What the section says
Section 40 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of body. and reads in full: S1S2
40. The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.
One sentence, two halves, when the right starts, and when it stops. No clauses, no proviso, no illustration. S1 It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3
The textual comparison with its predecessor can be stated at once, because it is the simplest in the chapter. A programmatic word-level diff of IPC Section 102 against BNS Section 40 produces 52 tokens on each side and returns zero differences. S1S4 The only change is to the marginal-note title, which dropped two definite articles: "Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body" became "Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of body." The classification is renumbered.
The first half: when the right begins
Three things in the commencement limb repay attention, and all three come from the words.
A reasonable apprehension is enough. The right commences "as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises". S1 Not when danger materialises, when a reasonable apprehension of it arises.
An attempt or a threat will do. The apprehension may arise "from an attempt or threat to commit the offence". S1 A threat alone can start the clock.
The offence need not have been committed. The section says so expressly: "though the offence may not have been committed". S1 This is the point Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab restates as principle (iii) at paragraph 58: "A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self defence into operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence." S6
The most emphatic judicial statement on this limb is in Deo Narain v. The State of U.P., decided by the Supreme Court on 11 December 1972 and reported as AIR 1973 SC 473, (1973) 1 SCC 347 and 1973 SCR (3) 57. The passage below is taken from the body of the judgment itself. The repository text is damaged by optical character recognition at this point; the square brackets mark the only substantive repair, and the defects are itemised at the end of this article: S7
"The threat, however, must reasonably give rise to the present and imminent, and not remote or distant, danger. This right rests on the general principle that where a crime is endeavored to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force in self-defence. To say that the appellant could only claim the right to use force after he had sustained a serious injury by an aggressive wrongful assault is [a complete misunderstanding of the law embodied in the above] section."
So a defender is not required to absorb the first blow. The High Court in Deo Narain had held otherwise and the Supreme Court called that a "complete misunderstanding of the law". The bracketed words are supplied from the report's own headnote, which states the same sentence in full as "is a complete misunderstanding of the law embodied in s. 102, I.P.C."; they are not this article's paraphrase. S7
But the commencement limb has its own limit, and it is in the same passage: the threat "must reasonably give rise to the present and imminent, and not remote or distant, danger." S7 An apprehension of something that might happen later is not enough.
The second half: when the right ends
The continuance limb is the half practitioners most often need, and it is strict: the right "continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues." S1 No longer.
Darshan Singh principle (iv) states the rule in terms: "The right of private defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is co-terminus with the duration of such apprehension." S6
Deo Narain draws out the consequence, and this is the sentence that decides most cases. Again the quotation is from the judgment body, with the repository's run-together words separated; no word has been added or changed: S7
"The right of private defence is available for protection against apprehended unlawful aggression and not for punishing the aggressor for the offence committed by him. It is a preventive and not punitive right. The right to punish for the commission of offences vests in the State (which has a duty to maintain law and order) and not in private individuals. If after sustaining a serious injury there is no apprehension of further … danger to the body then obviously the right of private defence would not be available."
The ellipsis marks a footnote reference and a page number, "(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 473 61", that interrupt the sentence in the printed text. S7
Three propositions follow, and they are the Court's, not this article's:
- The right is preventive, not punitive.
- The right to punish belongs to the State, not to the individual.
- Once there is no apprehension of further danger, the right is gone, even for a person who has already been seriously injured.
The practical shape of Section 40 is therefore a window that opens on reasonable apprehension of present and imminent danger and closes when that apprehension ends. What happens inside the window is governed by Sections 38 and 39: how far the right extends, and by Section 37, which restricts it. None of those is analysed here.
How the section works on facts
N.G. Sreedharan shows the section operating. During an altercation one Vincent "was found to brandish a knife which he had with him". The Supreme Court held: S8
"Judged in that light the appellants were entitled to raise the plea of the right of private defence of their persons apprehending threat of assault with the knife so brandished in view of Section 102 I.P.C., which provides that a right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence ('assault' in the instant case) though the offence may not have been committed, and it continues so long as apprehension of danger to the body continues."
The Court added that "not only the threat was imminent but the apprehension of the two appellants of being assaulted by Vincent was also a reasonable one — and indeed, it ultimately turned into a reality", and held that, considering the nature of the injuries the appellants had sustained, it could not be said "in view of Section 100 IPC, that they had exceeded their right of private defence in causing the death of Vincent". The conviction and sentence of the two appellants for murder "cannot be supported". S8
Two features of that reasoning are worth noticing. The brandishing of a knife (a threat, not a completed assault) was enough to start the right. And the Court assessed commencement under Section 102 separately from extent under Section 100, which are now Sections 40 and 38. That separation of questions is the author's observation about the structure of the reasoning.
Who must prove it
Section 40 is part of a General Exception, so the burden of bringing a case within the private-defence provisions lies on the accused under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which also directs the court to presume the absence of the circumstances. S5 On the standard, James Martin v. State of Kerala holds that the burden "stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record", and that an accused "is not necessarily required to call evidence". S9 As recorded in the article on Section 34, those authorities speak specifically of the plea of self-defence, and whether the same standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched.
Whether an apprehension existed, whether it was reasonable, and when it ceased are all questions of fact. Darshan Singh principle (vii) adds that the plea may be considered "even if the accused does not plead self-defence … if the same arises from the material on record." S6
Case law under the BNS
No judgment construing Section 40 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 40 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page containing the literal string "No matching results" and carrying zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S10
By contrast the statutory wording returns substantial authority: the exact phrase "commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence" returned 131 documents, among them N.G. Sreedharan, Hari Singh v. State of Haryana, Sampat Singh v. State of M.P., Kuldeep Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Vikram Nair v. State of Madhya Pradesh. S10 Of those, only N.G. Sreedharan was retrieved and read for this article. Only a subset of the 131 matches was examined.
Because the words are identical, Deo Narain, N.G. Sreedharan and Darshan Singh construe the same sentence that now appears in Section 40: but all three are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.
Common misconceptions
"I must be attacked before I can defend myself." No. The right commences on a reasonable apprehension arising "from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed". S1 Deo Narain called the contrary view a "complete misunderstanding of the law". S7
"A threat is not enough — there must be an attempt." The section says "an attempt or threat". S1 In N.G. Sreedharan the brandishing of a knife sufficed. S8
"Any fear of future harm triggers the right." No. The threat "must reasonably give rise to the present and imminent, and not remote or distant, danger." S7
"Once attacked, I may keep going." No. The right is "co-terminus with the duration of such apprehension" and, on Deo Narain, "If after sustaining a serious injury there is no apprehension of further danger to the body then obviously the right of private defence would not be available." S1S6S7
"Private defence lets me punish the attacker." It does not. Deo Narain: the right "is available for protection against apprehended unlawful aggression and not for punishing the aggressor for the offence committed by him. It is a preventive and not punitive right. The right to punish … vests in the State … and not in private individuals." S7
"Section 40 tells me how much force I may use." It does not. It fixes only the window of time. Sections 38 and 39 govern extent and Section 37 restricts the right; none is analysed here. S1
"The BNS changed when the right begins or ends." It did not. The diff returns zero differences across 52 tokens; only the marginal-note title lost two definite articles. S1S4
Reading the section in practice
- When did a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arise? That is the opening of the window not the moment of injury.
- Was the apprehended danger present and imminent? A remote or distant danger will not do.
- Was the apprehension reasonable? A question of fact.
- When did the apprehension end? The right closes with it; conduct afterwards is not private defence.
- Only then ask how far the right extended: Sections 38 and 39: and whether Section 37 removed or capped it.
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff.
This article does not analyse Sections 34 to 39 or 41 to 44. Section 40 fixes only the duration of the right; extent is in Sections 38 and 39 and restrictions in Section 37, and Section 43 performs the same function for property. None of their content is examined here.
A note on source condition, because it affects how the central passages are quoted. The repository text of Deo Narain is damaged by optical character recognition at precisely the points relied on. In the judgment body the sentences appear as "an attempt or threat to commit it he offence"; "wrongful assault is section.", with the operative words dropped; "available forprotection against-apprehended unlawful aggression and not forpunishing ,the aggressor"; "It isa preventive and not punitive right"; "The right to punish forthe commission of offences"; and "private individuals.If after sustaining a serious injury". The quotations above separate those run-together words and mark with an ellipsis a footnote and page number that interrupt one sentence. The single substantive gap, the clause dropped after "wrongful assault is", is supplied in square brackets from the report's own headnote, which carries the sentence in full. No other word has been added, removed or altered. S7
A caution about a reproduction of this passage. The same passage is reproduced by the Supreme Court in N.G. Sreedharan v. State of Kerala (13 December 1995, (1996) 2 SCC 112), and that reproduction is free of the spacing damage. It was not used for the two quotations above because it differs from Deo Narain's own text in one way that matters: it renders the sentence as "the appellant could not only claim the right to use force", whereas Deo Narain reads "the appellant could only claim" in both its headnote and its judgment body. The words "not only" invert the sense of a sentence whose point is that requiring a defender to wait for injury is wrong. The reading in Deo Narain itself has therefore been preferred. S7S8
The versions also differ in two smaller respects, which do not affect the propositions: Deo Narain's judgment body reads "and not remote or distant, danger" where N.G. Sreedharan reads "and no remote or distant danger"; and Deo Narain's headnote reads "a preventive and not a punitive right" and "rests on the principle" where its judgment body reads "a preventive and not punitive right" and "rests on the general principle". The official reports were not consulted and a reviewer should check the wording against them. S7S8
N.G. Sreedharan describes Deo Narain as a decision of "a 3 Judge Bench". That characterisation is reported as that Court's; the repository's own bench field for Deo Narain names a single judge, and this article does not assert the composition of the Bench.
Deo Narain, N.G. Sreedharan, Darshan Singh and James Martin were all read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched. Hari Singh, Sampat Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Vikram Nair, Ram Awadh Pandey, Shivappa Laxman Savadi and State of Karnataka v. Vishwanatha Devadiga appear only as results of a phrase search and were not read.
Two propositions are the author's observation: that Section 40 describes a window which opens on apprehension and closes with it; and that in N.G. Sreedharan the Court assessed commencement under Section 102 separately from extent under Section 100.
Whether the preponderance-of-probabilities standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched; the authorities speak of the plea of self-defence.
Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. When an apprehension arose, whether it was reasonable, and when it ended are findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.