What the section says
Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Right of private defence of body and of property. and reads: S1S2
35. Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 37, to defend—
(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;
(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
Section 34 provides that nothing done in exercise of the right of private defence is an offence. Section 35 is the provision that says there is such a right, who has it, and what it may be used to protect. It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3
The Supreme Court described the structure of the predecessor provision in Jassa Singh v. State of Haryana, decided on 8 January 2002 and reported as AIR 2002 SC 520 and (2002) 2 SCC 481: S7
"Section 96 IPC lays down that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence and Section 97 proceeds to divide the right of private defence into two parts --- the first part relating to private defence of his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting him; and the second part deals with the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass."
One small matter of accuracy about that passage. The Court's paraphrase of the first limb reads "against any offence affecting him", whereas the statutory words, in the IPC then and in Section 35(a) now, are "against any offence affecting the human body". S1S4 The difference matters, because the statutory phrase is a reference to a category of offences, not to whoever is affected. The second limb is quoted by the Court verbatim.
"Every person": the right to defend others
The right is conferred on "every person", and both limbs expressly extend beyond the defender himself: limb (a) covers "his own body, and the body of any other person", and limb (b) covers property "of himself or of any other person". S1
There is no requirement of relationship, no requirement of a request for help, and no requirement that the defender have any interest in the property. On the words of the section, a stranger who intervenes to protect a stranger is exercising the same right as the victim would have. That is a reading of the statutory language; it is also implicit in Jassa Singh's summary quoted above, which reproduces both "any other person" limbs.
Limb (a): offences affecting the human body
The first limb is keyed to a statutory category: "any offence affecting the human body." That category is not defined in Section 35, but the Sanhita contains a chapter of exactly that name. Verified against the Gazette text, Chapter VI is headed "Of Offences Affecting the Human Body" and runs from Section 100 to Section 146: it opens with culpable homicide in Section 100 and ends with unlawful compulsory labour in Section 146, Chapter VII ("Of Offences Against the State") beginning at Section 147. S1
The breadth of limb (a) is therefore considerable: it is not confined to attacks threatening death or grievous hurt but reaches any offence within that category. What the right permits in response is a different question entirely, governed by Sections 38 and 39: death only in the circumstances Section 38 specifies, and otherwise harm short of death. Those sections are not analysed here.
Limb (a) also has to be read with Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab principle (ix), that the right is conferred "only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence". S6 Conduct that is objectionable but not an offence affecting the human body does not engage limb (a) at all. That is precisely why Section 36 exists: where the attacker commits no offence because of youth, want of maturity of understanding, unsoundness of mind, intoxication or misconception, Section 36 restores the right that limb (a) would otherwise withhold. S1
Limb (b): a closed list of four offences
The property limb is drafted quite differently, and much more narrowly. It does not refer to a chapter or to "any offence affecting property". It names four offences and their attempts:
| Offence in limb (b) | Defined in the Sanhita by |
|---|---|
| theft | Section 303 |
| robbery | Section 309 |
| mischief | Section 324 |
| criminal trespass | Section 329(1) |
All four section numbers were verified against the official titles and text. S1
Two features of the drafting deserve attention.
The list is exhaustive, and it is a list of definitions. The words are "any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass". So the question is not whether property is threatened but whether the threatening act falls within one of those four definitions. An interference with property that is a civil wrong, or an offence of some other description, is not within limb (b) on these words. That is a reading of the statutory language; no authority deciding the point was located.
Attempts are expressly included. Limb (b) covers an act which "is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass". S1 Read with Darshan Singh principle (iii): that "it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence" and a reasonable apprehension suffices. The right does not wait for the property offence to be completed. S6
How far the property limb goes: the open-land limit
Limb (b) confers the right; it does not say how much force it permits. That is in Sections 41 and 42. But one consequence of the interaction is important enough that the Supreme Court has had to spell it out, because it is widely misunderstood.
In Jassa Singh the Court explained that the right of private defence of property extends to causing death only in the cases enumerated in Section 103 of the IPC, and that criminal trespass is not among them: S7
"Though private defence is available in respect of criminal trespass or mischief as against the property owned by himself or of any other person, but criminal trespass is not enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103 IPC. Therefore, the right of private defence of property will not extend to the causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land. Only a house-trespass committed under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence is enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103."
The Court also quoted its earlier observation in State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi (AIR 1998 SC 3016): S7
"Though there would be right of private defence under Section 97 IPC when offence of criminal trespass or attempting criminal trespass is committed, under Section 103 IPC it is only in the case of house trespass that right of private defence can extend to causing death."
So the right exists against criminal trespass under limb (b), but what it permits is limited. The distinction is between the existence of the right, which is Section 35's business, and its extent, which is not. The counterpart of IPC Section 103 in the Sanhita is Section 41, and this article does not analyse Section 41 or verify that its enumerated cases are the same as Section 103's: Jassa Singh is a decision on the IPC, and whether the Sanhita's list differs is a question for the article on Section 41. A reader should not assume the open-land conclusion carries over without checking Section 41's terms.
Defending possession: Munshi Ram
A recurring question under limb (b) is whose property it has to be. The leading authority is Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, decided by the Supreme Court on 27 November 1967 and reported as AIR 1968 SC 702 and 1968 SCR (2) 408, the judgment being delivered by K.S. Hegde, J. The passage below is taken from the judgment itself and not from the report's headnote, which paraphrases it closely: S8
"It is true that no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But stray, or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which has never been lost. The persons in possession by a stray act of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time, to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force."
Four propositions are packed into that passage, and they cut in both directions. A trespasser in settled possession may defend it even against the true owner. Settled possession requires occupation "extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner". Stray, intermittent or casual acts of possession do not qualify. And where possession has not matured, the true owner may re-enter and use necessary force, but no more.
In Munshi Ram the appeal was allowed, the convictions of the appellants were set aside and they were acquitted. S8
Two cautions. Munshi Ram is a decision on Section 97 of the IPC, whose relevant words Section 35(b) reproduces exactly, but it is not a decision on Section 35 of the Sanhita. And "settled possession" is not a statutory expression: it appears nowhere in Section 35 or in the Sanhita's definitions of the four offences. It is a judicial gloss on what it means for property to be "of himself or of any other person" for the purposes of defending it. That characterisation is the author's; the Court did not describe it in those terms.
"Subject to the restrictions contained in section 37"
The right in Section 35 is not freestanding. The section opens by making it "subject to the restrictions contained in section 37", which is headed "Acts against which there is no right of private defence" and begins "There is no right of private defence, —". S1 Section 37's clauses (a) and (b) concern acts done, or directed, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office which do not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt.
Section 37 is not analysed here; it is the subject of its own article. What matters for Section 35 is structural: the restrictions are built into the conferring provision, so a plea under Section 34 founded on Section 35 has to clear Section 37 before anything else is considered.
IPC Section 97 compared with BNS Section 35
The texts were compared programmatically after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes, the section number and the marginal-note title, but deliberately without normalising the clause labels, so that the presentational changes would show. Both sides produce 78 tokens, and the diff returns three classes of difference: S1S4
| Change | IPC s. 97 | BNS s. 35 |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-reference | "restrictions contained in section 99" | "restrictions contained in section 37" |
| Clause label | "First.—His own body…" | "(a) his own body…" |
| Clause label | "Secondly.—The property…" | "(b) the property…" |
| Marginal-note title | "Right of private defence of the body and of property" | "Right of private defence of body and of property." |
Only the first is substantive, and even that is a consequence of renumbering rather than a change of rule: IPC Section 99 was the restrictions provision and Section 37 is its counterpart. Everything that matters ("every person", both "any other person" limbs, "any offence affecting the human body", the closed list of four property offences and their attempts) is carried over word for word.
The correct classification is therefore modified, on account of the updated cross-reference and the relabelling, with the substance substantively unchanged. No section-specific legislative rationale was located, and none is asserted.
A research hazard: "Section 35 BNS" usually means something else
Anyone searching for authority on this section will meet the same difficulty encountered with Section 34, in a different form.
A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned thirty-three documents. S9 A combined search for that phrase together with "private defence" returned a page reading "No matching results" with zero result entries: verified by retrieving the page directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S9
Examination of documents from the result set shows why. They refer to "Section 35(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023": in contexts such as a police notice directing a person to appear, compliance with such a notice, and directions that its provisions "shall be strictly followed". S9 That is not this section. Section 35 of the BNS has no sub-section (3) at all: a check of its text confirms it contains no numbered sub-sections, only clauses (a) and (b). S1
The provision those orders are concerned with is Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, verified from the Gazette text, which provides that a police officer "shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under sub-section (1) issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice." S10 BNSS Section 35(1) is the power to arrest without warrant.
So where Section 34 attracts citations meant for the old IPC number (common intention, now Section 3(5)), Section 35 attracts citations meant for the wrong Sanhita: the procedural code rather than the penal one. In both cases the practical advice is the same: check the citation against the statute. A reference to "Section 35(3) BNS" cannot be to this provision, and a document discussing arrest notices is not discussing private defence. The inference that these are BNS/BNSS slips is the author's reading; this article does not assert what any particular record intended, and no court has been found to have commented on the pattern.
No judgment construing Section 35 of the Sanhita as the private-defence provision was located.
By contrast the statutory wording of the predecessor returns real authority: the exact phrase "the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person" returned 120 documents, including Munshi Ram, Jassa Singh, Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi and Manjeet Singh v. State of H.P. S9 Of these, Munshi Ram and Jassa Singh were retrieved and read for this article; the others were not.
Common misconceptions
"You can only defend yourself." No. Both limbs expressly extend to "any other person", and the right is conferred on "every person". S1 No relationship, request or proprietary interest is required on the words of the section.
"Private defence of property covers anything done to your property." No. Limb (b) is a closed list: theft, robbery, mischief, criminal trespass, and attempts at those four. S1 The question is whether the act falls within one of those definitions.
"You can kill to stop a trespasser." Not on open land, on the authority as it stood under the IPC. In Jassa Singh the Court held that because criminal trespass is not among the offences enumerated in Section 103 IPC, "the right of private defence of property will not extend to the causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land." S7 Whether the Sanhita's counterpart, Section 41, enumerates the same cases was not verified for this article.
"A trespasser has no rights against the owner." Not where possession is settled. Munshi Ram: "no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land", and in such a case the trespasser "is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner." S8 But stray or intermittent trespass gives no such right.
"The owner can always use force to get his land back." Only necessary force, and only where possession has not matured. Munshi Ram: "The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary." S8
"Section 35 tells you how much force you may use." It does not. It confers the right and identifies what may be defended. The extent of the right is in Sections 38 and 39 (body) and 41 and 42 (property), and its commencement and continuance in Sections 40 and 43: none of which is analysed here. S1
"Section 35(3) BNS is about private defence." There is no Section 35(3) of the BNS. Section 35 contains clauses (a) and (b) and no numbered sub-sections. S1 Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the notice-to-appear provision. S10
"The BNS changed the right of private defence." Section 35's substance is unchanged from IPC Section 97 across 78 tokens; the differences are the cross-reference from Section 99 to Section 37 and the relabelling of First and Secondly as (a) and (b). S1S4
Reading the section in practice
- Does Section 37 take the right away? The right is expressly subject to those restrictions.
- Body or property? The two limbs are drafted differently and the difference is not stylistic.
- For the body: was the threatened conduct an offence affecting the human body? That is the category in Chapter VI, Sections 100 to 146. If the conduct was no offence at all, consider Section 36.
- For property: does the act fall within one of the four definitions, or an attempt at one? Theft (Section 303), robbery (Section 309), mischief (Section 324), criminal trespass (Section 329(1)).
- Whose property, and who was in possession? On Munshi Ram, settled possession can be defended even against the true owner; stray trespass cannot.
- Then, separately, ask how far the right extends: Sections 38, 39, 41, 42: and whether it had begun and not ended, under Sections 40 and 43.
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the BNSS and the IPC as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S10 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff run without normalising clause labels, so that presentational changes would appear. Chapter VI's heading and extent, and the section numbers of theft, robbery, mischief and criminal trespass, were verified against the Gazette text and the official titles rather than assumed.
This article does not analyse Sections 36 to 44. Section 37's heading and opening words are quoted to show that the restrictions exist and where they are; Sections 38 to 43 are identified as the provisions governing extent, commencement and continuance. Their ingredients are not examined, and in particular it is not verified whether Section 41 of the Sanhita enumerates the same cases as Section 103 of the IPC, so the open-land conclusion in Jassa Singh should not be assumed to carry over without checking.
Three judgments were read: Munshi Ram, Jassa Singh and (for principles (iii) and (ix)) Darshan Singh. All three are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and not on the Sanhita. The Munshi Ram passage quoted is from the judgment text, the report's headnote having been identified and set aside. Jassa Singh's open-land holding depends on Section 103 IPC, as explained above. All were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched beyond the repository's citation counts (Munshi Ram 489, Jassa Singh 17, Darshan Singh 228).
State of Rajasthan v. Ram Bharosi (AIR 1998 SC 3016) appears only as quoted within Jassa Singh; the original was not retrieved or read. Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Manjeet Singh v. State of H.P. appear only as results of a phrase search and were not read.
Several propositions are the author's analysis, with no authority located: that limb (b)'s list is exhaustive and operates by reference to definitions rather than to threatened property generally; that no relationship or interest is required to defend another's body or property; that "settled possession" is a judicial gloss rather than a statutory concept; and the reading of the Section 35 / BNSS Section 35(3) mis-citation pattern. The article records that Jassa Singh's paraphrase of the first limb ("affecting him") differs from the statutory words ("affecting the human body").
The thirty-three documents matching "section 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" were not all retrieved; the conclusion that none concerns private defence rests on the verified nil return for the combined phrase search together with examination of documents from the result set. This is a weaker basis than the exhaustive document-by-document check performed for Section 34, and is stated as such.
Procedural questions under the BNSS were not examined beyond quoting Section 35(3) to identify it, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Whether a right of private defence existed, and how far it extended, depends on findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.