IPC2BNSConverter

BNS Section 43 · Deep dive

BNS Section 43: When the Right of Private Defence of Property Begins and Ends

BNS Section 43 fixes the duration of the right of private defence of property, and nothing else. Its architecture differs from the body provision in a way that is easy to miss: Section 40 states a single rule for the body, whereas Section 43 states one commencement rule in clause (a) and then four separate, offence-specific continuance rules. The right commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences. Against theft it ends on any one of three events - the offender effecting his retreat with the property, the assistance of the public authorities being obtained, or the property being recovered. Against robbery it continues while the offender causes or attempts death, hurt or wrongful restraint to any person, or while a fear of instant death, instant hurt or instant personal restraint continues. Against criminal trespass or mischief it is coterminous with the offence. Against house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise it continues as long as the house-trespass begun by the breaking continues. Compared with IPC Section 105 not one operative word changed. The section was restructured into clauses, which removed four repetitions of an eight-word phrase, and 'by night' was replaced by the words that already defined it in IPC Section 446. A footnote recording a 2013 amendment intrudes into the printed text of IPC Section 105 but belongs to a different provision, and no amendment to Section 105 is asserted. No judgment construing Section 43 of the Sanhita was located.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 23 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 43 — Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of property
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 105 — Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property · split or reorganised
Section 102 — Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body · renumbered
Section 99 — Acts against which there is no right of private defence · modified
Section 103 — When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death · modified
Section 104 — When such right extends to causing any harm other than death · substantively unchanged
Section 441 — Criminal trespass · consolidated
Side-by-side converterIPC 105 → BNS 43

What the section says

Section 43 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of property. and reads in full: S1S2

43. The right of private defence of property,—

(a) commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences;

(b) against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered;

(c) against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues;

(d) against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief;

(e) against house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise continues as long as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.

It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3

Section 43 does for property what Section 40 does for the body: it fixes duration, not extent. How far the right may go is governed by Sections 41 and 42, and Section 37 restricts it. Neither is analysed here. S1

The comparison with Section 40 repays a moment, because the architecture is different in a way that is easy to miss. Section 40 states a single rule for the body: the right begins on a reasonable apprehension and continues as long as that apprehension continues. Section 43 states a single rule only for commencement, in clause (a). For continuance it gives four separate, offence-specific rules. There is no general apprehension-based continuance rule for property of the kind Section 40 supplies for the body, whose words are that the right "continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues". That observation is the author's; the structure is the statute's. S1

What changed from IPC Section 105

A programmatic word-level diff was run against IPC Section 105 after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes, the section number and the marginal-note title.

A trap had to be cleared first. The India Code text of IPC Section 105 has a page-bottom footnote and a page number bleeding into the middle of the section, between the robbery paragraph and the criminal-trespass paragraph: "1. Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, s. 2 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013). 29". It would be easy, and wrong, to read that as recording a 2013 amendment to Section 105. Section 105 contains no bracketed insertion marker at all, which is how an amended passage is flagged in this text; the footnote belongs to a different provision on the same printed page. (As recorded in the article on Section 38, the 2013 insertion by Act 13 of 2013 was made to IPC Section 100.) No amendment to IPC Section 105 by Act 13 of 2013 is asserted here, and the footnote and page number were excluded before diffing. S4

With the footnote excluded, and the clause labels left in place, the diff returns 154 tokens for the IPC against 134 for the Sanhita, with 40 differing tokens. Run again with the repeated lead-in phrase collapsed on both sides, it returns 126 against 122, with 14 differing tokens. S4

Three changes account for all of it.

1. Four repetitions of an eight-word phrase were eliminated. IPC Section 105 consisted of five unlabelled paragraphs, and each one began with the words "The right of private defence of property": five statements of the same phrase. Section 43 states the phrase once, as an umbrella, and hangs clauses (a) to (e) off it. The arithmetic is visible in the diff: four blocks of seven tokens are removed (the right of private defence of property, the capital "The" having been normalised), and five clause labels are added. Twenty-eight words of repetition become five labels. S4

This is a presentational change. Not one word of the operative rules was altered by it.

2. "House-breaking by night" became "house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise": terminological, not substantive. This is the same change made in Section 41(b), and for the same reason. IPC Section 446 defined "house-breaking by night" as house-breaking "after sunset and before sunrise", so the Sanhita has put the definition where the defined label used to be. The Sanhita abolished "by night" as a defined term: the phrase appears 28 times in the Indian Penal Code and twice in the Sanhita, both surviving uses being inside illustrations in ordinary narrative English. S1S4

3. The marginal-note title lost a definite article. "Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property" became "Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of property." S1S4

The classification is therefore substantively_unchanged as to every operative rule, together with renumbered, and split_or_reorganised as to the drafting of the section into clauses.

No section-specific legislative rationale was located for the restructuring, for the terminological substitution, or for the dropped definite article, and none is invented here.

Clause (a): when the right begins

The right "commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences". S1

Two points follow from the words. The trigger is a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property, not actual loss, and not the completion of any offence. And the commencement test is stated in terms of the danger to the property itself, whereas Section 40 ties the body's right to "an attempt or threat to commit the offence". The property limb does not use the words "attempt or threat". Whether anything turns on that difference was not resolved by any authority located for this article, and no conclusion is drawn from it here. S1

In Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, decided by the Supreme Court on 19 January 1970 (I.D. Dua, M. Hidayatullah and A.N. Ray, JJ.; the judgment relied on in later cases as having been delivered by Dua, J.), the Court summarised both limbs: S6

"This right commences when[,] reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences and its duration, as prescribed in S. 105, in case of defence against criminal trespass or mischief, continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of such offence."

(The text relied on reads "commences when. reasonable apprehension", with a stray full stop; the comma in square brackets is supplied only to make the sentence readable, and no word has been altered.)

Clause (b): theft (three ways the right can end)

Against theft the right "continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered". S1

Three alternative terminations are stated, and any one of them ends the right:

  • the offender has effected his retreat with the property;
  • the assistance of the public authorities is obtained; or
  • the property has been recovered.

The practical consequence is that the right against theft is not open-ended merely because the property is still missing. Successful flight ends it, as does recourse to the authorities, as does recovery.

The second limb has a near-twin elsewhere in the scheme, and the two must not be run together. Section 37(1)(c) provides that there is no right of private defence "in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities". S1 Clause (b) is about a right that ends when assistance is in fact obtained; Section 37(1)(c) is about a right that never arises where there was time to seek that protection. The relationship between them was not resolved by any authority located for this article.

Gottipulla turned on the Section 37(1)(c) principle, not on clause (b), and the distinction is worth preserving. There the accused had raised a bund across a kunta; the occupiers, who claimed a right to cultivate it, went to the scene in numbers to remove the bund by force and beat some of the accused. It was the occupiers' reliance on private defence of property that failed. The Court said: S6

"it is indisputable that the occupiers had ample opportunity of approaching the public authorities concerned if they felt that their right had been encroached upon."

The Court recorded that a civil suit about the right to cultivate the kunta had been instituted as far back as 1957 and was still pending, that both sides had secured injunctions in it in February 1960, and that the occupiers had already complained to the police about the raising of the bund days before the incident; if the Sub-Inspector was guilty of "grave dereliction of duty (as in our opinion he clearly was)", then "the higher authorities could easily have been approached by the occupiers and their supporters", and "[e]ven the civil court could have been moved". S6 The availability of lawful recourse, rather than the merits of the land dispute, was what the Court fastened on.

Clause (c): robbery (two alternative measures)

Against robbery the right "continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues". S1

The clause supplies two measures joined by "or", and the second is the wider of the two. The first is conduct: the offender causing or attempting to cause death, hurt or wrongful restraint. The second is a state of fear: "the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint". Each of the three fears is qualified by the word instant, which does the limiting work. A fear of harm at some later time is not within the clause. Note also that the conduct limb speaks of causing harm "to any person", not only to the person exercising the right. S1

Clause (d): criminal trespass or mischief (coterminous with the offence)

Against criminal trespass or mischief the right "continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief". S1 The right is tied to the continuance of the offence itself, so it ends when the offender stops. Gottipulla states the same rule in the passage quoted above. S6

Clause (e): nocturnal house-breaking (tied to the house-trespass)

Against "house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise" the right "continues as long as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues". S1

The drafting rewards care. House-breaking is a mode of committing house-trespass: Section 330(2) defines house-breaking as a person who "commits house-trespass" by effecting entry or exit in one of six specified ways, and Section 329(2) defines house-trespass as a species of criminal trespass. S1 So the clause does not measure the right by the breaking, which may be over in a moment, but by the continuing trespass the breaking began.

One consequence of that definitional chain should be stated carefully. Because house-breaking is a species of criminal trespass, conduct within clause (e) also appears to answer the description in clause (d), and house-breaking in daylight, outside clause (e), appears to fall within clause (d) as criminal trespass. No authority addressing the interaction of clauses (d) and (e) was located, and this article does not assert how a court would resolve it. The point is flagged because the overlap is apparent on the face of the section, not because it has been decided.

A number collision that the new codes removed

A reader working from older judgments should know about a trap of numbering. Under the previous law the number 105 meant two different things in this area: IPC Section 105 was this commencement and continuance provision, while Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 placed on the accused the burden of proving that the case fell within a General Exception.

The two appear in consecutive sentences in Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato v. State of West Bengal (Supreme Court, 28 October 2005, S.B. Sinha and R.V. Raveendran, JJ.), which sets out IPC Section 105 in full and then observes: "Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act casts the burden of proof on the accused who sets up the plea of self-defence and in the absence of proof, it may not be possible for the court to presume the correctness or otherwise of the said plea. No positive evidence although is required to be adduced by the accused; it is possible for him to prove the said fact by eliciting the necessary materials from the witnesses examined by the prosecution." S7

Under the new codes the collision is gone: the commencement and continuance provision is BNS Section 43, and the burden provision is Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. S1S5 That observation about the renumbering is the author's.

Who must prove it

Section 43 is part of a General Exception, so the burden of bringing a case within the private-defence provisions lies on the accused under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which also directs the court to presume the absence of the circumstances. S5 On the standard, James Martin v. State of Kerala holds that the burden "stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record", and that an accused "is not necessarily required to call evidence". S8 Bishna makes the same practical point for the Evidence Act provision: no positive evidence need be adduced, and the plea may be established from the prosecution's own witnesses or from "the attending circumstances, as may transpire from the evidence led by the prosecution itself". S7 As recorded in the articles on Sections 34 and 39 to 42, those authorities speak specifically of the plea of self-defence, and whether the same standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched.

Whether a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property arose, and when the relevant clause of Section 43 ceased to operate, are questions of fact.

Case law under the Sanhita

No judgment construing Section 43 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 43 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page carrying the literal string "No matching results" with zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S9

The statutory wording returns authority, though less of it than for the body provisions. The exact phrase "continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property" returned 18 documents; "as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues" returned 11; and the clause (e) phrase "house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues" returned 1. S9 Of those, only Gottipulla and Bishna were retrieved and read for this article.

Because the operative rules are identical, Gottipulla and Bishna construe the same rules that now appear in Section 43: but both are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.

Common misconceptions

"The right lasts until I get my property back." Not necessarily. Against theft the right ends on any of three events: the offender effecting his retreat with the property, the assistance of the public authorities being obtained, or the property being recovered. Recovery is only one of the three. S1

"Section 43 tells me how much force I may use." It does not. It fixes duration only. Extent is in Sections 41 and 42, and Section 37 restricts the right, including the cap in Section 37(2). None of those is analysed here. S1

"Property defence works like body defence — it lasts as long as the apprehension." That is the rule for the body under Section 40. For property, clause (a) governs commencement but continuance is offence-specific: four different rules for theft, robbery, criminal trespass or mischief, and nocturnal house-breaking. S1

"Any fear during a robbery keeps the right alive." The fear must be of instant death, instant hurt or instant personal restraint. S1

"The BNS changed when the right begins or ends for property." It did not. Every operative rule is word for word the same. The section was restructured into clauses, four repetitions of an eight-word phrase were removed, and "by night" was replaced by the words that already defined it. S4

"Section 105 of the IPC became Section 43, so Evidence Act Section 105 became Section 43 too." No. They were different provisions that happened to share a number. IPC Section 105 is now BNS Section 43; Evidence Act Section 105 is now Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. S1S5

"Section 105 of the IPC was amended in 2013." No such amendment is asserted here. The 2013 footnote appearing in the middle of the printed section belongs to a different provision on the same page, and Section 105 carries no insertion marker. S4

Reading the section in practice

  1. When did a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commence? That is the opening of the window under clause (a).
  2. Identify the offence, because continuance depends on which one it is.
  3. Theft: has the offender retreated with the property, has the assistance of the public authorities been obtained, or has the property been recovered? Any one ends the right.
  4. Robbery: is the offender still causing or attempting death, hurt or wrongful restraint to any person, or does a fear of instant death, hurt or personal restraint continue?
  5. Criminal trespass or mischief: is the offender still committing it?
  6. House-breaking after sunset and before sunrise: does the house-trespass begun by the breaking continue?
  7. Only then ask how far the right extended: Sections 41 and 42: and whether Section 37 removed or capped it.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff, run twice, once with the clause labels retained and once with the repeated lead-in collapsed, after excluding the footnote and page number that intrude into the printed text of IPC Section 105.

This article does not analyse Sections 34 to 42 or 44. Sections 41 and 42 are named only as the provisions governing extent, Section 37 only for the restrictions it imposes (including clause (1)(c) and the cap in sub-section (2)), and Section 40 only for the contrast in architecture. Sections 329 and 330 are used only for the definitions of criminal trespass, house-trespass and house-breaking, and Section 446 of the IPC only for the definition of "house-breaking by night". None of those offence provisions is examined.

Three observations are the author's and are labelled as such in the text: that Section 43 states one commencement rule but four offence-specific continuance rules where Section 40 states a single rule for the body; that the renumbering has removed the old collision between IPC Section 105 and Evidence Act Section 105; and the arithmetic of the four eliminated lead-in repetitions.

Three questions are expressly left open because no authority resolving them was located: whether anything turns on clause (a) speaking of danger to the property while Section 40 speaks of an attempt or threat to commit the offence; how a right that ends when the assistance of the public authorities is obtained relates to Section 37(1)(c), under which the right never arises where there was time to seek that protection; and how clauses (d) and (e) interact, given that house-breaking is a species of criminal trespass. On the second of those, Gottipulla is not an answer: it applied the restriction now in Section 37(1)(c) and not clause (b), as the article explains.

Gottipulla and Bishna were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched; the official reports were not consulted. Three source conditions should be noted. The text of Gottipulla relied on reads "commences when. reasonable apprehension", and it writes "s. 103" and "s. 99" where Bishna's reproduction of the same passage writes "Section 103" and "Section 99". The passage has been quoted from Gottipulla's own judgment body, after the report's headnote was identified and set aside, rather than from the later reproduction. Bishna cites the case as "Gpttipulla Venkatasiva Subbarayanam"; the repository's own title for the judgment is "Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam", and the latter spelling is used here with the variance disclosed. Bishna reports the decision as having been given by "Dua, J. speaking for the Bench", which is recorded above as that Court's description.

Only two of the thirty phrase-search results were retrieved and read. One further document, a 2025 High Court decision, was retrieved and not used, because the burden point it addresses is already covered and verifying its court, bench and governing statute was not undertaken.

Whether the preponderance-of-probabilities standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched; the authorities speak of the plea of self-defence.

Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. When an apprehension of danger to property arose, which offence was being committed, and when the right ceased are findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 43 do?
It fixes only the duration of the right of private defence of property. Clause (a) governs commencement - the right 'commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences' - and clauses (b) to (e) give separate continuance rules for theft, robbery, criminal trespass or mischief, and house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise. How far the right may go is governed by Sections 41 and 42, and Section 37 restricts it. S1
+How is Section 43 different in structure from Section 40?
Section 40 states a single rule for the body: the right begins on a reasonable apprehension and continues as long as that apprehension continues. Section 43 states a single rule only for commencement. For continuance it gives four offence-specific rules, and there is no general 'as long as the apprehension continues' for property. That observation is this article's; the structure is the statute's. S1
+When does the right against theft end?
On any one of three events: the offender has 'effected his retreat with the property'; 'the assistance of the public authorities is obtained'; or 'the property has been recovered'. The right is therefore not open-ended merely because the property is still missing. S1
+Is that the same as the rule about having time to go to the public authorities?
No, and the two should not be run together. Clause (b) is about a right that ends when assistance is in fact obtained. Section 37(1)(c) provides that there is no right of private defence at all 'in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities' - a right that never arises. The relationship between them was not resolved by any authority located for this article. S1
+When does the right against robbery end?
The clause gives two alternative measures. It continues 'as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint' - note 'any person', not only the defender - 'or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues'. Each fear is qualified by the word 'instant', so a fear of harm at some later time is not within the clause. S1
+When does the right against criminal trespass or mischief end?
It is coterminous with the offence: the right 'continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief'. In Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam v. State of Andhra Pradesh the Supreme Court stated the same rule. S1S6
+Why does clause (e) talk about house-trespass rather than house-breaking?
Because house-breaking is a mode of committing house-trespass. Section 330(2) defines house-breaking as a person who 'commits house-trespass' by effecting entry or exit in one of six specified ways, and Section 329(2) defines house-trespass as a species of criminal trespass. The breaking may be over in a moment, so the clause measures the right by the continuing trespass the breaking began. S1
+Do clauses (d) and (e) overlap?
They appear to. Because house-breaking is a species of criminal trespass, conduct within clause (e) also appears to answer the description in clause (d), and house-breaking in daylight - outside clause (e) - appears to fall within clause (d). No authority addressing the interaction was located, and this article does not assert how a court would resolve it. The point is flagged because the overlap is apparent on the face of the section. S1
+Did the BNS change when the right begins or ends for property?
No. Every operative rule is word for word the same. The section was restructured from five unlabelled paragraphs into an umbrella plus clauses (a) to (e), which removed four repetitions of the eight-word phrase 'The right of private defence of property', and 'by night' was replaced by 'after sunset and before sunrise'. The marginal-note title also lost one definite article. S4
+Is the new wording 'after sunset and before sunrise' a change to the night-time window?
No. IPC Section 446 defined 'house-breaking by night' as house-breaking 'after sunset and before sunrise', so the Sanhita has put the definition where the defined label used to be. The Sanhita abolished 'by night' as a defined term: the phrase appears 28 times in the IPC and twice in the Sanhita, both surviving uses being inside illustrations in ordinary narrative English. S1S4
+Was IPC Section 105 amended in 2013?
No such amendment is asserted here. A footnote and page number - '1. Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, s. 2 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013). 29' - intrude into the middle of the printed text of IPC Section 105, between the robbery paragraph and the criminal-trespass paragraph. Section 105 carries no bracketed insertion marker, which is how an amended passage is flagged in that text; the footnote belongs to a different provision on the same printed page. As recorded in the article on Section 38, the 2013 insertion was made to IPC Section 100. S4
+Why do older judgments mention 'Section 105' for two different things?
Because under the previous law the number meant two different provisions in this area: IPC Section 105 was this commencement and continuance provision, while Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 placed on the accused the burden of proving a General Exception. Both appear in consecutive sentences in Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato v. State of West Bengal. Under the new codes the collision is gone: the provisions are BNS Section 43 and Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. S1S5S7
+Who has to prove it, and to what standard?
Section 43 is part of a General Exception, so under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 the burden lies on the accused and the Court is directed to presume the absence of the circumstances. On the standard, James Martin v. State of Kerala holds that the burden 'stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record' and that an accused 'is not necessarily required to call evidence'. Bishna makes the same practical point: no positive evidence need be adduced, and the plea may be established from the prosecution's own witnesses. Those authorities speak specifically of the plea of self-defence; whether the same standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched. S5S7S8
+Are there any judgments on Section 43 of the Sanhita?
None was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase 'section 43 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned a page carrying the literal string 'No matching results' with zero result entries, retrieved and inspected directly. The statutory wording returned 18 documents for the theft limb, 11 for the robbery limb and 1 for the clause (e) phrase; of those only Gottipulla and Bishna were read. S9

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 43 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S6Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subrayanam and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another — Supreme Court of India, 19 January 1970; Bench I.D. Dua, M. Hidayatullah and A.N. Ray, JJ.; cited in later decisions as (1970) 1 SCC 235 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S7Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato and others v. State of West Bengal — Supreme Court of India, 28 October 2005; Bench S.B. Sinha and R.V. Raveendran, JJ. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S8James Martin v. State of Kerala — Supreme Court of India, 16 December 2003; judgment delivered by Arijit Pasayat, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  9. S9Indian Kanoon (judgment-text repository) — search result pages for the exact phrases "section 43 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita", "continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property", "as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues" and "house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues" (accessed 3 October 2026)

Related deep dives

← All BNS section deep dives