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BNS Section 36 · Deep dive

BNS Section 36: Defending Yourself Against Someone Who Commits No Offence

BNS Section 36 solves a problem created by Section 35. The right of private defence is keyed to the attacking conduct being an offence - as the Supreme Court put it in Darshan Singh, the Code 'confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence'. But Chapter III itself provides that a child under seven, a child of immature understanding, a person of unsound mind and a person involuntarily intoxicated commit no offence. Without more, a person attacked by any of them would have no right of private defence at all. Section 36 closes the gap by a legal fiction: where an act is not the offence it would otherwise be by reason of the youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind or intoxication of the person doing it, or by reason of any misconception on his part, every person has 'the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence'. It does not make the attacker guilty - both illustrations say expressly that he commits no offence. Of the five grounds, four map onto identifiable exceptions (Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23); 'misconception' uniquely has no dedicated exception, and Illustration (b) shows why it matters - Z attacks A in good faith taking him for a house-breaker, Z 'commits no offence', and A nonetheless has the full right of private defence, so both parties may lawfully use force against each other. Three limits follow from the words: the right is the SAME right and not a greater one; it remains 'controlled by Section 99' - now Section 37 - as the Supreme Court held in Rizan; and its extent and duration are fixed by Sections 38 to 43. Section 36 reproduces IPC Section 98 across 166 tokens with exactly one substantive change, in Illustration (a): 'Z, under the influence of madness' has become 'Z, a person of unsound mind'. That single change is arithmetically verifiable against a scan of both codes - 'madness' appears once in the whole Indian Penal Code, in Section 98 itself, and nowhere in the Sanhita, while 'unsound mind' rises from five occurrences to six. 'lunatic', 'insane' and 'idiot' have likewise gone from the Sanhita entirely, though 'sane' survives in this very illustration. No legislative rationale for the substitution was located and none is asserted.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 23 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 36 — Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 98 — Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc · modified
No earlier equivalent · modified
Section 82, 83, 84, 85 — The exceptions supplying the first four grounds in s. 36 · renumbered
Section 97 — Right of private defence of the body and of property · modified
Section 99 — Acts against which there is no right of private defence · renumbered
Side-by-side converterIPC 98 → BNS 36

What the section says

Section 36 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc. and reads: S1S2

36. When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.

Illustrations.

(a) Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.

(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.

It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3

The problem this section exists to solve

Section 35 confers the right of private defence of the body "against any offence affecting the human body", and of property against acts falling within four named offence definitions. S1 The right is keyed to the attacking conduct being an offence.

The Supreme Court has put the point squarely. In Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab the ninth of the ten principles set out at paragraph 58 is that "The Indian Penal Code confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence." S6

That creates an obvious gap. Chapter III of the Sanhita itself provides that certain acts are not offences when done by certain people. A child under seven commits no offence (Section 20); a child between seven and twelve of immature understanding commits none (Section 21); a person of unsound mind who cannot know the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law commits none (Section 22); and a person incapable of judgment through intoxication caused against his will commits none (Section 23). S1 Without more, a person attacked by any of them would have no right of private defence at all, because the attacking act would not be an offence.

Section 36 closes that gap. It does not say the attacker is guilty of anything. It says that the person attacked "has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence." S1 The right is restored by a legal fiction, not by re-criminalising the attacker.

The five grounds

Section 36 lists five reasons why an act might not be the offence it would otherwise be: S1

Ground in s. 36Where the Sanhita deals with it
the youth of the person doing the actSection 20: act of a child under seven years of age
the want of maturity of understandingSection 21: act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding
the unsoundness of mindSection 22: act of a person of unsound mind
the intoxication of the personSection 23: act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will; and see Section 24
any misconception on the part of that personNo single corresponding exception; see below

The first four map onto identifiable General Exceptions, whose titles are given above as verified from the statute. The fifth does not, and that is the most interesting feature of the section.

"Misconception" has no dedicated exception of its own. It is not a Chapter III heading. What Illustration (b) describes is a person acting under a mistaken belief in good faith, Z takes A for a house-breaker, and the illustration states flatly that Z "commits no offence". The reason Z commits no offence is not stated in Section 36; it lies elsewhere, in the provisions on acts done by a person who by reason of a mistake of fact in good faith believes himself bound or justified by law, which are not analysed in this article. What Section 36 does is take the consequence, that there is no offence, and restore the right of private defence against it. That reading of the relationship is the author's analysis; no authority on it was located.

Note also that Section 36's list is framed by reference to why the act is not an offence, not by reference to particular sections. It does not cross-refer to Sections 20 to 24 at all. S1 So the question under Section 36 is functional: was the act not an offence for one of these five reasons?

The two illustrations, and what each adds

Illustration (a) is the straightforward case: "Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane." S1 The phrase "if Z were sane" makes the fiction explicit. A's position is assessed as though the attacker were fully responsible.

Illustration (b) is the more instructive, because both parties are innocent. A is lawfully entering a house he is "legally entitled to enter". Z attacks him "in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker". The illustration says Z "commits no offence", and then says A nonetheless has the full right of private defence against Z. S1

So Section 36 produces a situation in which two people may lawfully use force against each other, each protected: Z because his misconception means he commits no offence, A because Section 36 gives him the right of private defence notwithstanding. That is not a drafting accident: it follows directly from the section's structure, which asks only whether the act would otherwise be an offence and not whether the actor is blameworthy. That observation is the author's analysis; no authority stating it was located.

A further point about Illustration (b) worth noticing. The right it gives A is a right of private defence against Z's attack, which is an attack on A's body. It is not a right arising from A's entitlement to enter the house. Section 36 operates on the attack, not on the underlying property dispute.

What the section does not do

Three limits follow from the words, and all three are important.

It does not extend the right beyond what Section 35 would have given. The right conferred is "the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence": the same, not a greater right. S1 So the attacked person is in the position he would have occupied had the attacker been fully responsible, and no better.

It does not escape the restrictions. The Supreme Court stated the structural position in Rizan & Another v. State of Chhattisgarh, decided on 21 January 2003 and reported as AIR 2003 SC 976 and (2003) 2 SCC 661, the judgment being delivered by Arijit Pasayat, J. for a Bench of himself and Shivaraj V. Patil, J.: S7

"Section 99 lays down limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99."

Section 98 of the IPC is the predecessor of Section 36, and Section 99 is the predecessor of Section 37: the provision Section 35 expressly makes the right subject to. So the right that Section 36 restores is controlled in the same way as any other. The appeal in Rizan was dismissed as being without merit. S7

It does not fix the extent of the right. How far the right goes, whether to causing death or only to lesser harm: is in Sections 38 and 39 for the body and Sections 41 and 42 for property, and when it begins and ends is in Sections 40 and 43. None of those is analysed here.

The one textual change: "madness" out, "unsound mind" in

Section 36 reproduces Section 98 of the Indian Penal Code with a single substantive alteration, and it is in Illustration (a).

The texts were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes and the Sanhita's double-hyphens, apostrophes, the section number, the marginal-note title and a trailing page number in the source. Both sides produce 166 tokens, and the diff returns one change: S1S4

Illustration (a) opens
IPC s. 98"Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A"
BNS s. 36"Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A"

The marginal-note title also drops a definite article, from "Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc." to "Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc." S1S4

This is a small change with a verifiable context. A word-frequency scan across both codes shows the following: S1S4

WordIndian Penal CodeBharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
"madness"10
"lunatic"10
"insane"40
"idiot"10
"unsound mind"56

The single occurrence of "madness" in the whole Indian Penal Code was in Section 98: verified by locating it. S4 The Sanhita contains none. And the count of "unsound mind" rises by exactly one, from five to six, which is this substitution. The arithmetic matches the change.

That the Sanhita has eliminated "madness", "lunatic", "insane" and "idiot" entirely while retaining and extending "unsound mind" is a verified fact about the two texts. Whether it reflects a deliberate drafting policy is not something this article asserts: no section-specific legislative rationale for Section 36, and no stated rationale for the terminology substitution, was located. The pattern is reported; the motive is not.

It is also worth being precise about what the change does not do. It does not alter the ground. The operative words of Section 36 already said "the unsoundness of mind" before the change and say it still; only the illustration's wording moved. And the illustration's closing words remain "which he would have if Z were sane" — so "sane" survives in the Sanhita even though "insane" does not. S1

FeatureIPC s. 98BNS s. 36
Operative wordsIdentical (five grounds, same fiction)Identical
Illustration (a) opening"under the influence of madness""a person of unsound mind"
Illustration (a) closing"if Z were sane""if Z were sane"
Illustration (b)Identical (misconception, house-breaker)Identical
Marginal-note title"against the act of a person…""against act of a person…"

The correct classification is modified, on account of the illustration and the title, with the rule itself substantively unchanged.

Case law

No judgment construing Section 36 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 36 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page of 17,079 bytes containing the string "No matching results", with zero result entries. The page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S8

Authority on the predecessor is thin, and the reason is worth stating. A search for the exact operative phrase "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence" returned twelve documents, of which four are statute pages. S8 In the judgments examined, Section 98 appears as part of a block recital of the private-defence scheme rather than as the operative provision.

State of U.P. v. Gajey Singh, decided by the Supreme Court on 24 February 2009, reproduces Sections 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the IPC in full as a block, and then quotes the Rizan passage set out above. S9 Its own discussion concerns the effect of non-explanation of injuries on the accused and the extent of the right where death is caused; Section 98 is not applied to the facts. The appeal was dismissed as "devoid of any merit". S9

Captain Baliram Bhaskarrao Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, a decision of the Bombay High Court of 24 December 2025, likewise describes Section 98 of the Indian Penal Code in the course of setting out the private-defence provisions. S8 It is an IPC case notwithstanding its date.

So the honest position is that the operative provision in litigation is almost always Section 35 (or Sections 38 to 43), and Section 36 is recited rather than construed. That is an observation about the documents examined, not a claim about reported case law generally; only a subset of the twelve was examined, and the characterisation is the author's.

Because the operative words of Section 36 are identical to those of Section 98, reasoning on Section 98 construes the same language. But Rizan, Gajey Singh, Darshan Singh and Captain Shinde are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.

Common misconceptions

"If the attacker commits no offence, I cannot defend myself." That is exactly the position Section 36 reverses. Where the act is not an offence by reason of youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind, intoxication or misconception, "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence." S1

"Section 36 makes the attacker guilty." It does not. Illustration (a) says "Z is guilty of no offence" and Illustration (b) says Z "commits no offence". S1 Section 36 operates only on the rights of the person attacked.

"It only applies to people of unsound mind." The marginal note names unsoundness of mind and adds "etc." for a reason: the section lists five grounds, including the youth of the attacker, want of maturity of understanding, intoxication and misconception. S1

"Both people cannot be in the right." Under Illustration (b) they can. Z attacks A under a good-faith misconception and "commits no offence"; A nonetheless has the full right of private defence against Z. S1

"Section 36 gives a wider right because the attacker is not responsible." No. It gives "the same right … which he would have if the act were that offence": no more. S1 And on Rizan the right given by the predecessor provision "is controlled by Section 99", now Section 37. S7

"The BNS changed this provision." It changed four words in an illustration. "Z, under the influence of madness" became "Z, a person of unsound mind"; the operative five grounds, the legal fiction and Illustration (b) are untouched across 166 tokens. S1S4 No legislative rationale for the change was located.

"The Sanhita has abolished the insanity defence." Nothing in Section 36 bears on that, and the terminology change does not. Section 22 remains the exception for an act of a person of unsound mind, and this article does not analyse it.

Reading the section in practice

  1. Was the attacking act one that would otherwise be an offence? If it would not be an offence for any reason, Section 36 does not assist. The section presupposes conduct that is an offence but for one of the five grounds.
  2. Is the reason it is not an offence one of the five? Youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or misconception. The section asks functionally, not by section number.
  3. If so, assess the defender's position as though the attacker were fully responsible. That is what "the same right … as if the act were that offence" does.
  4. Then apply the ordinary limits. Section 37's restrictions, and the extent and duration provisions in Sections 38 to 43, apply as they would in any other case.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS and the IPC as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff, and the terminology counts were produced by a word-frequency scan across the full text of both codes, with the single IPC occurrence of "madness" located to Section 98.

This article does not analyse Sections 20 to 24, 22, 35, or 37 to 44. The titles of Sections 20 to 24 are given to show where the Sanhita deals with the five grounds; Section 35's keying of the right to offences is quoted because it is what makes Section 36 necessary; Sections 37 to 43 are named as the provisions on restrictions, extent and duration. Their ingredients are not examined. In particular, the provisions under which a person acting under a misconception commits no offence were not analysed, and the article's account of why Illustration (b)'s Z is innocent is deliberately left to those provisions.

Four judgments were read or consulted. Rizan was retrieved and the quoted passage verified directly in it. It was first encountered as a quotation inside Gajey Singh, and was obtained rather than cited second-hand. Gajey Singh reproduces the private-defence sections as a block and does not apply Section 98 to its facts. Darshan Singh is relied on only for principle (ix). Captain Baliram Bhaskarrao Shinde was identified from the search set and its reference to Section 98 examined, but it was not read in full. All were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched beyond the repository's citation counts (Rizan 165, Gajey Singh 12, Darshan Singh 228).

Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394 and V. Subramani v. State of T.N. (2005) 10 SCC 358 appear only as decisions referred to within Gajey Singh and were not retrieved or read. Ram Prasad Ahir v. State (1958), Raising Mohmia v. State of Gujarat (1961), Sanjay Subba v. State of Sikkim (2017), Ram Awadh Pandey v. State of U.P. (2016) and State of Karnataka v. Vishwanatha Devadiga (2019) appear only as results of a phrase search and were not read.

Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: that Section 36 exists to close the gap created by the right being keyed to offences; that "misconception" uniquely among the five grounds has no dedicated exception; that Section 36 asks functionally rather than by section number; the observation that under Illustration (b) both parties may lawfully use force; and the characterisation that Section 36 is recited rather than construed in litigation. That last is based on examination of a subset of the twelve search results, not all of them.

Only a subset of the twelve documents matching the operative phrase was examined. The statement that no judgment construing BNS Section 36 was located rests on a verified nil return for the section-number phrase.

That the Sanhita has eliminated "madness", "lunatic", "insane" and "idiot" is verified as a fact about the texts. No legislative rationale for the substitution was located and none is asserted, and nothing here should be read as a claim about Parliament's intention.

Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred. Nothing here addresses the law relating to mental illness, capacity, or the treatment of persons of unsound mind, which the Sanhita does not govern.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a right of private defence arose under Section 36, and how far it extended, depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What problem does BNS Section 36 solve?
The right of private defence under Section 35 is keyed to the attacking conduct being an offence - in Darshan Singh the Supreme Court said the Code 'confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence'. S6 But Chapter III itself provides that a child under seven (Section 20), a child of immature understanding (Section 21), a person of unsound mind (Section 22) and a person involuntarily intoxicated (Section 23) commit no offence. S1 Without Section 36, a person attacked by any of them would have no right of private defence at all. Section 36 restores it by providing that he has 'the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.' That reading of the section's purpose is the author's analysis.
+Does Section 36 make the attacker guilty of something?
No. It operates only on the rights of the person attacked. Illustration (a) states that 'Z is guilty of no offence' and Illustration (b) that Z 'commits no offence'. S1 Section 36 works by a legal fiction - treating the position as if the act were the offence it would otherwise have been - not by re-criminalising the attacker.
+What are the five grounds in Section 36?
That the act is not the offence it would otherwise be by reason of (1) the youth of the person doing it, (2) the want of maturity of understanding, (3) the unsoundness of mind, (4) the intoxication of that person, or (5) any misconception on his part. S1 The marginal note names unsoundness of mind and adds 'etc.' for that reason. Note that the section does not cross-refer to Sections 20 to 24 at all - it asks functionally why the act is not an offence.
+Which exceptions do those grounds correspond to?
Four of them map onto identifiable General Exceptions, whose official titles are: Section 20 'Act of a child under seven years of age.'; Section 21 'Act of a child above seven and under twelve years of age of immature understanding.'; Section 22 'Act of a person of unsound mind.'; and Section 23 'Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.' S1 The fifth ground, misconception, has no dedicated exception of its own; the provisions under which such a person commits no offence lie elsewhere and were not analysed for this article. This article does not analyse Sections 20 to 24 either.
+Can two people both be acting lawfully at the same time?
Under Illustration (b), yes. A enters by night a house 'which he is legally entitled to enter'; Z, 'in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A'; the illustration says Z 'commits no offence'; and it then says A nonetheless has the same right of private defence against Z that he would have had if Z were not acting under that misconception. S1 So each may lawfully use force against the other. That follows from the section's structure, which asks only whether the act would otherwise be an offence and not whether the actor is blameworthy. That observation is the author's analysis.
+Does Section 36 give a wider right because the attacker is not responsible?
No. The words are 'the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence' - the same, not a greater right. S1 The person attacked is placed in the position he would have occupied had the attacker been fully responsible, and no better.
+Are the restrictions on private defence still applicable?
Yes. In Rizan and Another v. State of Chhattisgarh the Supreme Court said: 'Section 99 lays down limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99.' S7 IPC Section 98 is the predecessor of Section 36 and Section 99 of Section 37 - the provision to which Section 35 expressly makes the right subject. S1 The extent and duration of the right remain governed by Sections 38 to 43, which this article does not analyse.
+How did the BNS change IPC Section 98?
By four words in an illustration. A word-level diff gives 166 tokens on each side with one change: Illustration (a) opened 'Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A' in the IPC and opens 'Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A' in the Sanhita. S1S4 The marginal-note title also drops a definite article. The operative five grounds, the legal fiction and the whole of Illustration (b) are untouched.
+Is that terminology change part of a wider pattern?
It is, and the arithmetic confirms it. A word-frequency scan across the full text of both codes gives: 'madness' IPC 1, BNS 0; 'lunatic' IPC 1, BNS 0; 'insane' IPC 4, BNS 0; 'idiot' IPC 1, BNS 0; 'unsound mind' IPC 5, BNS 6. S1S4 The single occurrence of 'madness' in the entire Indian Penal Code was located to Section 98 itself, and 'unsound mind' rises by exactly one - this substitution. So the Sanhita has eliminated 'madness', 'lunatic', 'insane' and 'idiot' entirely while retaining and extending 'unsound mind'. That is a verified fact about the texts. Whether it reflects a deliberate drafting policy is NOT asserted here: no legislative rationale was located.
+Does the change mean 'sane' has also been removed?
No - and this is a small but telling detail. Illustration (a) still closes with the words 'which he would have if Z were sane'. S1 So 'sane' survives in the Sanhita in this very illustration even though 'insane' appears nowhere in it. The substitution affected only the opening description of Z.
+Does Section 36 change the law on unsoundness of mind as a defence?
No. Section 36 is about the rights of the person attacked, not about the attacker's liability. Section 22 remains the exception for an act of a person of unsound mind, and this article does not analyse it. S1 Nothing in Section 36 or in the terminology substitution bears on the scope of that exception.
+Are there any judgments on BNS Section 36?
None was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase 'section 36 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned a page of 17,079 bytes containing 'No matching results' with zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S8
+Is there much case law on the predecessor provision?
Surprisingly little that construes it. A search for the exact operative phrase 'every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence' returned twelve documents, of which four are statute pages. S8 In the judgments examined, Section 98 appears as part of a block recital of the private-defence scheme rather than as the operative provision - State of U.P. v. Gajey Singh (Supreme Court, 2009) reproduces Sections 96 to 99 in full and then quotes Rizan, but does not apply Section 98 to its facts. S9 The characterisation that Section 36 is recited rather than construed is the author's, based on a subset of the twelve results.
+Can IPC-era decisions be relied on for Section 36?
Its operative words are identical to those of IPC Section 98, so reasoning on Section 98 construes the same language. But Rizan, Gajey Singh, Darshan Singh and Captain Baliram Bhaskarrao Shinde are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita. S6S7S8S9 Whether Section 36 applies to any particular facts depends on findings only a court can make, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 36 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S6Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 15 January 2010; equivalent citations AIR 2010 SC 1212, (2010) 2 SCC 333; Bench of Dalveer Bhandari and Asok Kumar Ganguly, JJ. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S7Rizan and Another v. State of Chhattisgarh — Supreme Court of India, 21 January 2003; equivalent citations AIR 2003 SC 976, (2003) 2 SCC 661; Bench of Shivaraj V. Patil and Arijit Pasayat, JJ., judgment delivered by Arijit Pasayat, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S8Indian Kanoon (judgment-text repository) — search result pages for the exact phrase "section 36 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" and for the exact phrase "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence" (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S9State of U.P. v. Gajey Singh and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 24 February 2009; Bench of Dalveer Bhandari and Harjit Singh Bedi, JJ., judgment delivered by Dalveer Bhandari, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)

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