What the section says
Section 36 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc. and reads: S1S2
36. When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
Illustrations.
(a) Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3
The problem this section exists to solve
Section 35 confers the right of private defence of the body "against any offence affecting the human body", and of property against acts falling within four named offence definitions. S1 The right is keyed to the attacking conduct being an offence.
The Supreme Court has put the point squarely. In Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab the ninth of the ten principles set out at paragraph 58 is that "The Indian Penal Code confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence." S6
That creates an obvious gap. Chapter III of the Sanhita itself provides that certain acts are not offences when done by certain people. A child under seven commits no offence (Section 20); a child between seven and twelve of immature understanding commits none (Section 21); a person of unsound mind who cannot know the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law commits none (Section 22); and a person incapable of judgment through intoxication caused against his will commits none (Section 23). S1 Without more, a person attacked by any of them would have no right of private defence at all, because the attacking act would not be an offence.
Section 36 closes that gap. It does not say the attacker is guilty of anything. It says that the person attacked "has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence." S1 The right is restored by a legal fiction, not by re-criminalising the attacker.
The five grounds
Section 36 lists five reasons why an act might not be the offence it would otherwise be: S1
| Ground in s. 36 | Where the Sanhita deals with it |
|---|---|
| the youth of the person doing the act | Section 20: act of a child under seven years of age |
| the want of maturity of understanding | Section 21: act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding |
| the unsoundness of mind | Section 22: act of a person of unsound mind |
| the intoxication of the person | Section 23: act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will; and see Section 24 |
| any misconception on the part of that person | No single corresponding exception; see below |
The first four map onto identifiable General Exceptions, whose titles are given above as verified from the statute. The fifth does not, and that is the most interesting feature of the section.
"Misconception" has no dedicated exception of its own. It is not a Chapter III heading. What Illustration (b) describes is a person acting under a mistaken belief in good faith, Z takes A for a house-breaker, and the illustration states flatly that Z "commits no offence". The reason Z commits no offence is not stated in Section 36; it lies elsewhere, in the provisions on acts done by a person who by reason of a mistake of fact in good faith believes himself bound or justified by law, which are not analysed in this article. What Section 36 does is take the consequence, that there is no offence, and restore the right of private defence against it. That reading of the relationship is the author's analysis; no authority on it was located.
Note also that Section 36's list is framed by reference to why the act is not an offence, not by reference to particular sections. It does not cross-refer to Sections 20 to 24 at all. S1 So the question under Section 36 is functional: was the act not an offence for one of these five reasons?
The two illustrations, and what each adds
Illustration (a) is the straightforward case: "Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane." S1 The phrase "if Z were sane" makes the fiction explicit. A's position is assessed as though the attacker were fully responsible.
Illustration (b) is the more instructive, because both parties are innocent. A is lawfully entering a house he is "legally entitled to enter". Z attacks him "in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker". The illustration says Z "commits no offence", and then says A nonetheless has the full right of private defence against Z. S1
So Section 36 produces a situation in which two people may lawfully use force against each other, each protected: Z because his misconception means he commits no offence, A because Section 36 gives him the right of private defence notwithstanding. That is not a drafting accident: it follows directly from the section's structure, which asks only whether the act would otherwise be an offence and not whether the actor is blameworthy. That observation is the author's analysis; no authority stating it was located.
A further point about Illustration (b) worth noticing. The right it gives A is a right of private defence against Z's attack, which is an attack on A's body. It is not a right arising from A's entitlement to enter the house. Section 36 operates on the attack, not on the underlying property dispute.
What the section does not do
Three limits follow from the words, and all three are important.
It does not extend the right beyond what Section 35 would have given. The right conferred is "the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence": the same, not a greater right. S1 So the attacked person is in the position he would have occupied had the attacker been fully responsible, and no better.
It does not escape the restrictions. The Supreme Court stated the structural position in Rizan & Another v. State of Chhattisgarh, decided on 21 January 2003 and reported as AIR 2003 SC 976 and (2003) 2 SCC 661, the judgment being delivered by Arijit Pasayat, J. for a Bench of himself and Shivaraj V. Patil, J.: S7
"Section 99 lays down limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99."
Section 98 of the IPC is the predecessor of Section 36, and Section 99 is the predecessor of Section 37: the provision Section 35 expressly makes the right subject to. So the right that Section 36 restores is controlled in the same way as any other. The appeal in Rizan was dismissed as being without merit. S7
It does not fix the extent of the right. How far the right goes, whether to causing death or only to lesser harm: is in Sections 38 and 39 for the body and Sections 41 and 42 for property, and when it begins and ends is in Sections 40 and 43. None of those is analysed here.
The one textual change: "madness" out, "unsound mind" in
Section 36 reproduces Section 98 of the Indian Penal Code with a single substantive alteration, and it is in Illustration (a).
The texts were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes and the Sanhita's double-hyphens, apostrophes, the section number, the marginal-note title and a trailing page number in the source. Both sides produce 166 tokens, and the diff returns one change: S1S4
| Illustration (a) opens | |
|---|---|
| IPC s. 98 | "Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A" |
| BNS s. 36 | "Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A" |
The marginal-note title also drops a definite article, from "Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc." to "Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc." S1S4
This is a small change with a verifiable context. A word-frequency scan across both codes shows the following: S1S4
| Word | Indian Penal Code | Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita |
|---|---|---|
| "madness" | 1 | 0 |
| "lunatic" | 1 | 0 |
| "insane" | 4 | 0 |
| "idiot" | 1 | 0 |
| "unsound mind" | 5 | 6 |
The single occurrence of "madness" in the whole Indian Penal Code was in Section 98: verified by locating it. S4 The Sanhita contains none. And the count of "unsound mind" rises by exactly one, from five to six, which is this substitution. The arithmetic matches the change.
That the Sanhita has eliminated "madness", "lunatic", "insane" and "idiot" entirely while retaining and extending "unsound mind" is a verified fact about the two texts. Whether it reflects a deliberate drafting policy is not something this article asserts: no section-specific legislative rationale for Section 36, and no stated rationale for the terminology substitution, was located. The pattern is reported; the motive is not.
It is also worth being precise about what the change does not do. It does not alter the ground. The operative words of Section 36 already said "the unsoundness of mind" before the change and say it still; only the illustration's wording moved. And the illustration's closing words remain "which he would have if Z were sane" — so "sane" survives in the Sanhita even though "insane" does not. S1
| Feature | IPC s. 98 | BNS s. 36 |
|---|---|---|
| Operative words | Identical (five grounds, same fiction) | Identical |
| Illustration (a) opening | "under the influence of madness" | "a person of unsound mind" |
| Illustration (a) closing | "if Z were sane" | "if Z were sane" |
| Illustration (b) | Identical (misconception, house-breaker) | Identical |
| Marginal-note title | "against the act of a person…" | "against act of a person…" |
The correct classification is modified, on account of the illustration and the title, with the rule itself substantively unchanged.
Case law
No judgment construing Section 36 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 36 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page of 17,079 bytes containing the string "No matching results", with zero result entries. The page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S8
Authority on the predecessor is thin, and the reason is worth stating. A search for the exact operative phrase "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence" returned twelve documents, of which four are statute pages. S8 In the judgments examined, Section 98 appears as part of a block recital of the private-defence scheme rather than as the operative provision.
State of U.P. v. Gajey Singh, decided by the Supreme Court on 24 February 2009, reproduces Sections 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the IPC in full as a block, and then quotes the Rizan passage set out above. S9 Its own discussion concerns the effect of non-explanation of injuries on the accused and the extent of the right where death is caused; Section 98 is not applied to the facts. The appeal was dismissed as "devoid of any merit". S9
Captain Baliram Bhaskarrao Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, a decision of the Bombay High Court of 24 December 2025, likewise describes Section 98 of the Indian Penal Code in the course of setting out the private-defence provisions. S8 It is an IPC case notwithstanding its date.
So the honest position is that the operative provision in litigation is almost always Section 35 (or Sections 38 to 43), and Section 36 is recited rather than construed. That is an observation about the documents examined, not a claim about reported case law generally; only a subset of the twelve was examined, and the characterisation is the author's.
Because the operative words of Section 36 are identical to those of Section 98, reasoning on Section 98 construes the same language. But Rizan, Gajey Singh, Darshan Singh and Captain Shinde are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.
Common misconceptions
"If the attacker commits no offence, I cannot defend myself." That is exactly the position Section 36 reverses. Where the act is not an offence by reason of youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind, intoxication or misconception, "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence." S1
"Section 36 makes the attacker guilty." It does not. Illustration (a) says "Z is guilty of no offence" and Illustration (b) says Z "commits no offence". S1 Section 36 operates only on the rights of the person attacked.
"It only applies to people of unsound mind." The marginal note names unsoundness of mind and adds "etc." for a reason: the section lists five grounds, including the youth of the attacker, want of maturity of understanding, intoxication and misconception. S1
"Both people cannot be in the right." Under Illustration (b) they can. Z attacks A under a good-faith misconception and "commits no offence"; A nonetheless has the full right of private defence against Z. S1
"Section 36 gives a wider right because the attacker is not responsible." No. It gives "the same right … which he would have if the act were that offence": no more. S1 And on Rizan the right given by the predecessor provision "is controlled by Section 99", now Section 37. S7
"The BNS changed this provision." It changed four words in an illustration. "Z, under the influence of madness" became "Z, a person of unsound mind"; the operative five grounds, the legal fiction and Illustration (b) are untouched across 166 tokens. S1S4 No legislative rationale for the change was located.
"The Sanhita has abolished the insanity defence." Nothing in Section 36 bears on that, and the terminology change does not. Section 22 remains the exception for an act of a person of unsound mind, and this article does not analyse it.
Reading the section in practice
- Was the attacking act one that would otherwise be an offence? If it would not be an offence for any reason, Section 36 does not assist. The section presupposes conduct that is an offence but for one of the five grounds.
- Is the reason it is not an offence one of the five? Youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or misconception. The section asks functionally, not by section number.
- If so, assess the defender's position as though the attacker were fully responsible. That is what "the same right … as if the act were that offence" does.
- Then apply the ordinary limits. Section 37's restrictions, and the extent and duration provisions in Sections 38 to 43, apply as they would in any other case.
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS and the IPC as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff, and the terminology counts were produced by a word-frequency scan across the full text of both codes, with the single IPC occurrence of "madness" located to Section 98.
This article does not analyse Sections 20 to 24, 22, 35, or 37 to 44. The titles of Sections 20 to 24 are given to show where the Sanhita deals with the five grounds; Section 35's keying of the right to offences is quoted because it is what makes Section 36 necessary; Sections 37 to 43 are named as the provisions on restrictions, extent and duration. Their ingredients are not examined. In particular, the provisions under which a person acting under a misconception commits no offence were not analysed, and the article's account of why Illustration (b)'s Z is innocent is deliberately left to those provisions.
Four judgments were read or consulted. Rizan was retrieved and the quoted passage verified directly in it. It was first encountered as a quotation inside Gajey Singh, and was obtained rather than cited second-hand. Gajey Singh reproduces the private-defence sections as a block and does not apply Section 98 to its facts. Darshan Singh is relied on only for principle (ix). Captain Baliram Bhaskarrao Shinde was identified from the search set and its reference to Section 98 examined, but it was not read in full. All were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched beyond the repository's citation counts (Rizan 165, Gajey Singh 12, Darshan Singh 228).
Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394 and V. Subramani v. State of T.N. (2005) 10 SCC 358 appear only as decisions referred to within Gajey Singh and were not retrieved or read. Ram Prasad Ahir v. State (1958), Raising Mohmia v. State of Gujarat (1961), Sanjay Subba v. State of Sikkim (2017), Ram Awadh Pandey v. State of U.P. (2016) and State of Karnataka v. Vishwanatha Devadiga (2019) appear only as results of a phrase search and were not read.
Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: that Section 36 exists to close the gap created by the right being keyed to offences; that "misconception" uniquely among the five grounds has no dedicated exception; that Section 36 asks functionally rather than by section number; the observation that under Illustration (b) both parties may lawfully use force; and the characterisation that Section 36 is recited rather than construed in litigation. That last is based on examination of a subset of the twelve search results, not all of them.
Only a subset of the twelve documents matching the operative phrase was examined. The statement that no judgment construing BNS Section 36 was located rests on a verified nil return for the section-number phrase.
That the Sanhita has eliminated "madness", "lunatic", "insane" and "idiot" is verified as a fact about the texts. No legislative rationale for the substitution was located and none is asserted, and nothing here should be read as a claim about Parliament's intention.
Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred. Nothing here addresses the law relating to mental illness, capacity, or the treatment of persons of unsound mind, which the Sanhita does not govern.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a right of private defence arose under Section 36, and how far it extended, depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.