A note on this article. As with Sections 63 to 81, this article keeps to a clinical legal register, contains no invented factual scenarios, and does not recount the facts of the cases it cites.
Source check applied, following the truncation found at Section 72: the machine-readable copy of Section 82 is 1,316 characters and ends at a sentence boundary, and it carries both sub-sections and the Exception. No truncation. Confirmed against the Gazette fragment by fragment: six fragments, all passing. S1S2
What the section says
Section 82 carries the marginal-note title Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife. S1S2
82. (1) Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception.— This sub-section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge.
(2) Whoever commits the offence under sub-section (1) having concealed from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted, the fact of the former marriage, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Three structural features worth naming.
First, Section 82 carries an EXCEPTION: the first in this chapter. On its words it has three limbs: a marriage declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction; and, for the absence limb, seven years' continual absence and the person not having been heard of as alive within that time, subject to the proviso that the person informs the other party of the real state of facts before the subsequent marriage. (That itemisation is the author's reading of the text. The Exception is NOT construed here.)
Second, sub-section (2) is an aggravated form, not a separate offence on the face of it: it punishes whoever "commits the offence under sub-section (1)" with the added element of concealment of the former marriage, and raises the maximum from seven to ten years.
Third, neither sub-section has a minimum, and the fine is mandatory in both.
Section 82 is not in the Section 2(24)(a) or 2(24)(b) lists, so "offence" bears the Sanhita's narrow default meaning. Checked with the project's probe. S1
⭐ What changed: two Penal Code sections became one
Section 82 consolidates IPC Section 494 and IPC Section 495. S1S4
| IPC Section 494 (Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife) + its Exception | → Section 82(1) + the Exception |
| IPC Section 495 (Same offence with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted) | → Section 82(2) |
IPC Section 495's separate title has disappeared. A check confirmed the words "Same offence with concealment" do not appear anywhere in the Gazette text of the Sanhita: Section 82 carries only Section 494's title, and the concealment offence now sits inside it without a heading of its own. S2S4
Classification for this collection: consolidated.
Two word-level comparisons were run, and between them they produced three tokens.
Comparison A: IPC Section 494 (operative sentence and Exception) against Section 82(1) and the Exception: produced two tokens: S4
- "(1)" was inserted: the sub-section number, a necessary consequence of the consolidation.
- ⭐ The Exception's opening changed: "This SECTION does not extend…" became "This SUB-SECTION does not extend…".
Comparison B, IPC Section 495 against Section 82(2), produced one token: S4
- The cross-reference was re-pointed: "the offence DEFINED IN THE LAST PRECEDING SECTION" became "the offence UNDER SUB-SECTION (1)". That too follows necessarily from the consolidation. There is no longer a "last preceding section" to point to.
Everything else is word for word: the acts, the voidness formula, all three limbs of the Exception, the seven-year maximum, the ten-year maximum and both mandatory fines. Four controls confirmed the direction in both texts. S1S4
⭐ The one change that is not merely consequential, and it is left open
Of the three tokens, two are bookkeeping. The second one is not.
Under the Penal Code the Exception applied to "this section", that is, to Section 494 as a whole. In the Sanhita it applies to "this sub-section": on its face, to sub-section (1) only.
On the words, the Exception therefore no longer expressly reaches sub-section (2). But the point is not straightforward, and this article does not resolve it: sub-section (2) is itself defined as committing "the offence under sub-section (1)", so there is a question whether the Exception operates through that definition in any event.
THIS ARTICLE EXPRESSLY LEAVES THAT OPEN. It does not state which reading is correct, does not apply any rule of construction, and does not suggest what a court would hold. No decision on the point was located, and neither retrieved order addresses it. (The identification of the question is the author's.)
It is the second time in this chapter that the Sanhita has used "this sub-section" where the reach of an ancillary provision is in issue: the other being the Explanation at Section 80. Nothing is inferred from the pair; it is recorded because a reader working through the chapter will meet the same wording twice.
⚠️ Provenance: two page-footnotes that do NOT belong to these sections
This check changed what this article says, and it is set out because the trap is easy to fall into.
In the India Code text, two footnotes are printed between IPC Section 494's operative sentence and its Exception: a page-break artefact. They read: "Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, s. 117 and the Sch., for 'transportation for life' (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)" and "Ins. by Act 6 of 1943, s. 2." S4
Neither is attributable to Section 494 or Section 495. A check confirmed that neither section carries any inline footnote marker in the text as published. The first footnote also refers to replacing the words "transportation for life", which appear nowhere in either section. Both footnotes therefore belong to markers elsewhere on the page, and this article makes no claim about which provisions they attach to. S4
So the provenance run remains broken. As at Section 81, no amendment is recorded within either section as published, and their content appears to be original Penal Code material. That is the limit of what was verified: this article has NOT traced the legislative history of Section 494 or Section 495, has NOT checked amending Acts against them, and does NOT claim that either was never amended. Act 26 of 1955 and Act 6 of 1943 are named only because the footnotes name them, and nothing is said about what either Act did.
A quick mapping table, and this time it caught the structure
The secondary compilation consulted for this collection carries two entries here. One maps IPC Section 494 → Section 82 with "Same — Up to 7 years"; the other maps IPC Section 495 → Section "82(2)" with "Same — Up to 10 years". Both record the key difference as "No major change". S8
On the punishments both are right. And by mapping Section 495 to "82(2)" rather than to a section number, the compilation has captured the consolidation: the structural point of this section. That deserves saying, as it did at Section 80.
On "No major change" it misses the two wording changes: the Exception's narrowed reach and the re-pointed cross-reference. Whether either is "major" is not something this article decides; the first is flagged above as an open question precisely because it may matter.
(Running record on this dataset: Section 70 understated; 71 matched; 72 supplied a point this collection had missed; 73 has no entry; 74 and 79 misattributed the timing; 75 flattened the structure; 76 and 81 recorded no change where there was one; 77, 78 and 79 stated a "key difference" that was not a change; 80 was right and added something; 82 captures the structure but is blind to the wording.)
Case law
Two of the three searches returned results BELOW the apparent display limit of 10 and are therefore exhausted for those queries: 6 entries and 4 entries. The third returned 10 and is not exhausted. S9 Two orders were retrieved.
A caution first: BNSS Section 82 concerns the procedure when a warrant of arrest is executed outside the district in which it was issued, and BSA Section 82 concerns a presumption as to maps or plans, so subject matter must be checked. S5S6
Manpreet Singh Bhatia v. State of U.P.
Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, 29 July 2026, neutral citation 2026:AHC-LKO:51604, Subhash Vidyarthi J. A criminal revision against a summoning order. S7
Section 82 is summoned upon BY SUB-SECTION. The order records that the trial court "summoned the revisionist to face trial for the offence under Section 82(1) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita". Taken with "75(2)", "75(1)(iv)" and "80(2)" recorded earlier in this chapter, this is a fourth instance of proceedings framed below section level. (That observation is the author's.)
The order quotes a Coordinate Bench on what bigamy requires: reproduced as the High Court reproduced it, and attributed to that Coordinate Bench, not to this Court's own reasoning:
"8. It is well settled that, in order to constitute an offence of bigamy, the complainant must prima facie establish that the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first valid marriage and that the essential ceremonies of such marriage were performed. In the absence of specific averments regarding the date, place, and performance of essential marriage rites, a mere allegation of second marriage is insufficient to justify summoning the accused…"
It also quotes the Supreme Court, in a passage on the predecessor provision's central word:
"9. The expression 'whoever......marries' mentioned in Section 494 of I.P.C. must mean 'whoever.....marries validly' or 'whoever......marries and whose marriage is a valid one if the marriage is not a valid one, according to law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during life of the husband or wife of the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law."
⚠️ Three cautions on that passage, all material. First, it is quoted here as the High Court quoted it, attributed to Madhavrao Jivajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692. That judgment was NOT retrieved, its citation was not verified, and nothing is said about its full reasoning, its facts, or its present standing. Second, the passage as extracted contains unbalanced quotation marks and a run-on clause; it is reproduced as found rather than tidied, and no normalisation is implied. Third, it addresses IPC Section 494, whose operative words are identical to Section 82(1): but this article does not state that the proposition applies to Section 82, and expresses no view on it. S7
Outcome. The Court held that the trial court "has not committed any error or illegality in summoning the revisionist to face trial for the offence under Section 82(1) of BNS", and "the revision lacks merit and the same is dismissed at the admission stage". It then expressly ring-fenced its own observations: "the observations made in this order while examining the validity of the summoning order will not be taken into consideration during the trial, which shall be decided on its own merits, on the basis of evidence led during the trial." S7
That last sentence is why nothing further is taken from this order. The facts are not recounted; the Court's reasoning on the material before it is not reproduced; the reference it makes to "Section 58 of the Evidence Act" is recorded as found and named only, with no conclusion drawn; no view is expressed on whether the order is correct; and its weight as precedent is not stated.
Sudeshna Bhattacharya v. The State of West Bengal and Others
Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side), 18 June 2026, Saugata Bhattacharyya J. S7
Cited for one narrow point: a litigant asked for Section 82 to be ADDED to an existing prosecution. The order records a criminal prosecution registered "under Sections 85/316(2)/3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023", the petitioner's contention "that there is allegation of bigamy requiring addition of Section 82 of BNS, 2023", and the prayer "to direct the investigating agency to add Section 82 of BNS to the aforesaid criminal prosecution". The writ petition was disposed of with an observation referring to Section 193(9) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. S7
Nothing else is taken from it. The facts are not recounted; BNS Sections 85, 316(2) and 3(5) and BNSS Section 193(9) are named only and not analysed; the substance of the observation is not set out because only the passages quoted were verified; and no view is expressed on whether the order is correct.
What the searches establish, and what they do not
Established: Section 82 is in use; it is summoned upon by sub-section; and litigants are seeking its addition to existing prosecutions.
Not established: what "marries" requires under Section 82: a Supreme Court proposition on the predecessor's identical word was quoted to this collection second-hand and NOT retrieved; what the Exception's limbs require; whether the Exception reaches sub-section (2); what "concealed" requires in sub-section (2); and the Penal Code case law on Sections 494 and 495, which was NOT surveyed.
No negative finding is asserted as to the third search, which hit the display limit. For the two exhausted searches, the result sets were complete for those exact queries and nothing more.
Common misconceptions
| Misconception | Why it is wrong |
|---|---|
| "Section 82 is just renumbered IPC Section 494." | It consolidates TWO Penal Code sections: 494 and 495. Section 495's offence is now Section 82(2), and Section 495's separate title has disappeared from the statute book. S1S2S4 |
| "The text is identical." | Two comparisons produced three tokens: the inserted "(1)"; "this section" → "this sub-section" in the Exception; and "the last preceding section" → "sub-section (1)" in the concealment limb. S4 |
| "All three changes are mere bookkeeping." | Two are. The Exception's narrowed reach may not be: on the words it no longer expressly extends to sub-section (2). This article does not resolve it and no decision was located. S1S4 |
| "The Exception clearly covers the concealment offence." | Not on the face of the words, which now say "this sub-section". But sub-section (2) is defined by reference to sub-section (1), so there is a question either way. Expressly left open. S1 |
| "Seven years' absence is enough for the Exception." | On the words it is not. The person must also not have been heard of as being alive within that time, and the proviso requires the party to inform the other of the real state of facts before the subsequent marriage. The Exception is NOT construed here. S1 |
| "Section 82 was amended by Act 26 of 1955 or Act 6 of 1943." | No such claim can be made from these footnotes. They are printed on the same page but neither IPC Section 494 nor 495 carries any inline footnote marker, and the first refers to replacing "transportation for life", which appears in neither. This article makes no claim about which provisions they attach to. S4 |
| "So Section 82's content is amendment-derived like Sections 74 to 80." | Apparently not. As at Section 81, no amendment is recorded within either predecessor as published. But the histories were NOT traced and no claim is made that neither was ever amended. S4 |
| "There is a minimum sentence." | Neither sub-section has one. Seven years and ten years are maxima; the fine is mandatory in both. S1 |
| "A mere allegation of a second marriage is enough to summon." | A Coordinate Bench, quoted in one retrieved order, said it is not: "specific averments regarding the date, place, and performance of essential marriage rites" were required. That is reported as quoted, not adopted. S7 |
| "'Marries' in this section means any ceremony." | A Supreme Court passage on IPC Section 494, quoted second-hand and NOT retrieved, said it must mean "marries validly". This article does not state that the proposition applies to Section 82. S7 |
| "'Section 82' unambiguously means the BNS." | BNSS s. 82 (warrant executed outside the issuing district) and BSA s. 82 (presumption as to maps or plans) both exist. S5S6 |
Temporal application
The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 82 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3
On the acts and the punishments nothing of substance turns on which code applies. The one point on which the two codes differ in their words is the Exception's reach, and what, if anything, follows from that, including for conduct before 1 July 2024: is NOT addressed in this article. No decision on it was located. (This paragraph is the author's analysis as to scope, and deliberately stops short of the question.)
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published on India Code and verified against the Gazette fragment by fragment; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code, including its footnote apparatus; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The inventory copy was length-checked before use; two separate word-level comparisons were run against line-scoped extracts of IPC Sections 494 and 495 whose lengths were printed and asserted; the titles were compared; the disappearance of Section 495's title was checked against the Gazette; and Section 2(24) membership was checked with the project's probe.
⚠️ WHETHER THE EXCEPTION REACHES SUB-SECTION (2) IS LEFT OPEN. It is not decided, not argued either way, and not supported by any authority, because none was located and neither retrieved order addresses it. This is the principal point for human review on this section.
THE EXCEPTION IS NOT CONSTRUED. Its three limbs, the computation of "the space of seven years", what "continually absent" and "not have been heard of… as being alive" require, and the content of the disclosure proviso are not analysed.
"MARRIES" IS NOT CONSTRUED. The Supreme Court passage on IPC Section 494's use of that word is reported as quoted by a High Court; Madhavrao Jivajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 WAS NOT RETRIEVED, its citation was not verified, and nothing is said about its reasoning, facts or present standing. This article does not state that the proposition applies to Section 82.
"CONCEALED" IN SUB-SECTION (2) IS NOT CONSTRUED, and nothing is said about what concealment requires or when it must occur.
THE PENAL CODE CASE LAW ON SECTIONS 494 AND 495 WAS NOT SURVEYED. One of the three searches hit the display limit.
THE PROVENANCE STATEMENT IS NARROW. It rests on the absence of inline amendment markers, nothing more. The legislative histories of Sections 494 and 495 were NOT traced, no amending Act was checked against them, and Act 26 of 1955 and Act 6 of 1943 are named only because two page-footnotes name them: nothing is said about what either Act did, or which provisions those footnotes attach to.
No personal-law question is touched. Whether a second marriage is "void" depends on law outside this Sanhita; no personal law, and no statute governing marriage, was retrieved or analysed. Nothing here states when a marriage is or is not valid or void.
The two retrieved orders are used for the points identified and no others. Facts are not recounted; the Coordinate Bench passage is reported as quoted, not adopted; the reference to "Section 58 of the Evidence Act" and to BNSS Section 193(9), and BNS Sections 85, 316(2) and 3(5), are named only; no view is expressed on whether either order is correct; and their weight as precedent is not stated. One order expressly ring-fenced its own observations from the trial, and that limit is respected here. Both were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and the official reports were not consulted.
Procedural matters were not researched: cognizability, bailability, who may complain, the trial court and limitation were not researched for Section 82, and nothing here should be read as guidance on summoning, revision or the addition of charges.
Labelled as the author's analysis: the identification of the three structural features and the Exception's three limbs; the identification of the open question on the Exception's reach; the characterisation of two of the three tokens as consequential; and the observation that this is a fourth instance of proceedings framed below section level. No decision stating any of these was located.
Source note. The quoted statutory text uses plain quotation marks where the official texts use typographic ones. On the Penal Code side both extracts were taken line by line from the raw source and their lengths printed and asserted before any comparison, per the standing rule in this collection. The two page-footnotes printed inside Section 494's text were excised from the extract before comparison, and the reason is set out above: neither section carries an inline marker, so neither footnote is attributable to them. Had they been left in, the comparison would have reported them as differences, and had they been attributed, this article would have asserted an amendment history it has not verified. Both retrieved texts were scanned for the word-duplication artefact seen elsewhere in this collection and both were clean.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. In particular it does not tell a reader whether the Exception protects a person charged under sub-section (2), that question is expressly left open, and it does not tell a reader when a marriage is void, which depends on law outside this Sanhita that was not retrieved. Whether the elements are made out, whether the Exception applies, and what sentence follows, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.
Addendum (added on review): a procedural bar that governs this section, and it is not in the Sanhita
This was missing from the article as first written, and is added here. A check of this collection's existing articles confirmed that no article had previously covered the provision. It was found while researching Section 84, which BNSS Section 219 names expressly.
BNSS Section 219(1), under the marginal note "Prosecution for offences … marriage", provides S10:
"No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 81 to 84 (both inclusive) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence…"
Section 82 falls squarely inside that range.
A quotation-integrity note. That sentence had to be quoted in two halves, because the marginal note is printed inside it. The raw Gazette text reads "sections 81 to Prosecution for offences 84 (both inclusive)". Both halves were verified separately. A control confirmed the range: the string "sections 81 to 85" appears nowhere in the BNSS S10.
Section 219(1) carries three provisos, on the words S10: (a) where the aggrieved person is a child, is of unsound mind, has intellectual disability requiring higher support needs, is unable to complain through sickness or infirmity, or is a woman who by local customs and manners ought not to be compelled to appear in public, another person may complain with the leave of the Court; (b) where the aggrieved person is a husband serving in the Armed Forces under conditions certified by his Commanding Officer as precluding leave, an authorised person may complain on his behalf; and (c) where the person aggrieved by an offence under Section 82 is the wife, a complaint may be made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter, or by her parents' brother or sister, or with the leave of the Court by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption.
Proviso (c) names Section 82 expressly. It is the only section the provisos single out in this way, allowing an aggrieved wife's complaint to be made on her behalf by named relatives, or with the leave of the Court by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption S10. Section 219(2), which restricts "aggrieved" to the husband of the woman, is by contrast confined to Section 84 and does not touch Section 82.
(C) Editorial observation. This provision is recorded, not construed. This article does not analyse how the complaint requirement interacts with proceedings that originate in a police-registered FIR and charge-sheet, and no retrieved order in this article addresses the point. Nothing is inferred from it. Whether this offence is cognizable or bailable remains unstated: that depends on the First Schedule to the BNSS, which was not examined.
Addendum (added on review): a decision that bears on the open question, retrieved later
This was added after the article was first written. While researching Section 83 a decision was retrieved that speaks to the question this article leaves open, and it also corroborates both of the textual findings above.
Shumar Ali v. The State of Assam and Anr, Gauhati High Court, Crl.Pet./1620/2025, GAHC010282592025, Mridul Kumar Kalita J., order dated 5 June 2026 S11.
First, corroboration. The Court set out Section 82 in full. Its quotation renders the Exception as "This sub-section does not extend…" and the aggravated limb as "Whoever commits the offence under sub-section (1)…" S11. Those are precisely the two textual changes this article identified from the Gazette, now confirmed from an independent source.
Second, the open question. At paragraph 14 the Court held S11:
"commission of offence under Section 82(1) of the BNS, 2023 is a pre-requisite for fulfilling the ingredients of offence under Section 82(2) of the BNS, 2023."
What this does and does not do. It confirms, from a High Court, that sub-section (2) is dependent on sub-section (1), which is the premise on which this article observed that the Exception may operate through sub-section (2)'s own definition. But it does NOT decide the Exception point. The Court was addressing a different question: whether sub-section (2) could stand where sub-section (1) was not attracted at all. It did not consider whether a person who satisfies the Exception is thereby outside sub-section (2). The open question therefore remains open, and it remains the principal item for human review on this section.
The petitioner was charged under Section 82(2)/83 over a second marriage, and the proceedings were quashed on the ground that a Muslim male's second marriage was not void under the personal law applicable to him S11. A word-duplication scan of the order returned zero artefacts.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.