What the section says
Section 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Criminal conspiracy. and reads in full: S1
61. (1) When two or more persons agree with the common object to do, or cause to be done––
(a) an illegal act; or
(b) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy,––
(a) to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Sanhita for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence;
(b) other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
This is the end of Chapter IV's abetment-and-conspiracy material, and it is the only section in the chapter that consolidates two Penal Code sections into one: IPC Section 120A supplied the definition and IPC Section 120B the punishment.
Three words were added, and they matter
IPC Section 120A opened: "When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—". S4
Section 61(1) opens: "When two or more persons agree with the common object to do, or cause to be done––". S1
The words "with the common object" are new. Verified directly against the Ministry of Home Affairs Gazette, not inferred from a plain-text extraction.
That is a change to the opening words of one of the most heavily litigated definitions in Indian criminal law. Two readings are obviously available:
- the words codify what the courts already required (a meeting of minds, a shared design) adding nothing; or
- they add an element, so that an agreement without a demonstrable common object falls outside the definition.
This article does not choose between them, because nothing located permits a choice. No legislative material explaining the addition was found, and, as set out below, no court has yet discussed it. (The identification of the two readings is the author's analysis.)
What can be said with confidence is narrower and still useful: the opening words of the definition are not identical to their predecessor's, so any submission that Section 61(1) simply reproduces IPC Section 120A is wrong as a matter of text.
Two courts have quoted the new wording. Neither has discussed it.
This is the most practically important thing to know about the addition, and it cuts against reading too much into it too quickly.
Sri Dilip Kumar Sahani v. The State of Tripura
High Court of Tripura, Bail Application No. 107 of 2025, decided 11 December 2025 (Rudradeep Banerjee J.). S7
The Court set out Section 45 and then Section 61 in full, including "agree with the common object to do" — introducing it with the words "Section 61 of BNS similarly defines criminal conspiracy in the following manner", and appending after the quotation the bracketed note "[Corresponding to old provision of erstwhile Section 120A of IPC]". S7
It then applied pre-Sanhita Supreme Court authority to it:
While interpreting said provision Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra; (1980) 2 SCC 465 held that a conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible to adduce direct evidence of the same. The offence can be only proved largely from the inferences drawn from acts or illegal omission committed by the conspirators in pursuance of a common design.
and went on to cite Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1988) 3 SCC 609, to the same effect. S7
So a High Court has treated Section 61(1) as continuous with IPC Section 120A: describing it as "similarly" defining the offence and as "corresponding to" the old provision, and has applied 1980 and 1988 authority to it. The words "with the common object" appear in that judgment exactly once: inside the quotation. The Court did not remark on them.
That is not a holding that the addition makes no difference. The point was not argued, not identified and not decided. It is evidence of how the provision is being used, not of what the new words mean. (That distinction is the author's.)
Sri Anish Bansal v. The State of Karnataka
High Court of Karnataka, M. Nagaprasanna J., reserved 28 July 2026, pronounced 10 August 2026. S8
Petitions under BNSS Section 528 to quash Crime No. 211 of 2026, registered on a complaint by a co-founder, director and shareholder of a private company, for offences under BNS Sections 61(2), 316(5), 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340(2) read with 3(5). The Court set out Section 61 verbatim, again including the new words.
Outcome: "finding no warrant to interfere with the crime at the stage of FIR, the petitions stand rejected leaving open the remedies available to the petitioners at the appropriate stage before the appropriate fora" — with the express caution that "the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under Section 528 of the BNSS and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings pending at the crime stage." S8
Here too "common object" appears once, in the quotation. Again, no discussion.
Criminal conspiracy is not Victorian law
A point worth making because the Penal Code's 1860 date invites the opposite assumption.
Chapter VA of the Penal Code: Sections 120A and 120B: was inserted by amendment in 1913. The India Code text marks the inserted span with an opening bracket at the chapter heading, "³**[**CHAPTER VA", and closes it after Section 120B(2); the footnote on that page reads "Ins. by Act 8 of 1913, s. 3." S4
So criminal conspiracy as a substantive offence entered Indian criminal law in 1913, fifty-three years after the Code itself. (The Act is cited exactly as the Penal Code's footnote cites it; its short title was not verified and the amending Act was not retrieved.) What the Penal Code contained before 1913, and what conspiracy-like liability existed under the abetment provisions, is outside this article, but the absence of a pre-1913 conspiracy offence must not be confused with an absence of any prior liability for concerted wrongdoing.
What the consolidation did
| Penal Code | Sanhita | |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | s. 120A, titled Definition of criminal conspiracy | s. 61(1) |
| Punishment | s. 120B, titled Punishment of criminal conspiracy | s. 61(2) |
| Titles | two | one: Criminal conspiracy. |
Three consequences of the merger are visible on the face of the text.
The clause markers had to change. IPC Section 120A lettered its two limbs "(1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means". Since the material now sits inside sub-section (1) of a section that also has a sub-section (2), those numbers would have collided, so they became "(a)" and "(b)". The separator also changed from a comma to a semicolon: "an illegal act**;** or". S1S4
Repeated words were shed. IPC Section 120B(2) began "Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid…": repeating the opening of Section 120B(1). Section 61(2) states that opening once, in its lead-in, so clause (b) begins directly with "other than a criminal conspiracy…". S1S4 A genuine tightening.
Both section titles were lost. The Penal Code's headings told a reader which provision defined the offence and which punished it. Section 61 has one title covering both. (The characterisation of that as a loss of signposting is the author's analysis: the same observation made at Sections 55, 56 and 58 about dropped marginal notes.)
What did not change
The proviso and the Explanation are carried over, verified word for word. S1S4 So the two long-standing features of the definition survive intact:
- the overt-act requirement: for a conspiracy to do anything other than commit an offence, "some act besides the agreement" must be done by one or more parties in pursuance of it; and
- the Explanation. It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of the agreement or merely incidental to it.
The punishments are unchanged. S1S4 Section 61(2)(a) punishes conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for two years or upwards "in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence": a relative penalty that routes back through the abetment sections. Section 61(2)(b) catches every other conspiracy: up to six months, or fine, or both.
The residual clause survives, and in a third form. Section 61(2)(a) applies "where no express provision is made in this Sanhita for the punishment of such a conspiracy", exactly as IPC Section 120B(1) said "made in this Code". That completes a pattern this collection has been tracking: the Sanhita says "made by this Sanhita" at Section 49, "made under this Sanhita" at Sections 55 and 56, and "made in this Sanhita" here. S1 Three prepositions for what appears to be the same idea. No material explaining the variation was located, and nothing in this article turns on it. It is recorded because the inconsistency is real and may matter to someone construing one of those sections.
Section 61 is also the only section in Sections 57 to 61 that carries a residual clause at all; Sections 57, 58, 59 and 60 have none. Tested section by section. S1
Section 61 appears in the Section 2(24)(a) list, so the offence conspired at may be one punishable under a special or local law. S1
Classification for this collection: consolidated: two sections into one, with one substantive addition to the definition.
Independent cross-check. This website's own IPC-to-BNS comparison dataset records both IPC 120A and IPC 120B as corresponding to BNS 61. S10 It is a secondary compilation and not relied on as authority; the texts were read directly on both sides. The correspondence is in any event recorded by a court: the Tripura High Court's bracketed note quoted above. S7
Case law: abundant, for the first time in this chapter
Every section from 47 to 60 produced either a nil or a handful of results. Section 61 is different.
| Query | Result |
|---|---|
"section 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" | not nil: 10 result entries S9 |
"agree with the common object to do, or cause to be done" | not nil: 10 result entries S9 |
"Section 61(2) of the BNS" | not nil: 10 result entries S9 |
That is what one expects of a conspiracy provision, which is charged alongside a great many substantive offences. The second search is the significant one for present purposes: it matches only the Sanhita's wording, since the Penal Code lacked "with the common object", so every judgment it returns is necessarily post-commencement and quoting Section 61.
Two of those judgments were retrieved in full: Dilip Kumar Sahani and Anish Bansal, discussed above. The remainder were examined through their listings only, and nothing in this article rests on them. Given the volume, this article makes no claim to have surveyed the Section 61 case law, and the nil-type findings recorded for earlier sections are not available here: the honest position is that decisions citing Section 61 are numerous and that no decision addressing the added words was found among those examined.
Numbering collision. BNSS Section 61 concerns a person in lawful custody who escapes or is rescued, and BSA Section 61 provides that nothing in that Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record, so an abbreviated reference to "section 61" may mean a different statute. One of the long-form search results was in fact a BNSS Section 217 page. Recorded as a search hazard; neither provision is analysed. S5S6S9
Worked examples
All of the following are hypothetical illustrations written for this article, not decided cases.
1. Conspiracy to commit a grave offence. A and B agree, with a common object, to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. On the words, the agreement itself is the conspiracy. No overt act is needed, because the proviso excepts "an agreement to commit an offence". Clause (2)(a) applies and each is punished as if he had abetted that offence.
2. Conspiracy to do a lawful thing by unlawful means. A and B agree to achieve a lawful end by illegal means. That falls under clause (1)(b), but because it is not an agreement "to commit an offence", the proviso bites: some act besides the agreement must be done in pursuance of it.
3. The lesser tier. A and B conspire in a case falling outside clause (2)(a). Clause (2)(b) applies up to six months, or fine, or both.
4. Where the new words might be argued. A and B are shown to have agreed, but the prosecution cannot identify a shared object. Each had a different purpose. Under IPC Section 120A the argument would have run on "agreement" and the meeting-of-minds case law. Under Section 61(1) there is now a textual hook: "with the common object". Whether that changes the outcome is undecided, and this example identifies the argument rather than predicting its success.
5. Incidental illegality. A and B agree on an object whose illegal element is incidental rather than ultimate. The Explanation answers it: that is immaterial.
6. A pre-commencement agreement. The agreement was made in 2023. IPC Sections 120A and 120B govern, without the words "with the common object", and with the same punishments.
Common misconceptions
Each is explained above; this is a quick check, not a second explanation.
| Misconception | Why it is wrong |
|---|---|
| "Section 61(1) just reproduces IPC 120A." | It adds "with the common object". Gazette-verified. Whatever those words do, the texts are not identical. S1S4 |
| "The courts have confirmed the added words change nothing." | No court has discussed them. Two judgments quote them and neither remarks on them; one applies 1980 and 1988 authority without identifying the point. Silence is not a holding. S7S8 |
| "The added words clearly impose a new element." | Equally unestablished. No legislative material and no decision were located; this article declines to choose between the available readings. S1 |
| "Criminal conspiracy has been an offence since 1860." | Chapter VA was inserted by Act 8 of 1913, s. 3. S4 |
| "An overt act is always required." | Not for an agreement to commit an offence: the proviso excepts it. The requirement bites on other conspiracies. S1 |
| "Conspiracy carries its own fixed sentence." | Clause (2)(a) is relative: punishment "as if he had abetted such offence". Only clause (2)(b) gives a fixed maximum, of six months. S1 |
| "The BNS dropped the residual clause from this chapter." | Section 61 retains it, and is the only section among 57 to 61 that does. S1 |
| "'By', 'under' and 'in' this Sanhita are drafting noise." | They may be, but the variation is real (Section 49 "by", Sections 55 and 56 "under", Section 61 "in") and is recorded, not explained. S1 |
| "No court has applied Section 61 yet." | Many have. All three searches returned results, and two retrieved judgments apply it. S7S8S9 |
Temporal application
The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 61 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3
Here the temporal question has a particular edge. No penalty was increased, so the Article 20(1) difficulty that arises at Section 57 does not arise. But because the definition changed, an agreement made before 1 July 2024 falls to be judged on IPC Section 120A's words, without "with the common object", so if those words do impose an additional requirement, a pre-commencement conspirator cannot claim its benefit, and if they merely codify existing law the position is the same either way. (That analysis is the author's; no decision on it was located.)
What this article does not cover
The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs and on India Code; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code, including its footnote apparatus and the bracketing of the inserted Chapter VA; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The added words, the clause re-lettering, the shed repetition, the proviso, the Explanation, the punishments and the residual clause's preposition were each read directly from the Gazette. The residual clause was tested across Sections 49 and 55 to 61; Section 2(24)(a) membership across Sections 49 to 61.
The meaning of "with the common object" is not resolved, and the article says so repeatedly. No legislative material was located; no decision addressing the words was found among those examined. The two available readings are identified as the author's analysis and no preference is expressed.
This article does not survey the Section 61 case law. Unlike every earlier section in this chapter, the searches returned abundant results, 10 entries on each of three queries, and only two judgments were retrieved in full. The rest were examined through their listings only. No nil-type finding is asserted: it is entirely possible that a decision discussing the added words exists among the judgments not retrieved, and a reader should not treat this article as establishing otherwise.
The two retrieved judgments are used narrowly. Dilip Kumar Sahani is a bail decision; its observations were expressly made "only for limited purpose for deciding the merit of the bail applications", and its outcome is not stated here because the retrieved text did not make it unambiguous. It is cited for the mapping note it records, for its description of Section 61 as "similarly" defining the offence, and for its application of pre-Sanhita authority: not for any view on the new words. Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi and Kehar Singh were not retrieved or read; they are mentioned only as that Court cited them, and nothing is claimed about what they decide beyond the sentences that Court attributed to them. S7 Anish Bansal is an FIR-stage refusal to quash under BNSS Section 528, in which the Court itself cautioned that its observations "shall not bind or influence the proceedings pending at the crime stage"; the other BNS provisions charged there (316(5), 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340(2) and 3(5)) are not analysed, nor are the Apex Court judgments it relied on. S8
Sections 45 to 60 and 62 are not analysed. Sections 49, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60 are referred to only for the residual-clause and preposition comparisons stated.
The abetment route in clause (2)(a) is not worked out. Punishment "as if he had abetted such offence" sends the reader back into Sections 49 to 60, and this article does not trace how that calculation is performed in any given case.
No view is expressed on what preceded 1913. The absence of a pre-1913 conspiracy offence in the Penal Code is not a statement that concerted wrongdoing was unregulated; what the abetment provisions then covered was not researched.
Act 8 of 1913 and Act 10 of 2009 are cited exactly as the Penal Code's footnotes cite them. Their short titles were not verified and neither amending Act was retrieved.
Sentencing practice was not researched. Six months is a maximum, and clause (2)(a)'s penalty is derivative.
Procedural matters were not researched. Cognizability, bailability, the trial court, compounding, limitation and sanction requirements were not researched for Section 61, and no procedural classification should be inferred: in particular, nothing here follows from either retrieved judgment's procedural posture. S5S6
Labelled as the author's analysis: the identification of the two readings of "with the common object"; the distinction between a court's silence and a holding; the characterisation of the lost section titles as a loss of signposting and of the shed repetition as a tightening; the recording of the three-preposition variation; and the temporal observation. No decision stating any of these was located.
Source note. As throughout this collection, the quoted statutory text uses the plain apostrophe where the official texts use the typographic one. The Gazette renders the lead-ins as "done––" and "conspiracy,––" with double en-dashes. The retrieved judgment texts use typographic quotation marks rendered in places as "―" and "‖", and carry running page markers: "Page N of 20" in Dilip Kumar Sahani and bare page numbers in Anish Bansal; every quotation used above was tested and none spans such a break.
This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. In particular, the effect of the words "with the common object" is unresolved, and no party should assume either that they add a requirement or that they add nothing. Whether two or more persons agreed at all, whether they shared a common object, whether any overt act was required and done, and which tier of punishment applies, are findings that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.