The short answer
Section 104 punishes murder committed by someone already under a sentence of imprisonment for life. In full S1:
Whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life, commits murder, shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life.
One sentence. No sub-sections, no proviso, no Explanation, no Exception, no Illustration. It does not define murder, that is Section 101: and it adds no new ingredient beyond the offender's existing status.
Two features matter more than anything else in this section.
First, the sentence is a choice, not a command. The court may impose death or imprisonment for life meaning the whole of the offender's natural life. Its predecessor, IPC Section 303, said simply "shall be punished with death": a single mandatory outcome S3.
Second, and this is the point most commentary gets wrong: Section 303 had already been struck down as unconstitutional in 1983. For roughly four decades before the Sanhita was drafted, it was unenforceable. So Section 104 is not softening a provision that was in force. It is putting into statutory form what the Supreme Court had required S6; S7; S8.
And there is no fine. The word does not appear in Section 104. That is a real difference from Section 103, where both sub-sections end "and shall also be liable to fine" S1.
The punishment matrix
| Trigger | the offender is under sentence of imprisonment for life, and commits murder as defined in Section 101 |
| Custodial options | death or imprisonment for life: alternatives, joined by "or" |
| Meaning of life | expressly "the remainder of that person's natural life" |
| Mandatory? | No. Both options are open to the court |
| Minimum | none expressed below imprisonment for life |
| Fine | none. The word "fine" does not appear in the section |
| Imprisonment type | not specified as simple or rigorous |
No sentence is automatic, and nothing here predicts what any court will do in any case.
One thing the section does not say, and we will not supply: it does not define "under sentence of imprisonment for life". Whether that covers an offender on parole, on bail pending appeal, or whose conviction is under challenge is not addressed in the text, and we found no decision on Section 104 construing it.
(A) What the documented record shows
Against IPC Section 303: two differences, and the second is the whole point
The statutory headings are identical: "Punishment for murder by life-convict" in both S3.
IPC Section 303, in the official text, read:
Whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life, commits murder shall be punished with death.
The word-level comparison returns exactly two differences S3:
| IPC 303 | BNS 104 | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | commits murder | commits murder, |
| 2 | shall be punished with death. | shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life. |
The first is a comma. The second removes a mandatory death sentence and replaces it with a judicial choice. That is as substantive as a change gets.
We also ran a negative control on the Gazette, and it passed: the Penal Code's mandatory formula "commits murder shall be punished with death." is absent from the Sanhita altogether S2. The Sanhita does not reproduce it anywhere.
A qualification on the comma. A public repository's annotated page for IPC Section 303 reproduces the provision with a comma after "commits murder", where the official India Code text has none S12. We resolve that conflict in favour of the official text, and report the comma difference with that qualification attached. Nothing legal turns on it either way.
Provenance: Section 303 had been amended once
IPC Section 303 carries footnote marker 1, and footnote 1 records substitution by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and the Schedule, of "imprisonment for life" for "transportation for life", with effect from 1 January 1956 S3. The same footnote serves Sections 302, 303 and 304 on that printed page.
The marker excision was proved lossless by a reinsertion test that rebuilt the original string exactly: 147 characters against 147, string-equal S3. The slice measured 144 characters, inside the band asserted before the result was read.
The "natural life" formula is not special to this section
It would be easy to read "which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life" as a bespoke toughening of this particular provision. It is not. Scanning all 358 sections of the Sanhita, the formula appears in ten sections S5:
64 · 65 · 66 · 70 · 71 · 104 · 109 · 117 · 139 · 143
So it is a Code-wide drafting device for a whole-life sentence. Section 104 uses the same formula as the rape, grievous-hurt and trafficking provisions.
Commencement and cross-references
Section 104 commenced on 1 July 2024; the only provision excepted from that commencement was Section 106(2). The operative words were read in both the English and the Hindi text of the notification, which agree S4.
Section 104 appears in neither list in Section 2(24) S1. Unlike Section 103, the BNSS does not refer to Section 104 by number at all.
(B) The judicial history, and exactly how far we can vouch for it
This section cannot be understood without its predecessor's constitutional history. We set out below both what we verified and what we could not.
Mithu v. State of Punjab: what we can and cannot say
We did not retrieve Mithu itself. Every direct search for it hit the repository's ten-result display limit, so that field is not surveyed S10. We therefore report its effect only on the strength of later decisions that record and quote it, and we quote no paragraph of Mithu from the judgment itself.
Two retrieved judgments record the striking down independently:
- Saibanna v. State of Karnataka, Supreme Court of India, 21 April 2005: the judgment records that the accused "had been charged under Section 303 IPC" and that at the sentencing stage "it was brought to its attention that Section 303 IPC had been struck down as unconstitutional by this Court in Mithu v. State of Punjab" S7. The phrase "by this Court" is the Supreme Court's own account of its own decision.
- Sartej Singh Narula v. Union of India, a High Court decision, refers to "the decision of Supreme Court in Mithu Vs. State of Punjab, 1983 SCC (Crl.) 405 whereby Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code was struck down by their Lordships as unconstitutional" S8. That supplies a reporter citation, which we report as given in that judgment and did not confirm against the reporter.
Mithu's reasoning, as quoted in a later Supreme Court judgment. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court, 13 May 2009) sets out the following passage from Mithu S6:
So final, so irrevocable and so irrestitutable is the sentence of death that no law which provides for it without involvement of the judicial mind can be said to be fair, just and reasonable. Such a law must necessarily be stigmatised as arbitrary and oppressive. Section 303 is such a law and it must go the way of all bad laws… Section 303, Indian Penal Code, must be struck down as unconstitutional.
Two cautions we impose on ourselves. The passage is expressed as a concurrence, its author records agreement with the Chief Justice, so it is one opinion in Mithu and not necessarily the leading judgment. And we do not attribute it to a named judge, because the judge's name is not in the material we retrieved S6.
The objection in that passage is to a law that imposes death "without involvement of the judicial mind". That is precisely the feature Section 104 does not have.
A judgment we found, checked, and then had to discount
This is where the later-treatment check earned its place in the method.
Saibanna looked, at first, like a useful illustration: a life-convict who committed murder, convicted under Section 302 after Section 303 fell, and sentenced to death: the Sessions Court holding the case "rarest of rare" with no mitigating circumstances, the two High Court Judges disagreeing (one favouring life imprisonment), and the Supreme Court dismissing the appeal and leaving the death sentence undisturbed S7.
We then checked what became of it. It has been disapproved. In Bariyar, the Supreme Court said of it S6:
In this context, Saibanna v. State of Karnataka [(2005) 4 SCC 165] makes an interesting reading. The accused therein was a life convict. While on parole, he committed murder of his wife and daughter. This Court sentenced him to death on a reasoning, which effectively made death punishment mandatory for the category of offenders serving life sentence…
and then, flatly:
Saibanna (supra) to that extent is inconsistent with Mithu (supra) and Bachan Singh (supra).
Official legal analysis treats it the same way. The Law Commission of India's Report No. 262, "The Death Penalty", analyses a group of cases under the heading "Cases of Other Prisoners Sentenced to Death under Judgments Subsequently Declared to be Per Incuriam", and includes within it "b. The Case of Saibanna". A table in the report lists "Saibanna v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 165" against "Bariyar". The report also records that "The mercy petitions of Saibanna and Shivaji Alhat have been rejected" S9.
So Saibanna appears in this article only for the procedural history it records. We do not rely on it for any proposition about when death may be imposed, because the later authority we found says its reasoning on exactly that point was wrong. Had we not run the check, we would have reported it as sound law.
Bachan Singh, named in Bariyar, was not retrieved S6. The Law Commission report is contextual evidence of how the disapproval was understood in official analysis; it is not operative law, and no recommendation of it is attributed to the Sanhita S9.
Section 104 itself
No decision construing Section 104 was retrieved. Three separate exact-phrase searches each produced a genuine nil: the repository's own no-results marker with zero result entries, so each was exhausted rather than truncated S10. That is a nil on those queries, not a finding that no such decision exists.
The case law on IPC Sections 302 and 303 was not otherwise surveyed S10.
(C) Editorial analysis: clearly labelled as ours
Everything in this part is our own reading of the verified material above.
The most common way of describing this section is misleading, and the mistake is worth naming. To say that the Sanhita "reduced the punishment" for murder by a life-convict, or "softened" Section 303, implies that a mandatory death sentence was operating until 1 July 2024. It was not. On the material above, Section 303 had been unenforceable since 1983. What actually changed on 1 July 2024 is that the statute book caught up with the constitutional position. The text now says what the courts had already held it had to say.
The provision looks designed to survive the objection that destroyed its predecessor. Mithu's complaint, in the passage quoted above, was against a death sentence imposed "without involvement of the judicial mind". Section 104 gives the court two options and requires it to choose. Whether that is sufficient, and whether a provision singling out life-convicts for a sentencing regime distinct from Section 103 raises any separate question, is not something we can answer. We found no decision on Section 104, and the Constitution was not retrieved as a source for this article. We flag it as the central open question and stop.
Our website's own mapping table gets this one right, and that deserves saying. It records: "IPC 303 was struck down by SC; BNS 104 reintroduces it with 'Death or Life' option". On our verified findings that is accurate and genuinely informative. The best entry we have assessed in that dataset across this collection. Our only quibble is with "reintroduces": Section 303 was never repealed, it was held unconstitutional, so the Sanhita is re-enacting a provision in a form intended to be valid rather than bringing back something that had been taken off the statute book S11.
The absence of a fine is a small coherence point worth noticing. Section 103 attaches a mandatory fine to murder; Section 104, for a murder committed by someone already serving life, attaches none. We do not know why, we found no documented rationale, and we offer no explanation. It may be that a fine is pointless against a person facing a whole-life sentence. That is a guess, and we label it as one.
Reporting the "natural life" formula's ten appearances matters because it blocks a tempting but wrong inference. Read in isolation, the phrase looks like a toughening aimed at life-convicts. Read across the Code, it is the Sanhita's standard way of writing a whole-life sentence, used identically in the rape, grievous-hurt and trafficking provisions.
What we checked, and what we could not
Checked and verified. The full text and heading of Section 104 against the verified inventory and, fragment by fragment, against the Gazette S1; S2. That it has no sub-sections, proviso, Explanation, Exception or Illustration, and no fine: the last by testing for the word itself S1. The complete punishment matrix S1. The word-level comparison with IPC Section 303, on a line-scoped extraction with a length band asserted before the result was read (144 characters, in band) S3. A negative control confirming the Penal Code's mandatory-death formula is absent from the Sanhita S2. The 1955 amendment to Section 303, with the marker excision proved lossless at 147 characters against 147, string-equal S3. That the "natural life" formula appears in exactly ten sections, by scanning all 358 S5. Commencement, in both language texts S4. That Section 104 is in neither Section 2(24) list and that the BNSS does not refer to it S1. The striking down of Section 303, from two independent retrieved judgments S7; S8. Mithu's reasoning, as quoted in a later Supreme Court judgment S6. The later treatment of Saibanna, by targeted search, and the disapproval found S6; S9.
Not checked, and material. Mithu v. State of Punjab was NOT retrieved. Its effect is reported only through later judgments that record and quote it; no paragraph is quoted from the judgment itself, no bench is named, and the field is recorded as not surveyed because the direct searches were truncated at the display limit S10. The reporter citation 1983 SCC (Crl.) 405 is reported as given in Sartej Singh Narula and was not confirmed against the reporter S8. Bachan Singh was not retrieved S6. No decision construing Section 104 was retrieved: three genuine nils S10. The case law on IPC Sections 302 and 303 was not otherwise surveyed S10. Cognizability, bailability and compoundability are not stated: the BNSS First Schedule has never been examined in this project, and unlike Section 103 there is no model form of charge naming this section. The Constitution of India was not retrieved; no constitutional text is quoted or construed, and the constitutional validity of Section 104 is expressly left open. The meaning of "under sentence of imprisonment for life" (whether it reaches an offender on parole, on bail, or under appeal) is not answered. No State amendment or variation was searched for.
How this article was prepared
The official text of Section 104 was compared word by word with the official text of IPC Section 303; every fragment was then verified against the Gazette, and a negative control was run to confirm the old mandatory formula is absent from the Sanhita. The "natural life" formula was counted across all 358 sections rather than assumed to be local.
Three of this project's standing rules did the real work here:
- Check later treatment before relying on a judgment. Saibanna would have made an attractive illustration. A targeted search showed the Supreme Court had held its reasoning "inconsistent with Mithu", and the Law Commission had grouped it with judgments declared per incuriam. It is reported for its procedural history only.
- Never assert a holding from a judgment you have not retrieved. Mithu is central to this section and we could not obtain it. Its effect is therefore attributed to the judgments that record it, its reasoning is quoted at second hand with that fact stated, and no judge is named.
- Scope a finding to the provision, then test whether it is Code-wide. The "natural life" wording is not special to Section 104; it appears in ten sections, and saying so prevents a wrong inference.
Documented statutory material, judicial material, official legislative analysis and our own assessment are kept separate and labelled. Where something is unknown, this article says so rather than filling the gap.
This article was prepared with AI assistance. No lawyer has reviewed it and no human legal review is claimed. Its status is "ready for human review": ready to be checked by a person, not already checked.
This article is new and standalone. It does not reproduce, replace or alter any existing content on this website, and nothing here has been published, integrated or deployed.
Law checked as of the date recorded in this article's metadata. Statutes and case law change, and this article is not legal advice. Whether a person is "under sentence of imprisonment for life", whether murder is made out, and which of the two sentences is appropriate, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.