A note on this article. As with Sections 63 to 80, this article keeps to a clinical legal register, contains no invented factual scenarios, and does not recount the facts of the cases it cites.
Source check applied, following the truncation found at Section 72: the machine-readable copy of Section 81 is 323 characters and ends at a sentence boundary. No truncation. It was confirmed against the Gazette fragment by fragment: four fragments, all passing. S1S2
What the section says
Section 81 carries the marginal-note title Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage. and is one sentence: S1S2
81. Every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Three structural features worth naming.
First, Section 81 uses a THIRD way of naming the offender. Across this chapter the Sanhita has used "Whoever" (Sections 74, 76, 77, 79 and Section 80(2)) and "Any man who" or "A man" (Sections 75 and 78). Section 81 says "Every man who", and a control confirmed the Gazette opens neither "81. Whoever" nor "81. Any man who". S1S2 Nothing is inferred from this. It is recorded because this collection has tracked the actor-word across Sections 74 to 79, and a third formulation belongs in that record. Its legal effect is not stated and no decision on it was located.
Second, the elements are cumulative, not alternative. On the words the man must cause the belief and cause the woman to cohabit or have sexual intercourse in that belief. (That reading of the conjunction is the author's.)
Third, the punishment is a ten-year maximum with NO minimum, and a mandatory fine: "and shall also be liable to fine". Ten years is the highest maximum in this chapter so far other than Section 80's imprisonment for life, and yet there is no floor at all.
Section 81 is not in the Section 2(24)(a) or 2(24)(b) lists, so "offence" bears the Sanhita's narrow default meaning. Checked with the project's probe. S1
What changed from the Penal Code: two words in the title
A word-level comparison of Section 81's operative sentence against IPC Section 493 returned no differences at all. The sentence is identical. S1S4
The change is in the title, and it is the dropping of two indefinite articles:
| IPC Section 493 | "Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage" |
| BNS Section 81 | "Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage" |
Both "a"s were removed. Checked by direct comparison of the two titles. S1S4
Nothing in this article suggests anything turns on it. It is recorded because it is there, and because this collection has now seen the Sanhita drop "the" from a title at Section 79 and drop two "a"s here, which is worth noting as a drafting pattern in the titles rather than a change in any offence. (That characterisation is the author's.)
Classification for this collection: renumbered, substantively_unchanged.
⭐ The provenance run breaks here
Every section from 74 to 80 in this collection turned out to carry content that predated the Sanhita: the 2013 Act at Sections 74 to 79, and the 1986 Act at Section 80. Section 81 appears to be different.
No amendment marker appears within IPC Section 493 as extracted. The section carries no footnote numeral and no substitution or insertion bracket of the kind found at Sections 354, 354A to 354D, 509 and 304B. S4
What that supports, and what it does not. It supports the statement that no amendment is recorded within the section as published, so, unlike its neighbours, Section 81's content is not traceable to a later amending Act on the face of the text, and appears to be original Penal Code material. It does NOT establish that the provision was never amended: this article has not traced Section 493's legislative history, has not checked amending Acts against it, and makes no claim beyond the absence of a marker in the extract. That is the limit of what was verified.
So the run of amendment-derived provisions, which held for seven consecutive sections, stops at Section 81: on the evidence available, which is the absence of a marker rather than a positive history. (That observation is the author's.)
A quick mapping table
The secondary compilation consulted for this collection records, for IPC Section 493 → Section 81, a punishment change of "Same — Up to 10 years" and a key difference of "No major change". S8
On the punishment it is right. On the "key difference" it repeats the position at Section 76: there is a change, two words in the title, and a reader told "no major change" would not know of it. Whether it is "major" is not something this article decides; the point is only that the reader is given no reason to look.
(Running record on this dataset: Section 70 understated; 71 matched; 72 supplied a point this collection had missed; 73 has no entry; 74 and 79 misattributed the timing; 75 flattened the structure; 76 recorded no change where there was one; 77, 78 and 79 stated a "key difference" that was not a change; 80 was right and added something; 81 right on the punishment, silent on the only change.)
Case law, and here the field is largely surveyed
This section is unusual in this chapter: two of the three searches returned results BELOW the apparent display limit of 10, and are therefore exhausted for those queries. A search for "section 81 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned 3 entries; a search on the distinctive title phrase "deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage" returned 5. A third search, "Section 81 of BNS", returned 10 and is not exhausted. S9 Two orders were retrieved, one on each side of the commencement date.
A caution first: BNSS Section 81 concerns a warrant directed to a police officer for execution beyond the local jurisdiction, and BSA Section 81 concerns a presumption as to electronic or digital records, so subject matter must be checked. S5S6
Sanjay Ratre v. State of Chhattisgarh
High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, 28 April 2026, neutral citation 2026:CGHC:19575-DB, judgment authored by Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice, with Ravindra Kumar Agrawal J. A Division Bench. The petition was brought under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashment of an FIR registered "for the offence under Section 81 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023", the consequent final report, and the order taking cognizance. S7
The Court set Section 81 out, and its quotation matches the official text: the title without the indefinite articles, and "Every man who". This is the second time in this collection that a court's quotation of its section has matched on every point checked, after the order discussed at Section 79. S1S7
⭐ The holding is the most useful thing retrieved on this section, because it says what Section 81 is NOT for:
"the registration of the FIR under Section 81 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, appears to be wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable, as the said provision does not correspond to the nature of allegations involving sexual exploitation, deceitful inducement, and forced termination of pregnancy."
And the principle it applied:
"It is a settled principle that the substance of the complaint must guide the application of penal provisions"
The petition was allowed, and the order contemplates a fresh proceeding, a copy being forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, for compliance. The precise relief and any directions beyond that are NOT stated here, because only the passages quoted were verified. S7
What is NOT taken from this order: the facts, which are not recounted; the ingredients of Section 81, which it does not set out element by element; what provision would correspond to the allegations described, which it is not said to have decided and which is not analysed here; and BNSS Section 528, which is named only. No view is expressed on whether the order is correct, and its weight as precedent is not stated. The order renders the Sanhita's name variously as "Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita" and "Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita"; those spellings are reproduced as found with no conclusion drawn.
Vikas Kumar v. The State of Telangana
High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, Criminal Petition No. 4740 of 2022, 15 December 2022, K. Surender J. An IPC-era matter, in which the charge sheet included IPC Sections 376(2)(n), 417 and 493. S7
Cited for one point only: the predecessor's ingredient requirement, stated from the other side of the commencement date:
"it is no where mentioned in the charge sheet or the complaint that the petitioner deceitfully made the defacto complainant believe of lawful marriage and cohabited with her. When there is no such allegation, the question of attracting offence under Section 493 of IPC does not arise."
The Criminal Petition was allowed. S7
Nothing else is taken from it. The facts are not recounted; IPC Sections 376(2)(n) and 417 are not analysed; the basis on which the petition was allowed is not set out here; and Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi [Criminal Appeal No. 1217 of 2022, dated 10.08.2022], which the order cites, was NOT retrieved. It is named only as the order named it, nothing is said about what it decided, and its citation was not verified.
What the searches establish, and what they do not
Established: Section 81 is in use but sparingly: two searches were exhausted below the display limit; a Division Bench has quashed an FIR under it on the ground that the provision did not correspond to the allegations; and the predecessor was being applied on the same ingredient footing before commencement.
Not established: what "by deceit" requires; what causing a woman to "believe that she is lawfully married to him" requires; whether and how the two limbs must be connected in time; and the Penal Code case law on Section 493, which was NOT surveyed beyond the single IPC-era order retrieved.
No negative finding about the wider case law is asserted as to the third search, which hit the display limit. For the two exhausted searches, the result sets were complete for those exact queries and nothing more. A different phrasing may return more.
Common misconceptions
| Misconception | Why it is wrong |
|---|---|
| "The BNS rewrote this offence." | The operative sentence is identical to IPC Section 493: no differences at all. S1S4 |
| "So nothing changed." | The title changed: "Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief…" became "Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief…". Both indefinite articles were dropped. S1S4 |
| "Section 81 says 'Whoever'." | It does not. It says "Every man who": a third formulation alongside "Whoever" and "Any man who" used elsewhere in this chapter. Controls confirmed the Gazette opens with neither of the others. Nothing is inferred from this. S1S2 |
| "Section 81 is 2013 or 1986 law, like its neighbours." | No amendment marker appears within IPC Section 493 as extracted: unlike Sections 354, 354A–354D, 509 and 304B. It appears to be original Penal Code material. But this article has NOT traced Section 493's history and makes no claim beyond the absence of a marker. S4 |
| "Belief alone is enough." | On the words the elements are cumulative: the belief and cohabitation or sexual intercourse in that belief. (That reading of the conjunction is the author's.) S1 |
| "There is a minimum sentence." | There is none. The maximum is ten years, the highest in this chapter other than Section 80's life term, but there is no floor. The fine is mandatory. S1 |
| "Any case of sexual exploitation after a false promise falls under Section 81." | A Division Bench held the opposite on the allegations before it, finding an FIR under Section 81 "wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable" because the provision "does not correspond to the nature of allegations involving sexual exploitation, deceitful inducement, and forced termination of pregnancy". What provision would correspond is NOT stated here, and that order is one decision on one FIR. S7 |
| "Section 81 and Section 69 cover the same ground." | This article does not analyse the relationship. Section 69 (sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means) is named only, for the reader's awareness that more than one provision in this Sanhita uses the language of deceit. Nothing is said about how they relate. S1 |
| "'Section 81' unambiguously means the BNS." | BNSS s. 81 (warrant for execution beyond local jurisdiction) and BSA s. 81 (presumption as to electronic or digital records) both exist. S5S6 |
| "The case law on this section has been fully surveyed." | Two of three searches were exhausted; the third hit the display limit. And the Penal Code case law on Section 493 was NOT surveyed beyond one retrieved order. S9 |
Temporal application
The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 81 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3
Nothing of substance turns on which code applies: the operative sentence is identical and the only change is in the title. The pre-1860 or pre-amendment position is not addressed, because no amendment to Section 493 was identified and its history was not traced. (That assessment is the author's analysis; no decision on it was located.)
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published on India Code and verified against the Gazette fragment by fragment; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code, including its footnote apparatus; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The inventory copy was length-checked before use; a word-level comparison was run against a line-scoped extract of IPC Section 493 whose length was printed and asserted; the two titles were compared directly; the actor-word was tested against two controls; and Section 2(24) membership was checked with the project's probe.
⚠️ THE INGREDIENTS ARE NOT CONSTRUED. What "by deceit" requires, what causing a woman to believe she is lawfully married requires, and whether and how the two limbs must be connected are not analysed. No decision setting the ingredients out element by element was retrieved. The Penal Code case law on Section 493 was NOT surveyed beyond one IPC-era order.
WHAT SECTION 81 DOES NOT COVER IS REPORTED, NOT ADOPTED. The Division Bench's conclusion that the provision "does not correspond to" allegations of sexual exploitation, deceitful inducement and forced termination of pregnancy is reported as its holding on the FIR before it. This article does not extend it, does not state what provision would correspond, and expresses no view on whether it is correct.
THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SECTION 69 IS NOT ANALYSED. Section 69 is named only. Nothing is said about how the two provisions relate, whether they overlap, or which applies when.
THE ACTOR-WORD POINT IS RECORDED, NOT ARGUED. That Section 81 says "Every man who": a third formulation is established. Its legal effect is not stated, nothing is inferred from the variety across the chapter, no documented explanation was located, and the question flagged as open at Sections 76 and 77 remains open.
THE PROVENANCE STATEMENT IS NARROW. It rests on the absence of an amendment marker in the extract, nothing more. Section 493's legislative history was NOT traced, no amending Act was checked against it, and this article does not claim the provision was never amended.
The title change is recorded, not explained. Nothing is said to turn on it.
Kapil Gupta was NOT retrieved, its citation was not verified, and nothing is said about what it decided. BNSS Section 528 is named only. IPC Sections 376(2)(n) and 417 are named only.
State amendments were not examined, and nothing here states the position in any particular State or Union Territory.
The two retrieved orders are used for the points identified and no others. Facts are not recounted; no view is expressed on whether either is correct; their weight as precedent is not stated; and the precise relief in the Division Bench matter is not set out because only the quoted passages were verified. Both were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and the official reports were not consulted. The spelling variants of the Sanhita's name in one order are reproduced as found.
Procedural matters were not researched: cognizability, bailability, the trial court and limitation were not researched for Section 81, and nothing here should be read as guidance on quashing.
Labelled as the author's analysis: the identification of the three structural features; the reading that the elements are cumulative; the observation that ten years is the highest maximum in this chapter other than Section 80's life term; the characterisation of the dropped articles as a drafting pattern in the titles; and the observation that the amendment-derived run stops here. No decision stating any of these was located.
Source note. The quoted statutory text uses plain quotation marks where the official texts use typographic ones. A defect in this article's own verification is disclosed, and it was caught by a control. The first attempt to extract IPC Section 493 matched the table-of-contents entry instead of the section body, producing a slice of 83 characters; the standing assertion that every extracted slice must exceed a minimum length fired and stopped the run before any comparison was made. The extract was re-scoped to require the section's opening words on the same line, giving 407 characters, and the comparison was then run. This is the fifth time in this collection that a search for a section heading in the Penal Code text has matched the table of contents (previously at Sections 70, 71, 76 and 77), and the first time the assertion, rather than a later inconsistency, is what caught it. Both retrieved texts were scanned for the word-duplication artefact seen elsewhere in this collection and both were clean.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. In particular it does not tell a reader what "by deceit" requires, and it does not tell a reader which provision applies to any given set of allegations: one retrieved decision held that this section did not correspond to the allegations before it, and this article does not say what would. Whether the elements are made out, and what sentence follows, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.
Addendum (added on review): a procedural bar that governs this section, and it is not in the Sanhita
This was missing from the article as first written, and is added here. A check of this collection's existing articles confirmed that no article had previously covered the provision. It was found while researching Section 84, which BNSS Section 219 names expressly.
BNSS Section 219(1), under the marginal note "Prosecution for offences … marriage", provides S10:
"No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 81 to 84 (both inclusive) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence…"
Section 81 falls squarely inside that range.
A quotation-integrity note. That sentence had to be quoted in two halves, because the marginal note is printed inside it. The raw Gazette text reads "sections 81 to Prosecution for offences 84 (both inclusive)". Both halves were verified separately. A control confirmed the range: the string "sections 81 to 85" appears nowhere in the BNSS S10.
Section 219(1) carries three provisos, on the words S10: (a) where the aggrieved person is a child, is of unsound mind, has intellectual disability requiring higher support needs, is unable to complain through sickness or infirmity, or is a woman who by local customs and manners ought not to be compelled to appear in public, another person may complain with the leave of the Court; (b) where the aggrieved person is a husband serving in the Armed Forces under conditions certified by his Commanding Officer as precluding leave, an authorised person may complain on his behalf; and (c) where the person aggrieved by an offence under Section 82 is the wife, a complaint may be made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter, or by her parents' brother or sister, or with the leave of the Court by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption.
Proviso (c) names Section 82 only, and Section 219(2), which restricts "aggrieved" to the husband of the woman, is expressly confined to Section 84 S10. Neither limb names Section 81, so for Section 81 the general rule in sub-section (1), with provisos (a) and (b), is what applies on the words.
(C) Editorial observation. This provision is recorded, not construed. This article does not analyse how the complaint requirement interacts with proceedings that originate in a police-registered FIR and charge-sheet, and no retrieved order in this article addresses the point. Nothing is inferred from it. Whether this offence is cognizable or bailable remains unstated: that depends on the First Schedule to the BNSS, which was not examined.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.