A note on what this article is. This is a research-and-verification write-up of a single section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Every statutory quotation below was tested against a primary source before it was written down, and every test that failed or that I framed badly is disclosed. It separates (A) what the statute says, (B) what retrieved courts have said, and (C) clearly-labelled editorial observation. It is not legal advice.
1. The section, in full
BNS Section 83 is titled "Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage." Its text reads S1:
"Whoever, dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention, goes through the ceremony of being married, knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
That is the whole section. It has no sub-sections, no clauses, no proviso, no Explanation, no Exception and no illustration: all verified by structural scan S1.
It sits in Chapter V, under the sub-heading "Of offences relating to marriage". That placement was verified by an index-bounded containment test on the Gazette text rather than by the mere presence of a heading somewhere nearby S2.
Commencement. Section 83 came into force on 1 July 2024, with the rest of the Sanhita save one provision, by notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 S5.
2. The comparison with the Penal Code: the operative text is word-for-word identical
Section 83 corresponds to IPC Section 496, which carried the identical title "Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage" S3.
I ran a word-level comparison of the two operative sentences, not a loose impression, but a token-by-token sequence match. The result:
ZERO differences. Not one token.
A direct title comparison was also run. The titles are identical, character for character.
So on the text, BNS Section 83 reproduces IPC Section 496 exactly, and only its number changed: 496 became 83. Classification: renumbered and substantively_unchanged.
How that extract was taken, and why it matters. The Penal Code slice was taken by scanning the raw source line by line, requiring the section's title and words from its body to appear on the same line, and the length of the resulting slice was printed and asserted before any comparison was made. That discipline exists because the Penal Code source contains a table of contents in which every section title appears a second time: a naive search for a heading has matched the table-of-contents entry five times in this project, once producing an 83-character fragment that would have supported a false conclusion. Here the slice came out at 355 characters against the Sanhita's 281 (the difference being the title and section number, which the Sanhita inventory stores separately) S3.
3. Provenance: Section 496 appears on the face of the Penal Code as enacted
Since s. 74 of this collection, a recurring finding has been that an apparent Sanhita reform is often much older law. So the question is always asked: was IPC 496 ever amended?
Section 496 carries no inline footnote marker: a check for the markers the Penal Code uses to signal substituted or inserted text returned none within the section S3.
A caution on what that does and does not establish. It establishes that the published consolidated text I examined records no amendment inside this section. It does not establish that no amending Act ever touched it. No amending Act has been retrieved in this project at any point, and no legislative history of Section 496 was traced.
With that caveat: the amendment-provenance run remains broken for a third consecutive section. Sections 81, 82 and 83 all appear, on the published text, to carry wording of 1860. That stands in contrast to Sections 63–80, where almost every apparent Sanhita change turned out to be the work of an earlier amending Act.
4. The change that is NOT in Section 83's own words
Here is the substantive finding on this section, and it is not in Section 83 at all.
Section 83 contains exactly one pronoun: the word "he", in the phrase "knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married". A pronoun scan confirms it: one occurrence of "he", and no occurrence of "she", "his" or "her" S1.
That pronoun is not self-interpreting. It is governed by the Code's general gender clause. And that clause has changed.
| Text | |
|---|---|
| IPC s. 8, "Gender" | "The pronoun 'he' and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female." S5 |
| BNS s. 2(10), "gender" | "The pronoun 'he' and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male, female or transgender." S4 |
Both were verified directly, and both controls behaved correctly: the phrase "whether male or female" appears nowhere in the Gazette text of the Sanhita, and the phrase "whether male, female or transgender" appears nowhere in the Penal Code S2S3S4.
BNS s. 2(10) carries an Explanation: "'transgender' shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (k) of section 2 of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 (40 of 2019)." S4
A correction disclosed. An earlier draft of this article stated that the 2019 Act "was not retrieved" and declined to say what clause (k) provides. That was wrong, and the fault was mine: I made a negative claim about this project's own material without checking it. A search of the collection's existing articles shows that Section 2 of the 2019 Act was retrieved earlier in this collection and its clause (k) was set out there S10. The statement has been corrected and the source added. This is the same error class as the one disclosed at Section 79 of this collection, where a negative claim about a dataset was made without searching it, and the rule has now been generalised: before writing any negative about what this project has or has not retrieved, search the project's own articles.
What clause (k) provides. Section 2(k) of the 2019 Act defines "transgender person" as a person whose gender does not match the gender assigned at birth, including a trans-man or trans-woman whether or not they have undergone surgery or therapy, persons with intersex variations, genderqueer persons, and persons having socio-cultural identities such as kinner, hijra, aravani and jogta S10.
And a drafting point that follows from it, worth stating precisely. Clause (k) defines the composite expression "transgender person". BNS s. 2(10) borrows that meaning for the single word "transgender" S4S10. What, if anything, turns on that mismatch is not analysed here. No authority on it was located.
A further verified fact: the word "transgender" appears in only one section of the entire Sanhita: Section 2. A scan of all 358 inventory entries returned Section 2 and nothing else S4.
(C) Editorial observation, clearly labelled as such. The pattern here is one this collection has met before in a different form. At Section 80 the finding was that not a single word changed, but the section moved chapters. The provision was constant and its surroundings moved. Section 83 is the same shape of finding one level down: the provision is constant and the interpretation clause that reads its only pronoun has been widened. What follows from that for Section 83 is left open. No decision construing the widened gender clause was located, no retrieved order mentions it, and this article applies no rule of construction and predicts no outcome.
5. The ingredients, on the words
Reading the section as it stands, and this itemisation is the author's reading, not a judicial formulation:
- The accused goes through the ceremony of being married;
- doing so dishonestly, or with a fraudulent intention; and
- knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married.
Two of those words are defined terms, and there is a wrinkle worth stating precisely.
"dishonestly" is defined in BNS s. 2(7): "'dishonestly' means doing anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person." S4 The Penal Code's counterpart, s. 24, said: "Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing 'dishonestly'." S5 A verbatim test confirmed the Sanhita's wording does not appear in the Penal Code S5. The form was recast from a "whoever … is said to" construction into a "means" definition. Whether anything turns on that recasting is not analysed here.
"fraudulently" is defined in BNS s. 2(9): "'fraudulently' means doing anything with the intention to defraud but not otherwise." S4 The Penal Code's s. 25 read: "A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise." S5: "intent" in the Penal Code, "intention" in the Sanhita.
The wrinkle. Section 83 does not use the defined adverb "fraudulently". It uses the phrase "with a fraudulent intention". Whether the s. 2(9) definition of the adverb governs that adjectival phrase is a question this article does not answer. It is recorded as an observation about the text and nothing more.
Punishment. Imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and a fine which the section makes mandatory ("shall also be liable to fine"). A minimum-sentence control was run and correctly returned nothing: the words "not be less than", "shall not be less", "rigorous" and "minimum" are all absent from Section 83 S1. There is no minimum. "Either description" takes its meaning from BNS s. 4(c), under which imprisonment is of two descriptions: rigorous, that is, with hard labour, and simple S4.
The seven-year maximum is the same as Section 82(1), the bigamy provision immediately preceding it S1.
Meaning of "offence" in this section. Section 83 appears in neither of the two lists in BNS s. 2(24), verified by direct token test S4. The narrow default therefore applies: within this section "offence" means a thing made punishable by the Sanhita itself, not an act punishable under a special or local law.
5A. A procedural bar that governs this section, and it is not in the Sanhita
Section 83 cannot be taken cognizance of on anyone's complaint. This was omitted from an earlier draft of this article and has been added; a check confirmed that no article in this collection had previously covered the provision.
BNSS Section 219(1), under the marginal note "Prosecution for offences … marriage", provides S11:
"No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 81 to 84 (both inclusive) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence…"
Section 83 falls squarely inside that range.
A quotation-integrity note. That sentence had to be quoted in two halves, because the marginal note is printed inside it. The raw Gazette text reads "sections 81 to Prosecution for offences 84 (both inclusive)". Both halves were verified separately S11. A control confirmed the range is what it appears to be: the string "sections 81 to 85" appears nowhere in the BNSS S11.
Section 219(1) carries three provisos, on the words S11: (a) where the aggrieved person is a child, is of unsound mind, has intellectual disability requiring higher support needs, is unable to complain through sickness or infirmity, or is a woman who by local customs and manners ought not to be compelled to appear in public, another person may complain with the leave of the Court; (b) where the aggrieved person is a husband serving in the Armed Forces under conditions certified by his Commanding Officer as precluding leave, an authorised person may complain on his behalf; and (c) where the person aggrieved by an offence under Section 82 is the wife, named relatives may complain for her.
Two limits, both verified and both important:
- Proviso (c) names Section 82 only, not Section 83: confirmed by a control on its wording S11.
- Section 219(2), which restricts "aggrieved" to the husband of the woman, is expressly confined to Section 84, not Section 83 S11.
Compounding. The Table in BNSS s. 359(1) lists offences compoundable by named persons. Section 83 does not appear in the portion of that Table examined S11. That is stated as a limit on what was examined, not as a finding that the offence is non-compoundable. The Table was not read in full, and the First Schedule to the BNSS, which governs whether an offence is cognizable or bailable, was not examined at all.
(C) Editorial observation. These provisions are recorded, not construed. In particular, this article does not analyse how the complaint requirement interacts with the police-registered FIR and charge-sheet in Shumar Ali below, in which the proceedings originated in an FIR rather than a complaint. Neither retrieved order addresses the point, and nothing is inferred from it.
6. What the courts have said
Three matters were retrieved in which Section 83 appears. One construes it. Two do not.
6.1 Shumar Ali v. The State of Assam and Anr: Gauhati High Court, 5 June 2026
Gauhati High Court (High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh), Crl.Pet./1620/2025, GAHC010282592025, Mridul Kumar Kalita J., order dated 05.06.2026 S6.
A criminal petition under BNSS s. 528 sought quashing of PR Case No. 1071/2025, instituted on a charge-sheet under Section 82(2)/83 of the BNS, 2023. The FIR of 04.08.2025 had been registered under "Sections 85/318(4)/82(2)/83/49 of the BNS, 2023"; the informant had earlier lodged a separate FIR against the same petitioner under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which the order records as still pending S6.
The Court set out Sections 82 and 83 in full, and its quotation of Section 83 is word-for-word the official text. I verified this by extracting the Court's quoted text and running a word-level comparison against the official section: 281 characters against 281, zero differences S1S6. The Court's rendering of the title is also identical.
A defect in my own verification, disclosed. My first attempt at that control reported a mismatch. The cause was my test, not the source: the page marker "Page No.# 7/13" falls inside the Court's quotation, between "Whoever," and "dishonestly", and the fragment I had assembled to work around it silently dropped the opening word "Whoever,". The comparison was therefore between 273 words and 281 and was guaranteed to fail. Re-framed (marker excised, full sentence reconstructed) it passed cleanly. This is the second time in this collection that a badly-framed control of mine produced a false signal, the other being at Section 76.
The construction of Section 83. In paragraph 14 the Court said S6:
"For commission of offence under Section 83 knowingly performing the ceremony of an illegal marriage is a pre-requisite, which also indicates that the marriage in question has to be illegal marriage for whatsoever reason."
This is the first retrieved judicial construction of Section 83 in this collection. Two observations, both strictly limited:
- The Court's paraphrase speaks of an "illegal marriage". Section 83's own words are "knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married". The two formulations are reproduced here as found; this article does not treat them as equivalent, does not treat them as different, and draws no conclusion from the difference in wording.
- The reasoning is expressly tied to the facts of a Muslim male's second marriage, and the Court's conclusion on Section 83 was reached "for the same reasons" as its conclusion on Section 82: namely that "his second marriage is not an illegal marriage under the personal law applicable to a Muslim male" S6.
Outcome: the proceedings of PR Case No. 1071/2025 were quashed and the criminal petition was allowed S6.
A finding that bears on the Section 82 article in this collection. In the same paragraph the Court held: "commission of offence under Section 82(1) of the BNS, 2023 is a pre-requisite for fulfilling the ingredients of offence under Section 82(2) of the BNS, 2023" S6. The Section 82 article in this collection left open, as its principal item for human review, whether the Exception, reworded in the Sanhita from "This section" to "This sub-section", reaches sub-section (2); and it recorded that sub-section (2) is itself defined as committing "the offence under sub-section (1)". This passage is directly relevant to that question and has been logged as a corrective action on that article. It is not treated here as deciding the point: the Court was addressing whether sub-s (2) could stand where sub-s (1) was not attracted, not the reach of the Exception.
Independent corroboration of a Gazette reading. The Court's quotation of Section 82 renders the Exception as "This sub-section does not extend…" and the aggravated limb as "Whoever commits the offence under sub-section (1)…": both verified present in the order S6. These were the two textual changes the Section 82 article identified from the Gazette, and they are now corroborated from an independent source.
Authorities cited inside the order but NOT retrieved. The order discusses or quotes: Kalim Shaikh Munaf and Others v. The State of Maharashtra (cited as 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 12036); A.S. Nazar v. Jissa (cited as 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 17001); Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah (cited as (2001) 3 SCC 13); Venugopal K. v. Union of India (cited as 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 798); and Lilly Thomas v. Union of India (cited as (2000) 6 SCC 224). None of these was retrieved. They are listed because the order relies on them, and no proposition in this article rests on any of them. All of that discussion concerns IPC Section 494, not Section 83.
Renderings in the quoted material, reproduced as found. Within the passages the order quotes from other courts, the Latin phrase appears in three different spellings: "sine qua non", "sina qua non" and "sin qua non"; one quoted passage carries an interpolated "(SIC)"; one quoted Supreme Court passage sets a clause from Section 494 in capitals; and "pari-materia" and "sub-section" each appear broken across a space. These are reproduced as found and nothing is inferred from them. A word-duplication scan of the order returned zero artefacts, so the text as extracted is clean S6.
6.2 Nageshwar Thakur v. The State of Bihar: Patna High Court, 25 February 2026
Patna High Court, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 9081 of 2026, Shailendra Singh J., oral order dated 25-02-2026 S7.
An anticipatory bail application by five relatives of the informant's husband. The FIR: Jhajha P.S. Case No. 508 of 2025 dated 23.10.2025: was "registered for the offences punishable under Sections 81 and 83 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" S7.
Counsel submitted that the father-in-law, sister-in-law and mother-in-law had been accused "mainly on account of being relatives" of the husband, that the FIR's "main grievance and allegation … is against her husband only", and that "the alleged offences under Sections 81 and 83 of the BNS … do not even prima facie attract against the petitioners" S7. The application was dismissed as withdrawn for two petitioners who had been arrested, and anticipatory bail was granted to the remaining three on bonds of Rs. 20,000 each with two sureties, "subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 482(2) of the BNSS" S7.
This order construes no ingredient of Section 83. The quoted submission is counsel's, recorded by the Court, and the Court's own conclusion is expressed as "a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail" on the facts. It does not rule on whether the sections are attracted. A duplication scan returned zero artefacts S7.
6.3 Mayaram Nautiyal v. State of Uttarakhand: Uttarakhand High Court, 28 July 2026
Uttarakhand High Court, WPCRL/1436/2026, UKHC010129062026, Alok Mahra J., order dated 28-07-2026 S8.
A criminal writ petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 0201 of 2026 dated 12.07.2026, registered "under Sections 115(2), 316(1), 318(4), 351(3), 352, 64, 81, 82 and 83 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023" S8. The allegation recorded is that the petitioner's son "by playing fraud upon the complainant and concealing the fact that he had a subsisting marriage with another woman, solemnized marriage with the complainant" S8.
The Court formed a prima facie opinion that "the matter requires consideration", issued notice, and directed as an interim measure that the petitioner not be arrested provided he cooperates with the investigation S8.
This order construes no ingredient of Section 83, and it is interlocutory. The petition was not decided. A duplication scan returned zero artefacts S8.
6.4 A factual pattern across these three, and what it is not
In all three retrieved matters, Section 83 is charged alongside Section 81 or Section 82: never on its own. In Shumar Ali with 82(2); in Nageshwar Thakur with 81; in Mayaram Nautiyal with 81 and 82 together.
(C) This is recorded as a fact about these three matters and is expressly NOT offered as a generalisation. Three matters are not a survey. The search position is set out in section 8 below, and the field was not exhausted in every formulation tried.
7. What the Penal Code position was, and what has not been examined
Penal Code case law on Section 496 was NOT surveyed. No decision construing IPC Section 496 was retrieved. This matters, because a section whose words are unchanged carries its predecessor's case law with it, and that body of law is simply outside what this article examined.
The three retrieved matters are all post-commencement and all concern the Sanhita.
A separate, verified observation about this sub-heading. The word "adultery" appears nowhere in the Gazette text of the Sanhita, as does neither "Adultery" nor the Penal Code's formula "sexual intercourse with the wife of another": all three tested directly S2. The Penal Code's adultery provision therefore has no counterpart in the Sanhita. That is stated here as a verified fact about the text and nothing more. The reasons for it, and the decision commonly associated with it, are not discussed: the relevant judgment was not retrieved, and the omission of IPC 497 belongs to a different article in this collection, not to Section 83.
8. Search position: stated honestly
Searches were run on a judgment-text repository, with nil-detection and result-limit detection on every query. The repository displays a maximum of ten results, so a query returning ten means the field was not surveyed; a query returning fewer than ten is exhausted for that exact query only.
| Query | Entries | Status |
|---|---|---|
| section 83 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita marriage ceremony fraudulently | 5 | exhausted for this query |
| "83 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" marriage | 2 | exhausted for this query |
| "section 83 of BNS" marriage ceremony | 1 | exhausted for this query |
| "marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through" Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita | 1 | exhausted for this query |
| "Section 83 BNS" bigamy marriage | 0 (nil) | exhausted for this query |
| BNS 83 IPC 496 fraudulent marriage ceremony FIR | 2 | exhausted for this query |
No query returned ten. Abbreviated formulations were run as well as long-form ones, because a nil on a long phrase is not evidence that no case exists. Even so, this is not a complete survey of the field, and official court portals were not used: the judgment texts come from a repository, not from an official reporter.
A number-collision warning that matters here. A provision numbered 83 exists in all three of the new Acts: BNS s. 83 (this section), BNSS s. 83 (which on its opening words concerns an Executive Magistrate, District Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police) and BSA s. 83 (which concerns a presumption as to the genuineness of certain printed or published books) S1. An abbreviated reference to "section 83" in any document may mean any of the three. Check the subject matter before relying on such a reference.
9. The live site's existing IPC→BNS dataset
The dataset used by this website maps IPC 496 → BNS 83 and describes the section as "Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage", with punishmentChange: "Same - Up to 7 years" and keyDifference: "No major change" S9.
On what it addresses, it is correct. The mapping is right, the punishment is right, and "no major change" is an accurate description of the operative text, which this article's word-level comparison found identical to the token.
It is silent on the gender clause: the one substantive movement affecting how this section reads, discussed in section 4 above. That is not an error in the entry; it is outside the scope of a one-line mapping table.
This is the fourteenth distinct outcome recorded for that dataset in this collection, and one of the better ones. The dataset is treated throughout as secondary commentary and is never relied on as authority.
10. Verification record for this section
- Official text: length and sentence-boundary check run; 281 characters, ends at a full stop; extraction-defect scan returned none S1.
- Gazette cross-check: run fragment by fragment. One fragment returned False: "the ceremony of being married". This was not a discrepancy. Inspection of the raw Gazette window showed the marginal note interleaved mid-sentence: "…goes through the ceremony Marriage of being married…". Verified in halves, both present S2. A Gazette-side string test returning False is never, on its own, treated as evidence of a discrepancy in this project.
- Penal Code slice: taken line-by-line on the raw source requiring body words on the same line; length printed and asserted (355 characters) before comparison S3.
- Word-level diff: zero differences. Title comparison: identical.
- Footnote-marker check: run before any footnote was attributed, per the rule adopted at Section 82. None found in Section 496 S3.
- Controls designed to fail, which correctly failed: Section 83 contains no "electronic", no "void", no "Exception", no "husband or wife", and no minimum-sentence language S1.
- Controls on the gender clause, both correctly negative: the old wording absent from the Gazette, the new wording absent from the Penal Code S2S3S4.
- Chapter containment: verified index-bounded on both texts, not by mere heading proximity S2S3.
- Judgment quotations: tested for page-marker spanning before being quoted; the Shumar Ali quotation of Section 83 required reconstruction across "Page No.# 7/13" S6.
- Duplication scans: zero artefacts in all three orders S6S7S8.
- One control of mine was badly framed and produced a false mismatch; it is disclosed in section 6.1 and was re-framed before anything was written.
11. Open questions and what was not done
These are recorded so that a reader knows the limits of this article:
- What the widened gender clause does for Section 83 is LEFT OPEN. No authority located.
- Whether BNS s. 2(9) governs the phrase "a fraudulent intention" (as against the adverb "fraudulently") is not answered.
- "Goes through the ceremony of being married" is not construed: what suffices as a ceremony, and whose law determines it, were not examined.
- The relationship between Section 83 and Section 82 is not analysed; Shumar Ali decided Section 83 "for the same reasons" as Section 82 on its own facts.
- Penal Code case law on Section 496 was not surveyed.
- What turns on clause (k) defining the composite expression "transgender person" while BNS s. 2(10) borrows it for the single word "transgender" is NOT analysed. No authority located.
- No amending Act has been retrieved in this project; Section 496's legislative history was not traced.
- Whether this offence is cognizable or bailable is NOT stated: that depends on the First Schedule to the BNSS, which was not examined. Section 83 does not appear in the portion of the BNSS s. 359(1) compounding Table examined, which is a limit on the examination and not a finding of non-compoundability.
- BNSS ss. 219 and 359 are recorded, not construed, and this article does not analyse how the complaint requirement in s. 219(1) interacts with proceedings that originated in an FIR, as Shumar Ali's did.
- A correction was made to this article after first publication of the draft: see section 4. An earlier draft wrongly asserted that the 2019 Act had not been retrieved.
- State amendments were not examined.
- Section 83's interaction with personal law, and with the Assam Compulsory Registration of Muslim Marriages and Divorces Act, 2024 (mentioned in Shumar Ali but not retrieved), is not analysed.
12. How this article was prepared
This article was prepared with AI assistance. Statutory text was verified against the official Gazette text and the India Code repository; judgments were obtained from a judgment-text repository and each quotation was tested against the saved page before use. Research notes and the verification record are kept separate from this article, in the project's review files.
No lawyer has reviewed this article and no human legal review is claimed. Its review status is "ready for human review", which means exactly that: it is ready to be checked by a person, not that it has been. Nothing here is a prediction of how any court will decide anything.
This article does not reproduce or alter any existing content on this website.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Whether the ingredients of Section 83 are made out in any given case, what effect the widened gender clause has, and what sentence may follow, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.