A note on this article. As with Sections 63 to 74, this article keeps to a clinical legal register, contains no invented factual scenarios, and does not recount the facts of the cases it cites.
Source check applied, following the truncation found at Section 72: the machine-readable copy of Section 75 is 770 characters and ends at a sentence boundary, and it matches the Gazette. No truncation. S1S2
What the section says
Section 75 carries the marginal-note title Sexual harassment. and has three sub-sections: S1S2
75. (1) A man committing any of the following acts:— (i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or (ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or (iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or (iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
(2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Three structural features are worth naming, because they are easy to miss.
First, sub-section (1) creates no punishment. It declares that a man committing any of the four acts "shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment", and stops. A control confirmed that sub-section (1) contains no punishing words. The punishment lives entirely in sub-sections (2) and (3). S1
Second, the punishment is split by clause, and it is split two ways: term and kind. Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) attract rigorous imprisonment up to three years. Clause (iv) attracts imprisonment of either description up to one year. So the distinction is not merely that clause (iv) carries a shorter maximum; it is that clause (iv) does not require rigorous imprisonment at all. S1
Third, in both sub-sections the fine is an alternative, "or with fine, or with both", not conjunctive. (Contrast Section 74, where the fine is mandatory.)
(The itemisation above is the author's reading of the text.)
Section 75 is not in the Section 2(24)(a) or 2(24)(b) lists, so "offence" bears the Sanhita's narrow default meaning. Checked with the project's probe. S1
What changed from the Penal Code: a title, and a colon
A word-level comparison of Section 75 against IPC Section 354A produced exactly two differences, and one of them is the title. S1S4
The title was shortened:
| IPC Section 354A | "Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment" |
| BNS Section 75 | "Sexual harassment." |
A control confirmed the Sanhita's title contains no reference to punishment. S1S4
The second difference is a single punctuation mark. The IPC stem reads "A man committing any of the following acts**—"; Section 75 reads "A man committing any of the following acts:—**". A colon was added. Two controls confirmed the direction: the Sanhita text has no uncolonned form, and the Penal Code text has no colonned form. S1S4
That is the whole of it. Every clause, both punishments, the "rigorous"/"either description" split and the alternative fine are word for word as the Penal Code had them.
Classification for this collection: renumbered, substantively_unchanged.
The entire content of this section is 2013 law
IPC Section 354A carries a footnote marker, and the footnote reads: "Ins. by s. 7, ibid., (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)": the "ibid." referring to Act 13 of 2013, the Act named in the immediately preceding footnote. S4
So Section 354A was inserted into the Penal Code on 3 February 2013. Before that date the Penal Code contained no Section 354A at all: no four-clause definition of sexual harassment, and no two-tier punishment. The Sanhita reproduced the 2013 provision with a shortened title and an added colon.
This is the twelfth instance in this collection of a provision that looks like Sanhita reform and is not, and the fourth where the whole content, not merely a phrase, is 2013 law, after Sections 66, 67 and 68.
But the absence of a Section 354A before 2013 is NOT the absence of prior regulation, and that distinction matters. The Penal Code already contained Section 354 (assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty (the predecessor of Section 74) and Section 509 (word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman) the predecessor of Section 79). Both address related ground. What this article does NOT do is trace their histories or say how they applied: whether either was itself amended in 2013 was not examined, and nothing is said about what conduct they did or did not reach. S4
(Acts are cited exactly as the Penal Code's footnotes cite them. The short title of Act 13 of 2013 was not verified, no amending Act was retrieved, and the pre-2013 position is stated only from the fact that the footnote records an insertion.)
A quick mapping table, read carefully
The secondary compilation consulted for this collection records, for IPC Section 354A → Section 75, a punishment change of "Same — Up to 3 years" and a key difference of "Includes physical contact, demands for favors, pornography". S8
On the first point it is right, and this is the first time in this collection that this dataset has got the provenance question right. The punishment is the same. Noted, because the same dataset has been wrong in the other direction at Section 70 (understated) and Section 74 (misattributed the timing).
Two qualifications, stated neutrally. "Up to 3 years" describes sub-section (2) only and omits sub-section (3)'s one-year limb for clause (iv): the two-tier structure disappears. And the "key difference" lists clauses (i) to (iii): it describes what the section contains rather than anything that changed, and clause (iv), sexually coloured remarks, is not mentioned at all, which is the very clause with the different punishment.
It is a secondary compilation and is not relied on as authority; the provenance above was established from the Penal Code's own footnote.
(Running record on this dataset across the collection: Section 70 understated a change; Section 71 matched; Section 72 supplied a point this collection had missed; Section 73 has no entry; Section 74 misattributed the timing; Section 75 is right on provenance but flattens the structure.)
Case law
All three searches returned results at the apparent display limit of 10, so the field was not surveyed. S9 Three orders were retrieved, and they are useful on two different points.
A third "section 75": in the same charge-sheet
This collection records a numbering caution on every section. Here it is not hypothetical.
In Robin Baby v. State of Karnataka (Karnataka High Court, 19 December 2024) and Radha Kumari v. State of Karnataka (Karnataka High Court, 3 December 2024), two bail orders arising from the same Crime No. 409/2024, the offences are recorded as those punishable under "Sections 12 and 17 of POCSO Act, 2012, Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 and Section 75 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015". S7
Two different "Section 75"s in one charge-sheet. Add BNSS Section 75 and BSA Section 75, which also exist, and an unqualified "section 75" is genuinely ambiguous. S5S6
Nothing further is taken from these two orders. What Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act provides is not stated here. That Act was not retrieved. POCSO Sections 12 and 17 are not analysed, and nothing is said about whether or how Section 75 applies where the person concerned is a child: a question the words of the section ("a woman") raise and which this article does not answer. Facts are not recounted and the outcomes are not reported.
Mr Reny Wilfred v. State of Nagaland and 7 Ors
Gauhati High Court: Kohima Bench, W.P.(Crl.)/10/2025, 12 December 2025, neutral citation 2025:GAU-NL:632. S7
This order is cited for three things, and nothing else.
One. Section 75 is being charged by sub-section. The order records that a case was registered "under Sections 74/75(2)/79 of BNS, 2023 for further investigation". The charge identifies sub-section (2) specifically, the rigorous-imprisonment limb, rather than Section 75 at large. That is consistent with the section's structure, in which sub-section (1) creates no punishment. (That observation is the author's.) The order also records an inquiry report holding that "prima facie evidence indicates the existence of a cognizable offence of sexual harassment under Section 75 and 79 of the BNS, 2023".
Two: a point of law on the PoSH Act. The petitioner's case included the contention that cognizance of an offence under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 "can be taken by the Magistrate only upon a complaint, written by the victim or any authorized person and therefore, the registration of the FIR by the police is without any authority or law". The Court did not accept that this barred the criminal case. At its paragraph 26 it held:
"A case may be established against the accused petitioner under the PoSH Act, 2013, but it cannot bar a criminal proceeding against him wherein such nasty allegations of sexual harassment are brought by 10 … numbers of women employees who were working in the office of the IDAN as well as before the Chairperson, NSCW."
(The ellipsis marks a page-break marker, "Page No.# 18/20", printed inside the sentence between "10" and "numbers". Both halves were verified separately.)
Three: the outcome. At paragraph 30 the Court held it was "not at all a fit case for quashing the entire criminal proceeding as well as the charge sheet … invoking power under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 and accordingly, the present Writ Petition (Criminal) stands dismissed." S7
What is NOT taken from this order: the facts, which are not recounted; the ingredients of Section 75, which it does not construe; the scope of the PoSH Act, which is not analysed; BNSS Section 528, which is named only; and the role of the State Commission for Women, which is not examined. No view is expressed on whether the order is correct, and its weight as precedent is not stated.
An internal inconsistency in the order, reproduced as found. The order refers to the victims' statements as recorded "under Section 180 of the BNSS" in one place and "under Section 180 of the BNS, 2023" in three others. Both forms appear in the same document. It is recorded exactly as found, no correction is made, and no conclusion is drawn: in particular nothing here identifies which statute the Court intended. (This is the fifth citation discrepancy recorded in this collection, after those at Sections 68, 69, 70 and 72.)
What the searches establish, and what they do not
Established: Section 75 is in active use across several High Courts, including in workplace matters, in matters also involving POCSO and the Juvenile Justice Act, and with charges framed by sub-section.
Not established: what "unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures", "a demand or request for sexual favours", "against the will of a woman" or "sexually coloured remarks" require; whether clause (iv) has any distinct threshold; how Section 75 relates to Section 79; and whether Section 75 reaches conduct towards a child. The Penal Code case law on Section 354A was NOT surveyed.
No negative finding about the wider case law is asserted. All three searches hit the display limit and only three results were retrieved; the rest were examined through their listings only, with nothing resting on them.
Common misconceptions
| Misconception | Why it is wrong |
|---|---|
| "Section 75 is a new offence created by the BNS." | No. Its content was inserted into the Penal Code as Section 354A by Act 13 of 2013, section 7, with effect from 3 February 2013. S4 |
| "So there was no law on this before 2013." | That does not follow. The Penal Code already contained Section 354 and Section 509, addressing related ground. This article does not trace their histories or say how they applied. S4 |
| "The BNS rewrote the definition." | A word-level comparison found exactly two differences: the shortened title, and one added colon. S1S4 |
| "The title is the same." | No. "Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment" became "Sexual harassment". A control confirmed the new title says nothing about punishment. S1S4 |
| "Sub-section (1) is the offence you get punished under." | Sub-section (1) declares guilt but prescribes no punishment: a control confirmed it contains no punishing words. Punishment is in sub-sections (2) and (3). S1 |
| "All four acts carry the same punishment." | No. Clauses (i)–(iii) carry rigorous imprisonment up to three years; clause (iv) carries imprisonment of either description up to one year. S1 |
| "Clause (iv) is just a shorter sentence." | The kind of imprisonment differs too: clause (iv) does not require rigorous imprisonment. S1 |
| "A fine is mandatory." | No. In both sub-sections it is an alternative: "or with fine, or with both". (Unlike Section 74.) S1 |
| "The maximum under Section 75 is three years." | That is sub-section (2) only. Clause (iv) carries one year. Compilations that state a single figure flatten this. S1S8 |
| "'Section 75' unambiguously means the BNS." | It does not. Two retrieved orders record a charge-sheet citing both BNS Section 75 and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015; BNSS Section 75 and BSA Section 75 also exist. S5S6S7 |
| "A PoSH Act process rules out a criminal case." | In Reny Wilfred the Court held a PoSH Act case "cannot bar a criminal proceeding". The scope of the PoSH Act is not analysed here, and this is one High Court order, read from a judgment repository. S7 |
| "A court has construed what 'sexually coloured remarks' means." | No decision construing any ingredient of Section 75 was retrieved. S7S9 |
| "Section 75 covers harassment of a child." | This article does not say so. The section's words are "a woman". Two retrieved orders show it charged alongside POCSO, but neither construes it and the question is not answered here. S1S7 |
| "Does 'offence' here carry the wider Section 2(24) meaning?" | No. Section 75 is in neither the 2(24)(a) nor the 2(24)(b) list. S1 |
Temporal application
The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 75 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3
Nothing of substance turns on which code applies to conduct on or after 3 February 2013: the four clauses, both punishments and the rigorous/either-description split are identical. For conduct before that date there was no Section 354A, and what did or did not apply instead is not addressed here. (That assessment is the author's analysis; no decision on it was located.)
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published on India Code and verified against the Gazette fragment by fragment; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code, including its footnote apparatus; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The inventory copy was length-checked before use; a word-level comparison was run against IPC Section 354A on a line-scoped extract whose length was printed and asserted; the two titles were compared; and Section 2(24) membership was checked with the project's probe.
THE INGREDIENTS ARE NOT CONSTRUED. "Unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures", "a demand or request for sexual favours", "showing pornography against the will of a woman" and "sexually coloured remarks" are not analysed, and no decision construing any of them was retrieved. The Penal Code case law on Section 354A was NOT surveyed. That is the principal gap on this section.
The boundary with Section 79 (word, gesture or act intended to insult modesty of a woman) is not analysed, although one retrieved order records both being invoked together. Section 79 is named only.
Whether Section 75 reaches conduct towards a child is NOT answered, even though two retrieved orders show it charged alongside POCSO Sections 12 and 17. POCSO was not retrieved or construed.
Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is named only because a charge-sheet cited it alongside BNS Section 75. That Act was not retrieved and nothing is said about what its Section 75 provides.
The PoSH Act, 2013 is not analysed. It appears only as the subject of a contention and a holding in one retrieved order. Nothing here states who may set the criminal law in motion in a workplace matter.
Pre-2013 law is addressed only to the extent of recording that no Section 354A existed and that Sections 354 and 509 were in the Code. Their histories were not traced, nothing is said about how they applied, the short title of Act 13 of 2013 was not verified, and no amending Act was retrieved.
State amendments were not examined, and nothing here states the position in any particular State or Union Territory.
The three retrieved orders are used narrowly, for the points identified and no others. Facts are not recounted, no view is expressed on whether any of them is correct, and their weight as precedent is not stated. All were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals, and the official reports were not consulted. The internal citation inconsistency in Reny Wilfred is reproduced as found with no conclusion drawn.
Procedural matters were not researched: cognizability, bailability, the trial court and limitation were not researched for Section 75, and nothing here should be read as guidance on bail or on quashing.
Labelled as the author's analysis: the itemisation of the three structural features; the observation that charging by sub-section is consistent with sub-section (1) creating no punishment; the reading that the clause (iv) distinction goes to the kind of imprisonment and not only the term; and the temporal assessment. No decision stating any of these was located.
Source note. The quoted statutory text uses plain quotation marks where the official texts use typographic ones. In the Gazette, Section 75's marginal note runs down the right-hand column and its lines interleave with the text, so the section was verified fragment by fragment: seven fragments, all passing. On the Penal Code side the extract was taken line by line from the raw source and its length printed before any comparison was run, because a footnote block and a page number are printed inside Section 354A, between clause (i) and clause (ii); those lines are editorial apparatus and were excluded. One control in this section's verification behaved unexpectedly and changed what is written here: a test expecting Reny Wilfred not to contain the form "Section 180 of the BNSS" passed, which revealed that the order in fact uses both forms. Had the control not fired, this article would have described a uniform citation mismatch where the position is an internal inconsistency. It is recorded because the correction came from the check rather than from the draft.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. In particular it does not tell a reader what any of the four clauses means. The ingredients are not construed and the Penal Code case law on the predecessor was not surveyed. Whether any of the four acts occurred, which clause is engaged, and what punishment follows, are matters only a court can determine on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.