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BNS Section 133 · Deep dive

BNS Section 133: Assault With Intent to Dishonour - the Dignity Offence Nobody Has Defined

Section 133 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes assault or criminal force used INTENDING THEREBY TO DISHONOUR that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, with imprisonment of either description up to TWO YEARS, or fine, or both. This is the FIRST PROVISION IN THIS GROUP CONCERNED WITH DIGNITY rather than physical harm or the status of the victim's office: the conduct element is the same as everywhere else - assault within section 130 or criminal force within section 129 - and what aggravates it is the PURPOSE. Three things stand out. FIRST, THE PROCEDURAL REGIME DOES NOT FOLLOW THE PENALTY. Section 133 carries exactly the same two-year maximum as section 132, yet it is NON-COGNIZABLE, BAILABLE and COMPOUNDABLE WITHOUT LEAVE, where section 132 is cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable at all. The variable is not the gravity of punishment, which is identical, but WHO THE VICTIM IS. SECOND, 'DISHONOUR' IS NOT DEFINED AND ALMOST NO AUTHORITY CONSTRUES IT - targeted searches returned TWENTY and FOUR results, and neither decision read defines the word, so whether dishonour requires publicity, and whether it is assessed objectively or by the complainant's own sense of honour, are open questions. THIRD, SECTION 133 CARRIES NO EXPLANATION AND DOES NOT BORROW SECTION 131's. Section 131 has two Explanations of its own but Explanation 1 is expressly confined to 'an offence under this section'; section 136 solves that by incorporating it in terms; SECTION 133 DOES NEITHER, so its provocation carve-out operates with no statutory guidance at all - a gap the Sanhita INHERITED from the Penal Code rather than created. Against IPC section 355 the only change is the spelling of 'dishonour', and the Sanhita thereby normalised an inconsistency that had sat between the Penal Code's own marginal note and its operative text. In DEVAPPA a conviction for striking the complainant on the back with a FOOTWEAR was set aside and the appellant ACQUITTED for want of evidence; in the 1943 decision POLLARD a conviction was set aside on a question of SANCTION, the private defence ground having been advanced but never decided.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 14 October 2026 27 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 133 — Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour person, otherwise than on grave provocation
Earlier law (IPC)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 355 · direct
Side-by-side converterIPC 355 → BNS 133

The short answer

Section 133 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes assault or criminal force used with the intention of dishonouring the person, where there was no grave and sudden provocation. The maximum is two years' imprisonment of either description, or fine, or both. S1

"Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending thereby to dishonour that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

This is the first provision in this group concerned with dignity rather than with physical harm or with the status of the victim's office. The conduct element is the same as everywhere else in the group - assault within section 130 or criminal force within section 129 - and what makes the offence more serious than section 131 is the purpose: to dishonour. S1; S9; S10

Three things are worth flagging at the outset.

The procedural regime does not follow the penalty. Section 133 carries exactly the same two-year maximum as section 132, yet it is non-cognizable, bailable and compoundable, where section 132 is cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable at all. S4; S8

"Dishonour" is not defined, and almost no authority construes it. Targeted searches returned twenty and four results respectively, and neither decision read for this article defines the word. S1

And section 133 carries no Explanation of its own and does not borrow section 131's - which, as explained below, leaves its provocation carve-out without any statutory gloss. S1; S6; S7

The element that matters: "intending thereby to dishonour that person"

Everything in this group shares a conduct element. What separates the sections is the accompanying mental element or circumstance, and here it is an intention to dishonour. S1

Three points follow from the words themselves.

It is an intention, not a result. The section asks what the accused intended, not whether the person was in fact dishonoured. A person of unusual composure who feels no humiliation does not thereby take the conduct outside the section. S1

"Thereby" ties the intention to the force. The dishonour must be intended to be effected by the assault or criminal force, not by some separate act accompanying it. S1

The target is "that person" - the person assaulted. S1

But what does "dishonour" mean?

This article cannot tell you, and that is the single most important limitation on it. S1

Two searches were run. One, phrase-anchored on section 355 of the Penal Code and the intent to dishonour, returned twenty results. The other, aimed at the meaning of dishonour, returned four. For a provision that has been on the statute book since 1860 that is remarkably little. S1

Two decisions were retrieved and read in full. Neither defines the word. One sets out the ingredients of the section verbatim and then decides the case on the sufficiency of the evidence; the other, from 1943, disposes of the matter on a question of sanction. So the following questions are simply open on the material read: S1; S11; S12

  • whether dishonour requires publicity or witnesses, or whether a private indignity suffices;
  • whether it is assessed objectively or by reference to the particular complainant's sense of honour;
  • how it is distinguished from the fear or annoyance that section 129 already covers, and from insult provisions elsewhere in the Sanhita.

What can be said is what the reported facts suggest. In the one modern decision read, the allegation was that the accused had struck the complainant on the back with a footwear, which is the paradigm fact pattern associated with this provision - conduct whose point is degradation rather than injury. The Court did not say that such conduct constitutes dishonour; it treated the section as engaged on the allegations and acquitted for want of evidence. S11

The provocation carve-out - and a gap in the drafting

Section 133 contains the same words as section 131: the force must have been used "otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person". S1; S6

So, as at section 131, provocation does not exculpate. If there was grave and sudden provocation, this offence is not made out. S1; S6

But there is an asymmetry across the three provisions that use this formula, and it appears to be a drafting gap. S1; S6; S7

Explanations on provocation?
Section 131Yes - two of its own. Explanation 1 lists three cases where provocation will not mitigate; Explanation 2 makes gravity and suddenness a question of fact
Section 133None, and no cross-reference
Section 136Yes, by express incorporation - "This section is subject to the same Explanation as section 131"

S1; S6; S7

The difficulty is that section 131's Explanation 1 is expressly confined to its own section: it begins "Grave and sudden provocation will not mitigate the punishment for an offence under this section". Section 136 solves that by incorporating it in terms. Section 133 does neither. S1; S6; S7

So on the face of the Sanhita, the provocation carve-out in section 133 operates without any statutory guidance at all - no list of cases in which provocation will not avail, and no express statement that gravity and suddenness is a question of fact. S1; S6

Whether a court would nevertheless apply section 131's Explanations to section 133 by analogy, on the footing that the same phrase should mean the same thing throughout a Chapter, is a question this article cannot answer. No authority on it was read, and the position is reported as a gap in the drafting rather than as a resolved question. S1; S6; S7

Note also that section 133 inherited this structure from the Penal Code, which had the same arrangement - its section 352 carried the Explanation and its section 355 did not. The Sanhita did not create the gap; it reproduced it. S2

Against IPC section 355

The comparison returns one difference, and it is a spelling. S1; S2

IPC section 355 read "intending thereby to dishonor that person". Section 133 reads "dishonour". The penalty, the elements, the provocation carve-out and the absence of any Explanation or Illustration are all identical. S1; S2

The Sanhita tidied an internal inconsistency

This is a small point but a real one. The Penal Code was inconsistent with itself. Its marginal note to section 355 read "intent to dishonour person", with the British spelling, while the operative text of the section read "to dishonor that person", with the American one. S2

Section 133 uses "dishonour" in both places. So the Sanhita normalised a discrepancy that had sat inside a single section of the Penal Code. Nothing turns on it, but it is an instance of the tidying the Sanhita did carry out - and it sits beside instances elsewhere in this group where archaic or inconsistent phrasing was left untouched. The modernisation is real but uneven. S1; S2

No State amendment

The Penal Code text was extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note, and none is recorded against section 355. That check is worth running at every section, because an amendment note of exactly that kind - a Maharashtra amendment raising a maximum from two years to five - sits against section 353 and would be invisible if one stopped reading at the operative words. S2

The fine position is unchanged

Section 133 says simply "or with fine", so no ceiling is expressed and section 8(1) of the Sanhita supplies the limit. S1

IPC section 355 also left the fine unquantified, so the position is the same under either Code, section 63 of the Penal Code having performed the function section 8(1) now performs. There is no question here of the Sanhita having introduced or removed a ceiling. S1; S2

This matches section 132 and differs from section 131, which expresses a ceiling of one thousand rupees and therefore displaces section 8(1). Within four consecutive sections the Sanhita uses both drafting styles, and nothing was found explaining the choice. S1; S6; S8

Classification, forum and compounding

The First Schedule entry

ColumnSection 133Section 132, for comparison
Punishment"Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both"Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both
Cognizable?Non-cognizableCognizable
Bailable?BailableNon-bailable
Triable byAny MagistrateAny Magistrate

S4; S8

The procedural regime tracks the victim, not the penalty

This is the most practically useful observation about section 133, and it emerges only from the comparison. S4; S8

Sections 132 and 133 carry identical maximum sentences. Yet section 132 is cognizable and non-bailable, and section 133 is neither. The difference between them is not the gravity of the punishment Parliament attached, which is the same, but who the victim is: a public servant in the one case, anybody at all in the other. S1; S4; S8

So a reader should not reason from the length of the maximum sentence to the procedural consequences. In this Chapter they come apart. S4; S8

Compoundable without leave

Section 133 appears in the Table to section 359(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita - offences compoundable without the permission of the court. The entry reads: S4

"Assault or use of criminal force. | 131, 133, 136 | The person assaulted or to whom criminal force is used."

So the person assaulted may compound the offence without approaching the court. There is no entry in the Table to section 359(2); both Tables were checked separately. S4

Two observations. The entry groups section 133 with sections 131 and 136, so all three of the provisions using the provocation formula are compoundable on the same footing - while section 132, which does not use it, is not compoundable at all. S4; S6; S7; S8 And the Table's description of the offence, "Assault or use of criminal force", does not mention dishonour; the section numbers in the second column are what identify the offences covered. S4

Forum

The Schedule says "Any Magistrate". Under section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita a Magistrate of the first class may pass up to three years, so he can impose section 133's full two years; a Magistrate of the second class is capped at one year by section 23(3) and so cannot, although the Schedule makes the offence triable before him. S1; S4; S5

As at section 132, the distinction to hold onto is between competence to try and power to sentence: a second class Magistrate may try the offence but cannot award more than one year of the available two. S4; S5

No causal claim is made about this. IPC section 355 also carried two years, and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has never been retrieved for this collection, so whether the Sanhita created this gap or inherited it is unverified. S1; S2; S4

How the courts have applied IPC section 355

Because section 133 reproduces IPC section 355 but for a spelling, decisions on the Penal Code provision bear on it directly. There are very few. S1; S2

A conviction set aside for want of evidence

In Devappa @ Devindrappa v. State of Karnataka (High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, Hemant Chandangoudar J, 28 June 2023) the appellant had been convicted by a Sessions Judge sitting as a Special Court under IPC section 355 and section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. S11

The Court set out the ingredients of section 355 in terms, reciting that a person "must have assaulted or used criminal force to any person, intending thereby to dishonour that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by the person". S11

The allegation was that the appellant "had assaulted PW.3 on his back with a footwear". The Court held that "except the self-serving statements of PWs.3 and 4, there is no material to substantiate that the accused had assaulted PW.3 on his back with footwear", and that in the absence of material the conviction was not sustainable in law. S11

It allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted the appellant of both offences, and directed the fine deposited to be released to him. S11

Two things should be taken from this, and the second is a limitation.

The fact pattern is instructive. Striking a person with a shoe is the paradigm case associated with this provision - conduct whose object is degradation rather than injury - and the Court treated section 355 as engaged on those allegations. S11

But the Court did not define "dishonour", and did not need to. The appeal was decided on the sufficiency of the evidence that the assault had occurred at all. So the decision tells us how such a charge may fail; it does not tell us what dishonour is. S11

A 1943 decision, and a ground that was never decided

R.C. Pollard v. Satya Gopal Mazumdar (Calcutta High Court, Derbyshire CJ and Khundkar J, 24 August 1943, reported AIR 1943 Cal 594) concerned a conviction under section 355 - which the Court described as "assault with intent to dishonour a person" - and a sentence of a fine of Rs. 200. S12

Three grounds were advanced: that no previous sanction for the prosecution had been obtained under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935; that the accused was entitled to treat the complainant as a trespasser and was therefore protected by the right of private defence; and that the trial had been held in an atmosphere of prejudice. S12

The Court held that, assuming the prosecution evidence were accepted, the case was governed by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in the absence of sanction from the Local Government, and that the Sessions Judge had been wrong in law to hold otherwise. The rule was made absolute, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and no further proceedings were to be taken unless and until sanction was given. S12

The private defence ground was advanced by the accused; it was not the basis of the decision. The case was disposed of on sanction. That distinction matters, and it is recorded here because treating a ground of challenge as though it were a holding is a trap this collection has encountered more than once. S12

The decision's present utility is limited in two further ways. It is a pre-independence judgment, and the procedural provisions it turned on - section 197 of the Code of 1898 and section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935 - have long since been replaced. It is cited here for two narrow things: that section 355 was understood as an offence of assault with intent to dishonour a person, and that a conviction under it was set aside on a sanction point. S12

Practical distinctions and common misconceptions

The distinguishing element is the intention to dishonour, not the degree of force. A slight touch with a degrading purpose can fall within section 133; a heavy blow without that purpose will not. S1

It is the intention that matters, not the effect. The section does not require proof that the person was in fact humiliated. S1

"Dishonour" is not judicially defined on the material read. Whether publicity is required, and whether the test is objective, are open questions. S1; S11; S12

Section 133 carries the same maximum as section 132 but a wholly different procedural regime - non-cognizable, bailable and compoundable, against cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable. The regime tracks the victim, not the penalty. S4; S8

Provocation is not a defence, but it takes the conduct outside this section. S1; S6

Section 133 has no Explanation and does not borrow section 131's, unlike section 136 - so its provocation carve-out has no statutory gloss. S1; S6; S7

The offence is compoundable without leave by the person assaulted. S4

There is no ceiling on the fine in the section, so section 8(1) governs it - as at section 132, and unlike section 131. S1; S6; S8

Words alone will not do. Mere words are not an assault under section 130's Explanation and are not force under section 129, however dishonouring their content. S9; S10

No contact is needed, because assault requires none. A degrading gesture creating the required apprehension may suffice. S9

Worked examples

Example 1. A strikes Z on the back with a shoe to degrade him. Section 133 on the fact pattern in Devappa - though whether the charge succeeds will depend on proof. S1; S11

Example 2. A punches Z hard in a quarrel, meaning to hurt him and nothing more. Section 131, not section 133 - there is no intention to dishonour. The greater violence does not make it the graver offence. S1; S6

Example 3. A spits at Z intending to humiliate him. Criminal force within section 129, used with intent to dishonour: section 133. S1; S10

Example 4. A shouts grossly insulting words at Z and does nothing more. Not section 133 - mere words are neither an assault nor force, whatever their content. S9; S10

Example 5. Z gravely and suddenly provokes A, who immediately uses degrading force on Z. Section 133 is not made out, because the force was used on grave and sudden provocation. Note that section 133 gives no guidance on when provocation will not avail, because it has no Explanation. S1; S6

Example 6. A does the same thing to a police officer on duty, intending to dishonour him. Section 132 may be engaged as well, and if it is the procedural consequences change sharply - cognizable, non-bailable and not compoundable. S1; S8

Example 7. Z wishes to settle the matter. Section 133 is compoundable without the leave of the court by the person assaulted. S4

Example 8. A is tried before a second class Magistrate who considers two years warranted. He cannot impose it; his ceiling is one year. S5

Commencement and which law applies

Section 133 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S13

The transition is immaterial in substance. IPC section 355 and section 133 carry the same penalty, the same elements, the same unquantified fine and the same absence of any Explanation; the only difference is the spelling of "dishonour". For conduct before 1 July 2024 the applicable provision is IPC section 355; on or after it, section 133. No State amendment is recorded against either. S1; S2; S13

  • Section 129 - criminal force, one of the two ways this offence may be committed. S10
  • Section 130 - assault, the other, and the source of the rule that mere words will not do. S9
  • Section 131 - the general offence, which carries the two Explanations on provocation that section 133 lacks. S6
  • Section 132 - the same maximum, a wholly different procedural regime. S8
  • Section 136 - the provision that expressly borrows section 131's Explanation, which section 133 does not. S7

Sources and honest limits

The statutory comparison was made by token-level comparison of the India Code text of section 133 against the India Code text of IPC section 355, with page-number artefacts removed first and the Penal Code text extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note. The section text was checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita. The First Schedule row and both Tables to section 359 were read from the Gazette text of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, as was section 23. The texts of sections 129, 130, 131, 132 and 136 were read from the verified section inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6; S7; S8; S9; S10

What this article does not establish:

  • "DISHONOUR" IS NOT DEFINED, AND THIS ARTICLE CANNOT DEFINE IT. Searches returned twenty and four results respectively. Both decisions retrieved were read in full and neither construes the word. Whether dishonour requires publicity, whether it is assessed objectively or by the complainant's own sense of honour, and how it is marked off from the fear or annoyance already covered by section 129 and from insult provisions elsewhere in the Sanhita, are all open on the material read.
  • THE OBSERVATION THAT FOOTWEAR IS THE PARADIGM FACT PATTERN IS DRAWN FROM ONE REPORTED ALLEGATION, not from any holding. The Court in Devappa treated section 355 as engaged on the allegations and then acquitted for want of evidence; it did not hold that striking with a shoe constitutes dishonour.
  • DEVAPPA IS A SINGLE-JUDGE DECISION OF ONE HIGH COURT and does not bind elsewhere. Its subsequent treatment was not checked. Its reasoning on the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not examined.
  • POLLARD WAS DECIDED ON SANCTION, NOT ON DISHONOUR, AND NOT ON PRIVATE DEFENCE. The private defence ground was advanced by the accused and never decided. It is a pre-independence decision turning on provisions long since replaced, and is cited only for the description of the offence and for the fact that a conviction was set aside on a sanction point.
  • PRIVATE DEFENCE IS STILL NOT EXAMINED ANYWHERE IN THIS COLLECTION, although Pollard shows it being raised against a charge under this very provision. The provisions governing it are not analysed here.
  • WHETHER A COURT WOULD APPLY SECTION 131'S EXPLANATIONS TO SECTION 133 BY ANALOGY IS NOT ANSWERED. The drafting gap is reported as a gap. No authority on it was read, and the conclusion that section 131's Explanation 1 is textually confined to its own section is drawn from its opening words.
  • THE FORUM GAP IS REPORTED WITHOUT ATTRIBUTING CAUSE. IPC section 355 also carried two years and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has never been retrieved.
  • NO TRAVAUX WERE RETRIEVED, and no Law Commission search was run for this section. Nothing explains why section 131 expresses a fine ceiling while sections 132 and 133 do not, or why section 133 was left without an Explanation.
  • THE RELATIONSHIP WITH INSULT AND DEFAMATION PROVISIONS IS NOT EXAMINED, nor is the overlap with the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, under which the appellant in Devappa was also charged.
  • Sections 129, 130, 131, 132 and 136 are described, not analysed, beyond what is needed for the comparisons drawn.
  • Nothing is said about sentencing practice under this section.
  • Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.

Section 133 is the dignity provision of this group, and it is also the one about which least is known. Its conduct element is shared with every other section here; what sets it apart is a purpose - to dishonour - that the statute does not define and that the courts, on the material available, have not defined either. Two things can nevertheless be said with confidence. The first is that the procedural consequences in this Chapter do not follow the length of the sentence: section 133 and section 132 carry the same two-year maximum, yet one is cognizable, non-bailable and incapable of compromise while the other is none of those things, and the variable is the identity of the victim. The second is that section 133's provocation carve-out stands without any Explanation to guide it, where section 131 has two of its own and section 136 borrows them expressly - a gap the Sanhita inherited from the Penal Code rather than created, but did not take the opportunity to close. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 133 punish?
Assaulting or using criminal force against a person while intending thereby to dishonour that person, where there was no grave and sudden provocation. The maximum is two years' imprisonment of either description, or fine, or both.
+How does it differ from Section 131?
The conduct element is the same - assault or criminal force. What aggravates section 133 is the purpose: an intention to dishonour. Section 131 carries three months; section 133 carries two years.
+What does 'dishonour' mean?
This article cannot tell you, and that is its most important limitation. Two searches were run - one phrase-anchored on section 355 and the intent to dishonour, returning TWENTY results, and one aimed at the meaning of dishonour, returning FOUR. Both decisions retrieved were read in full and NEITHER defines the word. For a provision on the statute book since 1860 that is remarkably little authority.
+What questions about 'dishonour' are left open?
Whether dishonour requires publicity or witnesses, or whether a private indignity suffices; whether it is assessed objectively or by reference to the particular complainant's sense of honour; and how it is distinguished from the fear or annoyance that section 129 already covers, and from insult provisions elsewhere in the Sanhita. All are open on the material read.
+Does the person actually have to be dishonoured?
No. The section asks what the accused intended, not what resulted. A person of unusual composure who feels no humiliation does not thereby take the conduct outside the section.
+What does the word 'thereby' do?
It ties the intention to the force. The dishonour must be intended to be effected BY the assault or criminal force, not by some separate act accompanying it.
+Is striking someone with a shoe covered?
That is the paradigm fact pattern associated with this provision - conduct whose object is degradation rather than injury - and in Devappa the allegation was exactly that, the accused having assaulted the complainant on his back with a footwear. The Court treated section 355 as engaged on those allegations. BUT note carefully: it did NOT hold that striking with a shoe constitutes dishonour; it acquitted for want of evidence that the assault had occurred at all.
+Does the degree of force matter?
Not in itself. The distinguishing element is the intention to dishonour. A slight touch with a degrading purpose can fall within section 133; a heavy blow without that purpose will not.
+Is grave and sudden provocation a defence?
It is not a defence so much as a boundary: if the force was used on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, this offence is not made out.
+Where do I find out when provocation will not avail under Section 133?
Nowhere in the statute, and this is a real gap. Section 131 carries two Explanations - one listing three cases where provocation will not mitigate, one making gravity and suddenness a question of fact - but Explanation 1 is expressly confined to 'an offence under this section'. Section 136 solves that by stating that it 'is subject to the same Explanation as section 131'. SECTION 133 DOES NEITHER: it has no Explanation of its own and no cross-reference. So its provocation carve-out operates with no statutory guidance at all.
+Would a court apply Section 131's Explanations to Section 133 anyway?
Possibly, on the footing that the same phrase should mean the same thing throughout a Chapter - but this article cannot answer it. No authority on the point was read, and the position is reported as a gap in the drafting rather than as a resolved question.
+Did the Sanhita create that gap?
No. The Penal Code had the same arrangement - its section 352 carried the Explanation and its section 355 did not - so section 133's carve-out stood without statutory gloss under the Penal Code too. The Sanhita reproduced the gap rather than creating it, but also did not take the opportunity to close it.
+Which IPC section did BNS Section 133 replace, and what changed?
IPC section 355. One difference, and it is a spelling: the Penal Code's operative text read 'dishonor' and section 133 reads 'dishonour'. The penalty, the elements, the provocation carve-out and the absence of any Explanation are all identical.
+Was the Penal Code inconsistent about that spelling?
Yes, within a single section. Its marginal note to section 355 read 'intent to DISHONOUR person' with the British spelling, while the operative text of the same section read 'to DISHONOR that person' with the American one. Section 133 uses 'dishonour' in both places, so the Sanhita normalised a discrepancy that sat inside one section of the Penal Code.
+Is there a State amendment to this provision?
None is recorded against IPC section 355. The Penal Code text was deliberately extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note - the technique that located a Maharashtra amendment against IPC section 353, raising that provision's maximum from two years to five - and nothing of the kind is present here.
+Is there a ceiling on the fine?
Not in the section, which says simply 'or with fine', so section 8(1) of the Sanhita supplies the limit. IPC section 355 also left the fine unquantified, so the position is unchanged - there is no question of the Sanhita having introduced or removed a ceiling. This matches section 132 and differs from section 131, which expresses a ceiling of one thousand rupees.
+Is the offence cognizable and bailable?
The First Schedule records it as NON-COGNIZABLE and BAILABLE, triable by any Magistrate.
+Section 132 carries the same two years. Why is it treated so differently?
This is the most practically useful observation about section 133, and it emerges only from the comparison. Sections 132 and 133 carry IDENTICAL maximum sentences, yet section 132 is cognizable and non-bailable and section 133 is neither. The difference is not the gravity of the punishment Parliament attached, which is the same, but WHO THE VICTIM IS - a public servant in the one case, anybody at all in the other. So a reader should not reason from the length of the maximum sentence to the procedural consequences; in this Chapter they come apart.
+Can the offence be compounded?
Yes, and without the leave of the court. The Table to section 359(1) contains the entry 'Assault or use of criminal force' against sections 131, 133 and 136, with the person competent to compound being the person assaulted or to whom criminal force is used. There is no entry in the Table to section 359(2); both Tables were checked separately. Note that all three provisions using the provocation formula are compoundable on the same footing, while section 132, which does not use it, is not compoundable at all.
+Which Magistrate can try it, and can he impose the full two years?
The Schedule says 'Any Magistrate'. A Magistrate of the first class may pass up to three years and so can impose the full two; a Magistrate of the second class is capped at one year by section 23(3) and so cannot, although the Schedule makes the offence triable before him. As at section 132, the distinction is between competence to TRY and power to SENTENCE. No causal claim is made about this gap: IPC section 355 also carried two years, and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has never been retrieved for this collection.
+What happened in Devappa?
The appellant had been convicted by a Sessions Judge sitting as a Special Court under IPC section 355 and section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The allegation was that he had assaulted the complainant on his back with a footwear. The Karnataka High Court held that 'except the self-serving statements of PWs.3 and 4, there is no material to substantiate' the assault, and that in the absence of material the conviction was not sustainable. It ALLOWED the appeal, SET ASIDE the conviction and sentence, ACQUITTED the appellant of both offences and directed the fine to be released to him.
+And Pollard?
A 1943 Calcutta High Court decision concerning a conviction under section 355 - described by the Court as 'assault with intent to dishonour a person' - and a fine of Rs. 200. Three grounds were advanced, including that the accused was entitled to treat the complainant as a trespasser and was protected by the right of private defence. The Court held the case was governed by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction absent sanction from the Local Government, and set aside the conviction and sentence. THE PRIVATE DEFENCE GROUND WAS ADVANCED BUT NEVER DECIDED - the case went off on sanction.
+How useful is a 1943 decision?
Limited, and the article says so. It is a pre-independence judgment and the procedural provisions it turned on - section 197 of the Code of 1898 and section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935 - have long since been replaced. It is cited for two narrow things only: that section 355 was understood as an offence of assault with intent to dishonour a person, and that a conviction under it was set aside on a sanction point.
+Can words alone constitute this offence?
No, however dishonouring their content. Mere words are not an assault under the Explanation to section 130, and words are not force under section 129. But no contact is needed either, because assault requires none - a degrading gesture creating the required apprehension may suffice.
+Which law applies to conduct before 1 July 2024?
IPC section 355. Since the two provisions are identical but for a spelling, nothing turns on the date.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 133 - official text of the offence and the marginal note — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  2. S2The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), section 355 - the repealed text used for the correspondence analysis, extracted through to the next section heading to check for State amendment notes — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  3. S3The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs - used to verify the text of section 133 as enacted — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  4. S4The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023) - Gazette text, used for the First Schedule entry for section 133 and for both Tables to section 359 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023), section 23 - sentences which Magistrates may pass — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  6. S6The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 131 - punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation, with its two Explanations — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  7. S7The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 136 - assault or criminal force on grave provocation, which expressly incorporates section 131's Explanation — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  8. S8The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 132 - assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, the procedural comparator — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  9. S9The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 130 - assault, and its Explanation — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  10. S10The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 129 - criminal force — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (India Code) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  11. S11Devappa @ Devindrappa v. The State of Karnataka, High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, Hemant Chandangoudar J, judgment dated 28 June 2023, Crl.A. No. 200158 of 2016 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  12. S12R.C. Pollard v. Satya Gopal Mazumdar, Calcutta High Court, Derbyshire CJ and Khundkar J, judgment dated 24 August 1943, reported AIR 1943 Cal 594 — Indian Kanoon (reproducing the judgment of the Calcutta High Court) (accessed 14 October 2026)
  13. S13Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, appointing 1 July 2024 as the date of commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 14 October 2026)

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