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BNS Section 53 · Deep dive

BNS Section 53: When the Harm Caused Is Worse Than the Harm Intended

BNS Section 53 is the provision that makes an abettor answer for an outcome graver than the one he intended. Where the act abetted is carried out but causes a different effect, the abettor is liable for the effect caused as if he had abetted the act intending it - but only 'provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect'. The statutory illustration takes this as far as it goes: A instigates grievous hurt, B inflicts exactly that, Z dies, and if A knew the grievous hurt was likely to cause death, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder. Section 53 completes a three-way scheme: Section 50 covers a divergence of intention, Section 51 a divergence of act, and Section 53 a divergence of effect. It is the harshest of the three because the doer did precisely what was asked, and unlike Section 50 - which can reduce liability to match a lesser intention - Section 53 raises it to match a graver outcome. The knowledge proviso sits in the operative words, not merely the illustration, and requires knowledge that the effect was likely, not merely possible. The text is word-for-word identical to IPC Section 113; only two definite articles were dropped from the title.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 9 October 2026 23 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 53 — Liability of abettor for an effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by abettor
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 113 — Liability of abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted different from that intended by the abettor · substantively unchanged
Side-by-side converterIPC 113 → BNS 53

What the section says

Section 53 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Liability of abettor for an effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by abettor. and reads in full: S1S2

53. When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor of causing a particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect.

Illustration.

A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B, in consequence of the instigation, causes grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.

The illustration is the clearest statement of what this provision does, and it is severe. A asked for a beating serious enough to amount to grievous hurt. He got exactly that: B did the very act abetted. But Z died. And on the stated condition, A faces the punishment for murder.

The three-way scheme is now complete

Sections 50, 51 and 53 divide up every way the abettor's plan can go wrong, and they do it by asking what exactly diverged. S1

What divergedProvisionWhat the abettor getsThe limiting condition
The doer's intention or knowledge (same act)Section 50punishment for the offence his own intention would have producednone. He is simply measured by his own mens rea
The act itselfSection 51liability for the act doneproviso: probable consequence and caused by the abetment
The effect, the act being the one abettedSection 53liability for the effect caused"provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect"

Section 53 is the one that bites hardest, because the doer did nothing wrong by the abettor's lights: he carried out precisely the act requested. What changed is the world's response to that act. And unlike Section 50, which can reduce the abettor's liability to match his lesser intention, Section 53 operates in the opposite direction: it raises his liability to match a graver outcome than he intended.

Sections 50, 51 and 52 each have their own article in this collection and are not analysed here beyond this comparison.

The knowledge condition is in the operative words, not just the illustration

This matters, and it is a point of contrast with Section 52.

At Section 52 the abettor's state of mind appears only in the illustration. The operative sentence says nothing about it. At Section 53 the condition is written into the operative sentence itself: "provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect". S1 It is a true proviso, and it is the whole protection the section offers.

Three features of it are worth separating:

  • It requires knowledge, not intention. The section applies precisely because the abettor did not intend the effect that occurred. What must be proved is that he knew it was likely.
  • The standard is "likely", not "possible". An effect that was conceivable but not likely does not satisfy the proviso on its words.
  • The knowledge must be of the likelihood of that effect: "that effect", meaning the one actually caused, and must relate to the act abetted. It is not enough that the abettor knew the act was dangerous in a general way.

The illustration keeps the condition conspicuous by restating it: A is liable for murder only "if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death". Strip that knowledge away and the illustration gives A nothing to answer for under Section 53. (The three-part reading of the proviso above is the author's analysis; no decision construing it was located.)

Section 53 fixes no punishment of its own

Despite containing the words "punished", "death" and "liable to", Section 53 sets no term, no minimum, no maximum and no fine. S1 The words "death" and "murder" appear only inside the illustration. What the section does is borrow: the abettor is liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect". So the punishment is whatever abetting that graver result would have carried.

A structural point, and the other half of a pair

Section 2(24) gives "offence" the narrow meaning of "a thing made punishable by this Sanhita" except in the Chapters and sections listed in its sub-clauses, and sub-clause (a) widens it for a named list to include things punishable under any special or local law. S1

Section 53 is not on that list, and the reason is the same one that explains Section 51's absence. Running ss. 49 to 61 against the list one by one, every provision is listed except Sections 51 and 53, and those two are precisely the only ones in that range whose text never uses the word "offence" at all. Section 51 speaks of an "act" abetted and a "different act" done; Section 53 speaks throughout of an "act" and an "effect", and the word "offence" does not appear in it even once: verified directly against the official text. S1

So there is no "offence" in Section 53 for the widening to operate on. The section attributes liability for an effect, leaving the question of what offence that amounts to, and therefore the meaning of "offence", to the provision under which the abettor is finally punished. (The correlation is a verified fact; the explanation offered for it is the author's analysis, and no legislative material on the point was located.)

What changed from IPC Section 113

Nothing in the text. The operative sentence and the illustration are both identical. S1S4

Tested by direct string equality, the operative sentence matches word for word, and so does the illustration. As at Section 50, nothing needed to be neutralised: neither Section 113 nor Section 53 mentions its own code by name, so the comparison is exact as written. The inventory text was additionally confirmed against the MHA Gazette.

The only change is in the marginal-note title, which lost two words:

Title
IPC Section 113Liability of abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted different from that intended by the abettor
BNS Section 53Liability of abettor for an effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by abettor.

Both definite articles were dropped. This is the same kind of trimming seen at Section 49, whose title went from "if the act abetted is committed" to "if act abetted is committed". Nothing turns on it. A marginal note explains a section and does not control its operative words.

Classification for this collection: renumbered and substantively unchanged.

Independent cross-check. The IPC-to-BNS mapping used on this website's own comparison dataset records IPC 113 → BNS 53 with the punishment "Same" and "No major change", which agrees with the primary-source finding above. S10 That dataset is a secondary compilation and is not relied on as authority; it is noted only because an independent source reaching the same conclusion is worth recording.

Case law

Searches were run on Indian Kanoon, a judgment-text repository, not on official court portals.

Unusually for this part of the chapter, a search for "section 53 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" is not a nil: it returned 2 results, both retrieved and both genuine references to this provision rather than to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita section of the same number. S9 A search on the section's distinctive proviso, "provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect", returned 12 results, all examined through their listings and one retrieved in full. S9

Section 53 is being charged, but no court has yet construed it

Shahrukh Ibrahimbhai Mandaliya v. State of Gujarat (High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 13016 of 2026, order dated 14 July 2026, Hasmukh D. Suthar J.) and Nawaz @ Babut Dilavarbhai Pathan v. State of Gujarat (R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 13999 of 2026, order of the same date and judge) are companion applications for regular bail before chargesheet. Each records, in counsel's submission, that the applicant

was earlier arraigned as an accused in an offence punishable under Sections 115(2) and 117(2) read with Section 53 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, in which he has already been enlarged on bail.

S7S8 Bail was granted in both, with the usual direction that at trial the court "shall not be influenced by the observations of preliminary nature qua the evidence at this stage". S7

What this does and does not show must be stated exactly. The Section 53 reference is to an earlier, different case: it appears in counsel's narrative of the applicant's history, not as a charge in the proceedings before the Court. The present matters concerned an alleged organised crime syndicate. The Court decided nothing whatever about Section 53, and these orders are not authority on it.

What they are good for is showing the real-world charge combination. Sections 115(2) and 117(2) are voluntarily causing hurt and voluntarily causing grievous hurt: punishable with up to one year and up to seven years respectively. S1 Charging those "read with Section 53" is the statutory illustration's fact pattern in practice: an abettor who instigated one level of harm, faced with a graver one that followed. That Section 53 is being invoked at all, in live post-commencement investigations, is worth knowing.

The Penal Code position

State of Gujarat v. Anvar Kara Budha (Miyana) (High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, R/Criminal Appeal No. 1746 of 2008, judgment dated 8 October 2024, Hemant M. Prachchhak J.) was a State appeal against an acquittal, brought under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an abetment-of-suicide matter. The Court set out IPC Section 306 and then reproduced IPC Section 113 in full as part of the statutory framework, before turning to Supreme Court authority which that judgment names as Nipun Aneja and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 654 of 2017. S11

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal confirmed, the Court finding "no any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgement and order passed by the trial Court". S11 So Section 113 was reproduced as part of the framework, not applied to a finding: there is no holding on the "different effect" limb or on the knowledge proviso. Nipun Aneja was not retrieved or read and is named only as the authority that judgment relied on.

No decision construing Section 53's proviso, or the standard of knowledge it requires, was located under either code.

Worked examples

All of the following are hypothetical illustrations written for this article, not decided cases. Each turns on the proviso.

1. The statutory case. A instigates B to inflict grievous hurt on Z. B does so. Z dies. If A knew that grievous hurt of that kind was likely to cause death, Section 53 makes A liable to the punishment provided for murder, even though A intended only grievous hurt.

2. The proviso fails: knowledge absent. Same facts, but Z died because of an undiagnosed heart condition nobody knew of. A did not know the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death. Section 53 does not reach the death; A's liability rests on what he did abet.

3. The proviso fails: "possible" is not "likely". A instigates B to push Z, a healthy adult, in a scuffle. Z falls awkwardly and dies. That a push can kill is conceivable, but the question under the proviso is whether A knew death was likely from the act abetted.

4. Outside Section 53: the act changed, not the effect. A instigates B to burn a shed; B burns a house instead. The act done differs from the act abetted, so Section 51 and its probable-consequence proviso govern, not Section 53.

5. Outside Section 53: the mens rea diverged, not the effect. A tells B to frighten Z; B does exactly that, intending to extort money. The act and its effect are as asked; only B's intention differs. Section 50 governs.

6. The live charge pattern. An FIR alleges that the abettor instigated hurt and grievous hurt resulted, charging the hurt provisions "read with Section 53". Whether Section 53 can carry liability for the graver effect turns entirely on proof that the abettor knew that effect was likely, which is a matter for evidence, not for the charge sheet.

Common misconceptions

Each is explained above; this is a quick check, not a second explanation.

MisconceptionWhy it is wrong
"An abettor can never be liable for a worse outcome than he intended."Section 53 exists to do exactly that, and the statutory illustration takes it as far as the punishment for murder. S1
"Section 53 makes the abettor strictly liable for whatever happens."It applies only "provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect". That proviso is in the operative words, not merely the illustration. S1
"It is enough that the effect was foreseeable."The section requires that the abettor knew the effect was likely, not that it was possible, and not that a reasonable person might have foreseen it. S1
"Section 53 covers the case where the doer does something different."That is Section 51. Section 53 is for the case where the doer did the act abetted and a different effect followed. S1
"Section 53 has its own punishment."It fixes none. The abettor is liable as if he had abetted the act intending that effect, so the punishment comes from elsewhere. S1
"The BNS made this provision harsher."The operative sentence and the illustration are word-for-word identical to IPC Section 113. Only two definite articles were dropped from the title. S1S4
"A case citing 'Section 53 of the BNS' is a Section 53 case."Check the subject matter. BNSS Section 53 concerns medical examination of an arrested person and BSA Section 53 concerns facts admitted by the parties. S5S6

Temporal application

The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 53 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3

Abetment before that date is governed by IPC Section 113. Because the operative sentence and the illustration are identical, the ingredients and the proviso do not differ according to which code applies, but the correct provision must still be cited, and Article 20(1) of the Constitution forbids conviction for an act that was not an offence under a law in force when it was committed. Penal Code decisions on Section 113 remain directly usable and should be cited as such.

One structural point does change with the code. Section 53's liability is parasitic on "an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment", which routes back through the abetment provisions: Sections 45 and 46 under the Sanhita, Sections 107 and 108 under the Penal Code. The rule is the same; the sections it must be read with are not.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs and on India Code; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The operative sentence and the illustration were each compared with IPC Section 113 by direct string equality, and the absence of the word "offence" from Section 53 was verified directly against the official text. Section 2(24)(a) membership was checked for each of Sections 49 to 61 individually.

Sections 45 to 52 and 54 to 62 are not analysed. Sections 50, 51 and 52 are referred to only to mark the three-way scheme and each has its own article; Sections 45 and 46 only as the provisions Section 53's "liable in consequence of the abetment" routes back through. Sections 115(2) and 117(2) are cited only for their subject matter and maximum terms, because they appear in the located charge combination; their own content, including the exceptions they carry for Section 122, is not examined. Sections 101, 103 and 105 are not analysed, and nothing here addresses when a death amounts to murder rather than culpable homicide. The illustration's reference to "the punishment provided for murder" is reproduced, not explained. Sentencing practice was not researched, and because Section 53 fixes no punishment, nothing here indicates what any abettor would receive.

Procedural matters were not researched. Cognizability, bailability, the trial court, compounding and limitation were not researched for Section 53, and no procedural classification should be inferred. A numbering collision exists and is noted only as a search hazard: BNSS Section 53 concerns examination of an arrested person by a medical officer and BSA Section 53 concerns facts which the parties agree to admit. Neither is analysed. S5S6 CrPC Section 378, under which the located appeal was brought, is mentioned only as such.

No legislative material on Section 53 was located, and none is needed for the substance: the text is unchanged. No explanation for the dropped definite articles in the title was found, and none is claimed.

Judicial authority is thin, and each authority's limits are stated where it is discussed. No decision construing Section 53's proviso, or the standard of knowledge it requires, was located under either code. Shahrukh Ibrahimbhai Mandaliya and Nawaz @ Babut Dilavarbhai Pathan mention Section 53 only in counsel's narrative of an earlier, different case, not as a charge in the proceedings before the Court; the Court decided nothing about it, and bail was granted in both with an express direction that the trial court not be influenced by preliminary observations. S7S8 State of Gujarat v. Anvar Kara Budha (Miyana) reproduces IPC Section 113 as part of the statutory framework in an abetment-of-suicide acquittal appeal which was dismissed; there is no holding on the "different effect" limb or the proviso. S11 Nipun Aneja and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, relied on in that judgment, was not retrieved or read. Of the 12 results for the proviso search, all were examined through their listings and one was retrieved in full; the remainder were not read, and no proposition here rests on them. The Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 appears in those results with a correspondingly numbered provision and is mentioned only as such; it was not examined. S9 All judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals; the official reports were not consulted, and later treatment was not researched.

On the secondary cross-check. The website's own IPC-to-BNS comparison dataset agrees that IPC 113 maps to BNS 53 with no substantive change. S10 It is a secondary compilation, not authority, it was not relied on for any proposition, and it was not modified; it is recorded only because independent agreement is worth noting. The same dataset contains no entry mapping any IPC section to BNS Section 48, which independently corroborates the finding, made in this collection's Section 48 article, that Section 48 has no Penal Code counterpart. S10

Labelled as the author's analysis: the three-part reading of the proviso (knowledge not intention; "likely" not "possible"; knowledge of that effect); the observation that Section 53 raises liability where Section 50 can reduce it; the characterisation of Section 53 as the harshest of the three because the doer did exactly what was asked; and the explanation of why Sections 51 and 53 are absent from the Section 2(24)(a) list. No decision stating any of these was located.

Source note. As throughout this collection, the quoted statutory text uses the plain apostrophe where the official texts use the typographic one; nothing but the character is changed. In the Gazette, the marginal-note title for this section is printed in the left-hand column rather than the right, which is the reverse of the layout at Sections 49 to 52: a formatting detail recorded only because it affects automated comparison against the Gazette PDF. S1

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. What effect the abettor intended, what effect in fact followed, and above all whether the abettor knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect are findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 53 do?
It makes the abettor liable for an outcome worse than the one he intended. Where an act is abetted with the intention of causing a particular effect but the act causes a different effect, the abettor is liable for the effect actually caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act intending that effect - 'provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect'. S1
+How far can that go?
As far as murder, on the statutory illustration's own facts. A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z; B does exactly that; Z dies in consequence. 'Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.' A asked only for grievous hurt and got only grievous hurt - but faces the punishment for murder. S1
+How is Section 53 different from Sections 50 and 51?
By what diverged. Section 50 applies where the doer did the same act with a different intention or knowledge, and measures the abettor by his own mens rea. Section 51 applies where a different act altogether was done, and requires that it was a probable consequence of the abetment and caused by it. Section 53 applies where the doer did the act abetted but a different effect followed. Section 53 is the harshest of the three, because the doer did precisely what was asked - and unlike Section 50, which can reduce the abettor's liability to match a lesser intention, Section 53 raises it to match a graver outcome. S1
+What exactly does the knowledge proviso require?
Three things, on the article's reading. It requires knowledge, not intention - the section applies precisely because the abettor did not intend the effect that occurred. The standard is that the effect was 'likely', not merely possible. And the knowledge must be of the likelihood of that effect, meaning the one actually caused, and must relate to the act abetted; it is not enough that the abettor knew the act was dangerous in a general way. That reading is the article's analysis, and no decision construing the proviso was located. S1
+Is the knowledge requirement in the operative words or only in the illustration?
In the operative words, and this is a point of contrast with Section 52. At Section 52 the abettor's state of mind appears only in the illustration. At Section 53 the condition is written into the operative sentence itself as a true proviso - 'provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect' - and the illustration merely restates it. It is the whole protection the section offers. S1
+What is the punishment under Section 53?
Section 53 fixes none. Despite containing the words 'punished', 'death' and 'liable to', it sets no term, no minimum, no maximum and no fine, and the words 'death' and 'murder' appear only inside the illustration. The abettor is liable 'in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect', so the punishment is whatever abetting that graver result would have carried. S1
+Why is Section 53 missing from the Section 2(24)(a) list that widens 'offence'?
Because it has no 'offence' to widen. Running Sections 49 to 61 against that list one by one, every provision is listed except Sections 51 and 53 - and those two are precisely the only ones in that range whose text never uses the word 'offence' at all. Section 51 speaks of an 'act' abetted and a 'different act' done; Section 53 speaks throughout of an 'act' and an 'effect', and the word 'offence' does not appear in it even once, verified directly against the official text. Section 53 attributes liability for an effect, leaving the question of what offence that amounts to - and therefore the meaning of 'offence' - to the provision under which the abettor is finally punished. The correlation is a verified fact; the explanation is the article's analysis. S1
+What changed from IPC Section 113?
Nothing in the text. The operative sentence and the illustration are both identical, tested by direct string equality, and - as at Section 50 - nothing needed to be neutralised, because neither provision mentions its own code by name. The only change is in the marginal-note title, which dropped two definite articles: the IPC read 'caused by the act abetted different from that intended by the abettor' and the Sanhita reads 'caused by act abetted different from that intended by abettor'. The same trimming appears at Section 49. S1S4
+Has any court applied Section 53 under the Sanhita?
No court has construed it, but - unusually for this part of the chapter - it is being charged. A search for 'section 53 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' returned two results, both genuine references to this provision rather than to the BNSS section of the same number. They are companion bail applications in the Gujarat High Court decided on 14 July 2026, and each records in counsel's submission that the applicant 'was earlier arraigned as an accused in an offence punishable under Sections 115(2) and 117(2) read with Section 53 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita'. That reference is to an earlier, different case, not to a charge in the proceedings before the Court, and the Court decided nothing about Section 53. S9S7S8
+What does that charge combination tell us?
It is the statutory illustration's fact pattern in practice. Sections 115(2) and 117(2) are voluntarily causing hurt and voluntarily causing grievous hurt, punishable with up to one year and up to seven years respectively. Charging those 'read with Section 53' describes an abettor who instigated one level of harm and is faced with a graver one that followed. Whether Section 53 can carry liability for the graver effect then turns entirely on proof that the abettor knew that effect was likely. S1S7
+What is the position under the Penal Code?
Equally thin. In State of Gujarat v. Anvar Kara Budha (Miyana) (Gujarat High Court, 8 October 2024) a State appeal against an acquittal in an abetment-of-suicide matter, the Court set out IPC Section 306 and reproduced IPC Section 113 in full as part of the statutory framework before turning to Supreme Court authority. The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal confirmed, the Court finding 'no any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgement'. So Section 113 was reproduced as part of the framework, not applied to a finding: there is no holding on the 'different effect' limb or on the knowledge proviso. S11
+Is there a numbering trap with Section 53?
Yes. BNSS Section 53 concerns examination of an arrested person by a medical officer, and BSA Section 53 concerns facts which the parties agree to admit and which therefore need not be proved. An abbreviated reference to 'Section 53 of the BNS' in an order may mean one of those, so check the subject matter first - though in the two located instances the reference was genuinely to this provision. S5S6S9

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 2 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code — The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 53 (Liability of abettor for an effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by abettor) (accessed 2 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 2 October 2026)
  4. S4India Code — The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860) (accessed 2 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 2 October 2026)
  6. S6The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 2 October 2026)
  7. S7Shahrukh Ibrahimbhai Mandaliya v. State of Gujarat, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 13016 of 2026 (for regular bail before chargesheet), order dated 14 July 2026 (Hasmukh D. Suthar J.) (accessed 9 October 2026)
  8. S8Nawaz @ Babut Dilavarbhai Pathan v. State of Gujarat, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 13999 of 2026 (for regular bail before chargesheet), order dated 14 July 2026 (Hasmukh D. Suthar J.) (accessed 9 October 2026)
  9. S9Indian Kanoon phrase searches for "section 53 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" and "provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect" (search-result listings) (accessed 9 October 2026)
  10. S10ipc2bns.in IPC-to-BNS comparison dataset (project file sections.ts) — secondary compilation used only as an independent cross-check (accessed 9 October 2026)
  11. S11State of Gujarat v. Anvar Kara Budha (Miyana), High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, R/Criminal Appeal No. 1746 of 2008, judgment dated 8 October 2024 (Hemant M. Prachchhak J.) (accessed 9 October 2026)

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