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BNS Section 42 · Deep dive

BNS Section 42: Private Defence of Property Short of Causing Death

BNS Section 42 is the residual provision of the private-defence scheme for property. Section 41 lists four descriptions of offence in which the right may extend to causing death; Section 42 governs everything else. It is commonly misread as withdrawing the right, when its structure is a ceiling with a floor: where the offence is theft, mischief or criminal trespass outside Section 41, the right 'does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.' Two apparent gaps in its three-offence list are not gaps. Robbery is absent because robbery is clause (a) of Section 41 without qualification, so no residue exists. House-trespass and house-breaking are absent by name but included in substance, because Sections 329 and 330 make house-breaking a species of house-trespass and house-trespass a species of criminal trespass. Against IPC Section 104 nothing of substance changed: a word-level diff returns 75 tokens against 73 with 10 differing tokens, every one a cross-reference, and the marginal-note title is unchanged. Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana shows the provision operating both ways in one case - an accused who caused grievous hurt to a criminal trespasser was acquitted outright, while two who caused death were held to have exceeded the right and were convicted of culpable homicide rather than murder. No judgment construing Section 42 of the Sanhita was located.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 3 October 2026 21 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 42 — When such right extends to causing any harm other than death
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 104 — When such right extends to causing any harm other than death · substantively unchanged
Section 103 — When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death · modified
Section 101 — When such right extends to causing any harm other than death · modified
Section 97 — Right of private defence of the body and of property · renumbered
Section 99 — Acts against which there is no right of private defence · modified
Section 441 — Criminal trespass · consolidated
Side-by-side converterIPC 104 → BNS 42

What the section says

Section 42 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title When such right extends to causing any harm other than death. and reads in full: S1S2

42. If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions specified in section 41, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.

One sentence, no clauses, no proviso, no illustration. S1 It has been in force since 1 July 2024 under Notification S.O. 850(E). S1S3

Section 42 is the residual provision for property. Section 41 lists four descriptions of offence in which the right of private defence of property may extend to causing death; Section 42 governs what is left over. Its structure is worth stating precisely, because the section is commonly misread as a grant of a lesser right. It is better read as a ceiling with a floor: the right "does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend ... to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death." The right is not withdrawn; its upper limit is fixed.

A drafting detail confirms the design. The Sanhita gives Sections 39 and 42 the identical marginal-note title: When such right extends to causing any harm other than death. Section 39 is the residual provision for the body; Section 42 is the residual provision for property. The Indian Penal Code did the same with Sections 101 and 104. S1S4 The duplication is deliberate symmetry, not an error, and a reader searching by title will find two sections.

What changed from IPC Section 104

A programmatic word-level diff was run against IPC Section 104 after normalising whitespace, punctuation, em-dashes, the section number and the marginal-note title. It returns 75 tokens for the IPC against 73 for the Sanhita, with 10 differing tokens, and every one of them is a cross-reference. S4

The differences are exactly these:

  • "not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section" became "not of any of the descriptions specified in section 41";
  • "subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99" became "subject to the restrictions specified in section 37".

Nothing else. The offences that trigger the section (theft, mischief, criminal trespass) the exclusion of death, the permission of any other harm, and the words "to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer" are word for word identical. The marginal-note title is identical too, down to the absence of any definite article. S4 Unlike neighbouring Section 41, there is nothing substantive to report.

The classification is therefore substantively_unchanged, together with renumbered as to the cross-references.

The replacement of "the last preceding section" with "section 41" is worth a sentence, because it is the kind of change that is invisible until it matters. A reference to "the last preceding section" is positional: it means whatever section happens to precede. A reference to "section 41" is fixed. In a code that has renumbered everything, naming the section removes a class of error that cross-references of the older style invite. That observation is the author's, not a documented legislative rationale: no section-specific rationale for this change was located.

The three offences, and why the list is complete

Section 42 names three offences: theft, mischief, criminal trespass. Two absences from that list look like gaps and are not.

Robbery is missing. Section 35(b) confers the right of private defence of property against "theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass", so robbery is within the right; yet Section 42 does not mention it. The reason is arithmetic rather than policy: robbery is clause (a) of Section 41 without qualification. Every case of robbery is therefore already "of a description specified in section 41", and there is no residue for Section 42 to catch. A residual provision needs to name only those offences that can fall outside the primary list. S1

House-trespass and house-breaking are missing, but they are included. Section 41 reaches house-breaking in clause (b) only when committed after sunset and before sunrise, and house-trespass in clause (d) only in circumstances reasonably causing apprehension of death or grievous hurt. So house-breaking in daylight, or house-trespass without that apprehension, falls outside Section 41. It does not fall outside Section 42, because of a definitional chain in the Sanhita itself: S1

  • Section 329(1) defines criminal trespass;
  • Section 329(2) defines house-trespass as criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in a building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling, or a building used as a place for worship or for the custody of property;
  • Section 330(2) defines house-breaking as a person who "commits house-trespass" by effecting entry or exit in one of six specified ways.

House-breaking is therefore a species of house-trespass, which is a species of criminal trespass. Naming criminal trespass in Section 42 captures all three. The analysis of that chain is the author's; the definitions are the statute's. None of those offences is analysed in this article.

The practical result is a two-tier scheme for property. Where the offence is within Section 41, the right may extend to death. Where it is theft, mischief or criminal trespass outside Section 41, the right stops at any harm short of death. In both tiers Section 37 applies, and Section 37(2) provides that the right "in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence." S1

How the provision works on facts

Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana, decided by the Supreme Court on 9 February 1999 (K. Venkataswami and Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, JJ., order by Quadri, J.), is an unusually complete illustration, because in the same case the right succeeded for one accused and was exceeded by two others. S6

The Court set out the provision's scope: S6

"Section 104, IPC will apply if the wrong-doer commits or attempts to commit any of the following offences : (1) theft, (2) mischief or trespass not of the description which is covered under Section 103, subject of course to restrictions mentioned in Section 99 IPC; and in such a case the right of private defence of property would extend only to causing harm other than death to him."

A caution on that passage. It is the Court's paraphrase, not the statutory words. The section says "theft, mischief, or criminal trespass"; the Court wrote "mischief or trespass". Nothing in the case turned on the difference, but the statutory text governs, and the paraphrase should not be quoted as though it were the provision. S4S6

On the facts, the complainant party had come onto land in the possession of the accused group to irrigate it. The Court held: S6

"Form the facts, it is clear that the action of the deceased and his sons coming to the land in possession of the accused group was to irrigate the land which, on the facts of this case, could only amount to criminal trespass within the meaning of Section 441 IPC. The right of the accused-appellants, therefore, extended only to causing of harm other than death."

(The opening word is "Form" in the text relied on; it is evidently "From".)

The Court had already held that there was "no scope to invoke Section 103 IPC as none of the aforementioned offences were committed or attempted to be committed". S6 That is the Section 41–Section 42 boundary being drawn in practice: the conduct was criminal trespass, criminal trespass is not among the descriptions in the death-extending provision, and so the lesser provision governed.

The outcomes followed from that limit.

Where the right was exceeded. Two of the accused struck the deceased with weapons they were already carrying, and he died. The Court held they "are not entitled to protection of Section 104, IPC. But for the fact that they exceeded the right of self-defence of property under Section 104 IPC, the offence committed by them would have been one under Section 302 IPC." They were held "rightly convicted under Part-1 of Section 304/34, IPC", and the Court reduced the sentence from seven years to five. S6 So exceeding the right did not destroy its effect altogether: it reduced murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Where the right succeeded. The third accused had been convicted of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon. The Court held: S6

"Since he is one of the co-owners and possessor of the land and the offence committed by him is causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon he is protected as he did so in exercise of right of private defence of property under Section 104, IPC, so he cannot be found guilty of offence under Section 326 IPC."

He was acquitted and ordered to be set free, and the appeal was "allowed in part". S6 That is the residual right operating as a complete answer to a charge: grievous hurt, short of death, against a criminal trespasser, by a person in possession.

Two features of the reasoning deserve attention. The Court relied on the accused being "one of the co-owners and possessor" of the land, which is consistent with private defence of property resting on possession. And the distinction between the two outcomes was the harm caused, not the nature of the trespass: the same trespass supported a complete defence to grievous hurt and no defence to the causing of death. That reading of the contrast is the author's observation.

The IPC provisions that judgment applied have Sanhita counterparts, each verified: IPC Section 104 is now Section 42; Section 103 is Section 41; Section 99 is Section 37; Section 97 is Section 35; Section 441 is Section 329(1); Section 304 is Section 105; Section 34 is Section 3(5), whose wording is identical; and Section 326 is now part of Section 118, sub-section (2) covering grievous hurt by the means listed in sub-section (1). None of those offence or liability provisions is analysed in this article, and the counterparts are given only so that the judgment can be located in the new scheme. S1S4

A second authority states the same character of the right. In Bhupendrasinh A. Chudasama v. State of Gujarat, decided by the Supreme Court on 4 November 1997, the Court held that where the extended right under Section 103 was unavailable (the structure there was not used as a human dwelling or for the custody of property, and no apprehension of death or grievous hurt was pleaded) "still a restricted right of private defence can be claimed by a person which is adumbrated in Section 104 of IPC". S7 "Restricted right" is an accurate description: Section 42 restricts the extent of a right it does not remove.

That judgment goes on to reproduce Section 104, and the reproduction relied on contains an obvious numerical error, reading "the restrictions mentioned in Section 199" where the section reads 99. The statutory text in this article is taken from the official sources, not from that reproduction. S4S7

Who must prove it

Section 42 is part of a General Exception, so the burden of bringing a case within the private-defence provisions lies on the accused under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which also directs the court to presume the absence of the circumstances. S5 Bhupendrasinh states the same position for the Code it was decided under: "The accused who pleads any of the exceptions ... has to prove it since law has cast the burden on him in such situation." S7 On the standard, James Martin v. State of Kerala holds that the burden "stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record", and that an accused "is not necessarily required to call evidence". S8 As recorded in the articles on Sections 34, 39, 40 and 41, those authorities speak specifically of the plea of self-defence, and whether the same standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched.

Case law under the Sanhita

No judgment construing Section 42 of the Sanhita was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase "section 42 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned a page carrying the literal string "No matching results" with zero result entries; the page was retrieved and inspected directly rather than relying on the search tool's summary output, which is ambiguous between a nil return and a failed request. S9

The statutory wording, by contrast, returns authority. The exact phrase "be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions" returned 30 documents, and the older cross-reference formula "not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section" returned 45; "section 104 of the Indian Penal Code" returned 28. S9 Of all those results only Jai Bhagwan and Bhupendrasinh were retrieved and read for this article. Two further results were retrieved, found to be statute pages rather than judgments, and discarded.

Because the operative words are identical, Jai Bhagwan and Bhupendrasinh construe the same sentence that now appears in Section 42: but both are decisions on the Indian Penal Code and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita.

Common misconceptions

"Section 42 takes away the right to defend my property." It does not. It caps it. The right "does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend ... to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death." S1

"If I cannot kill, I cannot use serious force." The section permits "any harm other than death". In Jai Bhagwan an accused who caused grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon was acquitted on the strength of this provision. S1S6

"Robbery is left out of Section 42." It is, and for a reason that favours the defender: robbery is clause (a) of Section 41 without qualification, so it never falls to the residual provision at all. S1

"House-breaking in daylight is outside both sections." No. Section 41(b) is confined to house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise, but house-breaking is a species of house-trespass, which is a species of criminal trespass under Sections 329 and 330: so Section 42 applies. S1

"Exceeding the right destroys the defence completely." Not necessarily. In Jai Bhagwan the Court said that but for the accused having exceeded the right under Section 104, "the offence committed by them would have been one under Section 302 IPC"; they were convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder instead. The provisions governing that reduction are not analysed here. S6

"Section 42 changed in the BNS." It did not. The diff returns 10 differing tokens out of 75 and 73, and every one is a cross-reference. The rule and the marginal-note title are unchanged. S4

"Sections 39 and 42 are the same provision." They have the same marginal-note title, which is why they are confused. Section 39 is the residual extent provision for the body; Section 42 is the residual extent provision for property, and they list different triggering offences. S1

"Good title to the land is what matters." Private defence of property proceeds on possession. In Jai Bhagwan the Court relied on the acquitted accused being a co-owner and possessor. S6

Reading the section in practice

  1. Identify the offence being committed or attempted against the property.
  2. Is it within Section 41? If yes, Section 42 does not apply and the right may extend to death.
  3. If not, is it theft, mischief or criminal trespass? Remember that house-trespass and house-breaking are species of criminal trespass, and that robbery is always within Section 41.
  4. If Section 42 applies, death is excluded, but any harm other than death is permitted.
  5. Apply Section 37 in every case, including the necessity cap in Section 37(2).
  6. Check possession, not title.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the text of the BNS, the IPC and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam as published in official sources, and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5 The IPC-to-BNS comparison was verified by a programmatic word-level diff.

This article does not analyse Sections 34 to 41 or 43 and 44. Section 41 is referred to only as the list Section 42 excludes, Section 37 only for the restrictions it imposes, Section 35 only for the offences against which the right is conferred, and Section 39 only for the parallel structure as to the body. Sections 329, 330 and 441 are used only for the definitions of criminal trespass, house-trespass and house-breaking, and Sections 105, 118 and 3(5) of the Sanhita are named only as counterparts of the provisions Jai Bhagwan applied. None of those offence or liability provisions is examined, and no view is expressed on how any of them operates.

The analysis of why Section 42's three-offence list is complete is the author's, drawn from the statutory definitions. So is the observation about positional versus fixed cross-references, and the observation that in Jai Bhagwan the difference between the two outcomes was the harm caused rather than the nature of the trespass. No documented legislative rationale was located for any change in this section, and none is invented.

Jai Bhagwan and Bhupendrasinh were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and later treatment of each was not researched; the official reports were not consulted. The text of Jai Bhagwan relied on reads "Form the facts" for "From the facts", and the reproduction of Section 104 inside Bhupendrasinh reads "Section 199" for "Section 99"; both defects are disclosed above and neither affects the propositions.

A further note on the condition of the source. The repository turns statutory references into hyperlinks, and the extracted text retains the spacing that introduces: it reads "Section 104 , IPC", "Section 304 / 34 , IPC" and "following offences : (1) theft". The quotations above close that spacing to normal punctuation. No word has been added, removed or changed, and the only alteration is the whitespace around punctuation marks that the repository's own markup inserted. A reviewer collating against the official reports should expect the spacing to differ for this reason.

Beyond the two judgments named, none of the 30, 45 and 28 phrase results was retrieved or read.

The facts of Jai Bhagwan are described only so far as necessary to show how the provision operated; the medical evidence recorded in that judgment is not reproduced.

Whether the preponderance-of-probabilities standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched; the authorities speak of the plea of self-defence.

Procedural questions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were not examined, and no procedural classification should be inferred from anything above.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. Which offence was being committed, who was in possession, and whether the harm caused exceeded what was necessary are findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 42 do?
It is the residual extent provision for private defence of property. Where the offence is theft, mischief or criminal trespass and is not of any of the descriptions specified in Section 41, the right 'does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.' S1
+Does Section 42 take away my right to defend my property?
No. It caps the right rather than removing it. The words are 'does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend ... to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.' In Bhupendrasinh A. Chudasama v. State of Gujarat the Supreme Court described it as a 'restricted right of private defence' that can still be claimed where the extended right under IPC Section 103 is unavailable. S1S7
+How much force does Section 42 allow?
Any harm other than death, subject to Section 37 - and Section 37(2) provides that the right 'in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence'. In Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana an accused who caused grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon to a criminal trespasser was acquitted on the strength of the corresponding IPC provision. S1S6
+Why is robbery not mentioned in Section 42?
Because there is no residue for it to catch. Section 35(b) confers the right of private defence of property against theft, robbery, mischief and criminal trespass, and robbery is clause (a) of Section 41 without any qualification. Every case of robbery is therefore already within Section 41, so the residual provision need not name it. S1
+What about house-trespass or house-breaking - are they outside Section 42?
No, they are inside it, though not named. Section 329(2) defines house-trespass as criminal trespass into a building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or a building used as a place for worship or for the custody of property; Section 330(2) defines house-breaking as a person who commits house-trespass by effecting entry or exit in one of six specified ways. House-breaking is therefore a species of house-trespass, which is a species of criminal trespass. So house-breaking in daylight, or house-trespass without the apprehension required by Section 41(d), falls within Section 42. S1
+Has the BNS changed this provision?
Not in substance. A programmatic word-level diff of IPC Section 104 against BNS Section 42 returns 75 tokens against 73 with 10 differing tokens, and every one is a cross-reference: 'enumerated in the last preceding section' became 'specified in section 41', and 'mentioned in section 99' became 'specified in section 37'. The triggering offences, the exclusion of death, the permission of any other harm and the marginal-note title are word for word identical. S4
+Why do Sections 39 and 42 have the same title?
Because they perform the same function on opposite sides of the scheme. Both are titled 'When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.' Section 39 is the residual extent provision for the body; Section 42 is the residual extent provision for property, and they list different triggering offences. The Indian Penal Code did the same with Sections 101 and 104. A reader searching by title will find two sections. S1S4
+What happens if someone exceeds the right under Section 42?
In Jai Bhagwan the Supreme Court held of two accused who caused death that they were 'not entitled to protection of Section 104, IPC. But for the fact that they exceeded the right of self-defence of property under Section 104 IPC, the offence committed by them would have been one under Section 302 IPC.' They were held rightly convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and the sentence was reduced from seven years to five. The provisions governing that reduction are not analysed in this article. S6
+Can Section 42 be a complete answer to a charge?
Yes, on appropriate facts. In Jai Bhagwan the Court held of a third accused that 'since he is one of the co-owners and possessor of the land and the offence committed by him is causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon he is protected as he did so in exercise of right of private defence of property under Section 104, IPC, so he cannot be found guilty of offence under Section 326 IPC.' He was acquitted and ordered to be set free. S6
+Does good title to the property establish the plea?
Private defence of property proceeds on possession. In Jai Bhagwan the Court relied on the acquitted accused being a co-owner and possessor of the land. S6
+Who has to prove it, and to what standard?
Section 42 is part of a General Exception, so under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 the burden lies on the accused and the Court is directed to presume the absence of the circumstances. Bhupendrasinh states the same for the Code it was decided under: the accused who pleads an exception 'has to prove it since law has cast the burden on him in such situation'. On the standard, James Martin v. State of Kerala holds that the burden 'stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record' and that an accused 'is not necessarily required to call evidence'. Those authorities speak specifically of the plea of self-defence; whether the same standard governs every General Exception in Chapter III was not researched. S5S7S8
+Are there any judgments on Section 42 of the Sanhita?
None was located. A search of a judgment-text repository for the exact phrase 'section 42 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned a page carrying the literal string 'No matching results' with zero result entries, retrieved and inspected directly. The statutory wording, by contrast, returned 30 documents for one phrase, 45 for the older cross-reference formula and 28 for 'section 104 of the Indian Penal Code'; of those only Jai Bhagwan and Bhupendrasinh were read. S9
+Can IPC judgments still be relied on for Section 42?
The operative words are identical, so Jai Bhagwan and Bhupendrasinh construe the same sentence that now appears in Section 42. Both remain decisions on the Indian Penal Code, however, and must not be described as decisions on the Sanhita. S4S6S7
+Why does this article say the Court's description of Section 104 should not be quoted as the provision?
Because in Jai Bhagwan the Court's paraphrase reads 'theft, mischief or trespass not of the description which is covered under Section 103', whereas the section says 'theft, mischief, or criminal trespass'. Nothing in the case turned on the difference, but the statutory text governs. A separate defect appears in Bhupendrasinh, whose reproduction of Section 104 reads 'Section 199' for 'Section 99'. The statutory text in this article is taken from the official sources rather than from either judgment. S4S6S7

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code (official repository of Central legislation, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 42 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E), New Delhi, dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 3 October 2026)
  4. S4The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860), official text with amendments, India Code (accessed 3 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 3 October 2026)
  6. S6Jai Bhagwan and Others v. State of Haryana — Supreme Court of India, 9 February 1999; Bench K. Venkataswami and Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, JJ.; order delivered by Quadri, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  7. S7Bhupendrasinh A. Chudasama v. State of Gujarat — Supreme Court of India, 4 November 1997 (accessed 3 October 2026)
  8. S8James Martin v. State of Kerala — Supreme Court of India, 16 December 2003; judgment delivered by Arijit Pasayat, J. (accessed 3 October 2026)
  9. S9Indian Kanoon (judgment-text repository) — search result pages for the exact phrases "section 42 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita", "be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions", "not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section" and "section 104 of the Indian Penal Code" (accessed 3 October 2026)

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