What the section says
Section 44 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person. and reads in full: S1S2
44. If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.
Illustration.
A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder him. He cannot effectually exercise his right of private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of harming young children who are mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children.
It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3
This is the last section of Chapter III, General Exceptions, and the last of the private-defence provisions. S1 It answers a question none of the others reaches: what happens when exercising a lawful right of defence will, or may, injure somebody who has done nothing wrong.
What changed from IPC Section 106
Nothing.
A programmatic word-level diff was run against IPC Section 106 after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes, the section number and the marginal-note title. It returns 108 tokens on each side and zero differences. The marginal-note titles are identical too, word for word, including the article-free phrase "risk of harm to innocent person". S4 The classification is renumbered and substantively_unchanged: the cleanest result of any section in this chapter.
One diff trap had to be cleared. The India Code text of IPC Section 106 is immediately followed by the
heading "CHAPTER V — OF ABETMENT", which the extraction carries along with the section. Left in, it
produces four spurious removals (-chapter -v -of -abetment) and makes the sections look different. It
was excluded before comparison. This is the recurrence of a defect class met several times in this
collection, and it is the reason the zero result can be relied on. S4
That trailing heading is also a useful signpost: it marks where the old code moved from general exceptions to abetment. The Sanhita does the same at Section 45, though its chapter is wider: Chapter IV of the Sanhita is headed "OF ABETMENT, CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPT", where the Penal Code's Chapter V was headed "OF ABETMENT" alone. Those chapters are not analysed here. S1S4
No section-specific legislative rationale was located, and none is needed: there is no change to explain. Where the rule is unchanged this article says so plainly rather than manufacturing reform.
What the section actually requires
Four conditions have to be satisfied, and they are cumulative on the words.
1. The defender must already have a right of private defence. The section operates only "in the exercise of the right of private defence". It does not create a right; it extends one that exists under Section 35 and is not excluded by Section 37. S1
2. The assault must reasonably cause the apprehension of death. This is the narrowest condition, and it is where the section is most often misunderstood. The trigger is death, not grievous hurt, not serious injury, not the other situations in Section 38. An assault reasonably causing apprehension only of grievous hurt does not engage Section 44 on its words. S1
3. The defender must be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise the right without the risk. The word doing the work is "effectually". The section is not satisfied by showing that the chosen method carried a risk; it requires that the right could not be exercised effectually without running it. S1
4. What is permitted is the running of a risk. The right "extends to the running of that risk", not to harming an innocent person as an end, and not to any wider licence. S1
The illustration is worth reading to its last clause, because the last clause is the operative part. It is not merely that A may fire; it is that "A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children." The section produces, where it applies, a complete answer in respect of harm to the innocent person. S1
Two features of the illustration also narrow it. The mob "attempt to murder him". The apprehension is of death, satisfying condition 2. And the children are "mingled with the mob", so the risk is one the defender cannot separate out. The illustration does not address a defender who could have aimed elsewhere.
Section 44 is also expressly subject to the rest of the scheme. It does not displace Section 37, whose sub-section (2) provides that the right "in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence". S1
The case law, and what it does and does not decide
Authority on this provision is thin. The exact phrase "his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk" returned 11 documents; "without risk of harm to an innocent person" returned 10; the illustration's phrase "young children who are mingled with the mob" returned 6; and "section 106 of the Indian Penal Code" returned 44. S9 Two decisions were retrieved and read.
A Supreme Court decision that identifies the provision but does not apply it
In State of Karnataka v. Madesha and Others, decided on 1 August 2007 (Arijit Pasayat and P.P. Naolekar, JJ.), the Court came to "the question whether the plea relating to exercise of right of private defence can be made available vis-[à]-vis the deceased who had no role to play in the dispute", and said that for that purpose "the provisions of Section 106 IPC needs to be noted". It then set the section out in full and held that "the possibility of the right of private defence vis-[à]-vis the deceased has to be considered in the background of what was stated in Section 106 IPC". S6
It went no further on that point. The Court recorded that the prosecution's "star witness" had been disbelieved by both the trial court and the High Court as not "cogent and credible", and concluded: "while clarifying the position in law we find no scope for interference with the order of the High Court in view of the specific findings recorded regarding the role played by A-3 and A-4." The State's appeal "fails and is dismissed". S6
So Madesha is authority that where the person harmed had no role in the dispute, Section 106: now
Section 44: is the provision through which the question must be approached. It is not a decision on
how the section applies, because the appeal was resolved on findings of fact about a witness. (The
repository text renders "vis-à-vis" with a backtick in place of the accented character, as "vis-- vis" in the first passage and "vis--vis" in the second; the accented character is supplied in square brackets
above.)
A High Court decision that reasoned from the provision, but a fortiori
Girish Saikia v. State of Assam, Gauhati High Court, 24 March 1993, is the only decision located in which the section carried real weight, and it must be described carefully.
The appellant had struck a blow at his younger brother; his father intervened suddenly, the blow fell on the father instead, and the father later died. The Court held the appellant protected by Section 80 of the Penal Code (accident in doing a lawful act, now Section 18 of the Sanhita) and continued: "The appellant is not only protected by Section 80, I.P.C, he is protected also by Section 106, I.P.C". S7
But the Court's own reasoning shows the case was not squarely within the section, and it said so: S7
"Under Section 106, I.P.C., in similar circumstances, a defender is protected when he exercises his right of private defence even after knowing that such exercise may even harm an innocent person. In the instant case, appellant had no means to know that when he was acting in self-defence, it was likely to harm his father. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, it is apparent that the case of the appellant was much better situated than those cases covered by Section 106, I.P.C."
That passage is valuable for two reasons. It states expressly what Section 106: and so Section 44: is about: a defender who runs the risk knowingly. And it reasons a fortiori: a defender who did not know of the risk at all is in a better position than one the section protects. The Court held that the appellant "has not committed any offence under any provision of penal law of the land", observing that he had been convicted in 1988 and had been in custody since. S7
What this means for Section 44 should be stated without overreach. Girish Saikia is not authority that Section 44 applies where the defender did not know of the risk; the Court's point was the opposite. That such a case does not need the section. It is authority for the section's character, namely that it addresses the knowing assumption of risk. And the appellant there had an independent defence under Section 80, so the Section 106 reasoning was an additional ground.
The honest summary of the authority position
No judgment construing Section 44 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 44 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page carrying the literal string "No matching results" with zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S9
And under the Penal Code, no decision was located in which the provision was applied to a defender who knowingly ran a risk to an innocent person and was held protected on that basis. Madesha identified the provision without applying it; Girish Saikia reasoned from it a fortiori in a case that also fell under Section 80. Two further documents: Girja Shanker Pandey and Others v. State of U.P. (11 September 2018) and Ram Awadh Pandey and Others v. State of U.P. (26 August 2016): were identified as referring to Section 106 but were not read for this article, and nothing is asserted about them. Because the words of Section 44 are identical to those of Section 106, both decisions read construe the same sentence that now appears in Section 44: but both are decisions on the Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.
Who must prove it
Section 44 is part of a General Exception, so the burden of bringing a case within it lies on the accused under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which also directs the court to presume the absence of the circumstances. S5 On the standard, James Martin v. State of Kerala holds that the burden "stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record", and that an accused "is not necessarily required to call evidence". S8 As recorded in the articles on Sections 34 and 39 to 43, those authorities speak specifically of the plea of self-defence, and whether the same standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched.
Whether the apprehension of death was reasonable, and whether the defender could have exercised the right effectually without the risk, are questions of fact.
Common misconceptions
"Section 44 lets me harm a bystander whenever I am defending myself." No. The assault must reasonably cause the apprehension of death, and the defender must be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise the right without the risk. Both conditions are narrow. S1
"It applies to any serious assault." It does not. The trigger is apprehension of death. An assault reasonably causing apprehension only of grievous hurt does not engage the section on its words, whatever other provisions may do. S1
"Section 44 creates a right." It extends one. The defender must already have a right of private defence under Section 35 that is not excluded by Section 37. S1
"If an innocent person is harmed, the defence always fails." That is the proposition Section 44 exists to deny. Where it applies, the illustration is explicit: "A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children." S1
"It protects a defender who accidentally harms someone he did not know was there." That is not what the section addresses. On Girish Saikia it speaks to a defender "even after knowing that such exercise may even harm an innocent person"; a defender who had no means to know may have a different answer: in that case, accident under what is now Section 18: and the Court treated such a case as better placed than the section's own. S1S7
"Section 44 overrides the limits on private defence." It does not mention any such thing. Section 37 continues to apply, including the cap in Section 37(2) on inflicting more harm than is necessary. S1
"The BNS changed this provision." It did not. The diff returns zero differences across 108 tokens on each side, and even the marginal-note title is identical. S4
"There is settled case law on how it works." There is very little. No decision applying the section to a knowingly-run risk was located, and no judgment on Section 44 of the Sanhita was found at all. S6S7S9
Reading the section in practice
- Establish the underlying right under Section 35, and check Section 37.
- Identify the apprehension. Was it an apprehension of death, reasonably caused?
- Ask whether the right could have been exercised effectually without the risk. If it could, the section does not assist.
- Identify the innocent person and the risk, and be clear that what the section permits is the running of a risk.
- If the harm was not a risk knowingly run at all, consider whether the real answer is accident under Section 18 rather than Section 44.
- Apply Section 37 in every case, including the necessity cap.
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff after excluding the trailing chapter heading that the extraction carries with IPC Section 106.
This article does not analyse Sections 34 to 43, or Section 45 and the chapter it opens. Section 35 is named only as the provision conferring the right, Section 37 only for the restrictions it imposes (including the cap in sub-section (2)), Section 38 only to contrast the apprehension-of-death trigger, and Section 18 only as the counterpart of IPC Section 80, which Girish Saikia applied alongside Section 106. None of those provisions is examined here.
The four-condition reading of the section is this article's analysis of the statutory words, not a judicial formulation; no decision setting out such a list was located. The observations about the word "effectually", about the illustration's final clause, and about the children being "mingled with the mob" are likewise drawn from the text.
Madesha is expressly described as not deciding how the section applies, and Girish Saikia as reasoning a fortiori from it in a case that also fell under Section 80. Neither is presented as settled authority on the operation of Section 44.
Madesha and Girish Saikia were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court
portals, and later treatment of each was not researched; the official reports were not consulted. Source conditions should be noted. The repository text of Madesha renders "vis-à-vis" with a backtick
in place of the accented character, and inconsistently: "vis-- vis" in one passage and "vis--vis" in
the other; the accented character has been supplied in square brackets. Girish Saikia's reproduction of
Section 106 contains several defects ("readsas follows" without a space, "the defender be situated"
omitting "so", and "without the risk of harm" where the section has no article) and the quotation
used in this article is taken from the Court's own reasoning rather than from its reproduction of the
statute; the statutory text above comes from the official sources. In Girish Saikia the repository's
bench field names S.N. Phukan while the judgment is recorded as delivered by S.B. Roy, J.; this article
does not assert the composition of the Bench.
Only two of the documents located were read. Girja Shanker Pandey and Ram Awadh Pandey appear only as search results, and the remaining results of the four phrase searches were not retrieved.
Whether the preponderance-of-probabilities standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched; the authorities speak of the plea of self-defence.
Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether an apprehension of death was reasonable, whether the right could have been exercised effectually without risk to an innocent person, and what the defender knew are findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.