The short answer
Section 133 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes assault or criminal force used with the intention of dishonouring the person, where there was no grave and sudden provocation. The maximum is two years' imprisonment of either description, or fine, or both. S1
"Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending thereby to dishonour that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
This is the first provision in this group concerned with dignity rather than with physical harm or with the status of the victim's office. The conduct element is the same as everywhere else in the group - assault within section 130 or criminal force within section 129 - and what makes the offence more serious than section 131 is the purpose: to dishonour. S1; S9; S10
Three things are worth flagging at the outset.
The procedural regime does not follow the penalty. Section 133 carries exactly the same two-year maximum as section 132, yet it is non-cognizable, bailable and compoundable, where section 132 is cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable at all. S4; S8
"Dishonour" is not defined, and almost no authority construes it. Targeted searches returned twenty and four results respectively, and neither decision read for this article defines the word. S1
And section 133 carries no Explanation of its own and does not borrow section 131's - which, as explained below, leaves its provocation carve-out without any statutory gloss. S1; S6; S7
The element that matters: "intending thereby to dishonour that person"
Everything in this group shares a conduct element. What separates the sections is the accompanying mental element or circumstance, and here it is an intention to dishonour. S1
Three points follow from the words themselves.
It is an intention, not a result. The section asks what the accused intended, not whether the person was in fact dishonoured. A person of unusual composure who feels no humiliation does not thereby take the conduct outside the section. S1
"Thereby" ties the intention to the force. The dishonour must be intended to be effected by the assault or criminal force, not by some separate act accompanying it. S1
The target is "that person" - the person assaulted. S1
But what does "dishonour" mean?
This article cannot tell you, and that is the single most important limitation on it. S1
Two searches were run. One, phrase-anchored on section 355 of the Penal Code and the intent to dishonour, returned twenty results. The other, aimed at the meaning of dishonour, returned four. For a provision that has been on the statute book since 1860 that is remarkably little. S1
Two decisions were retrieved and read in full. Neither defines the word. One sets out the ingredients of the section verbatim and then decides the case on the sufficiency of the evidence; the other, from 1943, disposes of the matter on a question of sanction. So the following questions are simply open on the material read: S1; S11; S12
- whether dishonour requires publicity or witnesses, or whether a private indignity suffices;
- whether it is assessed objectively or by reference to the particular complainant's sense of honour;
- how it is distinguished from the fear or annoyance that section 129 already covers, and from insult provisions elsewhere in the Sanhita.
What can be said is what the reported facts suggest. In the one modern decision read, the allegation was that the accused had struck the complainant on the back with a footwear, which is the paradigm fact pattern associated with this provision - conduct whose point is degradation rather than injury. The Court did not say that such conduct constitutes dishonour; it treated the section as engaged on the allegations and acquitted for want of evidence. S11
The provocation carve-out - and a gap in the drafting
Section 133 contains the same words as section 131: the force must have been used "otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person". S1; S6
So, as at section 131, provocation does not exculpate. If there was grave and sudden provocation, this offence is not made out. S1; S6
But there is an asymmetry across the three provisions that use this formula, and it appears to be a drafting gap. S1; S6; S7
| Explanations on provocation? | |
|---|---|
| Section 131 | Yes - two of its own. Explanation 1 lists three cases where provocation will not mitigate; Explanation 2 makes gravity and suddenness a question of fact |
| Section 133 | None, and no cross-reference |
| Section 136 | Yes, by express incorporation - "This section is subject to the same Explanation as section 131" |
The difficulty is that section 131's Explanation 1 is expressly confined to its own section: it begins "Grave and sudden provocation will not mitigate the punishment for an offence under this section". Section 136 solves that by incorporating it in terms. Section 133 does neither. S1; S6; S7
So on the face of the Sanhita, the provocation carve-out in section 133 operates without any statutory guidance at all - no list of cases in which provocation will not avail, and no express statement that gravity and suddenness is a question of fact. S1; S6
Whether a court would nevertheless apply section 131's Explanations to section 133 by analogy, on the footing that the same phrase should mean the same thing throughout a Chapter, is a question this article cannot answer. No authority on it was read, and the position is reported as a gap in the drafting rather than as a resolved question. S1; S6; S7
Note also that section 133 inherited this structure from the Penal Code, which had the same arrangement - its section 352 carried the Explanation and its section 355 did not. The Sanhita did not create the gap; it reproduced it. S2
Against IPC section 355
The comparison returns one difference, and it is a spelling. S1; S2
IPC section 355 read "intending thereby to dishonor that person". Section 133 reads "dishonour". The penalty, the elements, the provocation carve-out and the absence of any Explanation or Illustration are all identical. S1; S2
The Sanhita tidied an internal inconsistency
This is a small point but a real one. The Penal Code was inconsistent with itself. Its marginal note to section 355 read "intent to dishonour person", with the British spelling, while the operative text of the section read "to dishonor that person", with the American one. S2
Section 133 uses "dishonour" in both places. So the Sanhita normalised a discrepancy that had sat inside a single section of the Penal Code. Nothing turns on it, but it is an instance of the tidying the Sanhita did carry out - and it sits beside instances elsewhere in this group where archaic or inconsistent phrasing was left untouched. The modernisation is real but uneven. S1; S2
No State amendment
The Penal Code text was extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note, and none is recorded against section 355. That check is worth running at every section, because an amendment note of exactly that kind - a Maharashtra amendment raising a maximum from two years to five - sits against section 353 and would be invisible if one stopped reading at the operative words. S2
The fine position is unchanged
Section 133 says simply "or with fine", so no ceiling is expressed and section 8(1) of the Sanhita supplies the limit. S1
IPC section 355 also left the fine unquantified, so the position is the same under either Code, section 63 of the Penal Code having performed the function section 8(1) now performs. There is no question here of the Sanhita having introduced or removed a ceiling. S1; S2
This matches section 132 and differs from section 131, which expresses a ceiling of one thousand rupees and therefore displaces section 8(1). Within four consecutive sections the Sanhita uses both drafting styles, and nothing was found explaining the choice. S1; S6; S8
Classification, forum and compounding
The First Schedule entry
| Column | Section 133 | Section 132, for comparison |
|---|---|---|
| Punishment | "Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both" | Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both |
| Cognizable? | Non-cognizable | Cognizable |
| Bailable? | Bailable | Non-bailable |
| Triable by | Any Magistrate | Any Magistrate |
The procedural regime tracks the victim, not the penalty
This is the most practically useful observation about section 133, and it emerges only from the comparison. S4; S8
Sections 132 and 133 carry identical maximum sentences. Yet section 132 is cognizable and non-bailable, and section 133 is neither. The difference between them is not the gravity of the punishment Parliament attached, which is the same, but who the victim is: a public servant in the one case, anybody at all in the other. S1; S4; S8
So a reader should not reason from the length of the maximum sentence to the procedural consequences. In this Chapter they come apart. S4; S8
Compoundable without leave
Section 133 appears in the Table to section 359(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita - offences compoundable without the permission of the court. The entry reads: S4
"Assault or use of criminal force. | 131, 133, 136 | The person assaulted or to whom criminal force is used."
So the person assaulted may compound the offence without approaching the court. There is no entry in the Table to section 359(2); both Tables were checked separately. S4
Two observations. The entry groups section 133 with sections 131 and 136, so all three of the provisions using the provocation formula are compoundable on the same footing - while section 132, which does not use it, is not compoundable at all. S4; S6; S7; S8 And the Table's description of the offence, "Assault or use of criminal force", does not mention dishonour; the section numbers in the second column are what identify the offences covered. S4
Forum
The Schedule says "Any Magistrate". Under section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita a Magistrate of the first class may pass up to three years, so he can impose section 133's full two years; a Magistrate of the second class is capped at one year by section 23(3) and so cannot, although the Schedule makes the offence triable before him. S1; S4; S5
As at section 132, the distinction to hold onto is between competence to try and power to sentence: a second class Magistrate may try the offence but cannot award more than one year of the available two. S4; S5
No causal claim is made about this. IPC section 355 also carried two years, and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has never been retrieved for this collection, so whether the Sanhita created this gap or inherited it is unverified. S1; S2; S4
How the courts have applied IPC section 355
Because section 133 reproduces IPC section 355 but for a spelling, decisions on the Penal Code provision bear on it directly. There are very few. S1; S2
A conviction set aside for want of evidence
In Devappa @ Devindrappa v. State of Karnataka (High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, Hemant Chandangoudar J, 28 June 2023) the appellant had been convicted by a Sessions Judge sitting as a Special Court under IPC section 355 and section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. S11
The Court set out the ingredients of section 355 in terms, reciting that a person "must have assaulted or used criminal force to any person, intending thereby to dishonour that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by the person". S11
The allegation was that the appellant "had assaulted PW.3 on his back with a footwear". The Court held that "except the self-serving statements of PWs.3 and 4, there is no material to substantiate that the accused had assaulted PW.3 on his back with footwear", and that in the absence of material the conviction was not sustainable in law. S11
It allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted the appellant of both offences, and directed the fine deposited to be released to him. S11
Two things should be taken from this, and the second is a limitation.
The fact pattern is instructive. Striking a person with a shoe is the paradigm case associated with this provision - conduct whose object is degradation rather than injury - and the Court treated section 355 as engaged on those allegations. S11
But the Court did not define "dishonour", and did not need to. The appeal was decided on the sufficiency of the evidence that the assault had occurred at all. So the decision tells us how such a charge may fail; it does not tell us what dishonour is. S11
A 1943 decision, and a ground that was never decided
R.C. Pollard v. Satya Gopal Mazumdar (Calcutta High Court, Derbyshire CJ and Khundkar J, 24 August 1943, reported AIR 1943 Cal 594) concerned a conviction under section 355 - which the Court described as "assault with intent to dishonour a person" - and a sentence of a fine of Rs. 200. S12
Three grounds were advanced: that no previous sanction for the prosecution had been obtained under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935; that the accused was entitled to treat the complainant as a trespasser and was therefore protected by the right of private defence; and that the trial had been held in an atmosphere of prejudice. S12
The Court held that, assuming the prosecution evidence were accepted, the case was governed by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in the absence of sanction from the Local Government, and that the Sessions Judge had been wrong in law to hold otherwise. The rule was made absolute, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and no further proceedings were to be taken unless and until sanction was given. S12
The private defence ground was advanced by the accused; it was not the basis of the decision. The case was disposed of on sanction. That distinction matters, and it is recorded here because treating a ground of challenge as though it were a holding is a trap this collection has encountered more than once. S12
The decision's present utility is limited in two further ways. It is a pre-independence judgment, and the procedural provisions it turned on - section 197 of the Code of 1898 and section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935 - have long since been replaced. It is cited here for two narrow things: that section 355 was understood as an offence of assault with intent to dishonour a person, and that a conviction under it was set aside on a sanction point. S12
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
The distinguishing element is the intention to dishonour, not the degree of force. A slight touch with a degrading purpose can fall within section 133; a heavy blow without that purpose will not. S1
It is the intention that matters, not the effect. The section does not require proof that the person was in fact humiliated. S1
"Dishonour" is not judicially defined on the material read. Whether publicity is required, and whether the test is objective, are open questions. S1; S11; S12
Section 133 carries the same maximum as section 132 but a wholly different procedural regime - non-cognizable, bailable and compoundable, against cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable. The regime tracks the victim, not the penalty. S4; S8
Provocation is not a defence, but it takes the conduct outside this section. S1; S6
Section 133 has no Explanation and does not borrow section 131's, unlike section 136 - so its provocation carve-out has no statutory gloss. S1; S6; S7
The offence is compoundable without leave by the person assaulted. S4
There is no ceiling on the fine in the section, so section 8(1) governs it - as at section 132, and unlike section 131. S1; S6; S8
Words alone will not do. Mere words are not an assault under section 130's Explanation and are not force under section 129, however dishonouring their content. S9; S10
No contact is needed, because assault requires none. A degrading gesture creating the required apprehension may suffice. S9
Worked examples
Example 1. A strikes Z on the back with a shoe to degrade him. Section 133 on the fact pattern in Devappa - though whether the charge succeeds will depend on proof. S1; S11
Example 2. A punches Z hard in a quarrel, meaning to hurt him and nothing more. Section 131, not section 133 - there is no intention to dishonour. The greater violence does not make it the graver offence. S1; S6
Example 3. A spits at Z intending to humiliate him. Criminal force within section 129, used with intent to dishonour: section 133. S1; S10
Example 4. A shouts grossly insulting words at Z and does nothing more. Not section 133 - mere words are neither an assault nor force, whatever their content. S9; S10
Example 5. Z gravely and suddenly provokes A, who immediately uses degrading force on Z. Section 133 is not made out, because the force was used on grave and sudden provocation. Note that section 133 gives no guidance on when provocation will not avail, because it has no Explanation. S1; S6
Example 6. A does the same thing to a police officer on duty, intending to dishonour him. Section 132 may be engaged as well, and if it is the procedural consequences change sharply - cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable. S1; S8
Example 7. Z wishes to settle the matter. Section 133 is compoundable without the leave of the court by the person assaulted. S4
Example 8. A is tried before a second class Magistrate who considers two years warranted. He cannot impose it; his ceiling is one year. S5
Commencement and which law applies
Section 133 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S13
The transition is immaterial in substance. IPC section 355 and section 133 carry the same penalty, the same elements, the same unquantified fine and the same absence of any Explanation; the only difference is the spelling of "dishonour". For conduct before 1 July 2024 the applicable provision is IPC section 355; on or after it, section 133. No State amendment is recorded against either. S1; S2; S13
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 133
- Section 129 - criminal force, one of the two ways this offence may be committed. S10
- Section 130 - assault, the other, and the source of the rule that mere words will not do. S9
- Section 131 - the general offence, which carries the two Explanations on provocation that section 133 lacks. S6
- Section 132 - the same maximum, a wholly different procedural regime. S8
- Section 136 - the provision that expressly borrows section 131's Explanation, which section 133 does not. S7
Sources and honest limits
The statutory comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 133 against the India Code text of IPC section 355, with page-number artefacts removed first and the Penal Code text extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note. The section text was checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The First Schedule row and both Tables to section 359 were read from the Gazette text of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, as was section 23. The texts of sections 129, 130, 131, 132 and 136 were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6; S7; S8; S9; S10
What this article does not establish:
- "DISHONOUR" IS NOT DEFINED, AND THIS ARTICLE CANNOT DEFINE IT. Searches returned twenty and four results respectively. Both decisions retrieved were read in full and neither construes the word. Whether dishonour requires publicity, whether it is assessed objectively or by the complainant's own sense of honour, and how it is marked off from the fear or annoyance already covered by section 129 and from insult provisions elsewhere in the Sanhita, are all open on the material read.
- THE OBSERVATION THAT FOOTWEAR IS THE PARADIGM FACT PATTERN IS DRAWN FROM ONE REPORTED ALLEGATION, not from any holding. The Court in Devappa treated section 355 as engaged on the allegations and then acquitted for want of evidence; it did not hold that striking with a shoe constitutes dishonour.
- DEVAPPA IS A SINGLE-JUDGE DECISION OF ONE HIGH COURT and does not bind elsewhere. Its subsequent treatment was not checked. Its reasoning on the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not examined.
- POLLARD WAS DECIDED ON SANCTION, NOT ON DISHONOUR, AND NOT ON PRIVATE DEFENCE. The private defence ground was advanced by the accused and never decided. It is a pre-independence decision turning on provisions long since replaced, and is cited only for the description of the offence and for the fact that a conviction was set aside on a sanction point.
- PRIVATE DEFENCE IS STILL NOT EXAMINED ANYWHERE IN THIS COLLECTION, although Pollard shows it being raised against a charge under this very provision. The provisions governing it are not analysed here.
- WHETHER A COURT WOULD APPLY SECTION 131'S EXPLANATIONS TO SECTION 133 BY ANALOGY IS NOT ANSWERED. The drafting gap is reported as a gap. No authority on it was read, and the conclusion that section 131's Explanation 1 is textually confined to its own section is drawn from its opening words.
- THE FORUM GAP IS REPORTED WITHOUT ATTRIBUTING CAUSE. IPC section 355 also carried two years and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has never been retrieved.
- NO TRAVAUX WERE RETRIEVED, and no Law Commission search was run for this section. Nothing explains why section 131 expresses a fine ceiling while sections 132 and 133 do not, or why section 133 was left without an Explanation.
- THE RELATIONSHIP WITH INSULT AND DEFAMATION PROVISIONS IS NOT EXAMINED, nor is the overlap with the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, under which the appellant in Devappa was also charged.
- Sections 129, 130, 131, 132 and 136 are described, not analysed, beyond what is needed for the comparisons drawn.
- Nothing is said about sentencing practice under this section.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.
Section 133 is the dignity provision of this group, and it is also the one about which least is known. Its conduct element is shared with every other section here; what sets it apart is a purpose - to dishonour - that the statute does not define and that the courts, on the material available, have not defined either. Two things can nevertheless be said with confidence. The first is that the procedural consequences in this Chapter do not follow the length of the sentence: section 133 and section 132 carry the same two-year maximum, yet one is cognizable, non-bailable and incapable of compromise while the other is none of those things, and the variable is the identity of the victim. The second is that section 133's provocation carve-out stands without any Explanation to guide it, where section 131 has two of its own and section 136 borrows them expressly - a gap the Sanhita inherited from the Penal Code rather than created, but did not take the opportunity to close. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.