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BNS Section 35 · Deep dive

BNS Section 35: Who Has the Right of Private Defence, and Against What

Section 34 says that nothing done in exercise of the right of private defence is an offence; BNS Section 35 is the provision that says there is such a right, who has it and what it protects. It confers on 'every person' a right, 'subject to the restrictions contained in section 37', to defend two things, and the two limbs are drafted quite differently. Limb (a) protects 'his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body' - a reference to a statutory category, verified against the Gazette text as Chapter VI of the Sanhita, which runs from Section 100 to Section 146. Limb (b) protects property 'whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person' but only against four named offences and their attempts: theft (Section 303), robbery (Section 309), mischief (Section 324) and criminal trespass (Section 329(1)). Both limbs expressly extend to 'any other person', so on the words of the section no relationship, request or proprietary interest is needed to defend a stranger. The Supreme Court in Jassa Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) described the predecessor as dividing the right into two such parts, and held that because criminal trespass is not among the offences enumerated in Section 103 IPC the right of private defence of property 'will not extend to the causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land' - a conclusion about extent rather than existence, and one this article expressly does not carry over to the Sanhita's Section 41 without verification. On whose property may be defended, Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration (1967) holds that a trespasser in settled possession may defend it 'even against the rightful owner', that settled possession must extend 'over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner', that stray or intermittent trespass gives no such right, and that where possession has not matured the true owner 'may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary'. Section 35 reproduces IPC Section 97's substance exactly across 78 tokens; the only changes are the cross-reference from Section 99 to Section 37 and the relabelling of First and Secondly as (a) and (b). One research hazard dominates the section: a search for 'section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returns thirty-three documents, but a combined search with 'private defence' returns nothing, because those documents concern Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita - the notice-to-appear provision - and BNS Section 35 has no sub-section (3) at all.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 27 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 35 — Right of private defence of body and of property
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 97 — Right of private defence of the body and of property · modified
Section 99 — Acts against which there is no right of private defence · renumbered
Chapter XVI (offences affecting the human body) — The category to which limb (a) refers · renumbered
Section 378, 390, 425, 441 — Theft; Robbery; Mischief; Criminal trespass (the four definitions to which limb (b) refers) · renumbered
Section 103 — When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death · renumbered
No earlier equivalent · newly introduced
Side-by-side converterIPC 97 → BNS 35

What the section says

Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Right of private defence of body and of property. and reads: S1S2

35. Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 37, to defend—

(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;

(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.

Section 34 provides that nothing done in exercise of the right of private defence is an offence. Section 35 is the provision that says there is such a right, who has it, and what it may be used to protect. It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3

The Supreme Court described the structure of the predecessor provision in Jassa Singh v. State of Haryana, decided on 8 January 2002 and reported as AIR 2002 SC 520 and (2002) 2 SCC 481: S7

"Section 96 IPC lays down that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence and Section 97 proceeds to divide the right of private defence into two parts --- the first part relating to private defence of his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting him; and the second part deals with the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass."

One small matter of accuracy about that passage. The Court's paraphrase of the first limb reads "against any offence affecting him", whereas the statutory words, in the IPC then and in Section 35(a) now, are "against any offence affecting the human body". S1S4 The difference matters, because the statutory phrase is a reference to a category of offences, not to whoever is affected. The second limb is quoted by the Court verbatim.

"Every person": the right to defend others

The right is conferred on "every person", and both limbs expressly extend beyond the defender himself: limb (a) covers "his own body, and the body of any other person", and limb (b) covers property "of himself or of any other person". S1

There is no requirement of relationship, no requirement of a request for help, and no requirement that the defender have any interest in the property. On the words of the section, a stranger who intervenes to protect a stranger is exercising the same right as the victim would have. That is a reading of the statutory language; it is also implicit in Jassa Singh's summary quoted above, which reproduces both "any other person" limbs.

Limb (a): offences affecting the human body

The first limb is keyed to a statutory category: "any offence affecting the human body." That category is not defined in Section 35, but the Sanhita contains a chapter of exactly that name. Verified against the Gazette text, Chapter VI is headed "Of Offences Affecting the Human Body" and runs from Section 100 to Section 146: it opens with culpable homicide in Section 100 and ends with unlawful compulsory labour in Section 146, Chapter VII ("Of Offences Against the State") beginning at Section 147. S1

The breadth of limb (a) is therefore considerable: it is not confined to attacks threatening death or grievous hurt but reaches any offence within that category. What the right permits in response is a different question entirely, governed by Sections 38 and 39: death only in the circumstances Section 38 specifies, and otherwise harm short of death. Those sections are not analysed here.

Limb (a) also has to be read with Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab principle (ix), that the right is conferred "only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence". S6 Conduct that is objectionable but not an offence affecting the human body does not engage limb (a) at all. That is precisely why Section 36 exists: where the attacker commits no offence because of youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind, intoxication or misconception, Section 36 restores the right that limb (a) would otherwise withhold. S1

Limb (b): a closed list of four offences

The property limb is drafted quite differently, and much more narrowly. It does not refer to a chapter or to "any offence affecting property". It names four offences and their attempts:

Offence in limb (b)Defined in the Sanhita by
theftSection 303
robberySection 309
mischiefSection 324
criminal trespassSection 329(1)

All four section numbers were verified against the official titles and text. S1

Two features of the drafting deserve attention.

The list is exhaustive, and it is a list of definitions. The words are "any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass". So the question is not whether property is threatened but whether the threatening act falls within one of those four definitions. An interference with property that is a civil wrong, or an offence of some other description, is not within limb (b) on these words. That is a reading of the statutory language; no authority deciding the point was located.

Attempts are expressly included. Limb (b) covers an act which "is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass". S1 Read with Darshan Singh principle (iii): that "it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence" and a reasonable apprehension suffices. The right does not wait for the property offence to be completed. S6

How far the property limb goes: the open-land limit

Limb (b) confers the right; it does not say how much force it permits. That is in Sections 41 and 42. But one consequence of the interaction is important enough that the Supreme Court has had to spell it out, because it is widely misunderstood.

In Jassa Singh the Court explained that the right of private defence of property extends to causing death only in the cases enumerated in Section 103 of the IPC, and that criminal trespass is not among them: S7

"Though private defence is available in respect of criminal trespass or mischief as against the property owned by himself or of any other person, but criminal trespass is not enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103 IPC. Therefore, the right of private defence of property will not extend to the causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land. Only a house-trespass committed under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence is enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103."

The Court also quoted its earlier observation in State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi (AIR 1998 SC 3016): S7

"Though there would be right of private defence under Section 97 IPC when offence of criminal trespass or attempting criminal trespass is committed, under Section 103 IPC it is only in the case of house trespass that right of private defence can extend to causing death."

So the right exists against criminal trespass under limb (b), but what it permits is limited. The distinction is between the existence of the right, which is Section 35's business, and its extent, which is not. The counterpart of IPC Section 103 in the Sanhita is Section 41, and this article does not analyse Section 41 or verify that its enumerated cases are the same as Section 103's: Jassa Singh is a decision on the IPC, and whether the Sanhita's list differs is a question for the article on Section 41. A reader should not assume the open-land conclusion carries over without checking Section 41's terms.

Defending possession: Munshi Ram

A recurring question under limb (b) is whose property it has to be. The leading authority is Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, decided by the Supreme Court on 27 November 1967 and reported as AIR 1968 SC 702 and 1968 SCR (2) 408, the judgment being delivered by K.S. Hegde, J. The passage below is taken from the judgment itself and not from the report's headnote, which paraphrases it closely: S8

"It is true that no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But stray, or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which has never been lost. The persons in possession by a stray act of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time, to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force."

Four propositions are packed into that passage, and they cut in both directions. A trespasser in settled possession may defend it even against the true owner. Settled possession requires occupation "extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner". Stray, intermittent or casual acts of possession do not qualify. And where possession has not matured, the true owner may re-enter and use necessary force, but no more.

In Munshi Ram the appeal was allowed, the convictions of the appellants were set aside and they were acquitted. S8

Two cautions. Munshi Ram is a decision on Section 97 of the IPC, whose relevant words Section 35(b) reproduces exactly, but it is not a decision on Section 35 of the Sanhita. And "settled possession" is not a statutory expression: it appears nowhere in Section 35 or in the Sanhita's definitions of the four offences. It is a judicial gloss on what it means for property to be "of himself or of any other person" for the purposes of defending it. That characterisation is the author's; the Court did not describe it in those terms.

"Subject to the restrictions contained in section 37"

The right in Section 35 is not freestanding. The section opens by making it "subject to the restrictions contained in section 37", which is headed "Acts against which there is no right of private defence" and begins "There is no right of private defence, —". S1 Section 37's clauses (a) and (b) concern acts done, or directed, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office which do not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt.

Section 37 is not analysed here; it is the subject of its own article. What matters for Section 35 is structural: the restrictions are built into the conferring provision, so a plea under Section 34 founded on Section 35 has to clear Section 37 before anything else is considered.

IPC Section 97 compared with BNS Section 35

The texts were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes, the section number and the marginal-note title, but deliberately without normalising the clause labels, so that the presentational changes would show. Both sides produce 78 tokens, and the diff returns three classes of difference: S1S4

ChangeIPC s. 97BNS s. 35
Cross-reference"restrictions contained in section 99""restrictions contained in section 37"
Clause label"First.—His own body…""(a) his own body…"
Clause label"Secondly.—The property…""(b) the property…"
Marginal-note title"Right of private defence of the body and of property""Right of private defence of body and of property."

Only the first is substantive, and even that is a consequence of renumbering rather than a change of rule: IPC Section 99 was the restrictions provision and Section 37 is its counterpart. Everything that matters ("every person", both "any other person" limbs, "any offence affecting the human body", the closed list of four property offences and their attempts) is carried over word for word.

The correct classification is therefore modified, on account of the updated cross-reference and the relabelling, with the substance substantively unchanged. No section-specific legislative rationale was located, and none is asserted.

A research hazard: "Section 35 BNS" usually means something else

Anyone searching for authority on this section will meet the same difficulty encountered with Section 34, in a different form.

A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned thirty-three documents. S9 A combined search for that phrase together with "private defence" returned a page reading "No matching results" with zero result entries: verified by retrieving the page directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S9

Examination of documents from the result set shows why. They refer to "Section 35(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023": in contexts such as a police notice directing a person to appear, compliance with such a notice, and directions that its provisions "shall be strictly followed". S9 That is not this section. Section 35 of the BNS has no sub-section (3) at all: a check of its text confirms it contains no numbered sub-sections, only clauses (a) and (b). S1

The provision those orders are concerned with is Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, verified from the Gazette text, which provides that a police officer "shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under sub-section (1) issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice." S10 BNSS Section 35(1) is the power to arrest without warrant.

So where Section 34 attracts citations meant for the old IPC number (common intention, now Section 3(5)), Section 35 attracts citations meant for the wrong Sanhita: the procedural code rather than the penal one. In both cases the practical advice is the same: check the citation against the statute. A reference to "Section 35(3) BNS" cannot be to this provision, and a document discussing arrest notices is not discussing private defence. The inference that these are BNS/BNSS slips is the author's reading; this article does not assert what any particular record intended, and no court has been found to have commented on the pattern.

No judgment construing Section 35 of the Sanhita as the private-defence provision was located.

By contrast the statutory wording of the predecessor returns real authority: the exact phrase "the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person" returned 120 documents, including Munshi Ram, Jassa Singh, Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi and Manjeet Singh v. State of H.P. S9 Of these, Munshi Ram and Jassa Singh were retrieved and read for this article; the others were not.

Common misconceptions

"You can only defend yourself." No. Both limbs expressly extend to "any other person", and the right is conferred on "every person". S1 No relationship, request or proprietary interest is required on the words of the section.

"Private defence of property covers anything done to your property." No. Limb (b) is a closed list: theft, robbery, mischief, criminal trespass, and attempts at those four. S1 The question is whether the act falls within one of those definitions.

"You can kill to stop a trespasser." Not on open land, on the authority as it stood under the IPC. In Jassa Singh the Court held that because criminal trespass is not among the offences enumerated in Section 103 IPC, "the right of private defence of property will not extend to the causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land." S7 Whether the Sanhita's counterpart, Section 41, enumerates the same cases was not verified for this article.

"A trespasser has no rights against the owner." Not where possession is settled. Munshi Ram: "no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land", and in such a case the trespasser "is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner." S8 But stray or intermittent trespass gives no such right.

"The owner can always use force to get his land back." Only necessary force, and only where possession has not matured. Munshi Ram: "The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary." S8

"Section 35 tells you how much force you may use." It does not. It confers the right and identifies what may be defended. The extent of the right is in Sections 38 and 39 (body) and 41 and 42 (property), and its commencement and continuance in Sections 40 and 43: none of which is analysed here. S1

"Section 35(3) BNS is about private defence." There is no Section 35(3) of the BNS. Section 35 contains clauses (a) and (b) and no numbered sub-sections. S1 Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the notice-to-appear provision. S10

"The BNS changed the right of private defence." Section 35's substance is unchanged from IPC Section 97 across 78 tokens; the differences are the cross-reference from Section 99 to Section 37 and the relabelling of First and Secondly as (a) and (b). S1S4

Reading the section in practice

  1. Does Section 37 take the right away? The right is expressly subject to those restrictions.
  2. Body or property? The two limbs are drafted differently and the difference is not stylistic.
  3. For the body: was the threatened conduct an offence affecting the human body? That is the category in Chapter VI, Sections 100 to 146. If the conduct was no offence at all, consider Section 36.
  4. For property: does the act fall within one of the four definitions, or an attempt at one? Theft (Section 303), robbery (Section 309), mischief (Section 324), criminal trespass (Section 329(1)).
  5. Whose property, and who was in possession? On Munshi Ram, settled possession can be defended even against the true owner; stray trespass cannot.
  6. Then, separately, ask how far the right extends: Sections 38, 39, 41, 42: and whether it had begun and not ended, under Sections 40 and 43.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the BNSS and the IPC as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S10 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff run without normalising clause labels, so that presentational changes would appear. Chapter VI's heading and extent, and the section numbers of theft, robbery, mischief and criminal trespass, were verified against the Gazette text and the official titles rather than assumed.

This article does not analyse Sections 36 to 44. Section 37's heading and opening words are quoted to show that the restrictions exist and where they are; Sections 38 to 43 are identified as the provisions governing extent, commencement and continuance. Their ingredients are not examined, and in particular it is not verified whether Section 41 of the Sanhita enumerates the same cases as Section 103 of the IPC, so the open-land conclusion in Jassa Singh should not be assumed to carry over without checking.

Three judgments were read: Munshi Ram, Jassa Singh and (for principles (iii) and (ix)) Darshan Singh. All three are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and not on the Sanhita. The Munshi Ram passage quoted is from the judgment text, the report's headnote having been identified and set aside. Jassa Singh's open-land holding depends on Section 103 IPC, as explained above. All were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched beyond the repository's citation counts (Munshi Ram 489, Jassa Singh 17, Darshan Singh 228).

State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi (AIR 1998 SC 3016) appears only as quoted within Jassa Singh; the original was not retrieved or read. Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Manjeet Singh v. State of H.P. appear only as results of a phrase search and were not read.

Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: that limb (b)'s list is exhaustive and operates by reference to definitions rather than to threatened property generally; that no relationship or interest is required to defend another's body or property; that "settled possession" is a judicial gloss rather than a statutory concept; and the reading of the Section 35 / BNSS Section 35(3) mis-citation pattern. The article records that Jassa Singh's paraphrase of the first limb ("affecting him") differs from the statutory words ("affecting the human body").

The thirty-three documents matching "section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" were not all retrieved; the conclusion that none concerns private defence rests on the verified nil return for the combined phrase search together with examination of documents from the result set. This is a weaker basis than the exhaustive document-by-document check performed for Section 34, and is stated as such.

Procedural questions under the BNSS were not examined beyond quoting Section 35(3) to identify it, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a right of private defence existed, and how far it extended, depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 35 do?
It confers the right of private defence and identifies what may be defended. Section 34 provides that nothing done in exercise of the right is an offence; Section 35 says that 'Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 37, to defend' (a) his own body and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the human body, and (b) property, movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass or an attempt at any of those. S1 It does not say how much force may be used - that is in Sections 38, 39, 41 and 42.
+Can I use private defence to protect someone else?
On the words of the section, yes. The right belongs to 'every person', and both limbs expressly extend beyond the defender: limb (a) covers 'his own body, and the body of any other person', and limb (b) covers property 'of himself or of any other person'. S1 There is no requirement of relationship, of a request for help, or of any interest in the property. That is a reading of the statutory language, and it is also reflected in the Supreme Court's summary of the provision in Jassa Singh. S7
+What counts as 'any offence affecting the human body'?
It is a reference to a statutory category. Verified against the Gazette text, Chapter VI of the Sanhita is headed 'Of Offences Affecting the Human Body' and runs from Section 100 (culpable homicide) to Section 146 (unlawful compulsory labour), Chapter VII beginning at Section 147. S1 Limb (a) is therefore broad and is not confined to attacks threatening death or grievous hurt. What the right permits in response is a separate question under Sections 38 and 39, which this article does not analyse.
+Does the right of private defence of property cover anything done to my property?
No. Limb (b) is a closed list and operates by reference to definitions: 'any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit' one of those. S1 In the Sanhita those definitions are theft Section 303, robbery Section 309, mischief Section 324 and criminal trespass Section 329(1). An interference with property that is a civil wrong, or an offence of some other description, is outside limb (b) on these words. That reading is the author's; no authority deciding the point was located.
+Do I have to wait until the theft actually happens?
No. Limb (b) expressly covers 'an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass'. S1 And on Darshan Singh principle (iii), 'it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence to give rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and it is likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.' S6
+Can I kill someone to stop them trespassing on my land?
On the authority as it stood under the IPC, not where the land is open land. In Jassa Singh v. State of Haryana the Supreme Court held that 'Though private defence is available in respect of criminal trespass or mischief as against the property owned by himself or of any other person, but criminal trespass is not enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103 IPC. Therefore, the right of private defence of property will not extend to the causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land. Only a house-trespass committed under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence is enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103.' S7 IMPORTANT: that turns on Section 103 of the IPC. Whether the Sanhita's counterpart, Section 41, enumerates the same cases was NOT verified for this article, and the conclusion should not be assumed to carry over without checking Section 41.
+Can a trespasser claim private defence against the real owner?
Where his possession is settled, yes. In Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration the Supreme Court held that 'no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner.' S8 But 'stray, or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right', and settled possession 'must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner'. Note that 'settled possession' is a judicial expression and appears nowhere in Section 35 - that characterisation is the author's.
+If someone occupies my land, can I throw them off?
Only with necessary force, and only where their possession has not matured into settled possession. Munshi Ram: 'The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which has never been lost.' The Court added that persons in possession by a stray act of trespass 'constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time, to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force.' S8 Whether any particular possession was settled is a question of fact for the court, and nothing here guarantees any outcome.
+What are the 'restrictions contained in section 37'?
Section 37 is headed 'Acts against which there is no right of private defence' and begins 'There is no right of private defence,: '; its clauses (a) and (b) concern acts done, or directed, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office which do not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt. S1 This article does not analyse Section 37, which is the subject of its own. The structural point is that the restrictions are built into the conferring provision, so a plea founded on Section 35 has to clear Section 37 first.
+Does the right exist if the attacker has committed no offence?
Not under limb (a) by itself. Darshan Singh principle (ix) is that the right is conferred 'only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence'. S6 That is why Section 36 exists: where the act is not an offence by reason of the attacker's youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind or intoxication, or by reason of any misconception, Section 36 gives every person the same right of private defence he would have had if the act were that offence. S1 Section 36 is covered in its own article.
+How did the BNS change IPC Section 97?
Barely. A word-level diff run without normalising the clause labels gives 78 tokens on each side and three classes of difference: the cross-reference 'restrictions contained in section 99' becomes 'section 37'; 'First.' becomes '(a)'; and 'Secondly.' becomes '(b)'. S1S4 The marginal-note title also drops a definite article. Only the cross-reference is substantive and it follows from renumbering - IPC Section 99 was the restrictions provision and Section 37 is its counterpart. Everything of substance is word for word identical.
+Why do searches for 'Section 35 BNS' return cases about arrest notices?
Because they are about a different statute. A search for the exact phrase 'section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned thirty-three documents, but a combined search with 'private defence' returned a verified nil return. S9 Documents in the result set refer to 'Section 35(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023' in connection with police notices to appear. BNS Section 35 has no sub-section (3) - its text contains no numbered sub-sections, only clauses (a) and (b). S1 The provision actually in issue is Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which requires a police officer to issue a notice to appear where arrest is not required under sub-section (1). S10 A reference to 'Section 35(3) BNS' cannot be to this provision.
+Are there any judgments on BNS Section 35?
None construing it as the private-defence provision was located. S9 By contrast the exact statutory phrase 'the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person' returned 120 documents, including Munshi Ram, Jassa Singh, Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi and Manjeet Singh v. State of H.P. Of those, only Munshi Ram and Jassa Singh were retrieved and read for this article. Because the substance of the wording is unchanged, those decisions construe the same language that now appears in Section 35 - but they are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.
+Does Section 35 tell me how much force I can use?
No, and this is the commonest confusion about it. Section 35 confers the right and identifies what may be defended. The extent of the right is in Sections 38 and 39 for the body and Sections 41 and 42 for property, and its commencement and continuance in Sections 40 and 43. S1 None of those is analysed in this article. As a general matter Darshan Singh principle (vi) holds that the force 'ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than necessary', while principle (v) recognises that 'It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude.' S6

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 35 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S6Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. — Supreme Court of India, 15 January 2010; equivalent citations AIR 2010 SC 1212, (2010) 2 SCC 333; Bench of Dalveer Bhandari and Asok Kumar Ganguly, JJ. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S7Jassa Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana — Supreme Court of India, 8 January 2002; equivalent citations AIR 2002 SC 520, (2002) 2 SCC 481 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S8Munshi Ram and Others v. Delhi Administration — Supreme Court of India, 27 November 1967; equivalent citations AIR 1968 SC 702, 1968 SCR (2) 408; judgment delivered by K.S. Hegde, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S9Indian Kanoon (judgment-text repository) — search result pages for the exact phrase "section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita", for that phrase combined with "private defence", and for the exact phrase "the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person" (accessed 3 October 2026)
  9. S10The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)

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