A note on this article. As with Sections 63 to 77, this article keeps to a clinical legal register, contains no invented factual scenarios, and does not recount the facts of the cases it cites.
Source check applied, following the truncation found at Section 72: the machine-readable copy of Section 78 is 1,192 characters and ends at a sentence boundary, and it carries both sub-sections, both clauses and the full proviso. No truncation. It was then confirmed against the Gazette fragment by fragment fourteen fragments, all passing. S1S2
What the section says
Section 78 carries the marginal-note title Stalking. and has two sub-sections: S1S2
78. (1) Any man who— (i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or (ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking:
Provided that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that— (i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the man accused of stalking had been entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and detection of crime by the State; or (ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any law; or (iii) in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and justified.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Four structural features worth naming, and they distinguish this section from its neighbours.
First, and this is the one most easily missed, the section uses BOTH actor-words. Sub-section (1), which defines the offence, says "Any man who". Sub-section (2), which punishes it, says "Whoever commits the offence of stalking". The two are in the same section. (Why that matters for this collection is taken up below, where it is recorded as a fact and nothing is concluded from it.)
Second, Section 78 contains a statutory defence with a REVERSE BURDEN. The proviso excludes three categories of conduct, but only "if the man who pursued it proves that" one of them applies. No other section in this group of six carries anything comparable. What the proviso requires in practice is not analysed here, and no decision construing it was located.
Third, the punishment is graded by CONVICTION but carries NO MINIMUM at either tier: "may extend to three years" on a first conviction and "may extend to five years" on a second or subsequent. That is a different arrangement from Section 77, which grades by conviction and imposes minima of one and three years. Section 78 has the lowest maxima in the sub-heading.
Fourth, the fine is mandatory at both tiers: "and shall also be liable to fine", conjunctive each time.
(The itemisation is the author's reading of the text.)
Section 78 is not in the Section 2(24)(a) or 2(24)(b) lists, so "offence" bears the Sanhita's narrow default meaning. Checked with the project's probe. S1
What changed from the Penal Code: one hyphen
A word-level comparison of Section 78 against IPC Section 354D produced one difference of substance: S1S4
| IPC Section 354D | BNS Section 78 | |
|---|---|---|
| Clause (ii) | "the internet, email or any other form…" | "the internet, e-mail or any other form…" |
A hyphen was added. The Gazette carries the hyphenated form, and a control against the unhyphenated "internet, email" correctly failed. S1S2
The comparison threw up one further token, and it is NOT a difference. The Penal Code's text closes with "fine.]": a square bracket closing the footnote-marked insertion that encloses the whole of Sections 354A to 354D. That is editorial apparatus marking the 2013 insertion, not statutory wording, and it is recorded here only so that a mechanical comparison is not misread. (The same class of artefact was recorded at Sections 58, 59 and elsewhere in this collection.) S4
And the title is identical, "Stalking." Everything else, both clauses, the whole proviso with its three exceptions and its reverse burden, both punishment tiers and both mandatory fines: is word for word as the Penal Code had it.
Classification for this collection: renumbered, substantively_unchanged.
⭐ The actor-word: this is the section where it did NOT change
At Sections 76 and 77 this collection recorded that the Sanhita replaced "Any man who" with "Whoever". Here it did not. Section 78 opens "(1) Any man who—", exactly as IPC Section 354D did. A control against "78. (1) Whoever—" in the Gazette correctly failed. S1S2S4
The pattern across the group, now complete and verified at every section:
| BNS | Opens with | Penal Code predecessor | Opened with | Actor-word changed? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 74 | "Whoever assaults…" | s. 354 | "Whoever assaults…" | no: already "Whoever" |
| 75 | "(1) A man committing…" | s. 354A | "(1) A man committing…" | no |
| 76 | "Whoever assaults…" | s. 354B | "Any man who assaults…" | YES |
| 77 | "Whoever watches…" | s. 354C | "Any man who watches…" | YES |
| 78 | "(1) Any man who…" | s. 354D | "(1) Any man who…" | no |
| 79 | "Whoever, intending…" | s. 509 | "Whoever, intending…" | no: already "Whoever" |
Sections 354A to 354D were all inserted by the same provision of the same Act: Act 13 of 2013, section 7. Within that group of four the Sanhita replaced the actor-word in the middle two and left it in the outer two. S4
And the internal point above makes this harder, not easier. Because Section 78 itself uses "Any man who" to define and "Whoever" to punish, and did so in the Penal Code too, the two formulations plainly coexisted in the 2013 drafting without anyone treating them as interchangeable or as equivalent.
What this collection does with that is: nothing beyond recording it. This article does not say the pattern was deliberate; does not say it was inadvertent; does not say what distinguishes the sections that changed from those that did not; does not state the legal effect of the change at Sections 76 and 77; and does not suggest what a court would hold. No documented explanation was located, no legislative material on the point was retrieved, and no decision construing any of it was found. The question flagged as open at Sections 76 and 77 remains open, and this section's internal use of both words is set out as material a reader or adviser may want to know about, not as an argument.
The content of this section is 2013 law
IPC Section 354D was inserted into the Penal Code by Act 13 of 2013, section 7, with effect from 3 February 2013: the same footnote examined at Sections 75, 76 and 77, and the closing square bracket discussed above is that insertion's marker. Before that date the Penal Code contained no Section 354D: no stalking offence in these terms, no monitoring-of-electronic-communication clause, and no three-exception proviso. S4
This is the fifteenth instance in this collection of a provision whose substance predates the Sanhita, and the sixth where the whole content rather than a phrase is 2013 law.
But the absence of a Section 354D before 2013 is NOT the absence of prior regulation. The Penal Code already contained Section 509: the predecessor of Section 79: which on its words reaches a person who "intrudes upon the privacy of such woman". That provision's history was not traced, and nothing is said here about what conduct it did or did not reach. S4
(The short title of Act 13 of 2013 was not verified, no amending Act was retrieved, and the pre-2013 position is stated only from the fact that the footnote records an insertion.)
A quick mapping table, and the same error as at Section 77
The secondary compilation consulted for this collection records, for IPC Section 354D → Section 78, a punishment change of "Same — Up to 3 years (1st conviction)" and a key difference of "Includes cyber stalking". S8
On the punishment it is right, and it again flags "(1st conviction)", which signals that another tier exists. It still omits the second or subsequent conviction tier of up to five years, and it does not mention that there are no minima.
On the "key difference" it repeats, almost exactly, the error recorded at Section 77:
- The word "cyber" appears in neither text. Verified against both.
- Clause (ii): "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication": was already in IPC Section 354D. Verified in both.
So the stated "key difference" is not a difference: it credits the Sanhita with a limb the Penal Code had carried since 2013. Meanwhile the one change that does exist, the hyphen in "e-mail", is not mentioned, and neither is the fact that the actor-word here was left alone while its neighbours' were changed.
This is said neutrally. It is a secondary compilation, not relied on as authority, and the comparison above was made against the official texts.
(Running record on this dataset: Section 70 understated; 71 matched; 72 supplied a point this collection had missed; 73 has no entry; 74 misattributed the timing; 75 right on provenance, flattened the structure; 76 right on the punishment, recorded no change where there was one; 77 and 78 right on the punishment, but each states a "key difference" that is not a change.)
Case law
The first search returned results at the apparent display limit of 10, and a third search also returned 10. A second search, on the statutory phrase "commits the offence of stalking" together with "Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita", returned 3 entries: below the limit, and therefore exhausted for that query. S9 Two orders were retrieved; one was set aside after checking.
A caution first: BNSS Section 78 concerns the person executing a warrant of arrest and BSA Section 78 concerns presumptions as to certified copies, so subject matter must be checked. S5S6 As it happens that caution is earned twice over in this section: see the citation slip recorded below.
Prakashan v. State of Kerala
Kerala High Court, Crl.M.C. No. 912/2024, 4 October 2024, neutral citation 2024:KER:76209, A. Badharudeen J. S7
This order is the most substantial material on this section, for three reasons.
One. A court has expressly stated the correspondence. At its paragraph 12:
"Section 78 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the pari materia provision corresponding to Section 354-D of IPC, dealing with `stalking'."
That is the first express judicial statement of an IPC-to-BNS correspondence retrieved anywhere in this collection. The order then sets both provisions out. Nothing further is taken from the statement. This article does not treat it as deciding anything about the two texts' differences, which the Court was not addressing.
Two: the Court's quotation of Section 78 opens "(1) Any man who--". That corroborates, from a judicial text, that the actor-word in this section was not changed. S7
But the Court's rendering of Section 78 departs from the official text in several respects, and they are recorded so that the quotation is not taken for the statute: it prints the unhyphenated "email" (the official Section 78 reads "e-mail"); it closes sub-section (1) with a semicolon where the official text has a colon; it prints "PROVIDED" in capitals; and it reads "on the first conviction" where the official text reads "on first conviction". Nothing is concluded from any of these. This article does not say whether the rendering was a paraphrase, a transcription feature or anything else, and does not treat it as bearing on the hyphen difference discussed above. The statutory text is as set out at the top of this article. S1S7
Three: the Court construed the first clause and applied it. At paragraph 13 it held that a man who "follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman is said to have committed offence of stalking", found on the evidence of PW1 "supported by the evidence of PW2 and PW4" that the accused "followed and attempted to contact PW1 to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear disinclination and disinterest by her", and concluded that "the ingredients to attract offence under Section 354-D of IPC is fully proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt". A contention of delay in lodging the FIR was not accepted. The Revision Petition was dismissed and the Court declined to interfere with the sentence. S7
This is the first retrieved matter in this collection in which a conviction and sentence under a provision in this group were affirmed rather than bail being granted or a proceeding quashed. (That observation is the author's.)
⚠️ A citation slip in the same paragraph, reproduced as found. The sentence reads that such a man "is said to have committed offence of stalking punishable under Section 354-D(2) of IPCor under Section 78 of BNSS." Section 78 of the BNSS deals with the person executing a warrant of arrest, not stalking. The slip is recorded exactly as found, no correction is made, and no conclusion is drawn: in particular nothing here states what the Court intended. (This is the sixth citation discrepancy recorded in this collection, after those at Sections 68, 69, 70, 72 and 75. The run-together "IPCor" is a text-extraction feature and is not treated as part of the order's wording.) S7
What is NOT taken from this order: the facts, which are not recounted; clause (ii), which it did not construe; the proviso, which it did not address; the sentence, which is not stated; and the delay-in-FIR point, which is not analysed. No view is expressed on whether the order is correct, and its weight as precedent is not stated.
An order retrieved and set aside
Abhijeet Babasaheb Patil v. The State of Maharashtra and Another (Bombay High Court, Circuit Bench, 19-aba-156-2026, 8 July 2026) appeared in the second search. On checking, the phrase "Section 78" is absent from the saved page altogether, not merely from the extracted text. The order refers to "the offence of stalking" only in recording the Additional Public Prosecutor's submission opposing anticipatory bail. It is therefore SET ASIDE and nothing is drawn from it. It is recorded here only because a search result that is examined and discarded should be visible, not silently dropped. (This is the third such instance in this collection, after orders set aside at Sections 68 and 71.) S9
What the searches establish, and what they do not
Established: Section 78 is in use; a High Court has stated expressly that it corresponds to IPC Section 354D; and the first clause has been construed and applied, with a conviction affirmed under the predecessor.
Not established: what clause (ii) requires: "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication" is unconstrued; how the proviso and its reverse burden operate; how a "second or subsequent conviction" is established; what "repeatedly" or "a clear indication of disinterest" require as a threshold; and the Penal Code case law on Section 354D, which was NOT surveyed.
No negative finding about the wider case law is asserted. Two of the three searches hit the display limit and only two results were retrieved, one of which was discarded; the rest were examined through their listings only, with nothing resting on them.
Common misconceptions
| Misconception | Why it is wrong |
|---|---|
| "The BNS rewrote the stalking offence." | A word-level comparison found one difference of substance: a hyphen. "email" became "e-mail". S1S4 |
| "The BNS changed 'Any man who' to 'Whoever' throughout this group." | It did not. Section 78 still reads "(1) Any man who", as IPC 354D did. The change was made at Sections 76 and 77 only. A control confirmed it. S1S2S4 |
| "So 'Any man who' and 'Whoever' mean the same thing." | This article does not say that either. It notes only that Section 78 itself uses both ("Any man who" to define, "Whoever" to punish) and did so in the Penal Code too. The legal effect is not stated and no decision on it was located. S1S4 |
| "The BNS added cyber stalking." | No. Clause (ii) (monitoring a woman's use of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication) was already in IPC Section 354D, and the word "cyber" appears in neither text. Verified. S1S4S8 |
| "Section 78 is a new offence created by the BNS." | No. Its content was inserted into the Penal Code as Section 354D by Act 13 of 2013, section 7, with effect from 3 February 2013. S4 |
| "So there was no law in this area before 2013." | That does not follow. Section 509 was already in the Code and on its words reaches intrusion upon a woman's privacy. Its history is not traced here. S4 |
| "The maximum is three years." | That is the first conviction tier. A second or subsequent conviction carries up to five years. S1 |
| "There is a minimum sentence." | There is not: at either tier. Section 78 says "may extend to", with no minimum. That distinguishes it from Section 77, which has minima of one and three years. S1 |
| "A fine is optional." | No. It is conjunctive at both tiers. S1 |
| "The three exceptions apply automatically." | On the words they do not. The proviso operates only "if the man who pursued it proves that" one of them applies: a reverse burden. How that works in practice is not analysed here and no decision construing the proviso was located. S1 |
| "The IPC text ends with a bracket, so the texts differ." | No. "fine.]" is the square bracket closing the footnote-marked 2013 insertion: editorial apparatus, not statutory wording. S4 |
| "A court has construed clause (ii)." | No. The one order that construed anything in this section construed clause (i) only. Clause (ii) is unconstrued. S7 |
| "'Section 78' unambiguously means the BNS." | It does not, and a High Court order in this very area illustrates it, referring to stalking as "punishable under … Section 78 of BNSS". BNSS s. 78 concerns the person executing a warrant; BSA s. 78 concerns presumptions as to certified copies. Recorded as found, with no conclusion drawn. S5S6S7 |
Temporal application
The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 78 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3
Unlike Sections 76 and 77, nothing of substance turns here on which code applies to conduct on or after 3 February 2013: both clauses, the proviso, both tiers and both mandatory fines are identical, and the single difference is a hyphen. For conduct before that date there was no Section 354D, and what applied instead is not addressed here. (That assessment is the author's analysis; no decision on it was located.)
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published on India Code and verified against the Gazette fragment by fragment; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code, including its footnote apparatus; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The inventory copy was length-checked before use; a word-level comparison was run against a line-scoped extract of IPC Section 354D whose length was printed and asserted; the titles were compared; the actor-words of all six sections from 74 to 79 were checked against their predecessors; and the presence of the word "cyber" and of clause (ii)'s electronic-communication limb was checked in both texts.
⚠️ CLAUSE (ii) IS NOT CONSTRUED. What it means to "monitor the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication" is not analysed, and no decision construing it was retrieved.
⚠️ THE PROVISO IS NOT CONSTRUED. Its three exceptions, and the reverse burden it places on the accused, are reported and not analysed; no decision on any of them was located. Nothing here should be read as indicating when any exception is available.
Clause (i) is reported as one High Court applied it, not construed independently. What "repeatedly", "a clear indication of disinterest" and "to foster personal interaction" require as thresholds is not analysed. The Penal Code case law on Section 354D was NOT surveyed.
How a "second or subsequent conviction" is established is not analysed.
The actor-word question flagged at Sections 76 and 77 is NOT answered here. This section's internal use of both "Any man who" and "Whoever" is recorded as material, not as an argument. No conclusion is drawn from the pattern across Sections 74 to 79; no documented explanation was located and no legislative material on it was retrieved. Sections 74 to 77 and 79 are named only for that comparison.
Pre-2013 law is addressed only to the extent of recording that no Section 354D existed and that Section 509 was in the Code. Its history was not traced, the short title of Act 13 of 2013 was not verified, and no amending Act was retrieved.
State amendments were not examined, and nothing here states the position in any particular State or Union Territory.
Prakashan is used for the three points identified and no others. The facts are not recounted, the sentence is not stated, the delay-in-FIR point is not analysed, no view is expressed on whether the order is correct, and its weight as precedent is not stated. The citation slip and the rendering departures are reproduced as found with no conclusion drawn. It was read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and the official reports were not consulted.
Abhijeet Babasaheb Patil was retrieved and SET ASIDE because "Section 78" is absent from the saved page. Nothing is drawn from it, and it is mentioned only so that a discarded result is visible.
Procedural matters were not researched: cognizability, bailability, the trial court and limitation were not researched for Section 78, and nothing here should be read as guidance on bail, revision or sentencing.
Labelled as the author's analysis: the identification of the four structural features; the observation that the section uses both actor-words internally; the observation that Section 78 has the lowest maxima in the sub-heading and no minima; the observation that this is the first retrieved matter in this collection in which a conviction under a provision in this group was affirmed; and the temporal paragraph. No decision stating any of these was located.
Source note. The quoted statutory text uses plain quotation marks where the official texts use
typographic ones. On the Penal Code side the extract was taken line by line from the raw source and its
length printed before any comparison was run: the standing rule in this collection after a find() on a
section heading matched the table of contents at Sections 70, 71, 76 and 77. The word-level comparison
returned two tokens; only one is a difference, the other being the closing square bracket of the 2013
insertion, which is identified above as editorial apparatus. The Prakashan text was scanned for the
word-duplication artefact seen elsewhere in this collection and showed a single harmless instance.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. In particular it does not tell a reader what clause (ii) covers, and it does not tell a reader when any of the proviso's three exceptions is available. Both are reported and not construed. Whether the conduct alleged amounts to stalking, whether any exception is made out, and what sentence follows, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.