became Protected for the First Time Since 1923

BNS Section 96 punishes whoever, by any means whatsoever, INDUCES ANY CHILD to go from any place or to do any act, with intent or knowledge that the child will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with ANOTHER PERSON. Maximum ten years; fine discretionary; no minimum. It replaces IPC Section 366A, and the operative texts differ in exactly THREE places - every one of them about WHO IS PROTECTED. 'Minor girl under the age of eighteen years' becomes 'child', 'girl' becomes 'child', and 'she' becomes 'such child'. The age stays at eighteen, because Section 2(3) defines 'child' as a person below eighteen; what changes is that BOYS ARE NOW PROTECTED, which the IPC provision never did. IPC Section 366A was not part of the 1860 Code at all: the whole section sits inside an insertion bracket, and both the footnote attribution and a 2019 Madhya Pradesh judgment trace it to Amendment Act 20 of 1923, enacted to give effect to Articles of the International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 10 October 2026 23 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 96 — Procuration of child
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 366A — Procuration of minor girl · modified
Side-by-side converterIPC 366A → BNS 96

What Section 96 says

Section 96 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is titled "Procuration of child." It reads in full S1:

Whoever, by any means whatsoever, induces any child to go from any place or to do any act with intent that such child may be, or knowing that it is likely that such child will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

One sentence. No sub-sections, no proviso, no Explanation, no Illustration, no minimum sentence S1.

Three features of the wording are worth fixing in mind at the outset.

The conduct is inducement, nothing more. "By any means whatsoever, induces any child to go from any place or to do any act." No force, no abduction and no deception is required by the words.

The intercourse must be with someone else. The words are "forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person". A person who induces a child for his own purposes is not described by this section S1.

The section does not say "of either description". Most sections in this sub-heading specify "imprisonment of either description"; this one says simply "punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years". So did its IPC predecessor S1S3.

The fine is discretionary, "shall also be liable to fine", in contrast with Section 95 immediately before it, where the fine is mandatory S1.

Section 96 came into force on 1 July 2024 S4. It appears in neither list in Section 2(24) S1.

(A) What the documented record shows about the change

Three changes, and all three are about who is protected

Section 96 replaces IPC Section 366A, "Procuration of minor girl". The word-level comparison returns exactly three differences S3:

IPC s. 366ABNS s. 96
"minor girl under the age of eighteen years""child"
"such girl may be""such child may be"
"knowing that it is likely that she will be""knowing that it is likely that such child will be"

That is the whole of it. Everything else is word for word: "by any means whatsoever", "to go from any place or to do any act", "forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person", the ten-year maximum, the discretionary fine. The title changed too, from "Procuration of minor girl" to "Procuration of child" S3.

What those three words actually do

The age did not change. IPC Section 366A said "minor girl under the age of eighteen years". BNS Section 96 says "child", and Section 2(3) defines "child" as "any person below the age of eighteen years" S1. Eighteen before, eighteen now.

What changed is who counts. IPC Section 366A protected girls only. The word "girl" appears in its text; the word does not appear anywhere in Section 96, which uses "child" three times S1S3.

So the real effect of three small substitutions is that boys are now protected by this section, and they were not protected by its predecessor at any point in its hundred-year life.

The Sanhita solved the same problem twice, two different ways

This is worth noticing because it shows the drafting was not done to a single template.

The companion provision to IPC Section 366A was IPC Section 366B, "Importation of girl from foreign country", which applied to "any girl under the age of twenty-one years" and protected no boys at all S3.

Its Sanhita successor is Section 141, "Importation of girl or boy from foreign country", which reads "any girl under the age of twenty-one years or any boy under the age of eighteen years" S1.

So within one Code: Section 96 gender-neutralised by replacing the gendered phrase with the defined term "child", producing a single age of eighteen. Section 141 gender-neutralised by adding boys alongside girls at a different age (twenty-one for girls, eighteen for boys) and did not use the defined term at all.

IPC Section 366A was not part of the 1860 Code

The whole of IPC Section 366A sits inside an insertion bracket in the published text. The body line begins 2 [366A. Procuration of minor girl.—Whoever ... S3.

Establishing which Act inserted it needed care, because footnote numbering restarts on each printed page and the nearest preceding footnote block belonged to a different page. The method used was marker-to-block correspondence by count, order and content.

The brackets on the Section 366-to-367 span run in the order 1, 2, 3, 4 and enclose, respectively: Section 366's criminal-intimidation limb; the whole of Section 366A; the word "India" in Section 366B; and "or from the State of Jammu and Kashmir" in Section 366B S3.

The footnote block for that page reads:

  1. Ins. by Act 20 of 1923, s. 2.
  2. Ins. by s. 3, ibid.
  3. The words "British India" have successively been subs. by the A. O. 1948, the A. O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and the Sch.
  4. Ins. by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and the Sch., (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
  5. Certain words omitted by s. 3 and the Sch., ibid.

The correspondence is corroborated by content, not merely by position: footnote 3 ("British India" to "India") matches the bracket around "India"; footnote 4 matches the Jammu and Kashmir insertion; footnote 5 matches the omission marked 5*** in Section 366B. With four of five independently fitting, marker 2 can be read with confidence.

Marker 2 is the whole of Section 366A, and footnote 2 is "Ins. by s. 3, ibid", that is, ACT 20 OF 1923, SECTION 3 S3.

The string "Act 20 of 1923" occurs exactly once in the whole India Code IPC text, at footnote 1 of this block S3.

A court has said the same thing, and added the reason

We did not have to rely on the footnote alone. In Babulal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) the High Court recorded S6:

Sections 366A and 366B were inserted by Amendment Act 20 of 1923 in IPC to effect to certain Articles of the International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children. Said sections are intended to punish the export and import of girls for prostitution.

That independently corroborates the attribution and supplies something the footnote does not: a stated purpose. The same judgment adds that Section 366A "deals with procurement of minor girls from one part to another part of the country", while Section 366B covered importation from outside India, and that "The provisions are framed with pious aim to safeguarding public interest of morality than the chastity of a particular woman" S6.

We record this as what the Madhya Pradesh High Court stated about the legislative history. We have not retrieved Act 20 of 1923 itself, and its short title remains unverified in this project.

Numbers and cross-references

The BNSS makes no reference to Section 96 of the Sanhita, tested by whole-number search so the digits could not match inside 196 S8. The collisions are sharp here: BNSS Section 96 concerns when a search warrant may be issued; Section 96 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 concerns language in a document which is on its face ambiguous S8.

(B) Judicial and practical context

Because the operative words are otherwise identical, the construction of IPC Section 366A applies to Section 96, with the single adjustment that "child" has replaced "minor girl".

What has to be proved

Babulal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 26 August 2019, Cr. Appeal No. 1350 of 2017 S6.

The appellants had been convicted on 19 July 2017 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sarangpur, District Rajgarh, in Special Sessions Trial No. 487 of 2015: three years under IPC Section 363, five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000 under Section 366-A, and three years under Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act.

The Court set out five ingredients:

firstly, the accused must induce a girl; secondly, the person induced was a girl under the age of 18 years, thirdly, the accused has induced the victim knowing that it is likely that she will be forced or seduced to an illicit sexual intercourse; fourthly, such intercourse must be with that person other than the accused; fifthly, the inducement caused the girl to go there...

The fourth of those is easy to miss and decisive in practice: the intended intercourse must be with someone other than the accused.

The Court also emphasised the mental element:

The existence of specific intention and knowledge is most important element in the constitution of the offence under section 366A IPC.

And it construed "seduced":

The word 'seduced' used in the section is in the sense of inducement of a woman to submit to illicit intercourse at any time or on any occasion with a person other than the accused.

On the evidence, the Court found no proof that at the time the girl was taken there was an intention that she be used for illicit intercourse with another person. The appellants were therefore acquitted of the Section 366A offence. The convictions under Section 363 and POCSO Sections 7 and 8 were not challenged and stood.

Consent is irrelevant; inducement is everything

Sobhana @ Sandhya v. State of Kerala, High Court of Kerala, 19 December 2025, Crl. Appeal No. 131 of 2016, neutral citation 2025:KER:98740, Bechu Kurian Thomas J. S5

The appellant was the first accused in Sessions Cases 310 and 311 of 2011 before the Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Kollam. She was convicted on 22 December 2015 under IPC Sections 366A and 372 and sentenced to eight years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,00,000 under Section 366A. Every other accused was acquitted.

The case had a grim evidential feature: the victim could not be examined at all, because she had been murdered by her own brother on 31 January 2005, within a year of the incident and before the trial began.

On the construction of Section 366A the Court held:

Section 366A IPC deals with procuration of a minor girl with intent that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person. The said provision is attracted even if the means for procuring her were legal or illegal.

And on willingness:

... even if it is evident that the minor girl was willing, still, the offence gets attracted. Inducing a minor girl to move from place to place or do any act with intent that she will be forced or seduced to have illicit intercourse with another person is the core requirement of the offence.

... Even if the minor girl had willingly accompanied the accused for the purposes mentioned in the provision, still, the offence under section 366A IPC will be attracted, provided there was inducement from the side of the accused. Under Section 366A of IPC, "inducement" without any compulsion or threat or abduction would suffice.

But the Court also marked the limit of the offence:

A mere deviation from the path of virtue by a minor girl would not attract the offence under section 366A IPC. What is relevant to attract the said offence is the inducement to stray from the path of virtue.

And on consent: "as long as the victim was a minor, consent of the victim had no bearing."

Outcome: the Section 372 conviction was set aside; the Section 366A conviction was affirmed. The appeal was allowed in part.

A de-duplication check

Three search results dated 27 August 2020 were 108,798, 108,768 and 108,776 characters long: a cluster close enough to require checking. The bodies were compared: similarity 0.9998, 0.9998 and 0.9999, with material differences only in the cause titles (P. Sandhya; State of Karnataka v. Syed Riyaz Basha; Akbar @ Akbar Basha). These are connected matters decided by one judgment of the Karnataka High Court, served under three document identifiers. They were counted as one, and nothing in them is relied on here beyond this note S7.

This is at least the third occasion in this project on which clustered lengths have signalled a single judgment served under several identifiers, which is why the check is now run whenever lengths cluster.

(C) Editorial analysis: clearly labelled as ours

Everything in this part is our own reading. No source is offered for it beyond the texts already cited.

The three-word change is the largest substantive reform in this sub-heading, and it is the one a mapping table is least likely to record. Nothing about the conduct, the mental element, the maximum or the fine moved at all. What moved is the class of victim, from girls to all children, and that is not a cosmetic change: it brings into the section a category of victim who had no protection under it for the whole of its existence from 1923 to 2024. A table that reports "Same - Up to 10 years" and "Moved to Chapter on Offences against Women/Children" is accurate on both counts and still misses this.

The two drafting techniques sit oddly together. Section 96 uses the defined term "child" and so lands on a single age of eighteen. Section 141, dealing with the same mischief across a border, keeps "girl under twenty-one or boy under eighteen". The result is that a seventeen-year-old boy and a twenty-year-old girl are both protected against importation from abroad, but only the boy is protected against domestic procuration, because a twenty-year-old is not a "child". We make no claim about whether that was intended. We note that the Sanhita had the defined term available in Section 141 and did not use it.

The Babulal ingredient, "intercourse with a person other than the accused", is the quiet trap in this section. It is in the statutory words ("with another person") and it was in the IPC words. It means Section 96 is a procuring offence, aimed at the person who supplies a child to someone else. A person who induces a child for his own purposes falls to be dealt with under other provisions. Anyone reading Section 96 as a general child-sexual-exploitation provision will overstate it.

The Sobhana line of reasoning transfers cleanly, and that matters more than it might seem. Because the only changes are to who is protected, the Kerala High Court's construction, inducement suffices without compulsion or threat; willingness is no answer; but mere deviation from virtue without inducement is not the offence, attaches to Section 96 without adjustment. The new section therefore arrives with a settled meaning already built, which is one of the practical advantages of re-enacting words rather than rewriting them.

The 1923 purpose is now a strange fit with the 2023 text. On the Madhya Pradesh High Court's account, Sections 366A and 366B were enacted to give effect to an international convention about traffic in women and children, and were "intended to punish the export and import of girls for prostitution". The Sanhita has kept the machinery and widened the protected class well beyond what that convention was concerned with. We offer no view on whether the original purpose constrains the new words; we note only that the gap between them has widened.

What we checked, and what we could not

Checked and verified. The text and title of Section 96 against this project's verified inventory and, fragment by fragment, against the Gazette S1S2. The word-level comparison with IPC Section 366A, on a line-scoped extraction from the raw source with a length-band assertion S3. That the whole of Section 366A sits inside an insertion bracket, and the attribution to Act 20 of 1923, Section 3, by marker-to-block correspondence in count, order and content S3. Independent corroboration of that attribution, and a stated purpose, from Babulal S6. The contrast with BNS Section 141 and IPC Section 366B S1S3. Commencement S4. Two judgments read in full, plus a three-way de-duplication check S5S6S7. The absence of any BNSS cross-reference, by whole-number test S8.

Method notes. The line-scoped lookup for Section 366A initially matched nothing, because the body line begins 2 [366A. rather than 366A.. Following this project's rule, the candidates were printed rather than the condition loosened, which located the body occurrence immediately S3. Separately, the Gazette interleaves marginal side-notes into the running text, here it reads "induces any child to go from any place or to child. do any act with intent", so failed single-string tests were re-run in halves; none disclosed a discrepancy S2.

Not checked. Whether the offence is cognizable or bailable, the BNSS First Schedule has not been examined S8. Act 20 of 1923 itself, not retrieved; its short title remains unverified, and the statement of its purpose comes from a judgment, not from the Act. The International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, not retrieved; named only as the Madhya Pradesh High Court named it S6. Bhagwati Prasad v. Emperor, AIR 1929 All 70; Manik Molla v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Cal 432; and Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 1908: cited in Babulal and not retrieved S6. The POCSO Act and the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956: named in the retrieved judgments and not retrieved S5S6. Any judicial construction of Section 96 itself; our searches returned results at the repository's ten-item display limit, so the field was not exhausted.

How this article was prepared

This article was prepared by comparing the official text of BNS Section 96 with the official text of IPC Section 366A word by word, verifying the Sanhita text against the Gazette fragment by fragment, establishing the amending Act by marker-to-block correspondence rather than by proximity, and reading in full every judgment relied on.

Where a provenance attribution rested on footnote numbering, the correspondence was tested by count, order and content, and the article sets out the working so a reader can check it. Where a court supplied legislative history, it is reported as what that court stated, not as verified legislative fact, because the amending Act was not retrieved.

Where search results clustered in length, the bodies were compared before anything was counted.

Documented material, judicial material and our own analysis are kept separate and labelled. Where we do not know something, the article says so instead of filling the gap.

This article was prepared with AI assistance. No lawyer has reviewed this article and no human legal review is claimed. Its status is "ready for human review": ready to be checked by a person, not already checked.

This article does not reproduce or alter any existing content on this website.

Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Whether the ingredients of this section are made out in any given case, whether any statutory exception or defence applies, and what sentence may follow, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 96 provide?
It punishes WHOEVER, BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, INDUCES ANY CHILD to go from any place or to do any act, with intent that the child may be - or knowing it likely that the child will be - FORCED OR SEDUCED TO ILLICIT INTERCOURSE WITH ANOTHER PERSON. Maximum TEN YEARS; fine DISCRETIONARY; no minimum. S1
+Which IPC section does it replace?
Section 366A of the Indian Penal Code, titled 'Procuration of minor girl'. The BNS title is 'Procuration of child'. S3
+What exactly changed in the text?
EXACTLY THREE THINGS, and every one of them is about who is protected: 'minor girl under the age of eighteen years' became 'child'; 'such girl may be' became 'such child may be'; and 'knowing that it is likely that SHE will be' became 'knowing that it is likely that SUCH CHILD will be'. Everything else is word for word. S3
+Did the age limit change?
No. IPC Section 366A said 'minor girl under the age of eighteen years'. Section 96 says 'child', and Section 2(3) defines 'child' as 'any person below the age of eighteen years'. Eighteen before, eighteen now. S1S3
+Then what is the real effect of those three words?
BOYS ARE NOW PROTECTED. IPC Section 366A protected GIRLS ONLY - the word 'girl' is in its text. The word 'girl' does not appear anywhere in Section 96, which uses 'child' three times. A boy had no protection under this provision at any point from 1923 to 2024. S1S3
+Is that the biggest change in this part of the Sanhita?
In our view yes - and it is also the change a mapping table is least likely to record, because nothing about the conduct, the mental element, the maximum or the fine moved at all. That is our assessment, offered as editorial analysis. S1S9
+Was Section 366A part of the original 1860 Penal Code?
No. The WHOLE of Section 366A sits inside an insertion bracket in the published text - the body line begins '2 [366A. Procuration of minor girl.' So the section was added by amendment. S3
+Which Act added it?
ACT 20 OF 1923, SECTION 3. Establishing that took care, because footnote numbering restarts on each printed page, so the nearest preceding footnote block belonged to a different page. We matched the in-text brackets to the footnote block by COUNT, ORDER AND CONTENT: four brackets in the order 1, 2, 3, 4, and a block reading '1. Ins. by Act 20 of 1923, s. 2. / 2. Ins. by s. 3, ibid. / 3. The words British India have successively been subs... / 4. Ins. by Act 3 of 1951...'. Bracket 2 is the whole of Section 366A, so footnote 2 - 'Ins. by s. 3, ibid' - attributes it to Act 20 of 1923, Section 3. S3
+How confident can you be in that attribution?
Reasonably confident, because the correspondence is corroborated by CONTENT and not merely by position: footnote 3 about 'British India' matches the bracket around the word 'India', footnote 4 matches the Jammu and Kashmir insertion, and footnote 5 matches the omission marked in Section 366B. Four of five fit independently. And a court has said the same thing. S3S6
+Which court, and what did it say?
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Babulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) recorded: 'Sections 366A and 366B were inserted by Amendment Act 20 of 1923 in IPC to effect to certain Articles of the International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children. Said sections are intended to punish the export and import of girls for prostitution.' S6
+So you have the legislative purpose?
We have WHAT A COURT STATED about the legislative purpose, which is not the same thing. We have NOT retrieved Act 20 of 1923, and we have NOT retrieved the International Convention. Its short title remains unverified in this project. We report the Court's account and label it as such. S6
+What must the prosecution prove?
The Madhya Pradesh High Court set out five ingredients: (1) the accused must induce the child; (2) the person induced was under eighteen; (3) the accused induced the victim knowing it likely she would be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse; (4) SUCH INTERCOURSE MUST BE WITH A PERSON OTHER THAN THE ACCUSED; and (5) the inducement caused the child to go. The Court added that 'The existence of specific intention and knowledge is most important element'. S6
+That fourth ingredient sounds important. Why?
Because it limits the section sharply, and it is in the statutory words - 'illicit intercourse with ANOTHER person'. Section 96 is a PROCURING offence, aimed at the person who supplies a child to someone else. Someone who induces a child for his own purposes is not described by this section and falls to be dealt with under other provisions. Reading Section 96 as a general child-sexual-exploitation provision overstates it. S1S6
+Does it matter if the child went willingly?
No. In Sobhana @ Sandhya v. State of Kerala (19 December 2025) the Kerala High Court held that 'even if it is evident that the minor girl was willing, still, the offence gets attracted', provided 'there was inducement from the side of the accused' - and that 'as long as the victim was a minor, consent of the victim had no bearing'. S5
+Does the accused have to use force or threats?
No. The same Court held: 'Under Section 366A of IPC, “inducement” without any compulsion or threat or abduction would suffice.' It also held the provision 'is attracted even if the means for procuring her were legal or illegal'. S5
+Is there any limit, then?
Yes, and the Kerala High Court stated it: 'A mere deviation from the path of virtue by a minor girl would not attract the offence under section 366A IPC. What is relevant to attract the said offence is the INDUCEMENT to stray from the path of virtue.' Without inducement by the accused, there is no offence. S5
+What happened in the Kerala case?
The appellant had been convicted in 2015 under IPC Sections 366A and 372 and sentenced to eight years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,00,000 under Section 366A. The Section 372 conviction was SET ASIDE and the Section 366A conviction AFFIRMED; the appeal was allowed in part. A grim feature: the victim could not be examined at all, because she had been murdered by her own brother on 31 January 2005, before the trial began. S5
+And the Madhya Pradesh case?
The appellants had been convicted in 2017 under IPC Section 363, Section 366-A (five years' rigorous imprisonment and a Rs. 3,000 fine) and POCSO Sections 7 and 8. On appeal they were ACQUITTED of the Section 366A offence, because there was no proof of the required intention at the time the girl was taken. The other convictions were not challenged and stood. S6
+Does the Sanhita gender-neutralise consistently?
No, and the inconsistency is easy to demonstrate. Section 96 replaced the gendered phrase with the defined term 'child', giving one age of eighteen. But Section 141 - the successor to IPC Section 366B, importation from a foreign country - reads 'any girl under the age of twenty-one years OR ANY BOY UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS'. Two different techniques for the same problem, inside one Code. S1S3
+Does that inconsistency have a practical consequence?
On our reading, yes. A twenty-year-old woman is protected against importation from abroad under Section 141, but is NOT protected against domestic procuration under Section 96, because a twenty-year-old is not a 'child'. We make no claim about whether that was intended; we note that the defined term was available and was not used in Section 141. This is our analysis, clearly labelled. S1
+Is the fine mandatory under Section 96?
No - it is DISCRETIONARY: 'shall also be liable to fine'. Contrast Section 95 immediately before it, where the fine is mandatory ('and with fine'). Adjacent sections in the same sub-heading take different approaches. S1
+Anything unusual about the punishment wording?
Yes, a small drafting point. Section 96 does NOT say 'imprisonment of either description', which most sections in this sub-heading do. It says simply 'punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years'. Its IPC predecessor was worded the same way, so this is inherited rather than new. S1S3
+Has any court construed Section 96 of the BNS itself?
Not in anything we retrieved. Our searches returned results at the repository's ten-item display limit, which means the field was NOT exhausted and further decisions may exist. What we can say is that because the only changes are to who is protected, the existing construction of Section 366A transfers to Section 96 without adjustment. S5S6
+Is the offence cognizable or bailable?
This article does NOT state that. The classification is set by the First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which this project has not examined. S8
+Does the BNSS mention Section 96 of the BNS?
No - a whole-number search found no reference. The collision here is a sharp one: BNSS Section 96 is about WHEN A SEARCH WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED, and Section 96 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is about language in a document that is on its face ambiguous. S8
+You mention a de-duplication check. What was that?
Three search results dated 27 August 2020 were 108,798, 108,768 and 108,776 characters long - close enough to be suspicious. We compared the full bodies: similarity 0.9998 to 0.9999, differing materially only in the cause titles. They are connected matters decided by ONE Karnataka High Court judgment, served under three document identifiers. We counted them as one. This is at least the third time in this project that clustered lengths have signalled exactly that. S7
+What does this website's own mapping table say?
It maps IPC 366A to BNS 96 with the topic 'Procuration of Girl', punishment 'Same - Up to 10 years' and key difference 'Moved to Chapter on Offences against Women/Children'. The punishment is correct and the chapter observation is correct and useful. But the entry MISSES the extension of protection from girls to all children - and its topic label 'Procuration of Girl' now describes the old law rather than the new. S9

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) - official text of section 96, with sections 2(3), 2(24) and 141, as held in this project's verified section inventory drawn from India Code (accessed 10 October 2026)
  2. S2The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Gazette of India text published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (PDF) (accessed 10 October 2026)
  3. S3The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860) - official text at India Code, used for the section 366A comparison (accessed 10 October 2026)
  4. S4Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 bringing the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 into force (accessed 10 October 2026)
  5. S5Sobhana @ Sandhya v. State of Kerala, High Court of Kerala, 19 December 2025, Crl. Appeal No. 131 of 2016, neutral citation 2025:KER:98740, Bechu Kurian Thomas J. - full text as served by Indian Kanoon (accessed 10 October 2026)
  6. S6Babulal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 26 August 2019, Cr. Appeal No. 1350 of 2017 - full text as served by Indian Kanoon (accessed 10 October 2026)
  7. S7Karnataka High Court judgment of 27 August 2020 served by Indian Kanoon under three separate document identifiers with differing cause titles - P. Sandhya D/o Satyababu v. The State by Circle Inspector of Police; State of Karnataka v. Syed Riyaz Basha; and Akbar @ Akbar Basha v. The State of Karnataka (accessed 10 October 2026)
  8. S8The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023) - Gazette text published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (PDF) (accessed 10 October 2026)
  9. S9ipc2bns.in IPC-to-BNS mapping dataset (this website's own existing comparison table) - treated as secondary commentary, never relied on as authority (accessed 10 October 2026)

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