What the section says
Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title When right of private defence of body extends to causing death. and reads: S1S2
38. The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—
(a) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(b) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(c) an assault with the intention of committing rape;
(d) an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release;
(g) an act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.
This is the provision that permits lethal force. Section 35 confers the right of private defence of the body; Section 38 says when that right "extends … to the voluntary causing of death". It is expressly subject to the restrictions in Section 37, which include the cap in Section 37(2) that the right "in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence". S1 It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3
The gateway: there must be an assault
Section 38 is not a free-standing licence. It operates only where "the offence which occasions the exercise of the right" falls within one of the seven descriptions, and six of the seven describe an assault.
The Supreme Court explained the architecture in Vishwanath v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, decided on 3 September 1959 and reported as AIR 1960 SC 67 and 1960 SCR (1) 646, the judgment being delivered by K.N. Wanchoo, J. for a Bench of himself and Syed Jaffer Imam, J. The passages quoted here are taken from the judgment text; the report also carries a headnote, which has been set aside. S6
"It is true that the right of private defence of person arises only if an offence against the human body is committed. Section 100 gives an extended right of private defence of person in cases where the offence which occasions the exercise of the right is of any of the descriptions enumerated therein. Each of the six clauses of s. 100 talks of an assault and assault is an offence against the human body; (see s. 352). So before the extended right under s. 100 arises there has to be the offence of assault and this assault has to be of one of the six types mentioned in the six clauses of the section."
The Court spoke of six clauses because, in 1959, that is all there were; the acid clause came later and is discussed below. The structural point is unaffected: the triggering offence is the assault, and what each clause does is identify an aggravating feature of that assault which extends the right to causing death.
"what s. 100 lays down is that if the assault is of an aggravated nature, as enumerated in that section, the right of private defence extends even to the causing of death." S6
The most important holding: the stated intention need not itself be an offence
This is the part of Vishwanath that resolves most of the difficulties people encounter with Section 38, and it is worth quoting at length because it is so often missed: S6
"The fact that when describing the nature of the assault some of the clauses in s. 100 use words which are themselves offences, as for example, 'grievous hurt', 'rape', 'kidnapping', 'wrongfully confining', does not mean that the intention with which the assault is committed must always be an offence in itself. In some other clauses, the words used to indicate the intention do not themselves amount to an offence under the Penal Code. For example, the first clause says that the assault must be such as may reasonably cause the apprehension of death. Now death is not an offence anywhere in the Penal Code. Therefore, when the word 'abducting' is used in the fifth clause, that word by itself [need] not be an offence in order that clause may be taken advantage of by or on behalf of a person who is assaulted with intent to abduct. All that the clause requires is that there should be an assault which is an offence against the human body and that assault should be with the intention of abducting, and whenever these elements are present the clause will be applicable."
One transcription point, bracketed above rather than silently corrected: the repository text of the judgment reads "that word by itself reed not be an offence", plainly a typographical error for "need". S6
The Court reached that conclusion on the specific question whether the "abducting" in the fifth clause had to be abduction of a kind punishable under the Penal Code. It held it did not: "abduction pure and simple is not an offence under the Penal Code. Only abduction with certain intent is punishable as an offence" — yet "there does not seem to be any reason for holding that the word 'abducting' used there means anything more than what is defined as 'abduction' in s. 362." S6 In reaching that view the Court departed from the approach in Ram Saiya's case, I.L.R. 1948 All. 165, observing that it "seems to overlook that in each of the six clauses enumerated in s. 100, there is an offence against the human body, namely, assault." S6 Ram Saiya was not retrieved or read for this article.
On the facts, the appellant's sister was being dragged from her father's house by her husband; the appellant stabbed him once. The Court held the appellant "had the right of private defence of person under the fifth clause of s. 100 and did not cause more harm than was necessary", allowed the appeal and acquitted him. S6
The structure of the seven clauses
Reading the clauses together with Vishwanath shows they are not a uniform list. They divide into two groups, and the difference matters enormously in practice.
| Group | Clauses | What must be shown |
|---|---|---|
| Apprehension-based | (a), (b) | An assault reasonably causing the apprehension that death (a) or grievous hurt (b) will otherwise follow |
| Intention-based | (c), (d), (e), (f) | An assault committed with a stated intention. No apprehension of death or grievous hurt is required by the words |
| Act-based, apprehension-qualified | (g) | An act of throwing or administering acid, or an attempt, reasonably causing the apprehension of grievous hurt |
The practical consequence of the intention-based group is substantial, and Vishwanath is the illustration: the appellant was entitled to kill in defence of his sister against an assault with intent to abduct, without any finding that death or grievous hurt was apprehended. Clause (f) carries its own qualifying circumstance, that the victim may reasonably apprehend being unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release, but clauses (c), (d) and (e) carry no such qualification on their face. That reading of the structure is the author's analysis; the Court did not tabulate the clauses in those terms.
Clause (g): the acid clause is not new to the Sanhita
It is natural to assume that a provision about acid attacks is a modern addition introduced by the recodification. It is not, and the point was checked rather than assumed.
The acid clause was inserted into Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code as "Seventhly" by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Act 13 of 2013), section 2, with effect from 3 February 2013. The India Code text of the IPC carries the inserted clause in square brackets with a footnote marker, and the corresponding footnote reads "Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, s. 2 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)." S4
So clause (g) of Section 38 reproduces a provision that had already been part of Indian law for more than eleven years before the Sanhita commenced. A programmatic comparison confirms that its wording is identical to the IPC's Seventhly. S1S4 The Sanhita renumbered it; it did not create it.
Clause (d): "gratifying unnatural lust"
Clause (d) requires careful and neutral statement, and two things about it are verified facts about the texts.
First, the Sanhita contains no counterpart to Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which was titled "Unnatural offences". A scan of the Sanhita shows no section whose title contains the word "unnatural". S1S4
Second, the word "unnatural" nevertheless survives in the Sanhita in exactly two places: in Section 38(d), and in Section 140, "Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc.", which refers to a person being disposed of so as to be put in danger of being subjected "to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person". S1
That raises an obvious question: how can clause (d) operate if there is no corresponding offence in the Sanhita? Vishwanath supplies the principled answer, because the Court addressed precisely this class of problem. The triggering offence under the section is the assault; "the words used to indicate the intention do not themselves amount to an offence" in every clause, and the Court's own example was that "death is not an offence anywhere in the Penal Code". S6 On that reasoning, clause (d) does not depend on the intended conduct being a punishable offence: what must be shown is an assault, committed with the stated intention.
Two limits on that must be stated plainly. The Court in Vishwanath was deciding about the word "abducting" in the fifth clause; applying its reasoning to clause (d) is the author's reading, though the Court expressed the principle generally and gave an example from a different clause. And what "unnatural lust" means, and how clause (d) is to be applied in the absence of any corresponding offence provision, was not researched for this article and no judgment on the point under the Sanhita was located. A reader advising on such facts should treat the question as open and take advice.
The restrictions still apply
Section 38 opens "under the restrictions specified in section 37". So everything in Section 37 governs. The three situations in which there is no right at all, and the cap in Section 37(2). S1
Vishwanath applied the cap and, in doing so, quoted a well-known observation on how it is assessed. The appellant had inflicted a single stab wound with an ordinary knife, and the Court held it "cannot be said that he inflicted more harm than was necessary for the purpose of defence", adding: S6
"As has been pointed out in Amjad Khan v. The State, 'these things cannot be weighed in too fine a set of scales or in golden scale'."
Amjad Khan v. The State was not retrieved or read and appears only as Vishwanath quotes it. The observation sits alongside Darshan Singh principle (v), that "It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude", and principle (vi), that the force "ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than necessary". S8
And the consequence of exceeding the cap is not automatic conviction for murder: on Bhanwar Singh v. State of M.P., where a right existed but more harm than necessary was caused, the ruling "may result in the application of Section 300, Exception 2": now Exception 2 to Section 101 of the Sanhita, which a programmatic comparison confirms is word-for-word identical to its IPC predecessor across 124 tokens. S1S4S7 That interaction is analysed in the article on Section 37 and is not pursued here.
IPC Section 100 compared with BNS Section 38
The comparison was run twice: once with the clause labels stripped to isolate substance, once with them retained.
Substance: 183 tokens against 180, seven differing tokens. One of the seven is an artefact of the footnote marker in the extracted IPC text. The remaining six amount to two changes, both to the cross-reference: S1S4
| IPC s. 100 | BNS s. 38 | |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-reference | "under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section" | "under the restrictions specified in section 37" |
"Mentioned" became "specified", and the relative reference "the last preceding section" became an express reference to Section 37. The second is the more useful change: a reader of the IPC had to work out which section was "the last preceding" one, whereas the Sanhita names it.
All seven descriptions, including clause (g), are word for word identical. S1S4
Structure: the labels "First." to "Seventhly." became "(a)" to "(g)". The marginal-note title dropped two definite articles, from "When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death" to "When right of private defence of body extends to causing death." S1S4
The classification is modified, on account of the cross-reference and the relabelling, with the seven descriptions substantively unchanged. No section-specific legislative rationale was located, and none is asserted. In particular, nothing located suggests the Sanhita altered the circumstances in which lethal private defence is permitted.
Case law under the BNS
No judgment construing Section 38 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 38 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page of 17,079 bytes containing the string "No matching results", with zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S9
By contrast the statutory wording of the predecessor returns substantial authority: the exact phrase "an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust" returned 87 documents, among them Vishwanath, Darshan Singh, Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab, State of U.P. v. Gajey Singh, Ram Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, Jangeer Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Ram Saiya v. Emperor. S9 Of these, only Vishwanath was retrieved and read for this article; Darshan Singh and Gajey Singh were read for earlier articles in this collection. Only a subset of the 87 matches was examined.
Because the seven descriptions are unchanged, Vishwanath construes the same words that now appear in Section 38: but it is a decision on Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as a decision on the Sanhita.
Common misconceptions
"You may kill only if your life is in danger." Not under this section. Clauses (c), (d), (e) and (f) are intention-based and do not on their face require any apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Vishwanath is the illustration: the appellant was held entitled to kill in defence of his sister against an assault with intent to abduct, with no finding that death or grievous hurt was apprehended. S1S6
"The acid clause is new in the BNS." It is not. It was inserted into IPC Section 100 as "Seventhly" by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, section 2, with effect from 3 February 2013, and its wording is reproduced identically. S4
"The intention named in the clause must itself be a crime." No. Vishwanath: "the words used to indicate the intention do not themselves amount to an offence under the Penal Code" in every clause, and "death is not an offence anywhere in the Penal Code." S6 What is required is an assault, with the stated intention.
"Mere abduction is not an offence, so clause (e) cannot apply." That argument was made and rejected. "All that the clause requires is that there should be an assault which is an offence against the human body and that assault should be with the intention of abducting." S6
"Section 38 permits any force once a clause is satisfied." No. It operates "under the restrictions specified in section 37", and Section 37(2) caps the right at the harm necessary for defence. S1 In Vishwanath the Court assessed that cap on the facts, applying the observation that "these things cannot be weighed in too fine a set of scales or in golden scale". S6
"Exceeding the limit means a murder conviction." Not necessarily. Where a right existed but more harm than necessary was caused, Bhanwar Singh holds the ruling "may result in the application of Section 300, Exception 2": now Exception 2 to Section 101 of the Sanhita. S1S7 That interaction is covered in the article on Section 37.
"The BNS widened or narrowed the right to kill in self-defence." Nothing located suggests so. All seven descriptions are identical to the IPC's; the changes are "mentioned"→"specified", "the last preceding section"→"section 37", and the relabelling of First–Seventhly as (a)–(g). S1S4
Reading the section in practice
- Was there an assault? On Vishwanath, the triggering offence is the assault itself. Clause (g) is the exception, being framed around an act of throwing or administering acid rather than an assault.
- Which clause is relied on? Apprehension-based (a) and (b), intention-based (c) to (f), or the acid clause (g).
- For (a), (b) and (g): was the apprehension reasonable? Of death for (a); of grievous hurt for (b) and (g).
- For (c) to (f): is the stated intention established? The intended conduct need not itself be a punishable offence. Clause (f) additionally requires the circumstances about recourse to the public authorities.
- Then apply Section 37 in full: both the situations in which no right exists and the cap in Section 37(2).
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS and the IPC as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was run twice, with labels stripped and retained. The insertion of the acid clause by Act 13 of 2013 was verified from the India Code text of the IPC, which carries the clause in square brackets with a footnote marker and the corresponding page footnote "Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, s. 2 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
This article does not analyse Sections 34, 35, 36, 37, or 39 to 44, nor Section 101 or its exceptions, nor the offences referred to in the seven clauses. Section 37's restrictions are identified and their controlling effect noted; Exception 2 to Section 101 is mentioned only to record that exceeding the cap is not automatically fatal, and that interaction is analysed in the article on Section 37. Section 140 is referred to only to locate the second surviving occurrence of the word "unnatural".
Vishwanath was retrieved and read in full, and the passages quoted are taken from the judgment text after the report's headnote was identified and set aside. It is a two-Judge Bench decision of 1959 on Section 100 of the IPC. Its later treatment was not researched, and the Court spoke of six clauses because the seventh did not then exist. Bhanwar Singh and Darshan Singh were read for earlier articles in this collection and are relied on here only for the passages quoted. All were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals.
Amjad Khan v. The State and Ram Saiya v. Emperor (I.L.R. 1948 All. 165) appear only as Vishwanath refers to them and were not retrieved or read. Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab, Ram Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, Jangeer Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Gursewak Singh v. State of Punjab and Sanjay Subba v. State of Sikkim appear only as results of a phrase search and were not read. Only a subset of the 87 matching documents was examined.
On clause (d), the limits of what is said here should be noted carefully. It is verified that the Sanhita has no counterpart to IPC Section 377 and that "unnatural" survives only in Sections 38 and 140. The application of Vishwanath's reasoning to clause (d) is the author's reading, the Court having decided the point in relation to "abducting". What "unnatural lust" means, and how clause (d) operates in the absence of a corresponding offence provision, was not researched; no judgment on the question under the Sanhita was located, and the constitutional litigation concerning IPC Section 377 was not examined. The question should be treated as open.
Several further propositions are the author's analysis: the division of the seven clauses into apprehension-based, intention-based and act-based groups; and the observation that naming Section 37 expressly is more useful to a reader than "the last preceding section".
Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a right of private defence extended to causing death depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.